Muslim battalion. "Muslim battalion" begins to operate
(brief military history)
... To do what the special forces did in Afghanistan, only infinitely courageous and determined soldiers can do. The people who served in the special forces battalions were professionals of the highest standard.
Colonel General Gromov B.V.
("Limited contingent")
During the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, in addition to the 154th "Muslim" battalion already here, the 40th Army also had another special forces unit - the 459th separate company, staffed by volunteers from the 15th Special Forces Brigade of the TurkVO. There were four groups in the company, laid down according to the state and initially there was no armored vehicles (the company was subordinate to the reconnaissance department of the 40th Army). This company was the first unit to participate in combat operations in Afghanistan. At the initial stage, it carried out its operations throughout the country. The first special forces operation in the "Afghan war" was carried out by a group of captain Somov.
In addition to this unit, in 1980-81. groups of the “Muslim battalion”, which by that time was already on the territory of the Soviet Union, were involved in conducting intelligence and implementing intelligence data. The officers of the battalion also trained military personnel of combined arms and airborne units to carry out special tasks, since there were not enough full-time reconnaissance units.
Given the effectiveness of the actions of the special forces, demonstrated during this period, it was decided to strengthen the special forces of the 40th Army. Since the end of 1981, the large-scale use of special forces units in Afghanistan begins. In October 1981, two detachments were introduced: the 154th (the former "Muslim battalion", in Afghanistan received the code name 1 omsb) to the north of the country in Akchu, Jowzjan province, and the 177th (the second "Muslim battalion" based on 22- th Special Forces Brigade of the Central Asian Military District, in Afghanistan - the 2nd OMSB) in Maymen, Faryab province - to the northwest.
The detachments were initially engaged mainly in combat operations to ensure the security of areas adjacent to the Soviet-Afghan border. In 1982, after the introduction of motorized maneuver groups of border troops into the northern provinces of Afghanistan, the detachments were transferred to the center of the country: the 1st battalion in Aibak, Samangan province, the 2nd - in Ruhu in Panjshir, Kapisa province, and a year later - in Gulbahor, province of Parwan.
The Kabul company performed combat missions, mainly in the Kabul region and the provinces bordering Pakistan.
The training battalion of the TurkVO special forces brigade in Chirchik was engaged in preparing military personnel for service in Afghanistan. Gunners-operators, BMP drivers, APC drivers came from combined arms training units, other specialists from a training regiment in the Leningrad Military District. In 1985, in addition to the training battalion in Chirchik, a special forces training regiment was formed to train sergeants and specialists. These two units trained military personnel only for service in Afghanistan, through which most of the officers of this unit passed.
By 1984 it became clear that the main task special forces is to create a barrier to supply the rebels with weapons, ammunition and materiel from Pakistan and partly Iran. Therefore, in the spring of 1984, special forces units were redeployed to the Pakistani border and the number of battalions was increased: the 1st battalion was transferred from Aibak to Jalalabad, Nargarhar province, the 2nd in the settlement. Pajak, near Ghazni, Ghazni province. In February 1984, the 173rd detachment (in Afghanistan - the 3rd OMSB) was introduced from the 12th brigade of the Transcaucasus.VO in the district of the Kandahar airfield, Kandahar province.
In April 1984, an operation was carried out to block part of the Pakistani border and the "Veil" zone was created along the Kandahar-Ghazni-Jalalabad line. The “caravan war” began, which lasted more than 4 years and made the special forces a legend of the 40th Army. The tasks of blocking the borders required great strength, and therefore, in late 1984 - early 1985, the special forces were doubled.
In the fall of 1984, the 668th detachment (4th OMSB) from the 9th Special Forces Brigade of the Kyiv Military District was introduced to Calagulai, near Bagram, Lagman province. At the beginning of 1985, three detachments were additionally introduced: from the 16th special forces brigade of the Moscow Military District near Lashkargah, Helmand province, the 370th detachment (6th OMSB) stood up, from the 5th brigade of Belorus.VO - to Asadabad, Kunar province, 334th detachment (5th OMSB), from the 8th brigade of the Carpathians. VO - near Shahja, Zobul province, 186th detachment (7th OMSB). In addition to these battalions, the 411th special forces detachment (8th OSB) was formed right in Afghanistan, which stood in the Iranian direction, near the Farakhrut bridge on the Shindand-Girishk highway; The 4th battalion was transferred from near Bagram to the village of Sufla, on the Gardez-Kabul highway, not far from Barakibarak, Kabul province.
All detachments were formed in the image of the "Muslim" battalion, with some changes in the organizational and headquarters structure. These eight battalions were combined into two brigades, whose headquarters were sent to Afghanistan in April 1985. The 22nd Special Forces Brigade (from the Central Asian Military District), which stood near Lashkargah, included: the 3rd "Kandahar", 6th "Lashkargah", 7th "Shahdzhoy" and 8th "Farakhrut" battalions. The 15th brigade (from TurkVO) in Jalalabad included the remaining battalions: 1st "Jalalabad", 2nd "Gazni", 4th "Barakin" and 5th "Asadabad". "Kabul" 459 - I company remained separate.
All battalions were deployed for the most part near the Pakistani and partly Iranian border, operating on 100 caravan routes. They prevented the penetration of new rebel groups and caravans with weapons and ammunition into Afghanistan. Unlike other battalions, the 5th "Asadabad" battalion operated mainly in the mountains of Kunar province, against the bases, training centers and warehouses of the rebels.
In total, by the summer of 1985, there were eight battalions and a separate special forces company in Afghanistan, which could simultaneously field up to 76 reconnaissance groups. To coordinate the activities of special forces units in the intelligence department of the 40th Army, the Combat Control Center (CBU) was created, consisting of 7-10 officers, which was headed by the deputy intelligence chief for special work. There were such CBUs in brigades and in all special forces battalions.
Despite all efforts, the special forces intercepted 12-15% of all caravans from Pakistan and Iran, although some battalions destroyed 2-3 caravans every month. According to the special forces themselves and intelligence data, only in one of the three exits did the special forces collide with the enemy. But the special forces have always been morally determined to win, thanks to the high morale of their soldiers and officers.
After the announcement by Kabul in January 1987 of the policy of national reconciliation and, in connection with this, the reduction in the number of military operations of the Soviet troops, the special forces remained the most active part of the 40th Army and continued to carry out their tasks in the same volume. The Islamic opposition rejected the peace proposals, and the flow of caravans from abroad increased even more. In 1987 alone, special forces units intercepted and destroyed 332 caravans. The "caravan war" continued until the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
In May 1988, special forces units were among the first to leave Afghan soil. It was withdrawn: the headquarters of the 15th brigade and three battalions ("Jalalabad", "Asadabad", "Shahdzhoy") from the south-east of Afghanistan. Two other battalions of the 15th brigade ("Gazni", "Barakin") were transferred to Kabul.
In August 1988, three battalions of the 22nd brigade left from the south and south-west (Lashkargahsky, Farakhsky, Kandaharsky).
By the fall of 1988, two battalions and a separate company remained in Afghanistan (all in Kabul), which, until the end of the withdrawal of the 40th Army, carried out combat missions to cover the capital and surrounding areas. All these parts came out in February 1989 among the last.
Due to the lack of complete information, it is not possible to give a detailed analysis of the combat activities of each spetsnaz battalion. But it is known that during the war years the special forces destroyed over 17 thousand rebels, 990 caravans, 332 warehouses, and captured 825 rebels. According to some reports, sometimes special forces units produced up to 80% of the results of the combat activities of the entire 40th Army, accounting for only 5-6% of the total number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The loss figures also speak of the intensity of the struggle: 184 people died in the 22nd brigade, about 500 people died in the 15th brigade.
Notorious was the case in April 1985 in the Maravar gorge of the Kunar province, when two groups of the 1st company of the "Asadabad" battalion were killed. Sometimes special forces groups died completely, B. Gromov's memoirs mention three such cases in 1987-88.
For heroism and courage, 6 special forces soldiers were awarded the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union" (of which 4 people received this title posthumously): Private V. Arsenov (posthumously), Captain Ya. Goroshko, Junior Sergeant Yu. Islamov (posthumously), Lieutenant N .Kuznetsov (posthumously), senior lieutenant O. Onischuk (posthumously). Hundreds of scouts received orders, thousands received military medals.
An interesting assessment of the activities of special forces in Afghanistan by American experts. Thus, in an article by David Ottawell in the Washington Post on July 6, 1989, it is written that "... the Soviet Union proved to be extremely flexible in adapting the Special Forces to the tasks of light infantry operations ..." and further: "... the only Soviet troops, who fought successfully - these are special forces. appointments…”
In the difficult situation that has developed around the CIS after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the role of special forces units in protecting the interests of the Commonwealth in the near abroad is increasing, using the Afghan experience.
