Ventilation
"Pocket battleships": the loser and lucky of the Nazi fleet. Heavy cruiser Lutzow Lutzow heavy cruiser 1939

"Pocket battleships": the loser and lucky of the Nazi fleet. Heavy cruiser Lutzow Lutzow heavy cruiser 1939

During the Second World War, the German "pocket battleships" of the "Deutschland" type proved to be universal ships, suitable both for raider operations and for combat with enemy cruisers. However, their fate was different. If the combat path of one of the "losers" of the German fleet, the cruiser "Deutschland" ("Lutzow") ran from repair to repair, then the cruiser "Admiral Scheer" showed high combat effectiveness and became famous for successful raids.

In pre-war Germany, heavy cruisers were clearly divided into two subtypes. "Pocket battleships" were built exclusively for raider operations, and "classic" heavy cruisers were built for squadron operations, but taking into account possible raiding. As a result, both of them were engaged almost exclusively in operations against trade, and at the end of the Second World War - artillery support for ground forces.

Let's start the review with "pocket battleships" - amazing ships, in fact, which were "mini-dreadnoughts". Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the Weimar Republic could not build ships with a standard displacement of more than 10,000 tons to replace the old ironclads of the pre-dreadnought era. Therefore, a non-trivial task was set before the German designers of the 1920s - to fit into this framework a ship that would be more powerful than any cruiser of that time and, at the same time, could elude the battleship. At the same time, it was supposed to be used as a raider to fight enemy trade (which means it had to have a long range).

All three qualities were combined thanks to the use of a diesel power plant, as well as the fact that the Allies did not limit the main caliber to the Germans. Therefore, the new ships received six 280-mm guns in three-gun turrets, which obviously exceeded the armament of the most powerful "Washington" cruisers of that time (six or eight 203-mm guns). True, the speed of the new ships was noticeably inferior to the cruisers, but even 28 knots made it safe to meet with most of the then dreadnoughts.

Heavy cruiser "Deutschland" after commissioning, 1934
Source - A. V. Platonov, Yu. V. Apalkov. Warships of Germany, 1939–1945. St. Petersburg, 1995

The initial draft of the ships, officially called "battleships", but nicknamed "pocket battleships" by journalists, was created in 1926. The budget for their construction was discussed in the Reichstag already at the end of 1927, and the construction of the lead Deutschland began in 1929. The Deutschland entered service in the spring of 1933, the Admiral Scheer in 1934, and the Admiral Graf Spee in 1936.

Later, the "pocket battleship" project was criticized as an attempt to create universal combat units to perform all tasks at once. However, in the early 30s, the new ships caused a real stir among Germany's neighbors. In 1931, the French "answered" the Germans with an order for 23,000-ton Dunkirk-class battlecruisers, after which the Italians began to upgrade their old dreadnoughts to the standard of fast battleships. Having developed a new project, the Germans launched a "battleship race" in continental Europe.

As a result of the construction, the standard displacement of the "pocket battleships" went beyond the limit of 10,000 tons and amounted to about 10,770 tons for the "Deutschland" (which was still under construction while observing the restrictions) and 12,540 tons for the "Admiral Count Spee". Note that exceeding the limit by 5-10% was typical for all "Washington" cruisers, except for the very first ones.

The armor of the new German ships turned out to be very strong. "Deutschland" was protected by a full inclined (12 °) outer belt along the citadel (80 mm thick in the upper half and up to 50 mm at the lower edge). At the ends of the citadel, near the cellars, the thickness of the upper part of the belt decreased slightly (up to 60 mm), but lighter armor continued behind 60 mm traverses (18 mm forward to the stem and 50-30 mm aft to the steering gear). The vertical armor was complemented by a 45 mm internal inclined belt running parallel to the outer one, so that the total thickness of the two belts was up to 125 mm - more than any other cruiser of the interwar period.

Booking German "pocket battleships" ("Admiral Graf Spee")

Horizontal armor consisted of two decks: the upper one (throughout the entire citadel, but above the edge of the belt and not structurally connected with it in any way) and the lower one, lying on top of the inner belt, but just below its upper edge. The thickness of the lower deck was 30–45 mm, and there was no gap between the armor belts at all. Thus, the thickness of the horizontal armor was 48–63 mm. The main battery turrets had 140 mm thick front armor, 80 mm thick walls and 85 to 105 mm thick roofs.

The quality of this armor is usually assessed as low, as it was made according to the technology of the beginning of the First World War. But on subsequent ships of the series, the armor was somewhat strengthened: the outer belt reached 100 mm over the entire height by reducing the thickness of the inner zone to 40 mm. The lower armored deck also underwent changes - it continued to the outer belt, but at the same time its thickness decreased to 20-40 mm in different areas. Finally, the thickness of the so-called upper longitudinal armored bulkheads, located in the depth of the hull between the armored decks, increased from 10 to 40 mm. Armor protection was supplemented by side boules, which were not on most cruisers of that time.

In general, the protection of the German "pocket battleships" makes a strange impression - it looks too patchy, uneven and "smeared" along the entire length of the ship. At the same time, in other countries, they preferred to follow the “all or nothing” principle, booking only vital elements as much as possible, and leaving the rest without protection at all. The horizontal armor of the "pocket battleship" looks too weak, especially for a raider with large-caliber guns designed for long-range combat. On the other hand, the booking turned out to be spaced, that is, more efficient; in addition, the projectile, before penetrating deep into the ship, had to overcome several layers of armor located at different angles, which increased the likelihood of a ricochet or a fuse on the armor. How did this protection show itself in combat conditions?

Deutschland (Lützow)

This ship became one of the most unfortunate German cruisers. For the first time, it came under enemy attack on the evening of May 29, 1937, when two Soviet SB aircraft bombed it from a height of 1000 m on the raid of the Spanish island of Ibiza, inflicting a diversionary strike on the island as part of an operation to escort the Magellanes transport (Y-33) to Cartagena ) with a load of weapons. The crew of Senior Lieutenant N. A. Ostryakov was successful - two bombs hit the ship, and another one exploded at its side. According to German data, we are talking about 50-kg bombs, and according to Soviet sources, bombs weighing 100 kg were used.

