Friends, I propose this topic. Filled with photos and interesting information.
The theme of the Navy is close to me. For 4 years he studied as a schoolboy at KUMRP (Club of Young Sailors, Rechnikov and Polar Explorers). Fate did not connect with the fleet, but I remember these years. Yes, and father-in-law turned out to be a submariner quite by accident. I'll start, and you help.

March 9, 1906 issued a decree "On the classification of military ships of the Russian Imperial Navy." It was by this decree that the submarine forces of the Baltic Sea were created with the base of the first formation of submarines in the naval base of Libava (Latvia).

Emperor Nicholas II "deigned to command" to include "messenger ships" and "submarines" in the classification. The text of the decree listed 20 names of submarines built by that time.

By order of the Russian Maritime Department, submarines were declared an independent class of fleet ships. They were called "hidden ships".

In domestic submarine shipbuilding, non-nuclear and nuclear submarines are conventionally divided into four generations:

First generation submarines for their time became an absolute breakthrough. However, they retained the traditional solutions for the diesel-electric fleet in terms of power supply and general ship systems. It was on these projects that hydrodynamics was worked out.

Second generation endowed with new types of nuclear reactors and electronic equipment. Also a characteristic feature was the optimization of the shape of the hull for underwater travel, which led to an increase in standard underwater speeds up to 25-30 knots (two projects even have over 40 knots).

third generation has become more perfect in terms of both speed and stealth. The submarines were distinguished by a large displacement, more advanced weapons and better habitability. For the first time they installed equipment for electronic warfare.

fourth generation significantly increased the strike capabilities of submarines, and increased their secrecy. In addition, electronic weapons systems are being introduced that will allow our submarines to detect the enemy earlier.

Now design bureaus are developing fifth generations submarine.

On the example of various "record-breaking" projects, marked with the epithet "most", one can trace the features of the main stages in the development of the Russian submarine fleet.

MOST FIGHTING:
Heroic "Pike" of the Great Patriotic War

Messages are merged 21 Mar 2017, first edit time 21 Mar 2017

Nuclear submarine missile cruiser K-410 "Smolensk" is the fifth ship of project 949A, code "Antey", (according to NATO classification - Oscar-II) in a series of Soviet and Russian nuclear submarine missile cruisers (APRK), armed with cruise missiles P-700 Granit and designed to destroy aircraft carrier strike formations. The project is a modification of 949 "Granite".
In 1982-1996, 11 ships out of 18 planned were built, one K-141 Kursk boat was lost, the construction of two (K-139 and K-135) was mothballed, the rest were canceled.
The cruising submarine Smolensk under the name K-410 was laid down on December 9, 1986 at the Sevmashpredpriyatie plant in the city of Severodvinsk under serial number 637. Launched on January 20, 1990. December 22, 1990 entered service. March 14, 1991 became part of the Northern Fleet. It has tail number 816 (1999). Port of registry Zaozersk, Russia.
Main characteristics: Displacement surface 14700 tons, underwater 23860 tons. The length of the longest waterline is 154 meters, the width of the hull is 18.2 meters, the average draft of the waterline is 9.2 meters. Surface speed 15 knots, underwater 32 knots. The working depth of immersion is 520 meters, the maximum immersion depth is 600 meters. Autonomy of navigation is 120 days. Crew 130 people.

Power plant: 2 OK-650V nuclear reactors with a capacity of 190 MW each.

Armament:

Torpedo-mine armament: 2x650-mm and 4x533-mm TA, 24 torpedoes.

Missile weapons: P-700 "Granit" anti-ship missiles, 24 ZM-45 missiles.

In December 1992, she received a prize from the Civil Code of the Navy for firing long-range cruise missiles.

On April 6, 1993, it was renamed Smolensk in connection with the establishment of patronage over the submarine by the administration of Smolensk.

In 1993, 1994, 1998 he won the Navy Civil Code prize for missile firing at a sea target.

