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USA: the birth of a superpower. Soviet state in the postwar years

USA: the birth of a superpower. Soviet state in the postwar years

The post-war USSR has always attracted the attention of specialists and readers interested in the past of our country. The victory of the Soviet people in the most terrible war in the history of mankind became finest hour Russia of the twentieth century. But at the same time, it also became an important frontier, marking the onset of a new era - the era of post-war development.

It so happened that the first post-war years (May 1945 - March 1953) were "deprived" in Soviet historiography. In the first post-war years, a few works appeared, extolling the peaceful creative work of the Soviet people during the Fourth Five-Year Plan, but, of course, not revealing the essence of even this side of the socio-economic and political history of Soviet society. After Stalin's death in March 1953 and the ensuing wave of criticism of the "cult of personality", even this story was exhausted and soon forgotten. As for the relationship between the authorities and society, the development of the post-war socio-economic and political course, innovations and dogmas in foreign policy, these topics have not received their development in Soviet historiography. In subsequent years, the plots of the first post-war years were reflected only in the multi-volume "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", and even then fragmentarily, from the point of view of the concept of "restoring war-ravaged National economy countries".

Only in the late 80s. publicists, and then historians, turned to this complex and short period of the country's history in order to look at it in a new way, to try to understand its specifics. However, the lack of archival sources, as well as the “revealing” attitude, led to the fact that the place of one half-truth was soon taken by another.

As for the study cold war”and its consequences for Soviet society, these problems were not raised at that time either.

A breakthrough in the study of the post-war USSR was the 90s, when archival funds became available supreme bodies government, and, most importantly, many documents of the top party leadership. The discovery of materials and documents on the history of the foreign policy of the USSR led to the appearance of a series of publications on the history of the Cold War.

In 1994, G. M. Adibekov published a monograph on the history of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties (Cominform) and its role in the political development of Eastern European countries in the first post-war years.

In a collection of articles prepared by scientists from the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences “Cold War: New Approaches. New Documents” have developed such new topics for researchers as the Soviet reaction to the “Marshall Plan”, the evolution Soviet policy in the German question in the 40s, the “Iranian crisis” of 1945–1946. and others. All of them were written on the basis of the latest documentary sources found in previously closed party archives.

In the same year, a collection of articles prepared by the Institute Russian history Russian Academy of Sciences "Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945-1985): A New Reading". Along with the disclosure of particular aspects of the history of the Cold War, articles were published in it that revealed the doctrinal foundations of Soviet foreign policy in those years, clarified the international consequences of the Korean War, and traced the features of the party leadership of the foreign policy of the USSR.

At the same time, a collection of articles “The USSR and the Cold War” appeared under the reaction of V. S. Lelchuk and E. I. Pivovar, in which for the first time the consequences of the Cold War were studied not only from the point of view of the foreign policy of the USSR and the West, but also in connection with with the impact that this confrontation had on the internal processes that took place in the Soviet country: the evolution of power structures, the development of industry and agriculture, Soviet society, etc.

Of interest is the work of the author's team, united in the book "Soviet Society: Origin, Development, Historical Finale" edited by Yu. N. Afanasyev and V. S. Lelchuk. It examines various aspects of the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR in the postwar period. It can be stated that the comprehension of many issues has been carried out here at a fairly high research level. The understanding of the development of the military-industrial complex, the specifics of the ideological functioning of power, has noticeably advanced.

In 1996, VF Zima published a monograph on the origin and consequences of the famine in the USSR in 1946–1947. It also reflected various aspects of the socio-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership of the USSR in the first post-war years.

An important contribution to the study of the formation and functioning of the Soviet military-industrial complex, its place and role in the system of relations between government and society was made by N. S. Simonov, who prepared the most complete monograph on this issue to date. He shows in it the growing role of "commanders of military production" in the system of power in the USSR in the post-war period, highlights the priority areas for the growth of military production in this period.

Leading specialist in the field of a comprehensive analysis of the economic development of the USSR in the postwar years and developments public policy V.P. Popov showed himself in this area during these years, publishing a series of interesting articles, as well as a collection of documentary materials that were highly appreciated by the scientific community. The general result of his many years of work was a doctoral dissertation and a monograph on these issues.

In 1998, R. G. Pikhoi's monograph “The Soviet Union: the history of power. 1945-1991". In it, the author, using unique documents, shows the features of the evolution of power institutions in the first post-war years, argues that the system of power that developed in these years can be considered as classical Soviet (or Stalinist).

E. Yu. Zubkova has established herself as a well-known specialist in the history of the reformation of Soviet society in the first post-war decades. The fruit of her many years of work on the study of moods and everyday life of people was a doctoral dissertation and a monograph “Post-war Soviet society: politics and everyday life. 1945-1953".

Despite the publication of these works over the past decade, it should be recognized that the development of the history of the first post-war years of Soviet society is just beginning. Moreover, there is still no single conceptually homogeneous historical work that would undertake a comprehensive analysis of the accumulated historical sources across the entire spectrum of the socio-economic, socio-political, foreign policy history of Soviet society in the early post-war years.

What sources have become available to historians in recent years?

Some researchers (including the authors of this monograph) got the opportunity to work in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (the former archive of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU). The richest material is concentrated here on all aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state and its top leadership, personal funds of the leaders of the CPSU. The notes of the members of the Politburo on specific issues of economic development, foreign policy, etc., make it possible to trace around what problems of post-war development disputes flared up in the leadership, what ways of solving these or those problems were proposed by them.

Of particular value are the documents of the personal fund of I. V. Stalin, which absorbed not only his correspondence, but also all the main decisions of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers of the USSR - the key institutions of state power. The authors studied the medical history of the leader, revealing the pages of the history of power, political struggle in the highest spheres of the party and state leadership in the first post-war years, inaccessible to the researcher.

In the State Archive Russian Federation(GARF) the authors studied the documents of the highest bodies of state power - the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR, a number of ministries. Great help in the work on the monograph was provided by the documents of the “special folders” of I. V. Stalin, L. P. Beria, V. M. Molotov, N. S. Khrushchev, which contain especially important materials on domestic and foreign policy issues.

In the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the authors studied numerous cases with the protocols of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, and a number of departments (f. 17). A special place was occupied by documents from the funds of I. V. Stalin (f. 558), A. A. Zhdanov (f. 77), V. M. Molotov (f. 82), G. M. Malenkov (f. 83), containing unique documents and materials on key issues of domestic and foreign policy.

A special place was occupied by the documents of Stalin's correspondence with the top party leadership during his vacations of 1945–1951. It is these documents and working materials to them that make it possible to trace what has so far been inaccessible to researchers - the mechanisms for making key political decisions in matters of domestic and foreign policy.

The memoirs of participants in the events of those years - V. M. Molotov, A. I. Mikoyan, N. S. Khrushchev, S. I. Alliluyeva, I. S. Konev, A. G. Malenkov, S. L. Beria, P. K. Ponomarenko, N. S. Patolicheva and others.