KAPCHAGAY BATTALION
Special mission
In 1981, an order was issued by the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate and the General Staff on the creation of a special forces detachment with a deployment point in the city of Kapchagay of the Central Asian military district. At the same time, a commission from the GRU and the intelligence department for the formation of military unit 56712 was created and began to work. In addition to the fact that national personnel were required, in without fail taken into account:
physical fitness of personnel;
good command of weapons and equipment that were in service with the military unit;
readiness of personnel in knowledge of the language (primarily Uighur, Uzbek, Tajik). Therefore, taking into account the expected tasks that the part will solve, 50-60% were people of Uyghur nationality.
The first question arose about the appointment of a unit commander. The criteria remained the same as above. The intelligence department invited 4-5 commanders for a conversation, including me.
A little bit about yourself.
I, Kerimbaev Boris Tukenovich, was born on January 12, 1948 in the village of. Prudki, Dzhambul district, Almaty region. After graduating from high school, in 1966 he entered the Tashkent Higher Command School. IN AND. Lenin. He graduated in 1970 and was sent to serve in the GSVG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany). For three years he served as commander of a motorized rifle platoon. In 1973 he was appointed commander of a reconnaissance company. In 1975, he was replaced in KSAVO, to the post of reconnaissance company commander. In 1977 he was appointed deputy chief of staff, later - commander of a motorized rifle battalion of military unit 52857 in Temirtau. In 1980, he was registered in the 10th Directorate of the General Staff for a foreign business trip to Ethiopia as an adviser to the commander of an infantry brigade.
In January 1980, I sent my battalion's equipment to Afghanistan, then left to receive a new one in return. Perhaps at that time my fate was already being decided. Before I had time to arrive with the equipment in the city of Temirtau, I remember it was Sunday, as the unit commander gave the order: on Monday at 10.00 to arrive at the SAVO intelligence department in Alma-Ata. Having changed one suitcase (“alarming”) for another, at the appointed time I was at the pass office of the Headquarters of the KSAVO at the intersection of Dzhandosov and Pravda streets and reported my arrival to the duty officer.
At that time, a lieutenant colonel came out at the checkpoint (I learned his last name later - Trepak, he was an intelligence officer). Seeing me, he took a closer look, approached me and asked:
Where are you from, Comrade Major? What is your last name?
When he found out who I was, he grabbed his head. Imagine my state at this moment. Naturally I asked him:
Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, tell me where they are sending me? Can refuse?
However, he did not say anything to me, but only periodically clutched his head with quiet exclamations - "Oh-oh-oh."
After his departure, I stood in a confused state for probably ten minutes, until Colonel Soldatenko, a representative of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, arrived at the pass office. He quickly, without any formalities, led me, almost by the hand, to the intelligence department for the GRU commission. Here I never found out where they want to send me. The truth was made known: the commission came to the conclusion that I was suitable, and made a unanimous decision on the approval of my candidacy. When he asked, "Where am I going?" They didn't answer me.
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Kerimbaev Boris Tukenovich
The composition of the Soviet forces introduced to provide assistance in 1979 to "friendly" Afghanistan included one unique, well-trained special unit, consisting exclusively of representatives of Central Asian nationalities. It is thanks to the origin of its personnel that this detachment received the name of the “Muslim battalion”. This battalion, unfortunately, did not last long, but managed to leave a bright mark in the history of the GRU.
Already in the spring of 1979, the leadership of our country firmly understood that the situation in Afghanistan required military intervention. That is why you need to be ready for any scenarios. The idea of a quiet and inconspicuous introduction of small military units into the rebellious country immediately arose. At the end of the spring of 1979, this decision was finally made and Vasily Vasilyevich Kolesnik (Colonel of the GRU) received an order to create a special forces battalion, staffed by representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the southern republics. Fulfilling the order, Kolesnik gathered soldiers from the most different parts Soviet Union. The detachment included motorized riflemen and tankers, paratroopers and border guards. They were sent to the small county Uzbek town of Chirchik. All soldiers, ensigns, officers, and even the battalion commander himself were of Central Asian nationality, mostly Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks, nominally Muslims. With this composition, the detachment had no problems with language training, all Tajiks, as well as half of the Turkmens and Uzbeks, were fluent in Farsi, which was one of the main languages in Afghanistan.
The first Muslim battalion (but, as history has shown, not the last), which is the 154th separate special forces detachment in the world as part of the fifteenth brigade of the Turkestan Military District, was led by Major Khabib Tajibaevich Khalbaev.
Initially, the unit had the following goal - to protect Nurmukhamed Taraki, the president of Afghanistan, who was trying to lay the socialist foundations in his country in a short time. There were plenty of opponents of such radical changes, and therefore Taraki quite rightly feared for his life. By that time, political upheavals, accompanied by bloodshed, had become quite common in Afghanistan.
The new formation was well provided with all the necessary resources, the fighters had no restrictions and limits on funds. The personnel of the detachment received a completely new weapon. For training shooting, according to the Decree of the General Staff, the Turkestan Military District battalion was allocated the training grounds of two military schools: the Tashkent Combined Arms Command and Tank School, located in Chirchik.
Throughout July-August, the soldiers were intensively engaged in combat training. Every day there were tactical exercises, driving combat vehicles, shooting.
The endurance of the fighters was tempered in thirty-kilometer forced marches. Thanks to extensive material and technical means, the personnel of the "Muslim battalion" had the opportunity to achieve a high level of training in hand-to-hand combat, shooting from all available types of weapons, as well as driving infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in extreme conditions.
Meanwhile, in Moscow, Afghan uniforms were hastily sewn on the Musbat soldiers and the necessary papers were being prepared. Each fighter received documents of the established type in the Afghan language. Fortunately, there was no need to invent new names - the servicemen used their own. In Afghanistan, especially in the north of the country, many Uzbeks and Tajiks lived, and Turkmens met there.
Soon the battalion changed the Soviet military uniform to the uniform of the Afghan army. In order to make it easier to recognize each other, the soldiers of the detachment wrapped bandages around both hands. For even greater realism, the military personnel constantly trained in Afghan uniforms so that it had a well-worn look.
When, at the end of the GRU check, the battalion was already preparing to be sent to Afghanistan, another coup took place in Kabul. The closest associate of President Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, eliminated the former leadership, taking control of the country. The intensified training of the special detachment was suspended, the visits of the senior command personnel ceased, and life in the battalion began to look like ordinary army everyday life. But such a lull did not last long, soon an order was received from Moscow to resume training. However, the purpose of education has changed radically. Now the servicemen were no longer being trained for defensive, but for assault operations against the Afghan government. This time, they did not delay the dispatch of the battalion. A list of personnel was announced, which on December 5, 1979, was supposed to fly on the first flight to prepare the camp. The rest of the battalion was to join them on 8 December.
During the flight, the soldiers of the "Muslim battalion" noticed one unusual fact: a detachment of mature military men, but in soldier's overcoats, was flying on the plane. The soldiers who were interested were explained that a group of sappers had gone with them. Only later did it become clear that these were important "big shots" from the KGB and the GRU.
The detachment under the leadership of the Uzbek Khabib Khalbaev joined the battalion of combat guards of the air base from the 345th separate airborne regiment in Bagram, which had been stationed here since July 1979. And on December 14, another battalion of the 345th arrived.
According to the original plan of the leadership of the GRU, the Muslim battalion was supposed to set out from Bagram, immediately capturing the residence of Amin, which was located in Kabul. However, at the last moment, the dictator moved to the new residence "Taj Beck", which was a real fortress. The plans were quickly amended. The detachment was tasked with getting to Kabul on its own and appearing near the Taj Beck Palace, as if to strengthen security. On the morning of December 20, about 540 GRU special forces troops advanced to the capital of Afghanistan.
In appearance, the detachment was very similar to the usual military formation of the Afghans, and the newly minted President Amin was sure that the fighters had arrived to carry out external protection of his new residence. On the way to the palace, the military personnel were stopped by patrols more than a dozen times, passing only after receiving the appropriate password or permission from above. At the entrance to Kabul, the battalion was met by Afghan officers who accompanied the special detachment to the very presidential palace.
The first line of defense of the Taj Beck was considered a company of personal bodyguards of Hafizullah Amin. The third was a security brigade, under the leadership of Major Dzhandat - Amin's main lieutenant. Our Muslim battalion was to form the second line. The palace was protected from an air strike by an anti-aircraft regiment. The total number of military personnel at the palace reached two and a half thousand people.
The GRU fighters were placed in a separate unfinished building, located four hundred meters from the residence. The building did not even have glass on the windows; instead of them, the soldiers pulled blankets. The final stage of preparation for the operation began. Every night, our fighters fired flares on the nearby hills, and the engines of combat vehicles were started in the boxes. The commander of the Afghan guard showed dissatisfaction with such actions, but he was explained that a planned training was underway, related to the specifics of possible military operations. Of course, everything was done in order to lull the vigilance of the guards when the detachment really went on the assault.