Deutschland in 1937. He had this color while off the coast of Spain
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The damage inflicted on the “pocket battleship” turned out to be quite impressive. The first bomb was destroyed by a 150 mm artillery mount No. 3 of the starboard side and a refueled aircraft standing on a catapult was set on fire. The second bomb hit the armored deck in the area of the forward superstructure on the port side and pierced it (in this case, 150-mm shells exploded in the fenders of the first shots). A fire broke out between the armored decks, threatening the bow 150-mm cellar, which had to be flooded. Losses in personnel amounted to 24 killed, 7 dead from wounds and 76 wounded.

"Deutschland" after being hit by air bombs near Ibiza, March 29, 1937
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The next damage to the ship, already renamed Lutzow, was received early in the morning on April 9, 1940 in the Oslo Fjord, when, together with the heavy cruiser Blucher, it came under dagger fire from Norwegian coastal batteries. Lutzow received three 150-mm shells from the Kopos battery (located on the eastern shore of the Oslo Fjord), fired almost point-blank, from a distance of no more than a dozen cables. Apparently, all three shells were high-explosive or semi-armor-piercing.

The first hit the middle gun of the bow turret and disabled it. Apparently, the hit fell right into the embrasure, as 4 people were injured, the electrical wiring, optics and hydraulics of the right gun were damaged. The second shell passed over the belt in the area of the 135th frame and exploded behind the barbette of the bow tower, destroying the situation of several living quarters (2 were killed and 6 paratroopers from the 138th Mountain Jaeger Regiment were wounded). The third shell hit the port side cargo boom and exploded above the deck, destroying the spare seaplane, breaking the searchlight cables and causing a local ammunition fire; 3 were killed and 8 sailors were wounded from the servants of 150-mm guns. In general, the Norwegian shells landed quite “successfully”: the hits somewhat weakened the firepower of the German ship, but did not cause any damage to its survivability. In total, 6 people were killed and 22 more were injured.

This was followed by two defeats by torpedoes. The first of these occurred on April 10 - the night after the German landing in Oslo, when the Lutzow was returning to base. Of the six 533-mm torpedoes fired by the British submarine Spearfish from a distance of 30 kb, one reached the target, hitting the steering compartment. The stern over the last three compartments was broken and did not come off only thanks to the power armored deck. Three aft compartments filled with water, 15 people who were here were killed, and the rudder was jammed in the 20 ° position to starboard. The ship took about 1300 tons of water and noticeably settled astern. However, the shafts survived, the power plant was not damaged, and the bulkhead between the 3rd and 4th compartments was hastily reinforced. By the evening of April 14, tugboats managed to drag the ship to the Deutsche Werke shipyard in Kiel. The repair, combined with modernization, took more than a year, and the cruiser entered service only by June 1941.

"Lützow" after torpedo damage on April 10, 1940. Broken feed is clearly visible
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The next time, the Lützow was damaged literally immediately after entering a new operation, the Sommerreise, which was carried out with the aim of breaking through the Danish Straits. Early in the morning of June 12, 1941, he was attacked by British Beaufort torpedo bombers from the 42nd Coast Command Squadron and received one 450-mm aircraft torpedo from six hundred meters. She hit almost in the center of the hull - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 7th compartment on the 82nd frame. Anti-torpedo protection from damage did not save, two engine compartments and a compartment with couplings were flooded, the ship took 1000 tons of water, got a roll of 20 ° and lost speed. Only by the next morning did the German sailors manage to give 12 knots on one shaft. The cruiser reached Kiel, where it again stood up for repairs - this time it took six months.

In the "New Year's Battle" on December 31, 1942, the "Lützow" for the first time came into fire contact with enemy ships. But he fired relatively little, which was caused, first of all, by unsuccessful maneuvering, poor coordination and indecision in the actions of the German formation. In total, Lutzow fired 86 main caliber shells and 76 mine caliber shells (first from a distance of 75 kb on destroyers, then from 80 kb on light cruisers). Shooting "Luttsov" was inconclusive, however, he himself did not receive hits.

Lutzow parked in Norway. The ship is surrounded by anti-torpedo net
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

Further, the “pocket battleship”, due to the poor condition of the diesel engines, was sent to the Baltic, where it served as a classic coastal defense battleship. In October 1944, it was actively used to shell the coast in the Baltic - as a rule, without adjustment from coastal posts. IN naval battles the ship no longer participated; On October 14, he was attacked by the Shch-407 submarine, but both torpedoes did not hit the target. On February 8, 1945, the Lützow was used to fire at coastal targets near Elbing, and on March 25, near Danzig.

Finally, on April 4, at the Hela Spit, the ship was hit by a shell fired by a coastal battery (probably 122 mm caliber). The shell hit the aft superstructure, destroying the admiral's quarters. And on April 15, in the parking lot near Swinemünde, the "pocket battleship" was hit by English Lancaster heavy bombers from the 617th squadron. The Lutzows were hit by two 500-kg armor-piercing bombs - one destroyed the bow command and rangefinder post of the main caliber, along with the top of the mast and the radar antenna, and the second pierced all the armored decks and landed directly in the bow cellar of 280-mm shells. Interestingly, none of these bombs went off! On the other hand, a close explosion of a heavy 5.4-ton bomb that fell into the water made a huge hole with an area of 30 m2 in the ship's hull. "Lützow" tilted and sat on the ground. By the end of the day, the team managed to pump out water from part of the premises, put into operation the bow 280-mm tower and four 150-mm starboard guns. On May 4, when the Soviet troops approached, the ship was blown up by the crew.

"Lützow" that landed on the ground in Swinemünde, 1945
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

"Admiral Scheer"

This ship, on the contrary, became famous for its raiding actions. True, he, unlike the Deutschland, was lucky - during the entire war he never encountered strong enemy ships. But under the British bombs, "Admiral Scheer" fell already on September 3, 1939. Of the eight Blenheim high-speed bombers that attacked Wilhelmshaven from a strafing flight, four were shot down, but the last one still scored hits. At the same time, all three 227-kg bombs that hit the German ship did not have time to cock their fuses due to their low altitude.