The authors believe that methodologically unjustified is the conclusion, traditional for the literature of previous years, that the main content of the first post-war period was "the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR during the Fourth Five-Year Plan". The main thing was something else - the stabilization of the political regime, which managed during the war years not only to survive, but also to noticeably grow stronger. At the same time, the lack of legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of supreme power inevitably led to an intensification of the struggle for power between various groups and specific individuals. This is especially clearly seen in the period under study, when the aging leader increasingly sent former favorites into disgrace and put forward new ones. Therefore, when studying the mechanisms of power in 1945-1953. we proceeded from the fact that, along with the constitutional and statutory bodies, it is necessary to carefully study those that were not officially stipulated anywhere, but played a key role in making the most important decisions. These were the "fives", "sevens", "nines" within the Politburo in 1945-1952. and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1952–1953. Using specific examples and documents, the monograph shows how and why there were changes in the country's leadership in 1946-1949, which can explain the rapid rise and no less rapid fall of the "Leningrad group", what are the reasons for the unsinkability of the Malenkov-Beria tandem. On the basis of the documents studied, the authors argue that only Stalin's death stopped a new wave of change in the top leadership in the spring of 1953. The circumstances of Stalin's last illness and death raise all the more questions, about which the book also gives a fundamentally new assessment based on previously completely closed documents.

The monograph gives a detailed description of the position of the USSR in the world that has changed after the war. The authors deviate from the assessment traditional for previous publications, according to which the West was the culprit of unleashing the Cold War. At the same time, they do not share the positions of those historians who blame the years of confrontation solely on the Stalinist leadership of the country. The documents show that the origins of the Cold War lie in the fundamentally different national interests of the USSR and Western countries, which took shape as early as the final stage of the Second World War. The divergence of positions of the allies was inevitable. It could only take other forms.

The monograph notes that 1947 became the turning point in East-West relations, after which the emphasis on military force in relations between the former allies became the main policy instrument. Stalin did not rule out a new war with the West (this time with the USA), who launched in the late 40s. large-scale military preparations for the coming clash.

The development of the country's economy was also subordinated to this main vector. The overmilitarization of almost all sectors of the economy could not but lead to an increase in disproportions in its development, and in the long term - to the collapse of the Soviet economic system based on non-economic coercion.

However, the entire second half of the 40s. passed under the sign of economic discussions and disputes in scientific circles and in the country's leadership on the question of the ways and direction of economic development. The limited use of material incentives to work was not ruled out. True, it should be noted that the use of market levers throughout Soviet history has never been of a strategic nature. They began to be used in conditions when the traditional Soviet economic model did not give the proper return, but as it saturates commodity market they were fading just as fast. The first post-war period was no exception. The emphasis planned by N. A. Voznesensky on light and food, and not heavy industry, did not take place (although, as follows from the documents, Voznesensky’s opponents Malenkov and others agreed with this approach, who later adopted this strategically correct slogan ).

The monograph shows that the stabilization of power during the war raised the question of the role and purpose of the official ideology in a different way, in which there has been a certain shift in emphasis. The public sentiment associated with the expectation of changes for the better has also changed significantly.

This work, of course, does not pretend to reflect all the variety of materials and points of view currently available on the post-war USSR. Each of the subjects and directions raised in it can become the topic of a specific special historical study.

We would like to express our gratitude to the archivists S. V. Mironenko, T. G. Tomilina, K. M. Anderson, G. V. Gorskaya, V. A. Lebedev, A. P. Sidorenko, N. A. Sidorov and etc. We are very grateful for the useful and qualified advice that influenced our work on the book, well-known scientists - A. O. Chubaryan, V. S. Lelchuk, N. B. Bikkenin.

The post-war USSR has always attracted the attention of specialists and readers interested in the past of our country. The victory of the Soviet people in the most terrible war in the history of mankind became the finest hour of Russia in the 20th century. But at the same time, it also became an important frontier, marking the onset of a new era - the era of post-war development.

As for the study of the Cold War and its consequences for Soviet society, these problems were not raised at that time either.

A breakthrough in the study of the post-war USSR came in the 1990s, when archival funds of the highest state authorities became available, and, most importantly, many documents of the top party leadership. The discovery of materials and documents on the history of the foreign policy of the USSR led to the appearance of a series of publications on the history of the Cold War.

In a collection of articles prepared by scientists from the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences “Cold War: New Approaches. New Documents” have developed such new topics for researchers as the Soviet reaction to the “Marshall Plan”, the evolution of Soviet policy on the German issue in the 1940s, the “Iranian crisis” of 1945-1946. and others. All of them were written on the basis of the latest documentary sources found in previously closed party archives.

In the same year, a collection of articles prepared by the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945-1985): A New Reading" was published. Along with the disclosure of particular aspects of the history of the Cold War, articles were published in it that revealed the doctrinal foundations of Soviet foreign policy in those years, clarified the international consequences of the Korean War, and traced the features of the party leadership of the foreign policy of the USSR.

During these years, V.P. Popov showed himself to be a leading specialist in the field of a comprehensive analysis of the economic development of the USSR in the postwar years and the development of state policy in this area, publishing a series of interesting articles, as well as a collection of documentary materials that were highly appreciated by the scientific community. The general result of his many years of work was a doctoral dissertation and a monograph on these issues.

What sources have become available to historians in recent years?

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Federal Agency for Education

State educational institution

Supreme vocational education

All-Russian Correspondence Financial and Economic Institute

Department of History of Economics

Test No. 1

by discipline " National history»

Completed by a student

1 course, gr.129

Faculty of Accounting and Statistics

(special Accounting Analysis and audit)

Salnikova A.A.

Checked Chernykh R.M.

Moscow - 2008

USSR in the post-war period (40s - early 50s).

1. Introduction - the relevance of the chosen topic.

Patriotic War

Restoration of the country's economy;

Industry recovery;

Rearmament of the army;

Agriculture;

Financial system;

Organization of labor in the postwar period;

The standard of living of the people, social benefits.

3 . Conclusion.

Introduction

Consequences of the Great Patriotic War

The victory over fascism went to the USSR at a high price. A military hurricane raged over the main regions of the most developed part of the Soviet Union for several years. Most of the industrial centers in the European part of the country were hit. All the main granaries - Ukraine, the North Caucasus, a significant part of the Volga region - were also in the flames of war. So much was destroyed that restoration could take many years, or even decades.
Nearly 32,000 industrial enterprises lay in ruins. On the eve of the war, they gave the country 70% of all steel production, 60% of coal. 65,000 kilometers of railway lines were put out of action. During the war, 1,700 cities and about 70,000 villages were destroyed. More than 25 million people lost their homes. But even more serious losses were human lives. Almost every Soviet family lost someone close during the war years. According to the latest estimates, the losses during the hostilities amounted to 7.5 million people, the losses among the civilian population - 6-8 million people. To military losses should be added the death rate in the camps, which during the war continued to function at full capacity, carrying out emergency construction, logging and mining on a colossal scale generated by the requirements of wartime.

The nutrition of the prisoners then, perhaps, corresponded even less to the physical needs of a person than in peacetime. Total between 1941 and 1945. premature death overtook about 20-25 million citizens of the USSR. Of course, the greatest losses were among the male population. Reducing the number of men 1910-1925 birth was horrendous and caused permanent disproportions in the demographic structure of the country. Too many women of the same age group were left without husbands. At the same time, they were often single mothers, who at the same time continued to work in the enterprises of the economy transferred to the war footing, which was in dire need of workers.