Colonel Kolesnik, who drew up the plan of the operation, later spoke about this: “I brought the plan signed by me and worked out on the map to Ivanov and Magomedov (respectively, the chief adviser of the KGB of the USSR and the chief military adviser of the Ministry of Defense). They approved the plan orally, but did not want to put their signatures. It was clear that while we were thinking about how to accomplish the task set by the management, these cunning people were deciding how to avoid responsibility in case of failure. Then I wrote on the plan in their presence: “The plan was approved verbally. They refused to sign." I set the date, time and went to my battalion ... ".
The operation to storm the palace from our side involved: groups "Thunder" and "Zenith" (24 and 30 people, respectively, commanders Major Romanov and Major Semenov), a Muslim battalion (530 people, led by Major Khalbaev), the ninth company of the 345th regiment (87 people, commander of starley Vostrotin), anti-tank platoon (27 people under the leadership of starley Savostyanov). The operation was led by Colonel Kolesnik, and his deputy was Major General Drozdov, head of the illegal intelligence service of the KGB.
The time of the assault was postponed, as information was received that the Afghans were beginning to guess everything. On December 26, the fighters were allowed to make a camp bath. Everyone was given fresh linen, new vests. Khalbaev was ordered to cover the KGB special forces and suppress any groups trying to break into the territory of the residence. The main task of capturing the palace was assigned to the fighters of the Zenith and Thunder groups.
At about 7 am on December 27, 1979, at the prearranged signal “Storm 333”, the KGB assault brigades began to climb the mountain along the only serpentine road. At this time, Khalbaev's people captured important positions and firing points near the palace, removed sentries. A separate group managed to neutralize the leadership of the infantry battalion. Twenty minutes after the start of the attack, "Thunder" and "Zenith" in combat vehicles, overcoming external guard posts, broke into the square in front of the palace. The doors of the troop compartments opened, and the fighters poured out. Some of them managed to break into the first floor of the Taj Beck. A fierce battle began with the personal guards of the self-appointed president, most of whom consisted of his relatives.
Parts of the Muslim battalion, together with a company of paratroopers, formed the outer ring of defense, repelling the attacks of the guard brigade. Two GRU special forces platoons seized the barracks of the tank and first infantry battalions, tanks fell into their hands. Here it was discovered that tank guns and machine guns have no shutters. This was the work of our military advisers, who, under the pretext of repairs, removed the mechanisms in advance.
In the palace, the Afghans fought with the tenacity of the doomed. Hurricane fire from the windows pressed the commandos to the ground, and the attack bogged down. This was a turning point, it was necessary to urgently raise people and lead forward to help those who were already fighting in the palace. Under the leadership of officers Boyarinov, Karpukhin and Kozlov, the fighters rushed to the attack. In these moments, the Soviet soldiers suffered the greatest losses. In an attempt to reach the windows and doors of the palace, many fighters were wounded. Only a small group broke in. There was a fierce battle in the building itself. The commandos acted decisively and desperately. If no one left the premises with their hands up, then grenades immediately flew through the broken doors. However, there were too few Soviet soldiers to eliminate Amin. Only about two dozen people were in the palace, and many were injured. After a short hesitation, Colonel Boyarinov ran out of the main entrance and began to call for help from the fighters of the Muslim battalion. Of course, the enemy also noticed him. A stray bullet ricocheted off the body armor and pierced the colonel's neck. Boyarinov was fifty-seven years old. Of course, he could not participate in the assault, his official position and age allowed him to lead the battle from headquarters. However, this was a real officer of the Russian army - his subordinates went into battle, and he had to be next to them. Coordinating the actions of groups, he also acted as a simple attack aircraft.
After the soldiers of the Muslim battalion came to the aid of the KGB special forces, the fate of the defenders of the palace was sealed. Amin's bodyguards, about one hundred and fifty soldiers and personal protection officers staunchly resisted, not wanting to surrender. The fact that the Afghans were mainly armed with German MP-5s, which did not penetrate the bulletproof vests of Soviet soldiers, saved our servicemen from heavy losses.
According to the story of Amin's captured assistant, it became clear about the last moments of the dictator's life. In the first minutes of the battle, the “master” ordered that our military advisers be informed of the attack on the palace. He shouted: "We need the help of the Russians!". When the adjutant rightly remarked: “That’s how Russians shoot!” Then he tried to call himself. But there was no connection. In the end, Amin said dejectedly: "That's right, I suspected it ...".
When the gunfight stopped and the smoke cleared in the palace, the corpse of Hafizullah Amin was found near the bar. What actually caused his death remained unclear, whether our bullet, or a fragment of a grenade. A version was also expressed that Amin was shot by his own. This operation was officially completed.
All the wounded, including the Afghans, received medical attention. Civilians under guard were taken to the location of the battalion, and all the dead defenders of the palace were buried in one place near the Taj Beck. Graves for them were dug by prisoners. To identify Hafizullah Amina, Babrak Karmal flew in specially. Soon the Kabul radio stations broadcast a message that, by decision of the military tribunal, Hafizullah Amin was sentenced to death. Later, the words of Babrak Karmal recorded on tape to the people of Afghanistan were heard. He said that "... the system of torture of Amin and his associates - executioners, murderers and usurpers of tens of thousands of my compatriots was broken ...".
During a short but fierce battle, the loss of the Afghans amounted to about 350 people killed. Approximately 1700 people were taken prisoner. Our soldiers lost eleven people: five paratroopers, including Colonel Boyarinov, and six servicemen of the Muslim battalion. A military doctor, Colonel Kuznechenkov, who happened to be in the palace, also died. Thirty-eight people earned injuries of varying severity. Two young sons of the president were killed during the shootout, but Amin's widow and her wounded daughter survived. At first, they were kept under guard in a special room at the location of the battalion, and then they were handed over to government representatives. The fate of the rest of the president's defenders turned out to be tragic: many of them were soon shot, others died in prison. This outcome of events, apparently, was facilitated by the reputation of Amin, who, even by Eastern standards, was considered a cruel and bloody dictator. According to tradition, a stain of shame also automatically fell on his entourage.
After the elimination of Amin, a plane from Moscow immediately flew to Bagram. In it, under the supervision of KGB workers, was new head Afghanistan - Babrak Karmal. When the Tu-134 was already descending, the lights on the entire airfield suddenly went out. The plane landed only with the help of headlights. The crew of the aircraft ejected a drag chute, but the aircraft rolled almost to the edge of the runway. As it turned out later, the head of the airbase was an ardent supporter of Amin and, suspecting something was wrong when landing a strange plane, turned off the lights, hoping to arrange a plane crash. But the high skill of the pilots made it possible to avoid the tragedy.
Already much later began to emerge Interesting Facts about the operation. Firstly, it turned out that during the entire assault there was no communication with the command post. The reason for the absence so no one could clearly explain. An attempt to immediately report on the liquidation of the president was also unsuccessful. Secondly, only a couple of years later, at a meeting of participants in those December events, it became known what the delay in reporting the death of the president could have turned out to be. It turned out that the military leaders had developed a backup plan to destroy Amin and his entourage. A little later than the assault brigades, the task of capturing the presidential palace was given to the Vitebsk division, which did not know about the earlier actions of the KGB and the “Muslim battalion”. If the message about the achievement of the goal had not arrived in time, the Belarusians could start a new assault attempt. And then it is not known how many, out of ignorance, in the ensuing confusion, the participants in the first offensive would have been killed. It is possible that it was precisely this outcome of events - to remove more witnesses - that was planned.
And here is what Colonel Kolesnik said: “In the evening the next day after the assault, all the leaders of this operation were almost killed by a machine-gun burst by one soviet soldier. Returning from a banquet organized on the occasion of the successful completion of the operation, in Amin's Mercedes we were fired upon near the building of the General Staff, which was guarded by paratroopers. Lieutenant Colonel Shvets was the first to notice strange flashes on the asphalt road and understood what they meant. He slipped out of the car, covering the sentries with a choice obscenity. It worked better than the password. We called the head of the guard. The lieutenant who appeared first received in the ear, and only then listened to the end of the procedure for using weapons by sentries at posts. When we examined the car, we found several bullet holes in the hood. A little higher and neither I nor Kozlov would have been alive. Already at the end, General Drozdov quietly said to the lieutenant: “Son, thank you for not teaching your fighter to shoot.”