In 1995, he performed autonomous military service off the coast of Cuba. During autonomy, in the area of ​​the Sargasso Sea, there was an accident of the main power plant, the consequences were eliminated by the crew without loss of secrecy and using security measures in two days. All tasks assigned to the combat service were successfully completed.

In 1996 - autonomous military service.

In June 1999, he took part in the Zapad-99 exercises.

In September 2011, he arrived at Zvezdochka CS OJSC to restore technical readiness.

In August 2012, the slipway repair stage was completed at the APRK: on August 05, 2012, a dock operation was carried out to launch the ship into the water. The final stage of work was carried out afloat near the outfitting embankment.

On September 02, 2013, at the Zvyozdochka dock, when testing the tank of the main ballast of the boat, the pressure cover of the kingston was torn off. No harm done. On December 23, after the completed repair, the APRK went to sea to carry out the program of factory sea trials. During the repair on the cruiser, the technical readiness of all ship systems was restored, including the mechanical part, electronic weapons, hull structures and the main power plant. The submarine's reactors were recharged and the weapons complex was repaired. The service life of the submarine missile carrier has been extended by 3.5 years, after which it is planned to begin work on a deep modernization of the ship. According to a message dated December 30, he returned to the main base of Zaozersk (Murmansk region), having made the transition to his native base from the city of Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk region), where he underwent repairs and modernization at the Zvyozdochka defense shipyard.

In June 2014, in the White Sea, the APRK, together with the rescuers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, took part in the rescue of the boat "Barents". In September, the cruiser participated in tactical exercises of the diverse forces of the Northern Fleet.

Nation's favorite

In the Third Reich they knew how to create idols. One of these poster idols created by propaganda, of course, was the submarine hero Gunther Prien. He had an ideal biography of a guy from the people who made a career thanks to the new government. At the age of 15, he was hired as a cabin boy on a merchant ship. He achieved the captain's diploma solely thanks to his diligence and natural mind. During the Great Depression, Prien found himself out of a job. After the Nazis came to power, the young man voluntarily joined the resurgent Navy as an ordinary sailor and quickly managed to prove himself from the best side. Then there were studies at a privileged school for submariners and the war in Spain, in which Prien participated already as a submarine captain. In the first months of World War II, he immediately managed to achieve good results by sinking several English and French ships in the Bay of Biscay, for which he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd degree from the commander of the naval forces, Admiral Erich Raeder. And then there was a fantastically audacious attack on the largest English battleship Royal Oak (“Royal Oak”) in the main base of the British Navy, Scapa Flow.

For the accomplished feat, the Fuhrer awarded the entire crew of U-47 with the Iron Cross 2nd Class, and the commander himself was honored to receive the Knight's Cross from Hitler's hands. However, according to the recollections of people who knew him at that time, fame did not spoil Prin. In dealing with his subordinates and acquaintances, he remained the former caring commander and charming guy. For a little more than a year, the underwater ace continued to create his own legend: peppy reports about the exploits of the U-47 appeared almost weekly in film releases of Dr. Goebbels' favorite brainchild, Die Deutsche Wochenchau. Ordinary Germans really had something to admire: in June 1940, German boats sank 140 ships from Allied convoys in the Atlantic with a total displacement of 585,496 tons, of which about 10% fell on Prien and his crew! And then all of a sudden everything was quiet at once, as if there was no hero. For quite a long time, official sources did not report anything at all about Germany's most famous submariner, but it was impossible to hush up the truth: on May 23, 1941, the Navy command officially recognized the loss of the U-47. She was sunk on March 7, 1941 on the way to Iceland by the British destroyer Wolverine ("Wolverine"). The submarine, waiting for the convoy, surfaced next to the guard destroyer and was immediately attacked by it. Having received minor damage, U-47 lay down on the ground, hoping to lie down and leave unnoticed, but due to damage to the propeller, the boat, trying to swim, created a terrible noise, hearing which the Wolverine hydroacoustics initiated a second attack, as a result of which the submarine was finally sunk by throwing depth charges . However, the most incredible rumors about Prien and his sailors circulated in the Reich for a long time. In particular, it was rumored that he did not die at all, but allegedly raised a riot on his boat, for which he ended up either in a penal battalion on the Eastern Front, or in a concentration camp.