Thus, according to the 1959 census, there were only 633 men per 1,000 women between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four. The result was a sharp drop in the birth rate in the 1940s, and the war was not the only reason.

Plans for the recovery of the country's economy.

The Soviet state began to restore the destroyed economy even during the war years, as the territories occupied by the enemy were liberated. But as a priority, restoration arose only after the victory. The country faced the choice of the path of economic development. In February - March 1946, Stalin again returned to the slogan put forward shortly before the war: the completion of the construction of socialism and the beginning of the transition to communism. Stalin assumed that in order to build the material and technical base of communism, it was enough to increase the production of cast iron to 50 million tons per year, steel to 60 million tons, oil to 60 million tons, coal to 500 million tons.

More realistic was the fourth five-year plan. The development of this plan is closely connected with the name of N. A. Voznesensky, who in those years was at the head of the State Planning Commission. During the war years, he actually led the industrial complex that produced the most important types of weapons: the people's commissariats of the aviation and tank industries, weapons and ammunition, and ferrous metallurgy. A son of his time, Voznesensky tried to introduce elements of cost accounting and material incentives into the economic system that had developed after the war, albeit while maintaining the decisive role of central planning.

Such foreign policy factors as the beginning of the Cold War, the looming nuclear threat, and the arms race had an effect. Thus, the first post-war five-year plan was not so much a five-year period for the restoration of the national economy, as the construction of new enterprises of the military-industrial complex - factories for the construction of ships of the Navy, new types of weapons.

Recovery of industry, rearmament of the army.

Immediately after the end of the war, the technical re-equipment of the army takes place, saturating it with the latest models of aviation, small arms, artillery, and tanks. Large forces required the creation of jet aircraft and missile systems for all branches of the armed forces. In a short time, tactical, then strategic, and air defense missiles were developed.

A broad program of building both large-capacity ships of the Navy and a significant submarine fleet was launched.

Huge funds were concentrated on the implementation of the atomic project, which was supervised by the all-powerful L.P. Beria. Thanks to the efforts of Soviet designers, and partly intelligence, which managed to steal important atomic secrets from the Americans, atomic weapons in the USSR were created in an unpredictably short time - in 1949. And in 1953, the Soviet Union created the world's first hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb.

Thus, in the post-war years, the Soviet Union managed to achieve considerable success in developing the economy and rearming the army. However, these achievements seemed insufficient to Stalin. He believed that it was necessary to "spur" the pace of economic and military development. In 1949, the head of the State Planning Commission, N.A. Voznesensky was accused of having drawn up in 1946 a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR for 1946-1950. contained low scores. Voznesensky was convicted and executed.

In 1949, at the direction of Stalin, without taking into account the real possibilities for the development of the country, new indicators were determined for the main branches of industry. These voluntaristic decisions created extreme tension in the economy and slowed down the improvement of the already very low standard of living of the people. (Several years later this crisis was overcome, and in 1952 the increase in industrial output exceeded 10%).

We must not forget about the forced labor of millions of people in the Gulag system (the main administration of the camps). The volume of camps completed by the system, where prisoners worked, increased several times after the war. The army of prisoners expanded with the prisoners of war of the losing countries. It was their labor that built (but was never completed) the Baikal-Amur Railway from Baikal to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the Northern Road along the shores of the Arctic Ocean from Salekhard to Norilsk, nuclear industry facilities, metallurgical enterprises, energy facilities were created, coal was mined and ore, timber, huge state farm camps produced products.

While recognizing the undoubted economic successes, it should be noted that under the most difficult conditions of the restoration of the war-torn economy, a unilateral shift in favor of the military industries, which essentially subjugated the rest of the industry, created an imbalance in the development of the economy. Military production fell heavily

burden on the country's economy, sharply limited the possibility of improving the material well-being of the people.

Agriculture.

The development of agriculture, which was in a severe crisis, proceeded at a much slower pace. It could not fully provide the population with food and raw materials for light industry. The terrible drought of 1946 hit Ukraine, Moldova, and southern Russia. People died. Dystrophy was the main cause of high mortality. But the tragedy of the post-war famine, as often happened, was carefully hushed up. After a severe drought, a high grain harvest was obtained in the next two years. This to some extent contributed to the strengthening of agricultural production in general and some of its growth.

In agriculture, the assertion of the old order, the unwillingness to undertake any reforms that would weaken the tight control of the state, had a particularly painful effect. In general, it rested not so much on the personal interest of the peasant in the results of his labor, but on non-economic coercion. Each peasant was obliged to perform a certain amount of work on the collective farm. For non-compliance with this norm, prosecution was threatened, as a result of which the collective farmer could be deprived of his liberty or, as a measure of punishment, his personal plot was taken away from him. It should be taken into account that it was this plot that was the main source of livelihood for the collective farmer, from this plot he received food for himself and his family, the sale of their surplus on the market was the only way to get Money. A collective farm member did not have the right to move freely around the country; he could not leave his place of residence without the consent of the head of the collective farm.

At the end of the 40s, a campaign was launched to enlarge the collective farms, which at first seemed a reasonable and reasonable measure, but in fact turned out to be only a stage on the path of turning the collective farms into state-owned agricultural enterprises. The situation in agriculture made it much more difficult to supply the population with food and raw materials for light industry. With an extremely limited diet of the population of the Soviet Union, the government exported grain and other agricultural products abroad, especially to the countries of central and southeastern Europe, which began to "build socialism."

After the end of World War II, the course of the history of the Soviet state was influenced by rather complex processes of internal life, and especially by events related to international factors.

Therefore, for the purpose of a more objective analysis of this period, it is advisable to begin the presentation with a description of the country's international position in the postwar years.

After the Second World War, the USSR, which made the main contribution to the defeat of fascism, turned into one of the leading world powers, without which it became impossible to resolve any serious issue of international life. The USSR during these years had diplomatic relations with more than 50 countries of the world. His international prestige steadily grew. At the same time, the situation in the world was completely different from what the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition had planned at the end of the war: two different political lines, two opposite platforms. One of these platforms was defended by the Soviet Union and the countries formed at the end of the war, called the countries of people's democracy. The second was represented by the United States of America and their allies - England, France and others. In the postwar years, the Soviet Union, although it was in great need of much, provided great assistance in economic development to their allies.

In the late 1950s, for example, under long-term agreements alone, our country provided assistance to the countries of the socialist community in the construction of more than 620 large industrial facilities and 190 individual workshops and installations. The largest deliveries of equipment were made to the People's Republic of China (PRC), Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. In China, 291 enterprises were built with the participation of the USSR, in Poland - 68, in Romania - 60, in Bulgaria - 45, in North Korea - 30, etc. escalate relations between the two political blocs.

The development of contradictions between these blocs led to the fact that world history at the end of 1946 made another zigzag, returning to the track of military-political confrontation. The idea and practice of universal peace, not having time to establish itself, began to be actively destroyed by opposing forces.

The United States, which took the lead as a result of the change in the "balance of power" in the capitalist world, assumed the role of the dominant power in the capitalist world after the war.

The increased economic and military capabilities of the United States as a result of the war instilled in the American ruling circles the confidence that both Western and Central and Southeastern Europe represented the “power vacuum” by filling which the United States would be able to secure a dominant position in the post-war system of international relations. and to carry out a policy of pressure against the USSR.

Since then, the so-called cold war between the USSR and the USA and their allies.