Created under the auspices of the GRU, a unique Muslim unit was withdrawn from Afghanistan almost immediately after the storming of the palace. All equipment was transferred to the Vitebsk division. The servicemen were left with only personal weapons and on January 2, 1980, two An-22s in full force were sent to Tashkent. For the successful conduct of the special operation, the fighters of the "Muslim battalion" were awarded orders and medals: seven people received the Order of Lenin, ten people received the Order of the Red Banner, forty-five - the Order of the Red Star, forty-six fighters were awarded the medal "For Courage", and the rest - a medal "For Military Merit". Colonel Kolesnik became a Hero of the Soviet Union, he was soon awarded the rank of general.
The battalion temporarily ceased to exist, the servicemen were transferred to the reserve, and all the officers were scattered around various garrisons for further service. After the reformation, by October 1981, there was no one in it who took part in the storming of the palace.
Many of the events associated with the coup in Afghanistan were presented by the Soviet press in a completely different light. According to the initial version of the media, President Amin was arrested. And only then by a fair court he was sentenced to death. A film about this was shot in advance and prepared for showing after the death of the dictator. The participation of Soviet special forces and the real death of the self-proclaimed president was not mentioned anywhere.
After the assassination of Hafizullah Amin, units of the 40th Army continued to enter Afghanistan, occupying cities, villages and the main centers of the country. Industrial and administrative facilities, highways, airfields, mountain passes were taken under control. At first, no one was going to fight, hoping only to convince others by the seriousness of their intentions. As a last resort, solve all the tasks with little bloodshed, without assuming the future scale of hostilities. The point of view of the General Staff was such that it was enough just to demonstrate a powerful military force, rocket units, tanks, artillery. This will instill fear in the hearts of the opposition, forcing them to surrender or simply scatter. In fact, the appearance of strangers in an Islamic country that has the experience of countless wars, a country where the bulk of the population knows how to handle weapons from early childhood, ignited an already ongoing civil war giving it the meaning of jihad.
Despite the fact that the operation to eliminate the president was carried out successfully, Western countries were not slow to designate this fact as evidence of the occupation of Afghanistan. Soviet Union, and the subsequent leaders of Afghanistan (Karmal and Najibullah) are called puppet leaders.
On October 30, 1981, at two in the morning, the 154th separate detachment of special forces, previously called the "Muslim battalion", crossed the state border of the USSR and rushed to the place of the future deployment. This is how the second arrival of "Musbat" to the Afghan land took place. The new unit commander, Major Igor Stoderevsky, served with him until the very end of the war.
Sources of information:
-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
-http://sevastopol.su/conf_view.php?id=17319
-http://afganrass.ucoz.ru/publ/musulmanskij_batalon/1-1-0-36
-http://www.desant.com.ua/spn1.html
Great experience Patriotic War showed that large airborne formations (brigade, corps), landed behind enemy lines for enough great depth(Vyazemsky and Dnieper operations), for several days (and with appropriate supplies, probably more) they could conduct active offensive and defensive operations. However, the same experience showed that the axis did not receive supplies, and it was not possible to establish interaction with front-line (strike) aviation.
As a result, due to a number of miscalculations made, all major airborne operations carried out during the war did not fully achieve their goals:
Nevertheless, the actions of small reconnaissance and sabotage groups sent behind enemy lines, with proper support and training, brought tangible results. An example of such hostilities is the actions of groups and detachments of a separate NKVD special-purpose motorized rifle brigade, the actions of front-line intelligence agencies, which throughout the war were thrown into the near and far rear of the enemy, and also partly the actions of special groups during the Far Eastern offensive operation.
Therefore, it was clear that for reconnaissance and sabotage tasks, not large military units, but small and mobile groups, which, in turn, required special training, were best suited, different from the training of combined arms (motorized rifle, airborne) units.
In addition, almost immediately after the war, the potential enemy had targets, the opening and destruction of which depended on the life or death of entire combined arms formations, large political and industrial centers - airfields of bombers equipped with nuclear bombs. To destroy enemy nuclear aircraft at these airfields, or at least disrupt a mass take-off at the right time (according to Soviet military leaders), theoretically, small sabotage groups, brought to the area where the task was located in advance, could theoretically.
It was decided to form such sabotage units under the wing of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, since sabotage formations were subordinated to scouts during the war.
On October 24, 1950, by directive of the Minister of War of the USSR, in fact, special-purpose companies could be called "companies of miners-paratroopers", but due to the special focus of the tasks, they received the name they received.
At the very beginning of the 50s, the Soviet Army suffered a large reduction.
Divisions, brigades and regiments were reduced by tens and hundreds, many corps, armies and districts were disbanded. The GRU special forces did not escape the fate of reductions either - in 1953, the 35th special-purpose company was disbanded. General N.V. saved special intelligence from a complete reduction.
Ogarkov, who was able to prove to the government the need to have such formations in the USSR Armed Forces.
In total, 11 special-purpose companies were retained. Companies remained in the most important operational areas:
18th separate special-purpose company of the 36th combined arms army of the Trans-Baikal Military District (near the town of Borzya);
26th separate special-purpose company of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Army of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (garrison in Furstenberg);
27th separate special-purpose company (district) in the Northern Group of Forces (Poland, Strzegom);
36th separate special-purpose company of the 13th combined arms army of the Carpathian military district (Khmelnitsky);
43rd separate special-purpose company of the 7th Guards Army of the Transcaucasian Military District (Lagodekhi);
61st Separate Special Purpose Company of the 5th Combined Arms Army of the Primorsky Military District (Ussuriysk);
75th separate special-purpose company in the Special Mechanized Army (Hungary, Nyiregyhaza);
76th separate special-purpose company of the 23rd combined arms army of the Leningrad Military District (Pskov);
77th separate special-purpose company of the 8th mechanized army of the Carpathian military district (Zhytomyr);
78th separate special-purpose company (district) in the Taurida military district (Simferopol);
92nd separate special-purpose company of the 25th combined-arms army of the Primorsky military district (n. p. Fighter Kuznetsov).
Among the total number of disbanded special forces companies, one should mention companies that, in addition to general “special forces” training, also had special conditions of service: for example, soldiers of the 99th separate special forces company (district) of the Arkhangelsk Military District in combat training tasks in the difficult conditions of the Arctic, scouts of the 200th separate special-purpose company of the Siberian Military District studied “Chinese. theater of operations, and the personnel of the 227th separate special-purpose company of the 9th combined-arms army of the North Caucasian military district underwent mountain training.
In 1956, the 61st separate special-purpose company of the 5th combined arms army of the Far Eastern military district was relocated to the Turkestan military district in the city of Kazandzhik. Probably, the leadership of the General Staff decided to pay attention to the southern "Islamic" direction. The second wave of the formation of separate special-purpose companies took place at the beginning of the 70s.
Apparently, at that time the fathers of the General Staff decided to give a "special purpose tool" not only to the fronts (districts), but also to some combined arms formations. As a result, several separate companies were formed for armies and army corps. Several companies were formed for internal military districts that did not previously have special intelligence units. In particular, the 791st separate special-purpose company was formed in the Siberian Military District. In the Western Group of Forces in Germany and on Far East separate companies were formed in each army.
In 1979, the 459th separate special-purpose company was formed as part of the Turkestan military district for the purpose of subsequent use in Afghanistan. The company will be introduced into the DRA and will show itself in the best possible way. Another wave of formation of separate special-purpose companies occurred in the mid-80s. Then companies were formed in all armies and corps, which until that moment did not have such units. Companies were formed even in such exotic (but quite justified) areas as Sakhalin (877th separate special-purpose company of the 68th Army Corps) and Kamchatka (571st separate special-purpose company of the 25th Army Corps).
In "democratic. . Russia after the separation of the “free. republics and the withdrawal of troops from the countries of the non-socialist camp, eight military districts remained with the corresponding number of armies and corps. Part of the individual special-purpose companies took part in the first Chechen war, where they were used as military intelligence, as guards for columns and precious command bodies - in general, as always, for "special purposes". All the companies subordinate to the North Caucasian Military District, as well as two companies of the Moscow Military District, one of which, the 806th, was formed literally the day before, were deployed in wartime states. Chechen campaign as part of the 1st Guards Tank Army, withdrawn from Germany to Smolensk.
In addition, by the summer of 1996, a new, 584th separate special-purpose company was formed as part of the 205th motorized rifle brigade. At the end of this war, another reduction in the Russian army followed, including its intelligence agencies. In order to preserve large special forces formations, the GRU made acceptable sacrifices - it gave away individual special-purpose companies to be "eaten up". By the end of 1998, separate special-purpose companies (with the exception of two companies located in special directions: the 75th subordinate to the Kaliningrad defensive region and the 584th, by this time transferred to the headquarters of the 58th combined arms army) in the structure of the Russian Armed Forces have ceased to exist.