First blood

The first victim of a submarine in World War II is the British passenger liner Athenia, torpedoed on September 3, 1939, 200 miles from the Hebrides. As a result of the U-30 attack, 128 crew members and passengers of the liner, including many children, were killed. And yet, for the sake of objectivity, it is worth recognizing that this barbaric episode is not very characteristic of the first months of the war. At the initial stage, many commanders of German submarines tried to comply with the terms of the London Protocol of 1936 on the rules of submarine warfare: first, stop a merchant ship on the surface and land an inspection team on board for a search. If, under the terms of the prize law (a set of international legal norms governing the seizure of merchant ships and cargo by the warring countries at sea), the sinking of the ship was allowed due to its obvious belonging to the enemy fleet, then the submarine crew waited until the sailors from the transport transferred to lifeboats and departed for a safe distance from the doomed ship.

However, very soon the warring parties stopped playing gentlemanly: submarine commanders began to report that single ships they met were actively using artillery pieces installed on their decks or immediately broadcasting a special signal about the detection of a submarine - SSS. Yes, and the Germans themselves were less and less eager to breed politeness with the enemy, trying to quickly end the war that had begun favorably for them.
Great success was achieved on September 17, 1939 by the U-29 boat (Captain Shukhard), which attacked the aircraft carrier Koreydzhes with a three-torpedo salvo. For the English Admiralty, the loss of a ship of this class and 500 crew members was a big blow. So the debut of the German submarines as a whole turned out to be quite impressive, but it could become even more painful for the enemy if it were not for the constant failures in the use of torpedoes with magnetic fuses. By the way, technical problems at the initial stage of the war were experienced by almost all of its participants.

Breakthrough in Scapa Flow

If the loss of an aircraft carrier in the first month of the war was a very sensitive blow for the British, then the event that occurred on the night of October 13-14, 1939 was already a knockdown. The planning of the operation was personally led by Admiral Karl Doenitz. At first glance, the Royal Navy's anchorage at Scapa Flow seemed completely impregnable, at least from the sea. There were strong and treacherous currents. And the approaches to the base were guarded around the clock by guards, covered by special anti-submarine nets, boom barriers, and sunken ships. Nevertheless, thanks to detailed aerial photographs of the area and data obtained from other submarines, the Germans still managed to find one loophole.

A responsible mission was entrusted to the boat U-47 and its successful commander Günther Prien. On the night of October 14, this boat, having passed a narrow strait, crept through a boom barrier accidentally left open and thus ended up in the main roadstead of the enemy base. Prien made two surface torpedo attacks on two English ships at anchor. The battleship Royal Oak, a modernized World War I veteran of 27,500 tons, experienced a massive explosion and sank along with 833 crew members, killing Admiral Blangrove on board. The British were taken by surprise, they thought that the base was attacked by German bombers, and opened fire in the air, so that U-47 safely escaped retaliation. Returning to Germany, Prien was greeted as a hero and awarded the Knight's Cross with oak leaves. His personal emblem "Bull Scapa Flow" after his death became the emblem of the 7th Flotilla.

Loyal Leo

The successes achieved during the Second World War, the German submarine fleet is largely due to Karl Doenitz. A former submarine commander himself, he was well aware of the needs of his subordinates. The admiral personally met each boat returning from a military campaign, organized special sanatoriums for crews exhausted by many months at sea, and attended graduations from a submariner's school. The sailors behind their backs called their commander "daddy Karl" or "Lion". In fact, Doenitz was the engine of the revival of the Third Reich submarine fleet. Shortly after the signing of the Anglo-German Agreement, which removed the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, he was appointed by Hitler as "Fuhrer of submarines" and led the 1st submarine flotilla. In his new position, he had to face active opposition from supporters of large ships from the leadership of the Navy. However, the talent of a brilliant administrator and political strategist has always allowed the chief of submariners to lobby the interests of his department in the highest state spheres. Doenitz was one of the few convinced National Socialists among the senior officers of the fleet. The admiral used every opportunity that presented itself to him to publicly praise the Fuhrer.