The question of the origin and beginning of the cold war between the former allies, and especially the question of who or which side is to blame for its unleashing, is an extremely important topic. To this day, there are no unambiguous answers to these questions. In the extensive literature published in the post-war years and more recently, we see various interpretations and assessments of who first started the Cold War and what were its consequences. Some authors, among them domestic historians, believe that the roots of the Cold War must be sought in the pre-war policy of the former allies, as well as in the events at the end of World War II. Without going into the details of this process, we will try to briefly express our point of view, taking into account the aspect of presentation that we have identified in this chapter. To be extremely objective, it should be noted that the Cold War did not break out suddenly and not from scratch. She, apparently, was born in the crucible of the Second World War. The term "cold war" was put into circulation in 1947. The concept of the cold war included a state of political, economic, ideological and other aspects of a pronounced confrontation between states, between countries, between two systems. The Cold War gained wide scope after W. Churchill's speech on March 5, 1946, in Fulton, Missouri (USA), at Westminster College. It is necessary to take into account the importance of this speech for understanding the causes of the Cold War, as well as the answer to it by I. V. Stalin, published in the Pravda newspaper in mid-March 1946.

Churchill's Fulton speech is considered one of the key moments in the beginning of the Cold War. This speech was coordinated in detail with the White House, primarily with the US President of those years, H. Truman. Moreover, Truman, along with Churchill, arrived in Fulton on the presidential train. Truman's reaction to Churchill's speech was personally described by the latter in a message to British Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin. As Churchill reported, "he (i.e., Truman) told me that the speech, in his opinion, was delightful and would bring nothing but good, although it would make a noise." She really made a lot of noise on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, the reaction in the United States itself, in England and in other European countries turned out to be contradictory, revealed the unwillingness at that time to immediately go so far in the Anglo-American opposition to the USSR. At the same time, the Fulton speech was a serious alarm signal for Stalin, a challenge from the former allies, which could not be left unanswered. In his reply to Pravda on March 14, 1946, Stalin spoke rather sharply about Churchill's speech and its possible consequences.

Churchill's speech revived the image of an old enemy, forgotten during the years of the war, and the abstract threat of a new war took on a very real face, calling for vigilance and combat readiness. However, it was impossible to go too far. Therefore, in his answer, Stalin carefully doses the ratio of anxiety and confidence, speaks of vigilance and at the same time of restraint. Here is how he himself formulated the essence of his appeal to the country in a May (1946) conversation with the Polish leaders: “Churchill's speech is blackmail. Its purpose was to intimidate us. That is why we responded so rudely to Churchill's speech ... We should not have allowed Churchill to intimidate our people.

Speaking about the beginning of the Cold War and its consequences, I would like to cite quite interesting observations and generalizations by well-known domestic historians L. A. Bezymensky and V. M. Falin, who tried to give an objective assessment of these processes. Yeshe in the late 1980s. they wrote in the article “Who Started the Cold War”: “Today we have the opportunity to restore by the day and even by the hour the chronology of the selection by the Truman government of the seeds of the “cold war”, which gave a lot of poisonous shoots. Let's turn to authentic American documents - to the diaries of President G. Truman, J. Kennan's "long telegram" from Moscow to Washington, the developments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and its divisions - the Joint Intelligence Committee (JRC), the Joint Military Planning Committee (OKVP ), as well as the National Security Council (NSC) established in 1947.

October 9, 1945 OKNSh (document 1545) sounds the alarm. The Soviet Union is credited with "the ability to capture the whole of Europe now or by January 1, 1948", throwing "40 divisions" at it. Together with Europe, it costs nothing for Moscow to include Turkey and Iran “in its sphere of influence”. Obedient performers endow the USSR with the potential to reach the Pyrenees with one throw and cross them, and in Asia to capture China.

At the same time, the compilers of the memorandum single out the "weaknesses" of the USSR, emphasizing the protracted time to overcome them:

“a) Military losses in manpower and industry, rollback from developed industry (15 years).

b) Lack of technical forces (5-10 years).
c) Lack of strategic air forces (5-10 years).
d) Lack of a navy (15-20 years).
e) Poor condition of railways, military transport - systems and equipment (10 years).
f) Vulnerability of oil sources, vital industrial centers for long-range bombers.
g) The absence of an atomic bomb (5-10 years, possibly earlier).
h) Resistance in the occupied countries (within 5 years), etc.”

The first document in an extensive series of developments directly aimed against the USSR was a memorandum (of the United States Intelligence Agency) on September 3, 1945, that is, from the day following the day of the official end of World War II.

Many other facts of a similar content could be cited, however, the cited ones are enough to make sure who is the main culprit in the beginning of the unleashing of the Cold War. It marked the beginning of an arms race unprecedented in world history in terms of scale and the creation of two military-political blocs. One more important circumstance of that period should be borne in mind. The American nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 meant the emergence of a superpower in the world that had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This monopoly was liquidated in 1949 by the Soviet Union, which by that time had managed to create its own atomic bomb, and in 1954 - a hydrogen bomb. However, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, The United States possessed an arsenal of nuclear weapons, which long time surpassed the nuclear arsenal of the USSR.

The "doctrine of massive retaliation" developed by the United States in 1954 was supposed to provide not only "containment", but also "rejection of communism." The possibility of using nuclear weapons against the USSR was allowed. And even in 1974, the US military-strategic doctrine allowed "separate nuclear operations" in the event of an escalation of the conflict in any region of the world. However, in 1982, NATO members declared that nuclear weapons would only be used in response to an attack.

During the Cold War, the Soviet military-strategic doctrine was based on the idea that its defensive structure, including strategic weapons, should be built taking into account the impressive military potential of the United States and NATO. For the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union, the essence of defensive sufficiency was determined by the need to maintain these forces at such a quantitative and qualitative level as to have reliable means of delivering a retaliatory strike in any conditions, even in the most unfavorable, in the event of a nuclear attack.

Under the conditions of the Cold War and the economic blockade by the United States and Western countries in 1949, the Economic Conference of representatives of the countries of people's democracy (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia) decided to create a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In 1950, the German Democratic Republic joined the CMEA, in 1962 - the Mongolian People's Republic, in 1972 - Cuba, in 1978 - the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. For settlements between the socialist countries, and then with the capitalist states, a clearing system of non-cash payments for goods and services was used, based on the offset of mutual claims. In connection with the post-war strengthening of the ruble, as well as increasing inflation in Western countries, the determination of the ruble exchange rate on the basis of the dollar was discontinued, and from March 1, 1950, the gold content of the ruble was established.

In the conditions of the Cold War, the competition of two superpowers, two economic strategies began: the United States - with an economic strategy of exporting capital to all countries and the Soviet Union - with an economic strategy of centralized distribution of investments for the development of leading industries.

During the Cold War, the rules of the game in the international arena were simplified to the extreme. The over-ideologization of interstate relations gave rise to a black-and-white vision of the world, which was clearly divided into “us” and “them”, “friends” and “enemies”. Every “win” for the US was automatically considered a “loss” for the USSR, and vice versa. From the point of view of the main participants in the confrontation, the quintessence of foreign policy wisdom was expressed by the old slogan: "He who is not with us is against us." In accordance with this logic, each country had to clearly define its place on one side or the other in this global confrontation.