Later, already during the Second Chechen War, in the North Caucasus Military District, for operations on the territory of Chechnya, six numberless special-purpose companies had to be formed (three companies in the 131st, 136th, 205th Omsbr and three companies in reconnaissance battalions 19th, 20th and 42nd MRD). These companies, according to the plans for combat training of special forces units, performed the prescribed number of parachute jumps at the airfields of the district.
In 1957, the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR decided to reorganize five special-purpose companies into battalions. By the end of the year, the USSR Armed Forces included five special-purpose battalions and four separate special-purpose companies:
26th Separate Special Purpose Battalion GSVG (Fürstenberg);
27th Special Purpose Hotel Battalion of the SGV (Stregom);
36th separate special-purpose battalion of the PrikVO (Khmelnitsky);
43rd separate special-purpose battalion 3akVO (Lagodekhi);
61st Separate Special Purpose Battalion TurkVO (Kazandzhik);
18th separate special-purpose company 36th od 3aBVO (Borzya);
75th separate special-purpose company of the South GV (Nyiregyhaza);
77th separate special-purpose company of the 8th TD PrikVO (Zhytomyr);
78th separate special-purpose company of the OdVO (Simferopol).
At the same time, two companies were disbanded, the personnel of which went to staff new battalions. For example, the 92nd separate special-purpose company of the 25th Army of the Far Eastern Military District was urgently loaded onto the train and sent to Poland - on the basis of this company (and the 27th company of the Northern Group of Forces), the 27th separate special forces battalion. The transfer of special forces units to the battalion structure made it possible to optimize the educational process, freeing a significant part of the personnel from garrison and guard duty. Three battalions were concentrated in the western (European) direction, one was in the Caucasus and one more in Central Asia.
There were three companies in the western direction, and at that time we had only one special-purpose company in the eastern direction as part of the 36th Army of the Trans-Baikal Military District. Subsequently, after the creation of the brigades, the special-purpose battalions became known as detachments, and organizationally they were all part of the brigades. Beginning in the 1960s, battalions did not exist as independent combat units, with the exception of individual detachments of brigades, which could be detached from the formation for operations in separate operational areas, but continued to remain in brigades in peacetime.
The experience of conducting combat training and various exercises showed the need to create formations in the GRU system that are much larger than the existing separate battalions, which would be able to solve an expanded range of tasks.
In particular, during the threatened period, special forces were supposed to engage not only in reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines, but also in the formation partisan detachments in the occupied territory (or in the territory that could be occupied). In the future, relying on these partisan formations, the special forces had to solve their problems. It was the partisan orientation that was the priority combat mission of the formations being created.
In accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU of August 20, 1961 "On the training of personnel and the development of special equipment for organizing and equipping partisan detachments", the directive of the General Staff of February 5, 1962, in order to train and accumulate personnel for the deployment of the partisan movement in wartime, the commander of the military districts was ordered to select 1,700 reserve troops, bring them into a brigade and hold a thirty-day training camp.
After the training camp, the personnel were assigned special military registration specialties. They were not allowed to be booked national economy and not be used for its intended purpose.
By the directive of the General Staff of March 27, 1962, drafts of the states of special-purpose brigades for peacetime and wartime were developed.
Since 1962, the creation of 10 cadre brigades began, the formation and arrangement of which was basically completed by the end of 1963:
The 2nd Specialized Special Forces (military unit 64044), was formed on December 1, 1962 (according to other sources, in 1964) on the basis of the collapsed 76th Specialized Special Forces of the LenVO and the personnel of the 237th Guards Airborne Regiment, the first commander - D. N. Grishakov; Leningrad Military District, Pechory, Promezhitsy;
4th Special Forces (military unit 77034), formed in 1962 in Riga, the first commander was D.S. Zhizhin; Baltic Military District, then transferred to Viljandi;
5th ObrSpN (military unit 89417), formed in 1962, first commander - I. I. Kovalevsky; Belarusian military district, Maryina Gorka;
8th ObrSpN (military unit 65554), formed in 1962 on the basis of the 36th OBSPN, Carpathian Military District, Izyaslav, Ukraine;
9th brig. spN (military unit 83483), formed in 1962, the first commander -L. S. Egorov; Kyiv Military District, Kirovograd, Ukraine;
10th ObrSpN (military unit 65564), formed in 1962, Odessa Military District, Stary Krym, Pervomaisky;
12th Specialized Special Forces (military unit 64406), formed in 1962 on the basis of the 43rd Specialized Specialized Brigade, first commander - I. I. Geleverya; 3 Caucasian Military District, Lagodekhi, Georgia;
14th ObrSpN (military unit 74854), formed on January 1, 1963 on the basis of the 77th orb, first commander - P.N. Rymin; Far Eastern Military District, Ussuriysk;
15th Specialized Special Forces (military unit 64411), formed on January 1, 1963 on the basis of the 61st Specialized Specialized Brigade, first commander - N.N. Lutsev; Turkestan Military District, Chirchik, Uzbekistan;
16th ObrSpN (military unit 54607), formed on January 1, 1963, first commander - D.V. Shipka; Moscow military district, Chuchkovo.
Brigades were formed mainly by military personnel of the airborne and ground forces. For example, the officer backbone of the 14th Specialized Special Forces of the Far Eastern Military District during the formation was staffed by officers of the 98th Guards Airborne Division from Belogorsk (from which 14 officers - participants in the Great Patriotic War came to the brigade), and the conscripts were recruited from military commissariats.
Basically, the formation of the first ten brigades ended on the 7th beginning of 1963, but, for example, the 2nd Special Forces, according to some sources, was finally formed only in 1964.
The organizational and staffing structure of a separate special-purpose brigade in 1963 was as follows:
Brigade headquarters (about 30 people);
One deployed detachment of Special Forces (164 people in the state);
Detachment of special radio communications on a reduced staff (about 60 people);
Three cadre detachments of the Special Forces;
Two framed separate detachments of Special Forces;
Company of economic support;
in addition, the brigade included such collapsed units as:
Company of special mining;
Group of special weapons (ATGM, RS "Grad-P. ., P3RK).
In peacetime, the size of a cadre brigade did not exceed 200-300 people; according to the wartime states, a fully deployed special-purpose brigade had more than 2,500 people.
At the beginning of its existence, the brigades were cadre, and, in particular, in the 9th Special Forces, deployed in Ukraine in the city of Kirovograd, there were initially six detachments, in which only the first detachment had two special forces companies, a platoon of special weapons and a platoon of special radio communications. The other five detachments had only commanders. The command, headquarters and political department of the brigade consisted of thirty people. Colonel L. S. Egorov was appointed the first commander of the 9th brigade, but soon he received a spinal injury while parachuting, and Colonel Arkhireev was appointed commander of the brigade.
By the end of 1963, the USSR Armed Forces included (some in the process of formation):
Twelve separate special forces companies;
Two separate special forces battalions;
Ten separate special purpose brigades (frame).
Soon, special forces units and units were reorganized, as a result of which, by the end of 1964, the composition of the USSR Armed Forces remained:
Six separate special purpose companies;
Two separate special-purpose battalions (26th and 27th) in the western direction;
Ten separate framed special forces brigades.
In August 1965, the chief of the General Staff for generals and officers of military intelligence and special forces engaged in combat training of personnel in guerrilla tactics was approved
"Guerrilla Organization and Tactics Manual".
At that time, special-purpose brigades were perceived by everyone in this way - as a reserve for deploying guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The special forces were even called that: partisans. The experience of creating such formations, it seems, came from the training of the partisan special reserve in the late 20s - early 30s, as you know, all its members were repressed in the late 30s.
A similar attitude towards trained saboteurs has been preserved in modern times: the authorities are still afraid of having qualified specialists in sabotage war, reasonably fearing for their own well-being. The whole country saw on television very vague trials of Colonels P. Ya. Popovskikh and V. V. Kvachkov, a group of Captain E. Ulman. Nevertheless, the creation of "partisan" units was in full swing.
In 1966, in the Odessa military district, the 165th The educational center special purpose. The center was based in the Simferopol region and existed at least until 1990.
During this time, many highly trained terrorist fighters were trained in the center for a great many revolutions. Graduates of this educational unit in different parts of the globe overthrew governments, killed and kidnapped opponents of communism, harmed world imperialism and otherwise implemented the special knowledge gained in Simferopol. Not all trained saboteurs were immediately sent to the combat areas - some graduates were legalized in the prosperous countries of Europe, America and Asia. They lived and worked for the benefit of their countries, but on a signal known to them, these militants gathered in the right place, received weapons and carried out special tasks. In the event of a major war, these conspiratorial groups were to become a support for the GRU special forces sent behind enemy lines. Apparently, this system is still relevant today.