Once, speaking to Berliners, he became so carried away that he began to assure his listeners that Hitler foresees a great future for Germany and therefore cannot be mistaken:

"We are worms compared to him!"

In the first years of the war, when the actions of his submariners were extremely successful, Doenitz enjoyed the full confidence of Hitler. And soon it came finest hour. This takeoff was preceded by very tragic events for the German fleet. By the middle of the war, the pride of the German fleet - heavy ships of the Tirpitz and Scharnhost types - were actually neutralized by the enemy. The situation required a radical change of orientation in the war at sea: the “batch of battleships” was to be replaced by a new team professing the philosophy of large-scale submarine warfare. After the resignation of Erich Raeder on January 30, 1943, Dönitz was appointed his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the German Naval Forces with the title of Grand Admiral. And two months later, German submariners achieved record levels by sending 120 Allied ships with a total tonnage of 623,000 tons to the bottom during March, for which their boss was awarded the Knight's Cross with oak leaves. However, the period of great victories was coming to an end.

Already in May 1943, Doenitz was forced to withdraw his boats from the Atlantic, fearing that soon he would have nothing to command. (By the end of this month, the grand admiral could sum up terrible results for himself: 41 boats and more than 1,000 submariners were lost, among whom was the youngest son of Doenitz, Peter.) This decision infuriated Hitler, and he demanded that Doenitz cancel the order , stating at the same time: “There can be no question of ending the participation of submarines in the war. The Atlantic is my first line of defense in the west." By the fall of 1943, the Germans had to pay for every Allied ship sunk with one of their own boats. AT recent months war, the admiral was forced to send his people to almost certain death. Nevertheless, he remained faithful to his Fuhrer to the very end. Before committing suicide, Hitler appointed Dönitz as his successor. May 23, 1945 new head state was captured by the Allies. At the Nuremberg trials, the organizer of the German submarine fleet managed to escape responsibility for issuing orders according to which his subordinates shot sailors who escaped from torpedoed ships. The admiral received his ten-year term for executing Hitler's order, according to which the captured crews of English torpedo boats were handed over to the SS for execution. After his release from the Spandau prison in West Berlin in October 1956, Dönitz began to write his memoirs. The admiral died in December 1980 at the age of 90. According to the testimonies of people who knew him closely, he always kept with him a folder with letters from officers of the Allied fleets, in which former opponents expressed their respect to him.

Burn everyone!

“It is forbidden to make any attempts to rescue the crews of sunken ships and vessels, to transfer them to lifeboats, to return capsized boats to their normal position, to supply victims with provisions and water. Salvation is contrary to the very first rule of warfare at sea, which requires the destruction of enemy ships and their crews, ”Denitz ordered German submarine commanders on September 17, 1942. Later, the Grand Admiral motivated this decision by the fact that any generosity shown to the enemy costs his people too much. He referred to the incident with the Laconia five days before the order was given, that is, on September 12th. Having sunk this English transport, the commander of the German submarine U-156 raised the Red Cross flag on his bridge and set about rescuing the sailors in the water. On board U-156, on the international wave, a message was broadcast several times that the German submarine was carrying out rescue work and guaranteeing complete safety to any ship ready to take on board sailors from the sunken steamer. Nevertheless, after some time, U-156 attacked the American Liberator.
Then air attacks began to follow one after another. The boat miraculously escaped destruction. Hot on the heels of this incident, the German command of the submarine forces developed extremely strict instructions, the essence of which can be expressed in a laconic order: “Do not take prisoners!” However, it cannot be argued that it was after this incident that the Germans were forced to “take off their white gloves” - cruelty and even atrocity have long become commonplace in this war.