Heavy cruiser "Admiral Scheer" after commissioning, 1939
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The next combat clash occurred more than a year later. On the evening of November 5, 1940, while in the North Atlantic, the Admiral Scheer came across convoy HX-84 - 37 transports guarded by the only auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay. Having opened fire on it with the main caliber, the Scheer achieved hits only from the fourth salvo, but the British 152-mm guns never hit the German ship. At the same time, the Sheer fired with medium caliber and achieved several hits on transport ships, so we can say that the statement about the complete uselessness of 150-mm artillery on "pocket battleships" is some exaggeration.

The sinking of the auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

It took twenty minutes to sink the Jervis Bay with 283-mm shells, but even that was enough to start getting dark and the convoy had time to disperse. The Germans managed to sink only five transports, and several more were damaged, but not finished off in the ensuing darkness. It is worth noting that against large unarmored ships, 283-mm shells turned out to be much more effective than 203-mm shells, while 150-mm shells proved to be not very effective (one or two hits were not enough for them to disable the transport). The next time, the Scheer used the main caliber in the same raid - on February 22, 1941, he sank the Dutch Rantau Pajang transport, which was trying to escape in a rain squall. In general, the almost six-month raiding of the “pocket battleship” turned out to be extremely successful - the Sheer sank or captured 17 enemy ships, mainly using 105-mm anti-aircraft artillery. Even the traditional problems with diesels were not insurmountable, although immediately after the raid the ship had to stand up for a 2.5-month power plant repair.

The next combat raid of the Admiral Scheer took place only in August 1942 - it was the famous Operation Wunderland against Soviet shipping in the Arctic Ocean. Despite lengthy training and the use of aerial reconnaissance, the results of the operation were modest. The "Pocket Battleship" managed to intercept and sink only one ship - the icebreaker "Alexander Sibiryakov" (1384 brt), which supplied the island of Severnaya Zemlya. The Germans intercepted him around noon on August 25 and shot him slowly - in 45 minutes, 27 shells were fired in six salvos from distances from 50 to 22 kb (according to German data, four hit the target). The two 76-mm Lender guns on the Sibiryakov did not hit the German ship, and could not hit, but fired desperately throughout the battle.

Sinking "Sibiryakov", view from the board of the "Admiral Scheer"
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

However, the crew of "Sibiryakov" did the main thing - managed to report the battle and the German "auxiliary cruiser" over the radio, which broke the secrecy of the entire operation. Therefore, the commander of the Scheer, Captain zur See Wilhelm Meendsen-Bolken, decided to stop it, and as a completion - to defeat the port of Dixon, landing troops there.

The moment for the attack was chosen exceptionally well: both coastal batteries protecting Dixon (130 mm No. 226 and 152 mm No. 569) were removed from their positions and loaded onto ships for transportation to Novaya Zemlya. However, after a radiogram from the Sibiryakov, the command of the White Sea Flotilla gave the order to urgently deploy batteries and prepare for the appearance of the enemy. In less than a day, two 152-mm howitzer guns of the 1910/30 model were installed directly on the wooden decking of the pier.

Scheme of the battle at Dixon on August 27, 1942
Source - Yu. Perechnev, Yu. Vinogradov. On guard of the sea horizons. M.: Military Publishing, 1967

On August 27, at one in the morning, the Sheer approached the inner roadstead of Dikson from the south and at 1:37 from a distance of 35 kb opened fire on the port and the ships stationed in it. From the third salvo, several 283-mm shells hit the Dezhnev auxiliary patrol boat (SKR-19), but by mistake the Germans used armor-piercing or semi-armor-piercing shells that pierced the ship's hull through without exploding. "Dezhnev" received at least four hits, two 45-mm anti-aircraft guns were disabled, 27 people were killed and wounded.

However, before landing on the ground, the steamer managed to cover the port with a smoke screen, and most importantly, the Kara transport loaded with explosives. The Sheer transferred fire to the Revolutionary transport, set it on fire, but also failed to sink. At this time, finally, coastal battery No. 569 opened fire. Despite complete absence instruments and a shortage of control personnel, her fire was rated by the Germans as "accurate enough". The personnel of the battery reported two hits, but in reality no hits were achieved, but the Sheer commander, not knowing the situation, preferred to leave the battle and hide the ship behind Cape Anvil.

152-mm guns of the coastal battery No. 569
Source - M. Morozov. Operation "Wunderland" // Flotomaster, 2002, No. 1

By half past three, the Admiral Scheer circled the peninsula and began shelling Dixon from the south, firing a significant part of the ammunition in 40 minutes - 77 main-caliber shells, 121 auxiliary-caliber shells and two and a half hundred 105-mm anti-aircraft shells. When the German ship appeared in the alignment of the Previn Strait, battery No. 569 opened fire again, firing 43 shells during the entire battle. The Germans mistook the smoke screen over the port for fires, and at 03:10 the raider commander gave the order to withdraw, ending Operation Wunderland. In fact, not a single person died in Dikson, and both damaged ships were put into operation within a week.

The next time, the Admiral Scheer artillery came into action more than two years later, already in the Baltic. On November 22, 1944, he replaced the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which had shot all the ammunition, opening fire at the Soviet troops from a long distance, storming the last German positions on the Syrve peninsula (Saaremaa island). For two days, the ship shot almost the entire ammunition of the main caliber. It is difficult to determine the effectiveness of his fire, but it should be stated that these almost continuous shellings were able to ensure a relatively calm evacuation of German troops from the peninsula to Courland. At the same time, during a raid by Soviet aviation on the afternoon of November 23 (three "Bostons" and several groups of Il-2s), the Sheer received a hit on the decks of one light bomb (or rocket), as well as damage from explosions at the side. These attacks did not cause serious damage, but forced the German ship to move away from the coast and cease fire before dark.