In 1966, in Furstenberg (Werder garrison, Neu-Timmen) on the basis of the 5th Guards Separate Reconnaissance Motorcycle Battalion (former during the war, the 5th Guards Warsaw-Berlin Reconnaissance Motorcycle Regiment, which was formed in 1944) by the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, on the basis of the 26th OBSpN, with the involvement of the forces of the 27th OBSPN, the 48th and 166th orbs, a special-purpose unit of a new type was formed - the 3rd obrSpN, which inherited from the 5th motorcycle battalion got the guards rank . Colonel R.P. Mosolov was appointed commander of the new brigade. The brigade received the code name of military unit 83149. The main difference between the new brigade and the existing ones was that the brigade, even during formation, was deployed to a full, special staff, as well as the fact that the brigade included separate units - separate special forces.
This brigade at that time was the most complete (up to 1300 personnel) and was in constant combat readiness to perform tasks as intended. The detachments of the brigade were formed in a slightly different state than the detachments of the brigades that were stationed in the USSR. These detachments had a staff of 212 people, while the "allied" brigades had detachments with a staff of only 164 people. The full name of the formation: 3rd Separate Guards Red Banner Warsaw-Berlin Order of Suvorov, 3rd Class Special Purpose Brigade.
As part of the brigade, special forces were formed: 501st, 503rd, 509th, 510th, 512th.
Parts of the special purpose, being equipped with physically strong and hardy soldiers and officers, were often involved in performing special tasks not only of a “sabotage” nature. So, in 1966, units of the 15th special forces brigade took part in the aftermath of the earthquake in Tashkent - the soldiers dismantled the rubble, pulled out the survivors from the ruins. In 1970 - the elimination of the consequences of the cholera epidemic in the Astrakhan region, and in 1971 - the elimination of the consequences of the epidemic of smallpox in Aralsk - scouts, together with the police, participated in the isolation of persons who had contact with the infected.
In 1972, the 16th Special Forces Division carried out a government task to eliminate forest fires in the Moscow, Ryazan, Vladimir and Gorky regions. For the fulfillment of this task, the brigade was awarded the Certificate of Honor of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.
Based on the results of combat and political training in 1967, the 14th brigade became one of the advanced formations of the troops and units of the Far Eastern Military District and was entered in the Book of Honor of the troops of the KDVO. All the personnel of the unit were thanked by the commander of the KFVO.
In 1968, a serviceman of the 1st Battalion of the 14th Special Forces Sergeant Vasilevsky made the first run in the history of Primorye along the Ussuriysk-Vladivostok highway. 104 km were covered in 8 hours 21 minutes. Sergeant Vasilevsky dedicated his run to the 50th anniversary of the Komsomol.
The 14th brigade took an active part in combat training. In the period from June 22 to June 27, 1970, the personnel of the brigade took part in district reconnaissance exercises conducted by the chief of staff of the district. The actions of the personnel during the exercises were checked by the GRU General Staff commission headed by Lieutenant General Tkachenko and Colonel Galitsin. During the exercises, the personnel parachuted and landed in Primorye, the Amur Region and Sakhalin Island and completed all the tasks with a “good” rating. In the period from August 21 to August 28, 1971, the personnel took part in district reconnaissance exercises, during which 20 RGSpN were parachuted into Primorye. Amur Region and Sakhalin Island, followed by reconnaissance missions. All tasks were successfully completed.
In 1968, under the leadership of a senior GRU officer of the General Staff, Colonel Shchelokov, the 9th company of special forces cadets was created in the Lenin Komsomol RVVDKU as part of three platoons, and in 1979 the company was deployed into a special forces battalion (lZ-I and 14th companies) .
Also, the Kiev Combined Arms Command School was engaged in training personnel for special forces, which produced officers with the specialty "referent translator".
In 1978 at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze was created at the intelligence faculty of the 4th training group of special forces officers. In 1981, the first release of the "special forces" group took place.
In 1969, on the basis of the 16th Special Forces MVO in the village of Chuchkovo, Ryazan Region, the GRU General Staff conducted an operational-strategic experimental exercise, the purpose of which was to work out the issues of combat use of special forces. To ensure the transfer of personnel and cargo to the rear of the enemy, military transport aviation was involved. Take-off and landing airfield - Dyagilevo. To designate nuclear and other means mass destruction, their protection and defense, as well as to counter the landing, collect and store their parachutes, the personnel of six (2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th) special forces brigades were involved.
In 1970, a special purpose training company was deployed in Pechory, which was later reorganized into a training battalion, and then into the 1071st Special Purpose Training Regiment (military unit 51064), which trained junior commanders and specialists for special purpose units. At the 1071st UpSpN, a school of ensigns functioned for special forces.
From the mid-1970s, the General Staff found an opportunity to deploy brigades, increasing the number of personnel in them. As a result of this decision, it was possible to complete the detachments of brigades by 60-80%. From this period, special-purpose brigades became combat-ready and were no longer considered only as a partisan reserve.
On June 12, 1975, the head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces approved the "Instruction for the combat use of formations, units and subunits (brigade, detachment, battalion) for special purposes."
In 1972, as part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Mongolia, two brigades were formed, the numbering of which is on the same line as the numbers of special forces brigades, but these brigades were called "separate reconnaissance brigades." In the US Army, in terms of the volume of tasks to be solved, there was an analogue to similar separate reconnaissance brigades - armored cavalry regiments. The new brigades included three separate reconnaissance battalions each, armed with infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and combat support units, which was due to the nature of the terrain in the responsibility zone of the GSM. However, each of these brigades had "jumping" reconnaissance and airborne companies, and each brigade also had its own separate helicopter squadron. Most likely, when creating these brigades, the General Staff tried to find the optimal organization of special forces units that were to operate in the mountainous desert area.
As a result, the 20th and 25th separate reconnaissance brigades were formed. There were no similar formations in the Soviet Army anywhere else. In the mid-80s, these brigades were reorganized into separate mechanized brigades and became part of the newly formed 48th Guards Army Corps, and with the collapse of the USSR, after the withdrawal of troops from Mongolia, they were disbanded.
At the end of the 1970s, the General Staff found an opportunity to transfer special forces brigades from cadre to deployed staff, as well as find reserves to form two more brigades. The 22nd Special Purpose Brigade was formed on July 24, 1976 in the Central Asian Military District in the city of Kapchagay on the basis of one of the detachments of the 15th Brigade, a company of the Special Radio Communications Detachment of the 15th Brigade, the 525th and 808th separate special purpose companies Central Asian and Volga military districts. Until 1985, the brigade was in Kapchagai, later changed its location several times and is currently located in the area of the city of Aksai, Rostov Region (military unit 11659).
24th Special Purpose Brigade was formed in the Trans-Baikal Military District on November 1, 1977 on the basis of the 18th Special Forces and was initially deployed in the area of n. the village of Kharabyrka, Chita region (23rd site), then in 1987 it was transferred to the village. Kyakhta, and in 2001 was transferred to Ulan-Ude (military unit 55433), and then to Irkutsk. When the brigade was transferred to Kyakhta, the 282nd ooSpN was transferred to the 14th detachment of the Far Eastern Military District and relocated to the city of Khabarovsk.
Later, in 1984, in the Siberian Military District, on the basis of the 791st OrdnSpN, the 67th Special Forces Brigade was formed, which was deployed in the city of Berdsk, Novosibirsk Region (military unit 64655).
In 1985, during the Afghan war, in Chirchik, on the site of the 15th brigade that had gone to Afghanistan, the 467th special-purpose training regiment (military unit 71201) was formed, which trained personnel for special-purpose units operating in Afghanistan. The regiment consisted of training battalions and support units. The training regiment had great privileges in the selection of personnel. If during the selection of conscripts for this regiment, the officer encountered any difficulties at the recruiting station, the issues that arose were resolved with one telephone call to the GRU.
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Reliable information about who was the first of the military leaders to introduce a code name muslim battalion- not available.
Creation of Muslim battalions
The main reason for the selection of military personnel on a national basis, which was adhered to by the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, was considered a small external difference with the indigenous people of Afghanistan.
In total, three "Muslim battalions" (combined military unit) were created.
1st Muslim Battalion
During the assault, the personnel of the battalion lost 7 people killed and 36 wounded.
After the storming of the palace, the 177th Special Forces did not take part in further hostilities. All combat equipment and military property of the battalion was transferred to the 103rd Guards Airborne Division. On January 2, 1980, the personnel of the detachment were taken by plane to the territory of the USSR, after which the detachment was disbanded, the conscripts were transferred to the reserve until the end of their term of service, and officers and warrant officers were distributed to military units.
It should be noted that the 154th separate special forces detachment was re-formed on the basis of the same 15th detachment in the summer of 1980. On May 7, 1981, the detachment was awarded the Battle Banner. On October 30, 1981, the detachment was introduced into Afghanistan, having received the symbol 1st separate motorized rifle battalion. During the re-formation of the selection of military personnel on the previous national basis, there was no and the designation "Muslim battalion" was not applied to it.