From January 1942, German submarines began to be supplied with fuel and supplies from special cargo submarine tankers, the so-called "cash cows", which, among other things, were a repair team and a naval hospital. This made it possible to transfer active fighting to the US coast. The Americans turned out to be completely unprepared for the fact that the war would come to their shores: for almost half a year, Hitler's underwater aces hunted with impunity for single ships in the coastal zone, shooting brightly lit cities and factories from artillery guns at night. Here is what one American intellectual wrote about this, whose house overlooked the ocean: “The view of the boundless sea space, which used to inspire life and work so much, now brings me longing and horror. Especially strong fear permeates me at night, when it is impossible to think about anything else but these prudent Germans choosing where to send them a shell or a torpedo ... "

Only by the summer of 1942 did the US Air Force and Navy succeed in jointly organizing a reliable defense of their coast: now dozens of aircraft, ships, airships and private high-speed boats were constantly monitoring the enemy. The US 10th Fleet organized special "killer groups", each of which included a small aircraft carrier, equipped with attack aircraft, and several destroyers. Patrolling by long-range aircraft equipped with radars capable of detecting submarine antennas and snorkels, as well as the use of new destroyers and ship-based Hedgehog bombers with powerful depth charges, changed the balance of forces.

In 1942, German submarines began to appear in polar waters off the coast of the USSR. With their active participation, the Murmansk convoy PQ-17 was destroyed. Of the 36 of his transports, 23 perished, while 16 sank submarines. And on April 30, 1942, the submarine U-456 shot down the English cruiser Edinburgh with two torpedoes, sailing from Murmansk to England with several tons of Russian gold to pay for Lend-Lease supplies. The cargo lay at the bottom for 40 years and was lifted only in the 80s.

The first thing that submariners who had just put out to sea encountered was terrible crowding. The crews of submarines of the VII series suffered especially from this, which, being already cramped in design, in addition were stuffed to the eyeballs with everything necessary for long-distance trips. The sleeping places of the crew and all the free corners were used to store boxes of provisions, so the crew had to rest and eat wherever they could. To take additional tons of fuel, it was pumped into tanks intended for fresh water (drinking and hygienic), thus drastically reducing her diet.

For the same reason, German submariners never saved their victims, desperately floundering in the middle of the ocean.
After all, there was simply nowhere to place them - except to shove them into a freed torpedo tube. Hence the reputation of inhuman monsters attached to submariners.
The feeling of mercy was blunted by constant fear for one's own life. During the campaign, I had to constantly be afraid of minefields or enemy aircraft. But the most terrible were the enemy destroyers and anti-submarine ships, or rather, their depth charges, the close burst of which could destroy the hull of the boat. In this case, one could only hope for a quick death. It was much more terrible to get severely injured and irretrievably fall into the abyss, listening in horror to how the compressible hull of the boat was cracking, ready to break inward with streams of water under pressure of several tens of atmospheres. Or worse than that - forever lie aground and slowly suffocate, while realizing that there will be no help ...

Wolf hunting

By the end of 1944, the Germans had already finally lost the Battle of the Atlantic. Even the newest boats of the XXI series, equipped with a snorkel - a device that allows you not to surface for a significant time to recharge batteries, remove exhaust gases and replenish oxygen supplies, could no longer change anything (the snorkel was also used on submarines of earlier series, but not very successfully). The Germans managed to make only two such boats, having a speed of 18 knots and diving to a depth of 260 m, and while they were on combat duty, the Second World War ended.