Attack by Soviet aircraft "Admiral Scheer" near the Syrve Peninsula on October 23, 1944
Source - M. Morozov. Boar hunting // Flotomaster, 1998, No. 2

In February 1945, the Admiral Scheer was used to shell the coast in the area of the Samland Peninsula and Königsberg, this time firing without adjustment. In March, he fired along the coast in the Swinemünde area, and then went to Kiel to replace worn-out main-caliber barrels. Here, on the evening of April 9, the ship came under a massive raid by British aircraft. Within an hour, she received five direct hits, a large hole in the starboard side from close bursts of heavy bombs, and capsized keel up in shallow water.

"Admiral Scheer", sunk in Kiel
Source - V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

During the Second World War, "pocket battleships" proved to be universal ships, suitable both for raiding operations and for combat with enemy cruisers. Their armor despite being insufficient high quality steel, reliably protected from 152-mm shells at all distances and heading angles, and most often withstood hits of 203-mm shells. At the same time, even one hit from a 280-mm gun could cause serious damage to any "Washington" cruiser - this was clearly shown by the battle near La Plata on December 13, 1939, during which the "Admiral Graf Spee" (sistership " Deutschland" and "Admiral Scheer"). The main problem of the "pocket battleships" was not armament, not protection, but control in battle, that is, the notorious "human factor" ...

Bibliography:

A. V. Platonov, Yu. V. Apalkov. Warships of Germany, 1939–1945. St. Petersburg, 1995
V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's Armored Pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012
Yu. Perechnev, Yu. Vinogradov. On guard of the sea horizons. M.: Military Publishing, 1967
S. Abrosov. Air war in Spain. Chronicle of air battles 1936–1939 Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012
denkmalprojekt.org

Unlike the Seydlitz, no attempt was made to increase speed during the night. 157 killed and 26 wounded were the price for the ship that remained afloat. For perseverance in battle, British sailors were nicknamed "Derflinger" iron dog". By the end of the battle, four 305-mm and four 150-mm guns were finally out of action on the cruiser.

Von Haase: “At the end of the column of German ships, only Derflinger and Von der Tann connected by night. It cannot be said that we were a very formidable cover. True, everything was going well on the starboard side and all six 150-mm guns were intact, but only two were active on the port side. One spotlight was also not enough. The sky was cloudy and the night was dark.”

Hull "Darflinger" in the dock during cutting into metal

After 230 hours on June 1, the German fleet was discovered by the 13th British destroyer flotilla, from which a torpedo was fired, which narrowly missed the Derflinger.

Von Haase: “The sun has risen. Hundreds of binoculars and spyglasses searched the horizon, but nowhere could they discover the enemy. Our fleet continued to move south, and on June 1, 1916, in the afternoon, we entered Wilhelmshaven. The Derflinger was badly beaten, many of the rooms were a bunch of broken iron. But the vital parts were not damaged: cars, boilers, steering wiring, propeller shafts and almost all auxiliary mechanisms survived thanks to armor protection. Thousands of fragments covered the ship, among them were two almost intact warheads of 381-mm shells.”

For temporary repairs, the Derflinger docked in a floating dock in Wilhelmshaven, where the Seydlitz had previously stood. After a temporary repair, he moved to the Howald shipyard in Kiel, where, in a floating dock after the dreadnought “Koenig”, from June 22 to October 15, 1916 (76 days), the main repairs were carried out on it. By the end of November, after six months of general repairs and combat training in the Baltic Sea, Derflinger had fully restored its combat capability.

Of the tasks in which the main efforts were directed to the guard service, providing free routes of movement and escorting German submarines, here we can only mention the distracting maneuver of the German mixed task force at the beginning of November 1917 during the laying of a minefield west of Horns-rev and north-west of Helgoland, and a mine-free passage was left here, while on the way from Horns- roars to the north and northwest were dense minefields.

In 1918, on April 20, Derflinger covered the laying of a minefield in the area of the Terschelling Bank and on April 23/24 took part in a large military campaign of the Open Sea Fleet to the latitude of Bergen.

After the armistice on November 19, 1918, the ship was transferred to Scapa Flow, where she arrived on November 24 and where on June 21, 1919 she was scuttled by her own crew. At 1445 hours the cruiser sank to the bottom at a depth of 27-30 m, turning her keel upwards with a list of 20° on board.

In 1938, he was the last of the large ships raised in Scapa Flow. It would have been dismantled in a year, but the outbreak of war prevented the start of cutting for scrap metal. Therefore, the “Derflinger” was anchored off the island of Riza in the keel up position. Only in 1946 was he transferred to the port of Fasline on the River Clyde, where he was in a floating dock until 1948. There, within 15 months, he was dismantled for metal, receiving about 20,000 tons of scrap.

As a sign of mutual reconciliation and respect between the British and German fleets, the British firm that dismantled the ship for scrap handed over the raised ship bells of the flagship battleship"Friedrich der Grosse" and "Derflinger", and later the service seal of this battlecruiser. The Bundesmarine training frigate Scheer brought these unique exhibits to Germany.

Battlecruiser Lützow

Ludwig von Lützow (May 18, 1782 - December 6, 1834). Prussian Major General, distinguished himself during the War of Independence. The ship was in the fleet from August 8, 1915 to June 1, 1916.

Above: battlecruiser Lützow

“Lützow” was built according to the program (budget year) of 1911 at the shipyard “Schihau” in Danzig (building number 885). The ship was laid down under the name "Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta". There are discrepancies in the literary sources regarding the date of laying the keel of the ship: Campbell and Groner name May 1912, Hildebrand - July 1912.

The battlecruiser "Lützow" was built according to the same project and had the same tactical and technical data as the "Derflinger", but at the same time they had some design differences. According to Conway, her normal displacement was 26,180 tons. The hull was divided by watertight bulkheads into XVII main compartments. The Lützow was outwardly different from the Derflinger with a wider front chimney.

According to the project, medium-caliber artillery consisted of 14 rapid-fire 150-mm guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers (6,750 mm) with a total ammunition load of 2,240 rounds (probably due to the fact that Framm's sedative tanks were not installed on it). Of the auxiliary artillery, only eight 88-mm anti-aircraft guns with a barrel length of 45 calibers (3,960 mm) with a maximum elevation angle of + 70 ° and an ammunition load of 225 rounds per gun were installed. The total ammunition load was 1800 rounds.

Torpedo armament in quantity and location was the same as on the Derflinger. Lützow is the first navy Germany had an increased caliber of torpedoes - 600 mm, (ammunition load 12 torpedoes).

On November 29, 1913, after a solemn ceremony at the Schiehau shipyard in Danzig, the second Derflinger-class battlecruiser, called Lützow, was launched, whose godfather was the Hoffmarschall Count von Pieper. Fleet on August 8, 1915 and in the same month moved to Kiel, where it continued to equip and arm. The slipway period of building the ship was 16 months, completion afloat 20 months. Total construction lasted 36 months. Testing and eliminating the accident that occurred in the process of sea trials took another 7 months.

When tested on a measured mile in the same area as Derflinger, Lutzow, with the same design power and with a draft of 0.3 m less than the design, developed the forced power of the machines 80,990 hp (an increase of 29%), which, at a propeller shaft speed of 277 rpm, provided it with a speed of 26.4 knots.This speed corresponded to 28.3 knots at normal draft in deep water.On October 25, 1915, during sea trials, an accident occurred with a low-pressure turbine of the left side, and it was only on March 20, 1916, with a great delay, as part of the 1st reconnaissance group, that he was able to leave Kiel for exercises.The cost of construction was higher than that of the Derflinger and amounted to 58,000 thousand marks or 29,000 thousand rubles The crew consisted of 1,112 people (1,182 in the Battle of Jutland).

March 24, 1916 "Luttsov" together with "Seidlitz" and "Moltke" entered the North Sea and took part in a campaign in the area east of the bank Amrum, because a report came in about cruising English destroyers. But the enemy was not found there. During the passage, he was attacked by an English submarine to no avail.

After the hike, from March 29 to! On April 1, 1916, Rear Admiral Bediker, Deputy Commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Group, raised his flag aboard the Lützow. On April 21/22, 1916, Lutzow took part in the next campaign of the High Seas Fleet, the purpose of which was to bombard the east coast of Great Britain.

The unfinished "Luttsov" fires at the German troops advancing on Leningrad

In 1940, as part of an active trade with the Third Reich, the USSR bought for 104 million. Reichsmark unfinished heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper class. Among the Germans, it was called "Lützow" (a fairly popular name among them - in the First world war this name was given to the battlecruiser that died in the Battle of Jutland, in World War II - this name was given to the pocket battleship "Deutschland" after the sale of the heavy cruiser. We first called this ship "Tallinn", and then renamed it "Petropavlovsk".

Upon reaching 100% readiness, Lutzow would have to have the following performance characteristics:

Standard displacement 13,900 tons, 3 propellers, power of three turbo-gear units 132,000 hp, speed 32 knots, length between perpendiculars 200 m, width 21.6. average deepening 4.57 m. Cruising range 18-knot course 6800 miles. Armor: belt 127 mm, deck 102 mm, turrets 127 mm. Armament: 8 - 203 mm guns, 12 - 105 mm anti-aircraft guns, 12 - 37 mm, 8 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, 12 torpedo tubes, 3 aircraft.
www.battleships.spb.ru/0980/tallinn.html

Sistership "Luttsova", heavy cruiser "Admiral Hipper". During the war, both ships ended up on opposite sides of the barricades.

In accordance with the quite reasonable considerations of Stalin: "A ship purchased from a prospective enemy is equal to two: one more from us and one less from the enemy", particular attention was paid to attempts to procure large warships. Almost all units of the German fleet were debating, but in reality the Germans had to give up only one - the Lutzows. This choice once again shows that heavy cruisers were of the least interest to Hitler, already embroiled in a war with strong naval opponents and having lost hope of achieving sea parity with Britain in traditional balanced fleets. So the loss of a ship that was not very suitable for individual raider actions due to its power plant could not greatly affect the plans of the German fleet, which was clearly incapable of a direct clash in battle with the English. On the other hand, the USSR received one of the most modern and technically advanced cruisers, albeit in an unfinished state.

A little about the state of the ship:
By the summer of 1941, the cruiser was already in 70% readiness. However, none of its premises was finally completed. From the armament of the ship, only the 1st and 4th two-gun turrets of the main caliber and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery were installed.
www.shipandship.chat.ru/military/c031.ht m
the Germans undertook to complete it in the Soviet Union and to complete it with the missing equipment, weapons and ammunition within the agreed time frame. The unfinished cruiser was transferred to Leningrad. Deliveries of the missing equipment in 1940 initially went smoothly, according to the agreed schedule, but from the beginning of 1941 there were interruptions. Before the German attack on Soviet Union the company supplied only half of the main caliber artillery, but at the same time - full ammunition for the guns.
www.kriegsmarine.ru/lutzov_tallin.php

Price.

Actually, what we see is that for solid money (more on this later), an expensive unfinished ship is bought from a potential enemy. Doesn't it remind you of anything? Regarding prices - 104 million. Reichsmark - a lot or a little?
Let's say the construction of one of the most famous ships of the Second World War, the battleship Bismarck, cost the Reich treasury 196.8 million dollars. Reichmark.

Hitler's expensive toy - the battleship "Bismarck"

One heavy tank"Tiger" cost an average of 800 thousand. Reichsmark. That is, it is not difficult to see how expensive toys were large warships of the main classes. Actually, in the case of the notorious Mistral, it is not difficult to establish that the purchase price of one ship is dozens of units of the same modern armored vehicles
Of course, we must remember that the cost of building such a ship in the country of origin and the cost of selling it to another country are somewhat different things, so it is possible that there is a certain trade percentage in the cost of the Lutzow. As a matter of fact, it is very likely that such a percentage is included in the "Mistral" offered to us. Of course, in this respect, the desire of our admirals to build these ships at home is completely and completely understandable - in this case, among other benefits, you can avoid excessive overpayment.