As you know, after the end of World War II, the political map of the world changed dramatically. The defeat of the fascist regimes, the military defeat of Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan significantly reduced the forces of international reaction. England, France and some other countries emerged from the war noticeably weakened. In Europe, Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fell away one after another from the capitalist system. In Asia, the peoples of China succeeded in doing this, North Korea and North Vietnam. The population of these 11 states was more than 700 million people.

The victory of the revolution in a number of countries in Europe and Asia led to the emergence on the globe of a very significant group of states with the same type of economic basis - public ownership of the means of production, the same state system, a single ideology - Marxism-Leninism.

The expansion after the Second World War of the community of countries that embarked on the socialist path of development did not lead to a weakening of the ideology. Most of these countries were also drawn into the orbit of confrontational confrontation.

The confrontation between the two systems eventually led to erection of the Iron Curtain, a policy of almost complete rupture of foreign trade, scientific, technical, cultural, social and personal ties between them.

As a result of the process of political disengagement, many of the agreements adopted at the end of the war and the institutions established to maintain peace and cooperation ceased to operate. Work in the UN on the fundamental issues of disarmament and peace was paralyzed.

In 1949, the Western powers, led by the United States, created the military-political organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO). Then successively in 1954 and 1955. two more blocks

(SEATO and CENTO). The United States, Great Britain and France have involved 25 more states of Europe, the Middle East and Asia into these military groupings.

In turn, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Albania in May 1955 in Warsaw signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO) was created.

In the West, the emergence of NATO was explained by the "Soviet threat", diligently emphasizing the defensive and peacekeeping role of this organization. And in the Soviet Union, not without reason, they believed that it was the formation of the NATO bloc that posed a threat to its security and that the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 was only a means of neutralizing this threat.

One of the most important problems in international relations as a result of the Second World War, was the "German question". At the Potsdam Conference (July 17 - August 2, 1945), the heads of the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain adopted decisions on the demilitarization of Germany, which provided that, as the conditions for unconditional surrender and the decisions of the conference were fulfilled, the German people should themselves determine the paths of their socio-economic and state structure. For the implementation of the stated goals in Germany, a temporary regime of quadripartite occupation was established.

However, the United States and other Western powers headed for the division of Germany. As a result, in 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formed. After that, in October 1949, another German state was formed in the eastern part of Germany - the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Shortly after the death of I. V. Stalin (March 3, 1953), a period of "thaw" began for some time in international relations. In 1955, all foreign troops were withdrawn from Austria, and a peace treaty was concluded with it. In the same year, for the first time in the last 10 years, a summit meeting was held between the United States and the USSR. And yet this was only the beginning of a détente, which was to gain momentum and irreversibility afterwards.

After the XX Congress of the CPSU (1956), the dismantling of the "Iron Curtain" began, the most acute manifestations of the Cold War were overcome, economic, political and cultural ties between the USSR and the capitalist countries began to be established.

Nevertheless, conflict situations between the two blocs continued.

The new Soviet leadership, which came to power after Stalin's death, strove for a turnaround, for a "thaw" in international relations.

In January 1954, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR was held in Berlin. The range of issues under consideration was wide: Indo-China, Korea, German problems, collective security in Europe. Since Western representatives advertised the defensive nature of NATO, the Soviet government put forward a proposal for the possible entry of the Soviet Union into NATO. At the same time, the USSR proposed to conclude a collective security treaty in Europe with the participation of the United States. However, all Soviet proposals were rejected by the West.

In July 1955 (10 years after Potsdam), the heads of the great powers - the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France - met again in Geneva. The focus of the meeting was on the interconnected German question and the question of European security. But here, too, the Western powers blocked Soviet proposals for concluding a collective security treaty in Europe, continuing to insist on joining the GDR to the FRG and including a united Germany in NATO.

In 1955, the Soviet government decided to return to their homeland all German prisoners of war who were in the USSR. In September 1955, German Chancellor K. Adenauer arrived in Moscow. As a result, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the FRG. West Berlin remained a hotbed of tension in Europe, so in 1958 the USSR proposed declaring it a free city. But this proposal was rejected by the West, as was the Soviet opinion about the need to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.

In July 1961, the first meeting between N. S. Khrushchev and the new US President D. Kennedy took place in Vienna. It was decided to establish a direct telephone connection between the Kremlin and the White House. In Berlin, the situation worsened again. And then, on August 12, 1961, overnight, a concrete wall was erected around West Berlin and checkpoints were set up at the border. This caused even greater tension both in Berlin itself and in the international situation as a whole.

The primary task of the Soviet Union in the foreign policy sphere was the struggle for peace and disarmament. In an effort to reverse the dangerous course of events, the USSR for the period 1956-1960. unilaterally reduced the strength of its Armed Forces by

4 million people. In March 1958, the Soviet Union also unilaterally stopped testing all types of nuclear weapons, thus expressing the hope that other countries would follow its example. However, this display of goodwill did not resonate with the United States and its NATO allies at the time.

In the autumn of 1959, the first ever visit of the head of the Soviet government N. S. Khrushchev to the United States took place. It was agreed with US President D. Eisenhower that the heads of government of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France would meet in May 1960 in Paris. However, this important meeting did not take place. A few days before it, a Soviet anti-aircraft missile shot down at an altitude of over 20 km a U-2 manned spy plane that was crossing our entire country from south to north along the Ural meridian. The pilot of this plane, Powers, jumped out with a parachute and was detained at the landing site. Such an unfriendly act on the eve of the summit meeting was regarded by the Soviet side as an attempt to disrupt the meeting, and the USSR refused to participate in it.

Thus, the post-war order, created “according to the blueprints” of Yalta and Potsdam, was not a European peace order, but a mode of mutual balancing based on nuclear weapons superpowers, the delimitation of the spheres of interests of the USSR and the USA, the confrontation between the two military-political allied structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Western Europe served as an instrument of the American strategy of "containment" of the USSR, while the Eastern European countries played the role of the "strategic foreground" of the USSR. Therefore, at different stages of post-war history, the results of social transformations did not always coincide with the original plans and ideas. In 1945-1947, when the new order in the people's democracies was just being established, development was carried out in line with the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam, and its course was relatively independent.

At the first stage of development of these countries, to some extent, they took into account such factors as national specificity, traditions (preservation of elements of private property, multi-party system). However, later such features were practically reduced to nothing and their presence was more and more formal. For many countries, the chosen development model turned out to be ineffective both politically and economically, which led to a discrepancy between the proclaimed lofty goals of socialism and very modest achievements.

From all the richness of the practice of socialist construction in the USSR, the Eastern European countries ultimately turned not to the New Economic Policy, but to the theory and politics of the 1930s. - the period of the cult of personality. Therefore, serious mistakes were made in these countries too, connected with the spurring of industrialization and collectivization; the imposition of a rigid centralized directive economic mechanism; the ever-widening spread of administrative-command methods of managing the economy and society as a whole. Authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes everywhere have become an obstacle to the economic and technical progress of their countries, a brake on integration processes within the CMEA.

The autumn of 1956 was difficult in the international aspect. The exposure of the personality cult of I. V. Stalin at the 20th Party Congress gave rise to crises in the pro-Stalinist leadership of a number of Eastern European countries; caused mass popular movements in Poland and Hungary, where the situation escalated to the extreme.