Countless Allied aircraft equipped with radar were constantly on duty in the Bay of Biscay, which became a real graveyard for German submarines leaving their French bases. Reinforced concrete shelters, having become vulnerable after the British developed the 5-ton Tallboy concrete-piercing aerial bombs, turned into traps for submarines, from which only a few managed to escape. In the ocean, submarine crews were often pursued for days by air and sea hunters. Now the "Doenitz wolves" were less and less likely to get a chance to attack well-protected convoys and were increasingly concerned about the problem of their own survival under the maddening impulses of search sonar, methodically "probing" the water column. Often, the Anglo-American destroyers did not have enough victims, and with a pack of hounds they attacked any submarine they found, literally bombarding it with depth charges. Such, for example, was the fate of U-546, which was simultaneously bombed by eight American destroyers at once! Until recently, the formidable German submarine fleet was not saved by either perfect radars or enhanced armor, nor did new homing acoustic torpedoes and anti-aircraft weapons help. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the enemy had long been able to read German ciphers. But the German command until the very end of the war was in full confidence that the codes of the Enigma encryption machine could not be cracked! Nevertheless, the British, having obtained the first sample of this machine from the Poles in 1939, by the middle of the war created an effective system for deciphering enemy messages under the code name "Ultra", using, among other things, the world's first electronic calculating machine "Colossus". And the most important "gift" the British received on May 8, 1941, during the capture of the German submarine U-111 - they got into their hands not only a serviceable car, but also the entire set of covert communications documents. Since that time, for German submariners, going on the air for the purpose of transmitting data has often been tantamount to a death sentence. Apparently, Doenitz knew this at the end of the war, since he once wrote lines in his diary full of helpless despair: “The enemy holds a trump card, covers all areas with the help of long-range aviation and uses detection methods for which we are not ready. The enemy knows all our secrets, and we know nothing about their secrets!”

According to official German statistics, out of 40,000 German submariners, about 32,000 people died. That is, many more than every second!
After the surrender of Germany, most of the submarines captured by the Allies were sunk during Operation Deadly Fire.

Submarine aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy

The Japanese navy during World War II had large submarines capable of transporting up to several light seaplanes (similar submarines were also built in France).
The aircraft were stored folded in a special hangar inside the submarine. The takeoff was carried out in the surface position of the boat, after the aircraft was taken out of the hangar and assembled. On the deck in the bow of the submarine there were special catapult skids for a short launch, from which the aircraft rose into the sky. After the flight was completed, the aircraft splashed down and retracted back into the boat hangar.

In September 1942, a Yokosuka E14Y aircraft, taking off from an I-25 boat, raided Oregon (USA), dropping two 76-kilogram incendiary bombs, which, as expected, were supposed to cause extensive fires in forest areas, which, however, did not occur and the effect was negligible. But the attack had a great psychological effect, since the method of attack was not known.
This was the only bombing of the continental United States during the entire war.

Submarines of the I-400 (伊四〇〇型潜水艦) type, also known as the Sentoku or CTO class, are a series of Japanese diesel-electric submarines from the Second World War. Designed in 1942-1943 for the role of ultra-long-range submarine aircraft carriers for operations anywhere in the world, including off the coast of the United States. Submarines of the I-400 type were the largest built during the Second World War and remained so until the advent of the nuclear submarine.

It was originally planned to build 18 submarines of this type, but in 1943 this number was reduced to 9 ships, of which only six were launched, and only three were completed in 1944-1945.
Due to the late construction, the I-400 type submarines were never used in combat. After the surrender of Japan, all three submarines were transferred to the United States, and in 1946 they scuttled them.
The history of the I-400 type began shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when, at the direction of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the development of the concept of a submarine aircraft carrier for striking the US coast was begun. Japanese shipbuilders already had experience deploying a single reconnaissance seaplane on several classes of submarines, however, the I-400 had to be equipped with large quantity heavier aircraft.