2nd Muslim Battalion
The 177th Separate Special Purpose Detachment (177th OOSPN or military unit 56712) was created on the basis of the Directive of the General Staff No. 314/2/00117 of January 8, 1980 on the basis of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade SAVO, in the city of Kapchagay Almaty region of the Kazakh SSR.
Major Kerimbaev Boris Tukenovich, a graduate of the Tashkent Combined Arms School, who by that time had served in command positions in the reconnaissance units of the ground forces, was appointed commander of the battalion.
Unlike the "1st Muslim Battalion", the 177th Special Forces was preparing for combat operations on the territory of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. In this regard, 300 conscripts of the Uighur nationality and officers of the Turkic peoples were recruited into the detachment. 70% of the officers of the battalion were graduates of combined arms schools. The total number of personnel is 498 people.
An accelerated Chinese language course was introduced for the officers of the detachment.
... Somewhere in September 1981, they announced that we would pass the autumn test to the Moscow commission, and that in addition to combat training subjects, knowledge of the Chinese language would also be tested. A Chinese instructor arrived from the intelligence department of the district and we quickly began to study it, that is, Chinese. The topic is the interrogation of a prisoner of war. They wrote down Chinese words in Russian letters and memorized them. So, learning Chinese in a month is not a tale, at least for us military, we can. But it didn’t last long at all, two weeks later, language learning was canceled ...
The personnel of the 177th Separate Special Forces Detachment were dressed in Soviet uniforms with insignia of the airborne troops.
By the spring of 1981, the time had come for the conscripts to be transferred to the reserve. There was a need for a new set. Mostly military personnel of the Uighur nationality left. With the new staffing of the 177th Special Forces, the requirements for Uyghur nationality, due to the changed international situation, have disappeared. The priority in the recruitment was made according to the nationalities of Central Asia (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz). With this choice, the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces changed the intended combat mission of the 177th Special Forces. Having staffed the unit, they again began combat coordination. The 177th Special Forces was preparing to be sent to Afghanistan.
By the time the 177th Special Operations Forces entered Afghanistan, the task of assembling personnel on a national basis, certainly the same as in the case of the first composition of the "1st Muslim Battalion", which stormed Amin's palace, was no longer standing. Therefore, the "2nd Muslim Battalion" did not fully correspond to its name.
On October 29, 1981, the 177th OOSPN received a new symbol ( 2nd separate motorized rifle battalion or military unit 43151), was introduced into Afghanistan and redeployed in the vicinity of the city of Maymen in the province of Faryab.
The 177th Special Forces under the command of Major Kerimbaev is known for its participation in the history of the Afghan war as the only special forces formation that long time was used not for its intended purpose of reconnaissance and sabotage specifics, but as a mountain rifle formation to capture and hold the high-mountain fortified areas of dushmans. In total, the 177th Special Forces Opposed the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Panjshir Gorge for 9 months (June 11, 1982 - March 8, 1983). As a result of such a confrontation, Massoud was forced to agree to a truce. Neither before nor after the “2nd Muslim Battalion” were tasks of a similar nature and duration assigned to special forces in the Afghan war.
3rd Muslim Battalion
The 173rd Separate Special Purpose Detachment (173rd OOSPN or military unit 94029) was created on the basis of Directive of the General Staff No. 314/2/0061 dated January 9, 1980 on the basis of the 12th Separate Special Purpose Brigade of the ZakVO, in the city of Lagodekhi Georgian SSR. The formation of the detachment was completed by February 29, 1980. The staff of detachment 21/19-51 was the same as that of the 177th Special Forces.
Captain Yaldash Sharipov was appointed commander of the detachment. Almost all officers and ensigns of the detachment were recruited from motorized rifle and tank troops, with the exception of a single officer - the deputy commander of the detachment for airborne training, a graduate of the RVVDKU.
Unlike the previous two detachments, the 173rd Special Forces was staffed mainly by military personnel from the indigenous nationalities of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, nominally Muslim.
Another difference between the "3rd Muslim Battalion" is that it was not introduced into Afghanistan in its original composition. The combat training of the detachment lasted 4 years until February 10, 1984, when it was introduced into Afghanistan. By this time, due to the rotation of personnel, the detachment no longer corresponded to its original code name.
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Notes
Literature
- S.M. Bekov, Starov Yu.T., Ovcharov A.A., O.V. Krivopalov. Chapters “Storm through life” and “Kapchagai battalion” // 15th brigade of SPECIAL FORCE: People and destinies. - Moscow: Russian panorama, 2009. - P. 100-109, 187-194. - 556p. - 1800 copies. - ISBN 978-5-93165-239-9.
- Sergei Kozlov. Heads of the "Second Musbat" and "Third Musbat" // 22nd Guards Separate Special Forces Brigade. - Moscow: Russian panorama, 2011. - P. 19-24, 53-57. - 480p. - ISBN 978-5-93165-295-5.
- Sergei Kozlov. Chapter 1.1 "Operation Storm-333" // GRU Spetsnaz. Volume 3. Afghanistan - finest hour special forces. 1979-1989 - Moscow: Russian Panorama, 2013. - P. 34-58. - 736p. - 3000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-93165-324-2.
- Sergei Kozlov. Creation of separate brigades and educational institutions// GRU special forces. Volume 2. History of creation: from companies to brigades. 1950-1979 - Moscow: "Russian Panorama", 2009. - P. 130-131. - 424p. - 3000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-93165-135-4.
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An excerpt characterizing the Muslim battalions
The fifth company stood near the forest itself. A huge fire burned brightly in the middle of the snow, illuminating the branches of trees weighed down with frost.In the middle of the night, the soldiers of the fifth company heard footsteps in the forest in the snow and the squawking of branches.
“Guys, witch,” said one soldier. Everyone raised their heads, listened, and out of the forest, into the bright light of the fire, stepped out two, holding each other, human, strangely dressed figures.
They were two Frenchmen hiding in the forest. Hoarsely saying something in a language incomprehensible to the soldiers, they approached the fire. One was taller, wearing an officer's hat, and seemed quite weak. Approaching the fire, he wanted to sit down, but fell to the ground. Another, small, stocky, soldier tied with a handkerchief around his cheeks, was stronger. He raised his comrade and, pointing to his mouth, said something. The soldiers surrounded the French, laid out an overcoat for the sick man, and brought both porridge and vodka.
The weakened French officer was Rambal; tied with a handkerchief was his batman Morel.
When Morel drank vodka and finished the bowl of porridge, he suddenly became painfully amused and began to say something to the soldiers who did not understand him. Rambal refused to eat and silently lay on his elbow by the fire, looking with meaningless red eyes at the Russian soldiers. From time to time he let out a long groan and fell silent again. Morel, pointing to his shoulders, inspired the soldiers that it was an officer and that he needed to be warmed up. A Russian officer, approaching the fire, sent to ask the colonel if he would take a French officer to warm him up; and when they returned and said that the colonel had ordered the officer to be brought in, Rambal was told to go. He got up and wanted to go, but staggered and would have fallen if a soldier standing nearby had not supported him.
- What? You will not? one soldier said with a mocking wink, addressing Rambal.
- Hey, fool! What a lie! That is a peasant, really, a peasant, - reproaches were heard from different sides to the joking soldier. They surrounded Rambal, lifted the two in their arms, intercepted by them, and carried them to the hut. Rambal hugged the necks of the soldiers and, when they carried him, spoke plaintively:
– Oh, nies braves, oh, mes bons, mes bons amis! Voila des hommes! oh, mes braves, mes bons amis! [Oh well done! O my good, good friends! Here are the people! O my good friends!] - and, like a child, he bowed his head on the shoulder of one soldier.
Meanwhile Morel was sitting on the best place surrounded by soldiers.
Morel, a small stocky Frenchman, with inflamed, watery eyes, tied around with a woman's handkerchief over his cap, was dressed in a woman's fur coat. He, apparently drunk, put his arm around the soldier who was sitting beside him, and sang a French song in a hoarse, broken voice. The soldiers held their sides, looking at him.
- Come on, come on, teach me how? I will pass quickly. How? .. - said the joker songwriter, whom Morel was embracing.
Vive Henri Quatre,
Vive ce roi vaillanti -
[Long live Henry the Fourth!
Long live this brave king!
etc. (French song)]
sang Morel, winking his eye.
Ce diable a quatre…
- Vivarika! Wif seruvaru! sidblyaka…” the soldier repeated, waving his hand and really catching the tune.
- Look, smart! Go ho ho ho! .. - coarse, joyful laughter rose from different sides. Morel, grimacing, laughed too.
- Well, go ahead, go on!
Qui eut le triple talent,
De boire, de battre,
Et d "etre un vert galant ...
[Having a triple talent,
drink, fight
and be kind...]
- But it's also difficult. Well, well, Zaletaev! ..
“Kyu…” Zaletaev said with an effort. “Kyu yu yu…” he drew out, diligently protruding his lips, “letriptala, de bu de ba and detravagala,” he sang.
- Oh, it's important! That's so guardian! oh… ho ho ho! “Well, do you still want to eat?”
- Give him some porridge; after all, it will not soon eat up from hunger.
Again he was given porridge; and Morel, chuckling, set to work on the third bowler hat. Joyful smiles stood on all the faces of the young soldiers who looked at Morel. The old soldiers, who considered it indecent to engage in such trifles, lay on the other side of the fire, but occasionally, rising on their elbows, looked at Morel with a smile.
“People too,” said one of them, dodging in his overcoat. - And the wormwood grows on its root.
– Oo! Lord, Lord! How stellar, passion! To frost ... - And everything calmed down.
The stars, as if knowing that now no one would see them, played out in the black sky. Now flashing, now fading, now shuddering, they busily whispered among themselves about something joyful, but mysterious.
X
The French troops were gradually melting away in a mathematically correct progression. And that crossing over the Berezina, about which so much has been written, was only one of the intermediate steps in the destruction of the French army, and not at all the decisive episode of the campaign. If so much has been written and written about the Berezina, then on the part of the French this happened only because on the Berezinsky broken bridge, the disasters that the French army had previously suffered evenly, suddenly grouped here at one moment and into one tragic spectacle, which everyone remembered. On the part of the Russians, they talked and wrote so much about the Berezina only because far from the theater of war, in St. Petersburg, a plan was drawn up (by Pfuel) to capture Napoleon in a strategic trap on the Berezina River. Everyone was convinced that everything would actually be exactly as planned, and therefore they insisted that it was the Berezinsky crossing that killed the French. In essence, the results of the Berezinsky crossing were much less disastrous for the French in the loss of guns and prisoners than the Red, as the figures show.
The only significance of the Berezinsky crossing lies in the fact that this crossing obviously and undoubtedly proved the falsity of all plans for cutting off and the validity of the only possible course of action required by both Kutuzov and all the troops (mass) - only following the enemy. The crowd of Frenchmen ran with an ever-increasing force of speed, with all their energy directed towards the goal. She ran like a wounded animal, and it was impossible for her to stand on the road. This was proved not so much by the arrangement of the crossing as by the movement on the bridges. When the bridges were broken through, unarmed soldiers, Muscovites, women with children, who were in the French convoy - everything, under the influence of inertia, did not give up, but ran forward into the boats, into the frozen water.
This endeavor was reasonable. The position of both the fleeing and the pursuing was equally bad. Staying with his own, each in distress hoped for the help of a comrade, for a certain place he occupied among his own. Having given himself over to the Russians, he was in the same position of distress, but he was placed on a lower level in the section of satisfying the needs of life. The French did not need to have correct information that half of the prisoners, with whom they did not know what to do, despite all the desire of the Russians to save them, were dying of cold and hunger; they felt that it could not be otherwise. The most compassionate Russian commanders and hunters of the French, the French in the Russian service could not do anything for the prisoners. The French were ruined by the disaster in which the Russian army was. It was impossible to take away bread and clothes from hungry, necessary soldiers, in order to give them not to harmful, not hated, not guilty, but simply unnecessary Frenchmen. Some did; but that was the only exception.
Behind was certain death; there was hope ahead. The ships were burned; there was no other salvation but a collective flight, and all the forces of the French were directed to this collective flight.
The farther the French fled, the more miserable were their remnants, especially after the Berezina, on which, as a result of the St. Petersburg plan, special hopes were placed, the more the passions of the Russian commanders flared up, blaming each other and especially Kutuzov. Believing that the failure of the Berezinsky Petersburg plan would be attributed to him, dissatisfaction with him, contempt for him and teasing him were expressed more and more strongly. Joking and contempt, of course, was expressed in a respectful form, in a form in which Kutuzov could not even ask what and for what he was accused. He was not spoken seriously; reporting to him and asking his permission, they pretended to perform a sad ceremony, and behind his back they winked and tried to deceive him at every step.
All these people, precisely because they could not understand him, it was recognized that there was nothing to talk about with the old man; that he would never understand the full depth of their plans; that he would answer his phrases (it seemed to them that these were only phrases) about the golden bridge, that it was impossible to come abroad with a crowd of vagabonds, etc. They had already heard all this from him. And everything he said: for example, that you have to wait for provisions, that people are without boots, it was all so simple, and everything they offered was so complicated and clever that it was obvious to them that he was stupid and old, but they were not powerful, brilliant commanders.
Especially after the unification of the armies of the brilliant admiral and the hero of St. Petersburg Wittgenstein, this mood and staff gossip reached its highest limits. Kutuzov saw this and, sighing, shrugged his shoulders. Only once, after the Berezina, did he get angry and write to Bennigsen, who delivered the following letter to the sovereign separately:
“Due to your painful seizures, if you please, Your Excellency, upon receipt of this, go to Kaluga, where you await further command and appointment from His Imperial Majesty.”
But after Benigsen's departure, the Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich came to the army, who made the beginning of the campaign and was removed from the army by Kutuzov. Now the Grand Duke, having arrived at the army, informed Kutuzov about the displeasure of the Emperor for the weak successes of our troops and for the slowness of movement. The Sovereign Emperor himself intended to come to the army the other day.
An old man, just as experienced in court affairs as in military affairs, that Kutuzov, who in August of that year was chosen commander-in-chief against the will of the sovereign, the one who removed the heir and the Grand Duke from the army, the one who, by his power, in opposition to the will of the sovereign, ordered the abandonment of Moscow, this Kutuzov now immediately realized that his time was over, that his role had been played and that he no longer had this imaginary power. And it was not just from court relations that he realized this. On the one hand, he saw that the military business, the one in which he played his role, was over, and he felt that his calling had been fulfilled. On the other hand, at the same time he began to feel physical weariness in his old body and the need for physical rest.
On November 29, Kutuzov entered Vilna - his good Vilna, as he said. Twice in his service, Kutuzov was governor in Vilna. In the rich surviving Vilna, in addition to the comforts of life, which he had been deprived of for so long, Kutuzov found old friends and memories. And he, suddenly turning away from all military and government concerns, plunged into an even, familiar life as much as he was given rest by the passions that boiled around him, as if everything that was happening now and about to happen in the historical world did not concern him at all.
Chichagov, one of the most passionate cut-offers and overturners, Chichagov, who wanted to first make a diversion to Greece, and then to Warsaw, but did not want to go where he was ordered, Chichagov, known for his bold speech with the sovereign, Chichagov, who considered Kutuzov blessed by himself, because when he was sent in the 11th year to conclude peace with Turkey, in addition to Kutuzov, he, convinced that peace had already been concluded, admitted to the sovereign that the merit of making peace belongs to Kutuzov; this Chichagov was the first to meet Kutuzov in Vilna at the castle where Kutuzov was supposed to stay. Chichagov in a naval uniform, with a dagger, holding his cap under his arm, gave Kutuzov a drill report and the keys to the city. That contemptuously respectful attitude of young people towards an old man who had gone out of his mind was expressed in the highest degree in the whole appeal of Chichagov, who already knew the charges leveled against Kutuzov.
Speaking with Chichagov, Kutuzov, among other things, told him that the carriages with dishes he had recaptured from him in Borisov were intact and would be returned to him.
- C "est pour me dire que je n" ai pas sur quoi manger ... Je puis au contraire vous fournir de tout dans le cas meme ou vous voudriez donner des diners, [You want to tell me that I have nothing to eat. On the contrary, I can serve you all, even if you wanted to give dinners.] - flaring up, said Chichagov, who wanted to prove his case with every word and therefore assumed that Kutuzov was also preoccupied with this. Kutuzov smiled with his thin, penetrating smile and, shrugging his shoulders, answered: - Ce n "est que pour vous dire ce que je vous dis. [I only want to say what I say.]
In Vilna, Kutuzov, contrary to the will of the sovereign, stopped most of the troops. Kutuzov, as his close associates said, unusually sank and physically weakened during his stay in Vilna. He reluctantly took care of the affairs of the army, leaving everything to his generals and, while waiting for the sovereign, indulged in a dispersed life.
Having left with his retinue - Count Tolstoy, Prince Volkonsky, Arakcheev and others, on December 7 from Petersburg, the sovereign arrived in Vilna on December 11 and drove straight to the castle in a road sleigh. At the castle, despite the severe frost, there were about a hundred generals and staff officers in full dress uniform and an honor guard of the Semenovsky regiment.