Necessity

The question of why Stalin needed "Luttsov" is very interesting. Despite the weakness of the Kriegsmarine, the Soviet Navy was inferior to it in a number of indicators, and even the purchase of the Lutzow changed little. Moreover, the ship was medium degree readiness. The course of events in the Baltic, where the Baltic Fleet was locked up at its bases for almost the entire war, showed this perfectly - heavy ships showed themselves more in the defense of Leningrad than in purely naval operations.
Cruiser "Maxim Gorky"
As a result of this, the unfinished cruiser was used during the war as a floating battery, methodically shooting at the Germans the ammunition supplied by them.

When the enemy came close to Leningrad, work was found for the 8-inch new unit. September 7 "Petropavlovsk" for the first time opened fire on German troops. Obviously, the Germans at one time considered that shells without guns were not too dangerous, and supplied the entire ammunition load, inflicting a double blow on themselves, reducing the reserve of ammunition for their heavy cruisers and making it possible to fire from four guns Soviet ship practically without restrictions. Only during the first week from the moment the "Petropavlovsk" was connected to operations against the troops, it fired 676 shells. However, on September 17, a shell from a German battery hit the hull and disabled the cruiser's only source of energy - generator room No. 3. The team not only had to stop firing; she was helpless against fire from subsequent hits, as the water supply to the fire mains was cut off. During the unfortunate day of September 17, the helpless ship received about 50 hits from shells of various calibers. A lot of water entered the hull and on August 19 the cruiser sat on a pound. Only the wall of the embankment, on which the "Petropavlovsk" fell sideways, saved it from capsizing. The team lost 30 men, including 10 killed.
www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/WeaponBook/Hipper/11.htm

The Tallinn / Petropavlovsk did not enter service as a full-fledged heavy cruiser - neither during the war, nor after it ended.
It was later used for various non-core tasks, and then logically disassembled. So here it is - they seem to have bought an expensive "unfinished" of a very dubious value, they did not have time to complete it for the war, they did not use it for its intended purpose. Yes, but if you look from the other side - after all, there was significant benefit from the ship, how to evaluate the artillery support provided during the defense of Leningrad, when the fate of the city hung in the balance? How much did the shells that the unfinished cruiser threw at the Germans cost? The question is rhetorical.

Now there is a lot of controversy about why Russia needs the Mistral. We must understand that we are not Nostradamus, and we do not know how history will go. Of course, the option is not ruled out that they will swell a lot of money into the ship, and the return from it will be with a gulkin's nose. But we must also understand that situations are also possible when such a purchase will pay off with interest. I'm not saying that the purchase of Mistral is unambiguously correct, but one must understand that such very dubious purchases, even from the point of view of specialists, can be beneficial in certain circumstances. After all, of course, when they took the Lutzow from the Germans, they could hardly imagine that it would bring benefits in a very unexpected way.
Regarding the Mistral, of course, not only the ship itself is important, but also the technological base attached to it, which can be mastered (if they give us, of course) during the construction of ships of this class at domestic shipyards. Actually, we can recall that in 1939-1940 the Soviet Union was interested in the drawings of Bismarck-class battleships, since the issue of building large warships was very relevant, as well as interest in foreign counterparts. That is, interest in foreign ships is not the prerogative of the current government. The facts of the same expensive contracts before 1917 are widely known. As you can see, there were such facts after the Revolution.

Expensive "pig in a poke"
Where and how our admirals will drive the Mistral is, of course, an interesting question - it already depends on them how to get the most out of an expensive purchase. Actually, I personally do not see anything criminal in such purchases for our Navy, especially if we manage to win a contract for the construction of these ships at our shipyards and access to French technologies.
In the worst case, these ships will allow us to survive in a period of timelessness until we again start building programs for the construction of large ships - it's better to have at least one than none at all. But before the hypothetical implementation of projects to create an AUG and attempts to modernize and commission nuclear-powered cruisers of the Orlan type, we do not foresee. On lack of fish, as they say, and cancer is a fish.
PS. Of course, you can blame the collapse of our shipbuilding industry, for which, at present, the construction of frigates with corvettes is almost a feat, but this is unproductive. Ships will not appear from this, but they are needed now to fill the growing holes associated with the obsolescence of the remnants of the Soviet Navy. So personally, I'm cautiously optimistic about the purchase.

"Lützow"

The last of the German heavy cruisers laid down met the strangest fate. After launching, which took place 2 years after the laying, on July 1, 1939, its completion slowed down significantly. The reason was the lack of labor and the first failures of the German industry that had been working like clockwork until now. The turbine blades arrived with great delays, which slowed down the installation of all the main mechanisms. But the fate of the ship was decided not by technology, but by politics. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact that provided, in particular, for intensive economic exchange. The USSR supplied a large amount of food and raw materials, intending to receive modern military equipment. In accordance with Stalin's perfectly reasonable considerations: "A ship bought from a prospective enemy is equal to two: one more from us and one less from the enemy," special attention was paid to attempts to purchase large warships. Almost all units of the German fleet were debating, but in reality the Germans had to give up only one - the Lutzows. This choice once again shows that heavy cruisers were of the least interest to Hitler, already embroiled in a war with strong naval opponents and having lost hope of achieving sea parity with Britain in traditional balanced fleets. So the loss of a ship that was not very suitable for individual raider actions due to its power plant could not greatly affect the plans of the German fleet, which was clearly incapable of a direct clash in battle with the English. On the other hand, the USSR received one of the most modern and technically advanced cruisers, albeit in an unfinished state.