On January 13, 1942, Yamamoto sent the I-400 project to the naval command. It formulated requirements for the type: the submarine had to have a cruising range of 40,000 nautical miles (74,000 km) and have on board more than two aircraft capable of carrying an aerial torpedo or an 800-kg aerial bomb.
The first draft of the I-400 type submarine was presented in March 1942 and, after improvements, was finally approved on May 17 of the same year. On January 18, 1943, construction of the lead ship of the series, the I-400, began at the Kure shipyards. The original construction plan, adopted in June 1942, provided for the construction of 18 boats of this type, but after the death of Yamamoto in April 1943, this number was halved.
By 1943, Japan began to experience serious difficulties with the supply of materials, and plans for the construction of the I-400 type were reduced, initially to six boats, and then to three altogether.

The data given in the table are largely conditional, in the sense that they cannot be taken as absolute figures. This is primarily due to the fact that it is rather difficult to accurately calculate the number of submarines of foreign states participating in hostilities.
Until now, there are discrepancies in the number of targets sunk. However, the values ​​given give a general idea of ​​the order of the numbers and their relationship to each other.
And so, we can draw some conclusions.
Firstly, Soviet submariners have the smallest number of targets sunk for each submarine participating in the hostilities (often the effectiveness of submarine operations is estimated by the tonnage sunk. However, this indicator largely depends on the quality of potential targets, and in this sense, for the Soviet fleet it is completely Indeed, but in the North, the bulk of enemy transports were ships of small and medium tonnage, and in the Black Sea, even such targets could be counted on the fingers.
For this reason, in the future, we will mainly talk simply about sunk targets, only highlighting warships among them). The United States is next in this indicator, but there the real figure will be much higher than indicated, since in fact only about 50% of the total number of submarines in the theater of operations participated in the hostilities on communications, the rest performed various special tasks.

Secondly, the percentage of lost submarines from the number of those participating in hostilities in the Soviet Union is almost twice as high as in other victorious countries (in the UK - 28%, in the USA - 21%).

Thirdly, in terms of the number of targets sunk for each lost submarine, we surpass only Japan, and are close to Italy. The rest of the countries in this indicator surpass the USSR several times. As for Japan, at the end of the war there was a real beating of its fleet, including the submarine, so comparing it with the victorious country is not correct at all.

Considering the effectiveness of the actions of Soviet submarines, it is impossible not to touch on another aspect of the problem. Namely, the ratio of this efficiency with the funds that were invested in submarines and the hopes that were placed on them. It is very difficult to estimate in rubles the damage inflicted on the enemy, on the other hand, and the real labor and material costs for the creation of any product in the USSR, as a rule, did not reflect its formal cost. However, this issue can be considered indirectly. In the prewar years, the industry transferred to the Navy 4 cruisers, 35 destroyers and leaders, 22 patrol ships and more than 200 (!) Submarines. And in monetary terms, the construction of submarines was clearly a priority. Until the third five-year plan, the lion's share of appropriations for military shipbuilding went to the creation of submarines and only with the laying of battleships and cruisers in 1939, the picture began to change. Such dynamics of financing fully reflects the views on the use of the forces of the fleet that existed in those years. Until the very end of the thirties, submarines and heavy aircraft were considered the main striking force of the fleet. In the third five-year plan, priority began to be given to large surface ships, but by the beginning of the war, it was submarines that remained the most massive class of ships, and if they were not the main bet, then great hopes were placed.

Summing up a short express analysis, it must be admitted that, firstly, the effectiveness of Soviet submarines during the Second World War was one of the lowest among the warring states, and even more so such as Great Britain, the USA, Germany.

Secondly, Soviet submarines clearly did not live up to the hopes placed on them and the funds invested. As one example of a number of similar ones, one can consider the contribution of submarines to disrupting the evacuation of Nazi troops from the Crimea on April 9-May 12, 1944. In total, during this period, 11 submarines in 20 military campaigns damaged one (!) transport.
According to the reports of the commanders, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this. Yes, it's not very important. Indeed, in April and twenty days of May, the enemy conducted 251 convoys! And these are many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine security. A similar picture developed in the Baltic in the last months of the war with the mass evacuation of troops and civilians from the Courland Peninsula and from the region of the Danzig Bay. In the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-tonnage ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine security in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 combat campaigns sank only one transport, a floating base and a floating battery.