In the 1960s-1970s. the international situation fluctuated first one way, then the other. At times, this situation led to clashes and even to hostilities.

The international situation of those years was generally characterized by instability and the growth of a whole group of contradictions, which created serious tension.

In the 1970s still kept the reality of a nuclear catastrophe. The build-up of nuclear missile weapons on both sides was becoming uncontrollable.

The Western ruling circles, together with the military-industrial complex, set out to rapidly build up their military power, seeking to create a potential for "containment" of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet leadership took retaliatory measures to increase its military-strategic potential. Using a powerful economic base, advanced achievements of science and technology, the USSR and its allies achieved approximate parity between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO by the beginning of the 1970s. However, the threat of war not only did not recede, but because of the excessive glut of weapons became more obvious.

The world community began to realize that a global nuclear war is fraught with catastrophic, unpredictable consequences, which means that the policy of confrontation becomes an unacceptable risk in the nuclear age.

In such a situation, the leadership of the USSR and the USA took a step towards certain agreements in order to reduce the danger of a nuclear war and to some extent improve the international situation. The Soviet Union and the United States signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War (1971), which supplemented the previously reached agreement on the establishment of a direct line of communication between Moscow and Washington, London and Paris, which, in combination, was supposed to reduce the risk of an accidental (unauthorized) outbreak of nuclear war.

Despite the measures taken, international tensions persisted.

The Soviet leadership, without radically changing its foreign policy course, sought to achieve a turn from the Cold War, from tension in the international situation to detente and cooperation.

During these years, the Soviet Union submitted over 150 different proposals aimed at ensuring international security, ending the arms race and disarmament. They created the appropriate political atmosphere. However, many of them could not be performed then. The arms buildup continued unabated despite the nuclear test cessation treaty and closer contacts between the superpowers after the Cuban crisis. The USSR hoped to reduce the US's large advantage in strategic missiles. Between 1960 and 1980, the spending on armaments of the two blocs increased by almost five times, although there were already more than enough weapons for the complete and repeated destruction of mankind. At the same time, arms exports to third world countries have tripled. By 1970, the destructive power wielded by the superpowers was about 1 million times greater than the two bombs dropped on Japan. For every person on Earth, there were 15 tons of explosives. Studies have also shown that in the event of a nuclear war, the sun's rays would not be able to break through dark clouds and radioactive dust, and thus the "nuclear night" would destroy all life on earth. The only hope was that the superpowers would understand that there would be no winners in a nuclear war and that it would be collective suicide. This way of thinking has come to be known as "mutual destruction" or "balance of terror."

With the advent of intercontinental missiles in our country, the relative strategic invulnerability of the United States has irrevocably become a thing of the past. As the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Yu. Kvitsinsky noted, already in early 1960, the Minister of Defense in the Eisenhower government Gates, speaking before a congressional commission, was forced to admit that the United States did not have protection against our intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads, and the commander of the strategic US Air Force, General Power stated that the USSR "could actually wipe out our entire strike force from the face of the Earth within 30 minutes." Thus, the plans of the United States to turn the territory of the USSR into a "lunar landscape" with impunity became pointless.

Seeing that the Soviet Union began to commission dozens and hundreds of new launchers for its strategic missiles, the Americans were forced to offer the USSR negotiations on a comprehensive limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic weapons delivery systems and defense systems against ballistic missiles. Such negotiations began in November 1969 in Helsinki, and the treaty signed as a result became the SALT-1 treaty. The USSR very quickly created its own warheads. In 1979, a new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT-2) was signed in Vienna, based on the principles of equality and equal security, which paved the way for significant reductions in strategic arms.

Despite the military-political confrontation between the two systems, the intensification of detente and adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence are gradually becoming a trend against thermonuclear war. In practice, its result is the signing between the USSR and the USA of an indefinite Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973).

Soviet-American relations began to change, which gave rise to an improvement in the international climate. Great efforts had to be made to convene a pan-European Conference on Security. The leaders of 33 states of Europe, the USA and Canada signed the Final Act of the Conference in Helsinki (August 1975). Its signing 30 years after the end of the Second World War fixed the principles of the inviolability of borders in Europe; respect for the independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity of states; renunciation of the use of force and the threat of its use; non-interference in each other's internal affairs, which became the international legal basis for overcoming the Cold War.

Somewhat earlier (1971), the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France concluded a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, recognizing it as an independent city. The borders of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia were recognized as inviolable.

In 1973, an agreement was signed to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam. Together, we managed to eliminate the most dangerous hotbed of international tension in Southeast Asia.

The emerging certain gap in international detente and changes in the political map of the world affected the fact that the ruling circles in the West called for a “freeze” in relations with the Soviet Union and for a “harder course” towards it in order to once again contain the onset of “communism” . Influential forces in the West began to focus on continuing the arms race in the hope of wearing down the USSR and other socialist countries and regaining their lost military superiority.

In general, the first half of the 1970s showed the possibility of softening the international situation, strengthening relations of peaceful coexistence between states with different political systems, including the development of cooperation between them. At the same time, it also revealed that in the event of a violation of the status quo, especially in the political sphere, relations between the USSR and the USA immediately become aggravated. Therefore, the consequence of this is another round of the arms race.

The confrontation sharply intensified in connection with the entry of a contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979. The political leadership dragged the Soviet Union into an extremely difficult conflict situation, which entailed heavy casualties on both sides. Most of the countries that are members of the UN, not only did not support this action, but also demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The further course of events led to the aggravation of the international situation. In response to the deployment of American missiles in Europe, the Soviet leadership decided to deploy medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Has begun new stage arms race, in which Europe was in the role of a hostage.

The Soviet leadership once again began to put forward peace proposals. They were supposed to implement confidence-building measures in Europe and Asia, settle the conflict over Afghanistan, limit and reduce strategic weapons, and, as a first step, introduce a mutual moratorium on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

However, the proposals put forward by the Soviet leadership were not successful.

In 1983, the US began deploying its missiles in Western Europe. The Soviet Union took similar actions that required additional material costs. The increase in spending on armaments in the socialist countries met with a far from unambiguous response.

Confrontational relations developed during these years with China as well. In February 1979, China carried out military operations against Vietnam. The Soviet Union declared that it would fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The general situation in the world, the situation in the countries of socialist orientation left their mark on their relations.

Some socialist countries tried to get out of the situation on their own, focusing on the Western states. The situation escalated. Attempts were made to intensify cooperation between the socialist countries, primarily in the economic, scientific and technical fields. A qualitatively new task was outlined: to turn the current decade into a period of intensive industrial, scientific and technical cooperation.

Proceeding from this, in 1985 the Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technological Progress of the CMEA Member Countries until 2000 was adopted. The decision of this program, in the opinion of its authors, should help strengthen the positions of socialism in the world community. But, as practice has shown, about 1/3 of the program did not meet the requirements of the world level of development of science and technology. The program in its initial execution was not the one that could carry out scientific and technological progress.

Exactly 100 years ago, on November 7, 1917, the Great October Socialist Revolution took place.

For the first time in world history, a working man threw off the shackles of oppression and exploitation that had weighed on him for millennia, his interests and needs were placed at the center of state policy. The Soviet Union has achieved truly world-historic successes. Under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet people built socialism, defeated fascism in the Great Patriotic War, and turned our Motherland into a powerful state.

Pre-revolutionary Russia was economically backward and dependent on advanced capitalist states. The national wealth of the country (per inhabitant) was 6.2 times less than the USA, 4.5 times less than England, 4.3 times less than France, and 3.5 times less than Germany. The gap in the economic development of Russia and the advanced states increased. Its industrial production in relation to the USA in 1870 was approximately 1/6, and in 1913 - only 1/8.

Being the greatest power in terms of territory and natural resources, the country ranked only fifth in the world and fourth in Europe in terms of industrial production.

In the agrarian sector, Russia was an ocean of small peasant farms (20 million) with primitive technology and manual labor.

“Russia was ruled after the revolution of 1905 by 130,000 landowners, they ruled through endless violence against 150 million people, through boundless mockery of them, forcing the vast majority to hard labor and a half-starved existence” (V.I. Lenin).

In pre-revolutionary Russia there were higher educational institutions in total - 91, theaters - 177, museums - 213, and churches - 77,767.

“Such a wild country in which the masses of the people would be so robbed in terms of education, light and knowledge - there is not one such country in Europe, except for Russia” (V.I. Lenin).

The First World War put the country on the brink of disaster. Industry fell by 1/3, the grain harvest was reduced by 2 times. Only the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and landlords and its transfer into the hands of the working people could save the country from destruction.

The victory of October opened up grandiose creative prospects for the young Soviet state. The people took over the main means of production. The land was nationalized (peasants received more than 150 million hectares of land free of charge), plants, factories, all the bowels of the country, banks, sea and river transport, and foreign trade.

The Russian economy, undermined by the imperialist war, was severely ruined by the civil war and foreign intervention unleashed by the overthrown classes of landlords and capitalists.

By the end civil war large-scale industry produced almost 7 times less products than in 1913. In terms of coal, oil and iron production, the country was thrown back to late XIX in. Compared with 1917, the size of the working class has more than halved.

The Soviet country, which fought for 7 years, suffered enormous destruction, in a short time by 1926 managed to restore the pre-war level of the national economy.

Entering a period of peaceful development, the Land of Soviets began to implement the tasks of building socialism.

IN AND. Lenin said on the eve of October:

"Either death, or catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries."

I.V. Stalin said that Russia was constantly beaten for its backwardness - industrial, agricultural, cultural, military and state. Such is the wolfish law of the exploiters - to beat the backward and weak, to rob and enslave them.

The construction of socialism began at an extremely difficult time for the young Soviet Republic conditions.

“We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we will do it, or they will crush us ”(I.V. Stalin).

It was necessary to overcome this backlog in the shortest possible time, relying only on own forces and resources.

Industrialization became a vital task of the country. A course was set for the accelerated pace of development of heavy industry.

During the years of the Stalin five-year plans, the following number of large industrial enterprises were built and reconstructed on a new technical basis: in the first five-year plan (1929 - 1932) - 1,500, in the second five-year plan (1933 - 1937) - 4,500, in three and a half years of the third five-year plans (1938 - the first half of 1941) - 3,000.

These were five-year plans for the construction of factories, representing a new technical basis for the reconstruction of the entire national economy. These were the five-year plans for the creation of new enterprises in agriculture - collective farms and state farms, which became the lever for the organization of all agriculture.

In the period after the victory of October and before the start of the Great Patriotic War, 11,200 large industrial enterprises were built and restored. Mechanical engineering and metalworking, the chemical and petrochemical industry, and the electric power industry, which play a key role in the industrialization of the country and strengthening its defense potential, developed at especially high rates.

History has never seen such a pace of development. Socialism has liberated dormant productive forces and given them a powerful forward vector of development.

The development of the national economy of the USSR in 1940 compared with 1913 is characterized by the following data: the national income increased by 5.3 times, the volume of industrial output - by 7.7 times, including in machine building - 30 times, in the electric power industry - 24 times, in the chemical industry - 169 times, in agricultural production - 14 times.

The growth rates of the industry of the USSR significantly outstripped those of the leading capitalist states. If industrial production in the USSR for the period from 1921 to 1939. increased by 24.6 times, then in the USA - 1.9 times, Great Britain - 1.7 times, France - 2.0 times, Germany - 2.2 times.

The growth rate of heavy industry during the years of Stalin's five-year plans ranged from 20 to 30 percent per year. In the 12 years from 1929 to 1940, the output of heavy industry increased 10 times. No country in the world has known such a breakthrough in its development.

Domestic industry was the basis for the transfer of small-scale peasant farming to the path of large-scale collective production. In a short time, more than 210 thousand collective farms and 43 thousand state farms were organized, about 25 thousand state machine and tractor stations were created. By the end of 1932, state farms and collective farms owned 78 percent of the country's sown area. They gave 84 percent of marketable grain. In the years of the first five-year plan alone, sown areas were increased by 21 million hectares.

Technical equipment of agriculture in 1928 - 1940 characterized by the following data: the fleet of tractors increased 20 times (from 27 to 531 thousand), the fleet of grain harvesters - up to 182 thousand, the fleet of trucks - up to 228 thousand units. During the Great Patriotic War, collective farms and state farms uninterruptedly supplied the army and cities with food, and industry with raw materials.

The Soviet Union has become an industrial power and a country of large-scale advanced agriculture.

As a result of the reforms, unemployment, which is the scourge of the working people in the capitalist countries, was forever eliminated.

cultural revolution put an end to the almost universal illiteracy of the working people of Russia and created the starting conditions for the transformation of the USSR into the most cultured, educated and reading country in the world.

In 1897, the proportion of illiterates among the adult population was 71.6%, in 1926 - 43.4%, in 1939 - 12.6%. Illiteracy in the USSR was completely eliminated in the first years after the Great Patriotic War.

In 1913, only about 290 thousand people had higher and secondary specialized education. These were representatives of the privileged elite. Among the workers and peasants of persons with a secondary education, and even more so with higher education there was practically none. And by 1987, out of 1,000 workers, 861 people had higher and secondary education, out of 1,000 collective farmers - 763. If in 1926 2.7 million people were employed in mental labor, then in 1987 - more than million

During the period of Soviet society, including from 1937 to 1939, there was a steady increase in the population in all regions of the USSR. Thus, from 1926 to 1937 the country's population increased by 11.2 million people, i.e. increased by more than 1.1 million per year. It grew at a faster rate from 1937 to 1939 - an average annual increase of 1.5 million people.

Such a rapid growth of the population of the USSR more convincingly than any other statistics refutes the speculation about the millions of people repressed in the so-called years of repression.

Clouds of imminent war began to thicken over the country. Thanks to the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union received time, redirected resources to military needs, created and put into production the latest weapons.

The peaceful creative development of the USSR was interrupted by the perfidious attack of fascist Germany.

Poland was defeated in 35 days, France - in 44 days, Denmark - in a day. The Soviet Union staunchly defended and advanced for 1,418 days and broke the back of fascism.

The German economy was boosted by US and British investment. The economic potential of all Western Europe worked for Germany. And the Soviet Union fought with its own forces and resources. During the war years, all external deliveries to the USSR amounted to only 4% of domestic production, for artillery - 1.5%, for tanks and self-propelled guns - 6.3%, for aviation - about 10% and for grain - 1.6%.

The Soviet Union suffered the greatest losses - about 25 million people, primarily because 18 million people ended up in the death camps, of which 11 million people were killed by the Nazi executioners. More than one million Soviet soldiers gave their lives in the liberation of the peoples of Europe and Asia. Losses of the USA - about 300 thousand people, Great Britain - 370 thousand, France - 600 thousand.

The advantages of the socialist economic system were most clearly manifested during the war years. Suffice it to cite the fact that in the shortest possible time at the beginning of the war, more than 1.5 thousand enterprises, 145 universities, dozens of research institutes were evacuated from the occupied regions to the East and put into operation.

After the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union quickly heals the wounds inflicted by the war and occupies one of the leading places in the world economy.

In the post-war period, the Soviet state carried out a number of unprecedented reforms. The ruble is untied from the dollar and transferred to a gold basis, there is a seven-fold decrease in retail prices for consumer products with a simultaneous increase in wages, which leads to a significant real increase in the well-being of the people.

In 1954, state retail prices for foodstuffs were 2.6 times lower than the prices of 1947, and for non-food products - 1.9 times.

The powerful economic potential created during the Stalin period charged the Soviet Union with sustainable development for the next decades.

The rates of development of the USSR economy for 1966-1985 were as follows: the growth of national income - 3.8 times, the volume of industrial production - 4.3 times, agricultural - 1.8 times, investment - 4.1 times, real incomes - 2.6 times, foreign trade - 4.7 times, the production of consumer goods increased almost 3 times.

As a result of Kosygin's market reforms, the growth rates of the USSR economy are significantly reduced compared to the growth rates of the Stalinist model of the economy and are approaching the level of capitalist countries. Thus, the average annual growth rate of industrial output in the USSR in the prewar years (1928 - 1940) was 16.8%, in the years of the postwar fifth five-year plan (1951 - 1955) - 13.1%, and in the years of the Kosygin reforms they sharply decrease by 2 - 4%. times, in the period 1971 - 1975. - up to 7.4%, in the period 1976 - 1980. - up to 4.4% (for comparison: in the USA - 5.1%), in 1981 - 1985. - up to 3.7% (in the USA - 2.7%).

Kosygin's reforms led to a significant slowdown in scientific and technological progress and a decrease in the growth rate of labor productivity. During the years of the Stalinist five-year plans, labor productivity in industry grew by an average of 10.8% per year, and during the years of the Kosygin reforms, the rates fall to 5.8 - 6.0% (1966 - 1975) and 3.1 - 3.2 % (1976 - 1985).

Despite this, in the years called "stagnant" by liberals and foreign Sovietologists, the growth rates of the USSR economy outstripped or were at the level of the growth rates of the leading countries of the world. Average annual growth rates of national income for 1961 - 1986 in the USSR amounted to 5.5% and per capita - 4.9%, in the USA - 3.1 and 2.1%, in the UK - 2.3 and 2.7%, in Germany - 3.1 and 3, 4%, in Italy - 3.6 and 3.1%, in Japan - 6.6 and 5.5%, in China - 5.5 and 4.1%.

Thus, the Soviet Union had a powerful economy, provided with all kinds of resources sufficient to meet all the challenges of the time.

If the share of the USSR in world industrial production in 1913 was a little more than 4%, then in 1986 it was 20% (from the US level - more than 80%). In 1913, industrial production per capita in Russia was 2 times less than the world average, and in 1986 it was 3.5-4 times more.

By 1985, the USSR occupied all the first places in Europe in terms of the level of production of the main types of products of industry, agriculture, transport and communications. In many positions, the USSR occupies the first places in the world, yielding in some positions to the USA and a number of other countries.

In world culture, the USSR takes a leading position. In terms of the number of school and university students, including engineering specialties, the number of cinemas, and the circulation of newspapers and books, the USSR ranks first in the world.

As a result of the defeat of the bloc of fascist states by the forces of the Soviet Union, socialism is being transformed into a world system. The potential of the economy of the socialist countries by the beginning of the 80s. approaching the level of the potential of the capitalist countries. The socialist countries covered more than 40% of world industrial production. The output of the socialist countries was more than three-fourths of that of the developed capitalist countries.

The national wealth of the USSR during the years of Soviet power increased by more than 50 times in comparison with 1913. About 20% of all fuel and energy resources of the world were concentrated on the territory of the USSR. In the USSR, almost all the elements contained in the periodic system of Mendeleev were mined. The USSR occupied the first place in terms of forest areas and hydropower resources.

It is no coincidence that I.V. Stalin warned in 1937 that “Having these successes, we turned the USSR into richest country and at the same time, a tidbit for all predators who will not calm down until they try all measures to grab something from this piece.

In the USSR, the entire national income was used to improve the well-being of the working people and develop the national economy. Four-fifths of the national income was directed to the people's welfare, including housing and socio-cultural construction. The following were provided in the USSR: free education, free medical care, free housing, decent pensions, scholarships for students, payment for annual holidays, free and reduced-price vouchers to sanatoriums and rest homes, free maintenance of children in preschool institutions, etc. The rent was only 3% of the population's budget. Retail prices were kept at stable level with wage growth. In the USSR, the right to work was really guaranteed, everyone had to work.

There is nothing like it in the capitalist countries.

In the United States, the wealthiest 1% of families own wealth that is almost one and a half times the combined income of the 80% of families at the bottom of the social pyramid. In the UK, 5% of the owners own 50% of the country's wealth. In "prosperous" Sweden, the income of 5% of families is equal to the income of 40% of families at the bottom of the social ladder.

After the collapse of the USSR, the country's economy faced a catastrophe. The country was plundered by the mafia bourgeoisie that came to power.

In modern Russia, 62% of its wealth falls on the share of dollar millionaires, 29% - on the share of billionaires.

Totally agree Last year the wealth of the 200 richest people in Russia grew by $100 billion. The top Russian billionaires own $460 billion, twice the annual budget of a country of 150 million people.

During the period of capitalist reforms, more than two-thirds of the country's enterprises and entire advanced science-intensive sectors of the national economy were destroyed.

The volume of industrial production in Russia decreased by 62%, in mechanical engineering - by 77.5%. In light industry in 1998, the output amounted to only 8.8% of the 1990 level. The decline in the fuel and energy complex - by 37%, oil production - by 47%, gas industry - by 9.1%. Ferrous metallurgy decreased by 55%, non-ferrous metallurgy - by 30%, chemistry and petrochemistry - by 62.2%, timber, woodworking and pulp and paper - by 69.1%, building materials - by 74.4%, food - by 64.1%.

The share of companies with foreign capital now stands at 56% in mining, 49% in manufacturing, and 75% in communications.

Russia is once again losing its economic independence and falling under the pressure of the leading imperialist states. Only the country's oil and gas resources, as well as the advanced military and nuclear technologies of the Soviet Union period, are pulling the country back from the brink.

The destruction of the country's economy occurred in accordance with the law of the correspondence of productive forces and industrial relations. The forcibly introduced private capitalist ownership of tools and means of production destroyed the country's common national economic ties and led to the collapse of a great power unprecedented in history.

Just like 100 years ago, in order to save the country, our people are faced with the task of overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie and transferring power to the working class.