On February 11, 1940, an agreement on the purchase of Lutzow was signed. For 104 million Reichsmarks, the USSR received a ship completed along the upper deck, which had part of the superstructures and a bridge, as well as two lower towers of the main caliber (however, the guns were installed only in the bow). This, in fact, ends the history of the German heavy cruiser Lutzow and begins the history of the Soviet warship, which first received the designation "Project 53", and from September 25 the name "Petropavlovsk". This story deserves a separate book. We briefly mention only the most important points. On April 15, the "purchase" with the help of tugboats left the Deshimag shipyard and on May 31 was towed to Leningrad, to the Baltic Shipyard. To continue work, a whole delegation of 70 engineers and technicians arrived with the ship, led by Engineer Rear Admiral Feige. Then the game began with dishonest intentions. According to the German-Soviet plans, it was supposed to put Petropavlovsk into operation by 1942, but already in the fall, work slowed down noticeably - through the fault of the German side. The war with the Soviet Union had already been decided, and the Germans did not want to strengthen the enemy. Deliveries were delayed at first, and then completely stopped. The explanations of the German government consisted of numerous references to difficulties in connection with the war with England and France. In the spring of 1941, Rear Admiral Feige went to Germany on "sick leave", from which he never returned. Then the rest of the specialists began to leave; the last of them left the Soviet Union on June 21, just a few hours before the German attack. It is not surprising that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the heavy cruiser was only 70% ready, and most of the equipment was missing. The guns were available only in the lowered bow and stern turrets supplied with the ship; in addition, several light anti-aircraft guns arrived from Germany (1 twin 37-mm installation and eight 20-mm machine guns were installed). Nevertheless, the workers of the plant and the team led by Captain 2nd Rank A.G. Vanifater made every effort to bring the cruiser to at least a conditionally combat-ready state. On August 15, the naval flag was raised on the Petropavlovsk and it entered the Soviet fleet. In accordance with its condition, the cruiser was included in the detachment of newly built warships of the KBF. By this time, the first level of the superstructure, the base of the bow and stern bridges, the pipe and the temporary lower part of the rear mast rose above the hull.

In a completely incompetent state, "Petropavlovsk" stood for a year. Only on September 10 of the following 1942 was it possible to completely restore the water resistance of the hull, and at night from September 16 to 17, put it into the dock of the Baltic Shipyard. Work continued throughout the next year, and already in 1944, the three remaining 203-mm guns spoke again (the left gun in the bow turret was completely disabled in 1941). The cruiser took part in the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky offensive operation, firing 1036 shells in 31 shellings. At the final commissioning, they put an end to it, so saving guns and ammunition no longer made any sense. September 1 "Petropavlovsk" was renamed "Tallinn". The war was drawing to a close, but there were no changes in the fate of the long-suffering ship. After the victory, there was a fundamental opportunity to complete the work begun five years ago, since Soviet shipbuilders received the damaged and unfinished Seidlitz in their hands. However, prudence prevailed and the alien, already outdated cruiser was never completed. For some time it was used as a non-self-propelled training vessel, and then as a floating barracks (on March 11, 1953 it was renamed Dnepr, and on December 27, 1956 it received the designation PKZ-112).

On April 3, 1958, the former Lützow was excluded from the lists of the fleet and towed to the ship's "cemetery" in Kronstadt, where it was dismantled for metal during 1959-1960.

The last of the German heavy cruisers laid down met the strangest fate. After the launch, which took place two years after the laying, on July 1, 1939, its completion slowed down significantly. The reason was the lack of labor and the first failures of the German industry that had been working like clockwork until now. The turbine blades arrived with great delays, which slowed down the installation of all the main mechanisms. But the fate of the ship was decided not by technology, but by politics. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact that provided, in particular, for intensive economic exchange. The USSR supplied a large amount of food and raw materials, intending to receive modern military equipment in return. In accordance with Stalin's perfectly reasonable considerations: "A ship bought from a prospective enemy is equal to two: one more from us and one less from the enemy," special attention was paid to attempts to purchase large warships. The acquisition of almost all large units of the German fleet was discussed, but in reality the Germans had to give up only one - the Lutzow. This choice once again shows that heavy cruisers were of the least interest to Hitler, already embroiled in a war with strong naval opponents and having lost hope of achieving sea parity with Britain in traditional balanced fleets. So the loss of a ship that was not very suitable for individual raider actions due to its power plant could not greatly affect the plans of the German fleet, which was clearly incapable of a direct clash in battle with the English. On the other hand, the USSR received one of the most modern and technically advanced cruisers, albeit in an unfinished state.

On February 11, 1940, an agreement was signed on the purchase of Lutzow. For 104 million Reichsmarks, the USSR received a ship completed along the upper deck, which had part of the superstructures and a bridge, as well as two lower towers of the main caliber (however, the guns were installed only in the bow). This, in fact, ends the history of the German heavy cruiser Lutzow and begins the history of the Soviet warship, which first received the designation "project 53", and from September 25 and the name "Petropavlovsk". On April 15, the "purchase" with the help of tugs left the Deshimag shipyard and on May 31 was towed to Leningrad, to the Baltic Shipyard. To continue the work, a whole delegation of 70 engineers and technicians arrived with the ship, led by Rear Admiral Feige. Then the game began with dishonest intentions. According to the German-Soviet plans, it was supposed to put Petropavlovsk into operation by 1942, but in the autumn the work slowed down noticeably - through the fault of the German side. The war with the Soviet Union had already been decided, and the Germans did not want to strengthen the enemy. Deliveries were delayed at first, and then completely stopped. The explanations of the German government consisted of numerous references to difficulties in connection with the war with England and France. But even after the fall of France, construction did not speed up at all, it even slowed down even more. Entire wagons with goods for "Petropavlovsk" "by mistake" got instead of Leningrad to the other end of Europe.

The game without rules continued. In the spring of 1941, Rear Admiral Feige went to Germany on "sick leave", from which he never returned. Then the rest of the specialists began to leave; the last of them left the Soviet Union on June 21, just a few hours before the German attack. It is not surprising that by the beginning of World War II, the heavy cruiser was only 75% ready, and most of the equipment was missing. The guns were available only in the lowered bow and stern turrets supplied with the ship; in addition, several light anti-aircraft guns arrived from Germany (1 twin 37-mm installation and eight 20-mm machine guns were installed). Nevertheless, the workers of the plant and the team led by Captain 2nd Rank A. G. Vanifatiev made every effort to bring the cruiser to at least a conditionally combat-ready state. By June 1941, the ship was fully staffed with officers and petty officers and approximately 60% with privates. After the start of the war and the threatening advance of the enemy to the northern capital, from July 17, by order of the commander of the Leningrad Naval Defense, the forces of the crew and workers hastily put into operation the existing artillery and the power equipment necessary for its functioning - diesel generators. At the same time, the ship, which was clearly not threatened with going to sea, lost a significant part of the crew. From its composition formed and sent to the front 2 companies of marines. Only the most necessary people remained on the cruiser - gunners, diesel mechanics, electricians. They had to work around the clock with their equipment, putting it into action. The team was assisted by the workers of the Baltic Plant, whose number almost equaled the number of the remaining military sailors.

On August 15, the naval flag was hoisted at the Petropavlovsk and it joined the Soviet fleet. In accordance with its condition, the cruiser was included in the detachment of newly built warships of the KBF. By this time, the first level of the superstructure, the base of the bow and stern bridges, the chimney and the temporary lower part of the main mast rose above the hull.

On September 17, from early morning, the Germans began shelling "their" ship. One of the first shells hit the hull and disabled the cruiser's only source of power - generator room No. 3. The team had to not only stop firing; she was helpless against fire from subsequent hits, as the water supply to the fire mains was cut off. Meanwhile, as a result of a direct hit, a fire broke out in a cistern with a solarium. The fire began to spread throughout the cruiser. During the unfortunate day of September 17, the helpless ship received 53 hits by shells of various calibers, mostly 210 mm - the "norm", quite sufficient to sink even a fully combat-ready heavy cruiser. The crew had to abandon ship; First of all, the wounded were handed over to the shore. A lot of water entered the hull, and on August 19 the cruiser sat on the ground. Only the wall of the embankment, on which the Petropavlovsk fell sideways, saved it from capsizing. The damage was very significant; the area of individual holes reached 25 sq.m. The team lost 30 men, including 10 killed.

Light anti-aircraft artillery began to be removed from the ship; his machine guns were installed on the ships of the Ladoga flotilla. The difficult situation at the front prompted the command to "cut down" the crew even more, which was reorganized. A small group of specialist technicians remained on board, mainly from the electromechanical warhead and several officers. After the survey, it was decided that the cruiser could still be raised and her artillery, which was of significant value to the besieged city, brought into combat readiness.

The work had to be carried out mainly at night in conditions of maximum secrecy and camouflage, since the enemy was only 4 km away. The EPRON rescue ships imperceptibly approached the board, but since they had to limit themselves to the smallest units, the power of their drainage facilities was not enough to lift the Petropavlovsk. Then the bay was covered with ice, and the rescuers were forced to leave. Meanwhile, the small crew did not stop fighting. It was decided to pump out water sequentially from each compartment, pre-sealing it. Initially, only low-power portable pumps were used, but after draining the aft engine compartment, it was possible to put the power plant No. 1 into operation. Gradually, stationary regular pumps located in the compartments began to be used. German technology turned out to be worthy of these truly heroic efforts (work was still carried out only at night), and the ship began to surface. For camouflage, every morning water was again taken into part of the drained compartments in order to hide changes in the draft from the Germans. The ship's pumps could work in completely flooded rooms and drained them quickly enough to take another step towards saving the ship at night. All this work was carried out in the midst of the cold blockade winter of 1941/1942. The personnel suffered not only from cold and dampness, but also from a lack of food: although the rations in the fleet remained in sizes acceptable for maintaining life, people also needed to work hard physically. Nevertheless, during the winter and spring, 2 more diesel generators were put into operation.

Petropavlovsk was in a completely incompetent state for exactly a year. Only on September 10, 1942, it was possible to completely restore the water resistance of the hull, and the next day to make a test ascent. In the morning they put him back on the ground. The operation was carried out so covertly that most of the personnel of the infantry unit located nearby on the shore in the trenches did not notice anything. Finally, on the night of September 16-17, the cruiser finally surfaced and, with the help of tugboats, proceeded to the wall of the Baltic Shipyard.

According to all the rules, repairs should have been continued in the dock, but it was impossible to bring the cruiser to Kronstadt along the Sea Canal, which was completely shot through by the enemy. I had to carry out work in the old fashioned way, as almost 40 years ago in Port Arthur. A huge caisson measuring 12.5 x 15 x 8 m was made at the factory, which was brought in turn to holes, pumped out water and closed up wounds inflicted by enemy shells. At the same time, work continued on the premises and on the deck to restore artillery weapons, electrical equipment and mechanics. And after their completion, the equipment had to be mothballed: work on the hull was too slow.

The repair continued throughout the next year, and already in January 1944, the three remaining 203-mm guns spoke from the new parking lot at the Trade Harbor (the left gun in the bow turret was completely disabled in 1941). The cruiser became part of the 2nd Artillery Group of the Fleet along with the battleship "October Revolution", the cruisers "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky" and two destroyers. Its artillery was commanded by Senior Lieutenant J.K. Grace. "Petropavlovsk" took part in the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky offensive operation, firing on the very first day, January 15, 1944, 250 shells. From January 15 to January 20, this number increased to 800. And in just 31 shelling, 1036 shells were fired at the enemy. The guns of the crippled ship were not too spared: it accounted for about a third of the firing and shells fired by the 2nd artillery group of the fleet. At the final commissioning, they put an end to it, so saving guns and ammunition no longer made any sense.

According to the reports of coastal observation groups and our troops, artillery operations proved to be very effective. Only on January 19, 3 guns, 29 cars, 68 wagons and 300 killed enemy soldiers and officers were recorded at the expense of the battery cruiser. But gradually the front moved away, and it became more and more difficult to fire. The ship fired its last salvos on January 24, 1944.

So, in fact, the combat life of the "Russian German" ended. September 1 "Petropavlovsk" was renamed "Tallinn". The war was drawing to a close, but there were no changes in the fate of the long-suffering ship. After the victory, there was a fundamental opportunity to complete the work begun five years ago, since the Soviet shipbuilders got their hands on the damaged and unfinished Seydlitz. However, prudence prevailed, and the alien, already outdated cruiser was never completed. For some time it was used as a non-self-propelled training vessel, and then as a floating barracks (on March 11, 1953 it was renamed Dnepr, and on December 27, 1956 it received the designation PKZ-112).

On April 3, 1958, the former Lutzow was excluded from the lists of the fleet and towed to the ship cemetery in Kronstadt, where it was dismantled for metal during 1959-1960.

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