The most likely reason for the low efficiency of domestic submarines may lie in their very quality. However, in the domestic literature, this factor is swept aside immediately. You can find a lot of statements that Soviet submarines, especially the "C" and "K" types, were the best in the world. Indeed, if we compare the most common performance characteristics of domestic and foreign submarines, then such statements seem to be quite reasonable. The Soviet K-type submarine surpasses foreign classmates in speed, in surface cruising range is second only to the German submarine and has the most powerful weapons.

But even when analyzing the most common elements, there is a noticeable lag in the cruising range in a submerged position, in the depth of diving and in diving speed. If you start to understand further, it turns out that the quality of submarines is greatly influenced not by those elements that are recorded in our reference books and are usually subject to comparison (by the way, we also, as a rule, do not indicate the diving depth and diving speed), and others directly related to new technologies. These include noise, impact resistance of instruments and mechanisms, the ability to detect and attack the enemy in conditions of poor visibility and at night, the stealth and accuracy of the use of torpedo weapons, and a number of others.

Unfortunately, by the beginning of the war, domestic submarines did not have modern electronic detection equipment, torpedo firing machines, bubble-free firing devices, depth stabilizers, radio direction finders, shock absorbers for instruments and mechanisms, but they were distinguished by high noise of mechanisms and devices.

The issue of communication with a submerged submarine was not resolved. Almost the only source of information about the surface situation in a submerged submarine was a periscope with very unimportant optics. The "Mars" type noise direction finders in service made it possible to determine by ear the direction to the noise source with an accuracy of plus or minus 2 degrees.
The range of the equipment with good hydrology did not exceed 40 kb.
The commanders of German, British, American submarines had hydroacoustic stations at their disposal. They worked in the direction-finding mode or in the active mode, when the hydroacoustic could determine not only the direction to the target, but also the distance to it. German submariners, with good hydrology, detected a single transport in the noise direction finding mode at a distance of up to 100 kb, and already from a distance of 20 kb they could get a range to it in the "Echo" mode. Similar opportunities were available to our allies.

And this is not all that directly affected the effectiveness of the use of domestic submarines. Under these conditions, the shortcomings in technical characteristics and the provision of combat operations could only be partially compensated for by the human factor.
Here, probably, lies the main determinant of the effectiveness of the domestic submarine fleet - Man!
But for submariners, like no one else, in the crew there objectively is a certain main person, a certain God in a separately taken closed space. In this sense, a submarine is like an airplane: the entire crew may consist of highly qualified professionals and work exceptionally competently, but the commander has the helm and it is he who will land the aircraft. Pilots, like submariners, usually either all come out victorious, or all die. Thus, the personality of the commander and the fate of the submarine are something whole.

In total, during the war years in the operating fleets, 358 people acted as submarine commanders, 229 of them participated in military campaigns in this position, 99 died (43%).

Having considered the list of commanders of Soviet submarines during the war, we can state that most of them had a rank corresponding to their position or one step lower, which is normal personnel practice.

Consequently, the statement that at the beginning of the war our submarines were commanded by inexperienced newcomers who took positions due to the political repression that took place is unfounded. Another thing is that the rapid growth of the submarine fleet in the pre-war period required more officers than the schools produced. For this reason, a crisis of commanders arose, and it was decided to overcome it by conscripting civilian sailors to the fleet. Moreover, it was believed that it would be expedient to send them to submarines, since they know the psychology of the captain of a civilian ship (transport) most well, and this should make it easier for them to act to combat shipping. This is how many sea captains, that is, people, in fact, not military men, became submarine commanders. True, they all studied at the appropriate courses, but if it is so easy to make submarine commanders, then why do we need schools and many years of study?
In other words, the element of serious inferiority in the future efficiency has already been incorporated.

List of the most successful domestic submarine commanders: