D.V. Vedeneev. The role of the Soviet special services in the defeat of Nazism (based on the intelligence and sabotage activities of the NKVD-NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR)

The national composition of the personnel of the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB of the USSR in 1g.

(Brief historical background)

Leningrad
October 1998

1.2 Introductory remarks
2. The leading personnel of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and the NKGB of the USSR in the years
2.1 Personnel of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD in the years
2.2 Changes in the personnel of the OGPU and the NKVD when he was deputy chairman of the OGPU and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
2.3 Changes in the personnel of the NKVD of the USSR when he was the People's Commissar
3. Key Findings
Used materials

1.1 The political significance of the issue

After the forthcoming inevitable restoration of democracy in the form of Soviets in Russia, the question will arise of carefully correcting the mistakes of the Soviet government during the period when the RSDLP-VKP(b)-CPSU were the only ruling Party in the USSR, in the years, i.e. until the moment of treacherous surrender political positions of the CPSU Yov and his like-minded people.

Among the mistakes in the field of the national question, one should note the weak, condescending and ineffective control of the Central Committee of the Party over the proportional representation of the peoples of the USSR. In the governing bodies of the country, the well-known exclusion of representatives of the indigenous nation - the Russian people - from active participation in the work of the governing bodies and the filling of these bodies, especially in their higher echelons, with national minorities in a share many times greater than their actual weight in the composition of the population of Russia and the USSR . This is a violation of a clear provision: Russia should be ruled by Russians, who make up the majority of its population. The remaining allied nations must have legal representation in the governing bodies of Russia, approximately proportional to their share in the numerical composition of the population of Russia.

A different approach is when some national clan is concentrated in the leadership of Russia, which, by the method of mutual support, gradually expands its influence and takes root in some important government body, pushing aside the indigenous nationality. This leads to:

Harmful to the cause of socialism, alienation of the broad masses of the people from the Party is being created, which allegedly introduces an alien government (which actually took place in the history of the country in connection with claims to the role of the “second leader of the October Revolution”);

There is a danger that, having concentrated in power, such a national wedge will gradually move away from defending the interests of Russia and will begin to use the authority of the Russian people to defend their own national interests;

A breeding ground is being created for hostile agitation inside and outside the country (at the international level) with the main thesis: “Russia is ruled by a non-Russian Government”, as it actually was in the years. and later;

The unity of the country's leadership is being broken, since the presence of "disproportionate national strata" in the governing bodies does not contribute to their unity and focus on solving the most difficult problems of building a socialist society, and introduces elements of national competition into the atmosphere of management.

Thus, on the whole, such a practice of disproportionate representation of nations in the leadership of a multinational socialist power does not contribute to the creation of sincere confidence of the broad masses of the people in Soviet power, and violates the monolithic unity of the Party and the people.

Of course, the principle of internationalism fully allows any worthy communist of a non-indigenous nationality to apply for any post and hold it in the Party and the State.

Being from a Russified Polish noble family, in particular, he did not contribute to the concentration of people of Polish nationality in the Cheka. In addition to the revolutionary underground known from time to time, who was the first deputy and became the successor after his death, only a few Chekists of Polish origin are known, for example, the Chekist Redens authorized by the OGPU in Transcaucasia, married to his wife's sister. Under the leadership of this Chekist, a young man began his work in the OGPU, who managed to survive his less insidious boss from the Caucasus and nestled himself in his position.

The fact that the founder of the Cheka-OGPU did not tend to concentrate his fellow tribesmen in the apparatus of his department is another positive characteristic of his political activity.

At that time, the cadres of the Cheka were formed from revolutionary sailors, Red Guards, Bolsheviks with underground experience, most of them Great Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, with a noticeable layer of Latvians. The question of the concentration in the Cheka-OGPU of persons of any one non-indigenous nationality was not raised, and the national composition of the bodies approximately corresponded to the composition of the population of Russia and the USSR.

However, it was not without errors. In 1919, under historically obscure circumstances, he authorized the admission, and immediately to the leading position of one of his deputies, a distant relative, the husband of his niece Yakov (Yankel) Mikhailovich Sverdlov. Most likely, he personally insisted on getting his relative to a prominent post in the Cheka-OGPU.

Since in the future he played a negative role in the work of the OGPU of the USSR and, in particular, in every possible way contributed to filling the apparatus of the OGPU with his fellow tribesmen (by nationality he was a “Polish Jew” - as he wrote in his own handwriting in his questionnaires), it is necessary to dwell on this person in more detail, which cannot be done without simultaneously covering the history of the Sverdlov family.

Nizhny Novgorod engraver-private Jew Mikhail Sverdlov (father of Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov) with late XIX For centuries, he served in his workshop the needs of revolutionary organizations (engraving seals, clichés, etc.). In connection with this, he was under the supervision of the Nizhny Novgorod gendarme department. In the first years of the 20th century, he was accepted as an engraver's student by the young son of the Nizhny Novgorod pharmacist Genrikh Genrikhovich Yagoda. In some sources, the true name and surname of Yagoda is defined as Gerschel Gershelevich Yehuda (translated from Hebrew - Judas).

The history of the relationship between the student and the master is dramatic: before the revolution, the student robbed his master twice, hid from him in other cities, where he tried to open “his own business”. In both cases, the Sverdlov family did not turn to the police, given their connections with revolutionary circles and fearing exposure and repression.

In both cases, he returned to the master in disgrace, asked for forgiveness and again worked in the engraving workshop of the Sverdlovs. After the second theft and the second reconciliation with Sverdlov, the eldest, the young engraver married the granddaughter of Mikhail Sverdlov (she is Yakov Sverdlov's niece) Ida Averbakh to strengthen the family union. After this, friction in the family ended, and in 1918 Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov got his relative into the bodies of the Cheka, although at that time the engraver had no revolutionary merits of his own, nor did he have experience in operational Chekist work. He considered himself a member of the Sverdlov family. Moreover, he considered himself a member of the family on the very flimsy basis that another son of Mikhail Sverdlov, Zavel (who, when he adopted Orthodoxy, was given the name Zinovy) was (after breaking with his father, Mikhail Sverdlov, on religious grounds) adopted (by Gorky) and since then has been known in the family as Zinovy ​​​​Peshkov (he was his godparent at Orthodox baptism).

This artificial “kinship” made him a part of the family in the 30s, where he, as a relative, spent a lot of time. From this followed the accusation of poisoning his son Maxim Peshkov.

The rather confusing circumstances presented here are set forth in a source (3), the author of which B. Bazhanov was closely acquainted with the younger generation of the Sverdlov family in the 1920s. It can be seen from this that, wanting to “please a loved one,” he slipped a frame that was very dubious in its moral qualities, and for some reason Dzerzhinsky himself contributed to this typically “criminal” employment operation, which did not and could not have any special merits before the RCP (b ) and could hardly qualify for the post of second deputy chairman of the Cheka for his business and political qualities.

As you know, those who were repressed under the “Bukharin process” have now been rehabilitated - all of them, with the exception of those on whose conscience there are many crimes. The moral character of this “chekist” is well characterized by his actions. Entering in the early 30s in strength and power, he anticipated the well-known "Beria Syndrome" - the hunt for women. In 1932/33, already as the head of the NKVD, he became interested in the wife of the diplomatic courier Selivanov, Nina Selivanova. The diplomatic courier himself was immediately captured, accused of spying for Germany and shot. Somewhat later, he “laid his eye” on an employee - the wife of his son Maxim. And then Maxim Peshkov - this healthy young man, athlete - suddenly dies to the great grief of his father -.

Before that, in 1933, the chief died, clearing the way for him to the top.

Considering that at that time he set up a special laboratory for the development of poisonous drugs as part of the OGPU-NKVD, it can be assumed that these particular deaths, which he personally needed, were not accidental. The rest of the accusations of “poisoning” Kuibyshev, Gorky and others were most likely attributed by the initiators of the “Bukharin process”, because there is no personal interest in the death of Gorky, Kuibyshev and others.

As follows from this, at the request and surprising oversight, a man who had no political merit before the Party before the Revolution, a principled cynic, a thief, a murderer and an adulterer, made his way to the responsible work of the head of all the special services of the USSR.

The principle “The Chekist must always have a cool head and a warm heart devoted to the cause of the Party” was violated in this case.

2.2 Changes in the personnel of the OGPU and the NKVD during his tenure
Deputy Chairman of the OGPU and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Already in the first period of his activity in the field of the special services of the USSR, as their deputy head, he contributed in every possible way to filling these services with people of the same nationality as him. He encouraged clans and fraternities, arranged for the bodies and members of his family (for example, his son - Nadezhda Peshkova, mentioned above).

The first assistant to the Secret Operational Directorate of the OGPU, which he personally oversaw, he appointed an Odessa Chekist.

The most important foreign department in the OGPU (foreign intelligence) was successively headed (at the suggestion) by Jewish Chekists Trilisser, Artuzov, Slutsky and Shpigelglass (the organizer of the murder of (Bronstein) in Mexico), Passov and Dekanozov.

A Jewish specialist (and, concurrently, a poisoner), Colonel Mairanovsky, was appointed to the post of head of the specially established “chemical laboratory of the OGPU” (compilation of deadly poisons and toxic long-acting compounds), who at the criminal court in his case (1954) directly testified: “ What kind of court sentences, they pointed the finger at me who should be seized, and I seized, that is, poisoned with the means developed by the laboratory. Gesselberg was appointed head of the photo laboratory of the OGPU, and Berenzon was appointed chief accountant of the department. After the “transfer of cases” - the last to be arrested was the Chekist Colonel Shvartsman from the NKVD investigation unit. This officer was accused of creating a terrorist Zionist organization directly in the general apparatus of the NKVD (Moscow). It was in the distant 30s, when the state of Israel did not yet exist, but the Zionist movement was already developing and was well organized.

Being “interrogated”, Colonel Shvartsman immediately named thirty (!) names of Chekists-Jews, who allegedly were in his organization.

Thus, the question of whether the organization was part of the NKVD remains open (this organization could have been invented by the investigator), but the fact that 30 Jewish Chekists “worked” in the central apparatus of the NKVD is beyond doubt.

Personally supervising the work of the Main Directorate of State Security of the OGPU-NKVD, he appointed the well-known (Sorenzon) as his first deputy in this important area. - this is the same investigator who, with one stroke of the pen, single-handedly “sentenced” the Russian poet to execution (1921) and who stubbornly imposed his “friendship” on another great poet -. In general, knowing with whom he was dealing, he respectfully called this “friend of Russian poetry” “Agranych”. By the way, Yagodovsky’s employee of the Cheka-OGPU was also the notorious “patron” - Osip Brik, who, using his connections in the OGPU, prevented Mayakovsky from issuing a passport for his next trip to Paris, which upset the poet’s plans to marry a Russian emigrant - Tatyana Yakovleva, daughter of the royal engineer-colonel Yakovlev, who left for France back in 1908. According to some writers, this tragedy (Tatyana, without waiting for Mayakovsky, married Prince Radziwill) caused the poet's suicide.

Back in 1924, he became a member of the Special Meeting of the OGPU, which had the rights of the highest judicial instance, passing sentences without the right to appeal.

How stubbornly the People's Commissar was committed to the idea of ​​saturating the cadres of the USSR special services with his fellow tribesmen is well shown by the historical episode of the second admission to the cadres of the OGPU for a responsible position of the famous Socialist-Revolutionary Ya. Blumkin.

Y. Blyumkin until 1918 worked in the Cheka from the allied at that time with the RCP (b) party of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. By position, he was entrusted with the supervision of the activities of the German embassy. Fulfilling the illegal order of the leader of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Maria Spiridonova, Blumkin, using his official access to the Embassy, ​​organized a terrorist act - the assassination of the German ambassador to the RSFSR, Count Mirbach, in order to provoke Germany into military action against a still weakened Russia, contrary to the Brest Peace. On the same signal, the Left SRs raised an armed rebellion in Moscow and Yaroslavl, in particular, managed to arrest. Thus, Ya. Blyumkin was the instigator and executor of the largest political provocation against the Soviet government, which put the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee in a critical situation. Thanks to political art, the rebellion of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was suppressed, but during its suppression (especially in Yaroslavl) a lot of blood was shed, which modern Israeli ideologists “really regret for reasons of humanity”, apparently forgetting who exactly started the case and shed blood in Moscow foreign diplomat.

For this counter-revolutionary outing Ya. Blyumkin was outlawed by the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR (at the suggestion).

For a couple of years, this SR terrorist was hiding from justice in the SR underground. Then, seeing no other way out, he “turned himself in confession to the OGPU” (the Cheka had already been reorganized), handed over to the OGPU all the materials known to him about the activities of the underground party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries already at that time (that is, in other words, he sold his accomplices) and .... asked to return to work in the OGPU of the RSFSR. His petition was warmly supported. As a result, Y. Blumkin was “forgiven” and again began to “serve” the Soviet government, first in Georgia, where, according to the conclusion of the OGPU itself, “showed excessive cruelty”, then in Mongolia, where again due to “abuse of executions” he was recalled to Moscow, a little later the Collegium of the OGPU sent Blumkin as a resident to the Middle East.

However, betrayal eats into the character of a person, Blumkin had to betray and in 1929 he betrayed the leadership of the OGPU, establishing an illegal connection with the exiled to Trotsky. Only after that was he forced to give sanction for the punishment of the traitor - Y. Blyumkin was shot.

The secondary admission of the Left Social Revolutionary Y. Blyumkin to a responsible job in the OGPU and his entire subsequent career lies entirely on his conscience. This episode illustrates how clan loyalty to people of their nationality, regardless of their moral, political and business qualities, is detrimental to the cause.

The admission of Blumkin to the cadres of the OGPU for the second time had other consequences: Blumkin, like Yagoda, dragged his fellow tribesmen into the OGPU to smaller positions. In 1924, in Odessa, the supply manager of a cavalry regiment, a cousin of Y. Blumkin, a certain Arkady Romanovich Maksimov (actually Isaac Birger) stole and was expelled from the party. Having taken root in the OGPU for the second time, Ya. Blyumkin turned to the head of the administrative department of the OGPU Flexner with a request to arrange A. Birger for a “good job”. There was a resolution "Accept". The scoundrel was accepted for "Chekist work", like Ya. Blyumkin, was reinstated in the CPSU (b), and began to demand "responsible assignments." The order was immediately issued - tacit observation of the work and life of the responsible technical secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks B. Bazhanov. In other words, instead of fighting the counter-revolution, the OGPU officer was charged with indirect “observation” of the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. And who was responsible for this observation? To the former thief expelled from the Party, recommended to the OGPU apparatus by the former Socialist-Revolutionary, provocateur and terrorist Y. Blyumkin, his relative! The whole story of Y. Blumkin and his henchman is detailed in the source (3).

This kind of semi-criminal admission of new "chekists" to responsible positions is typical of the times of the OGPU and NKVD.

This is a very dangerous recruiting system. One more concrete example has to be given. In the early 1920s, he recommended to the personnel service of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the position of personal secretary-referent to "one of the members of the Politburo" two of his "countrymen": a certain G. Kanner and widely known in the future. Both were issued directly to the secretariat.

Further, the case developed according to the principle of a “chain reaction”: he immediately accepted a certain Makhover and a certain Yuzhak as “assistant secretaries”. The latter turned out to be a Trotskyite: he regularly removed data from the table on the progress of voting against the opinion of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the primary party organizations (on the question of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc) and transmitted them directly.

The second "secretary" G. Kanner takes in his "assistant" Chekist, a certain Bombin (Shmul Zomberg), who, presumably, also "observed" the work of the Politburo.

So, clinging to each other and carefully maintaining their monopoly, the organs of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD and other “leading heights” were filled with more and more tribesmen of the omnipotent. The trouble would have been less if it had been about ideologically convinced Jews, communists, tested by the underground. However, the “personnel policy” was aimed at staffing the OGPU with people like Blumkin, Flexner, Mekhlis, Birger, etc., if there was a Jew, the rest would follow.

The staff of the Foreign Department of the OGPU (foreign international intelligence) was recruited in approximately the same way.

"This service was considered a bread service." Permanent residence abroad, the right to organize trade and industrial enterprises there with the money of the OGPU (masking and material support for basic intelligence work), accelerating career advancement, awards and, finally, high salaries of maintenance (for example, a resident in Trepper received $350 a month in the years, and when he sent his wife and children to the USSR he began to receive $275. At that time it was a lot of money (6). this area of ​​the tribesmen is like flies to honey.

As one of our military observers writes; The defeat of foreign intelligence led to the fact that foreign intelligence for operational work was taken almost from the street. “Recruits” were illegally sent abroad, who did not know the specifics of their business, the country of their illegal activity and its language.

The well-deserved authority of the external operations carried out by the Cheka and the OGPU during (for example, the operation “Trust” and the arrest of the “leader” of the Socialist-Revolutionary movement Savinkov), faded, things went from failure to failure, the first officers of the NKVD appeared - traitors (Ya. Blyumkin, A. Orlov (i.e. L. Feldbin) and others).

On the other hand, his Collegium of the NKVD sharply increased the purely repressive functions of the OGPU. “Extrajudicial bodies” appeared to pass sentences without the right to appeal. The network of “political isolation wards” and concentration camps expanded, “unauthorized methods” of investigation, in other words, the use of physical measures of influence against prisoners, became widespread.

It is surprising to note that the most acute structure of mass repressions - the Gulag - was also (in terms of leadership) staffed by Yagoda on a national basis.

At that time he was the head of the Main Directorate of Camps and Settlements. His deputy - .
He was the head of the White Sea camps.
He was the head of the White Sea - Baltic camp (canal construction).
The head of the Main Directorate of Prisons of the NKVD of the USSR was H. Apert.
The head of the camps on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR were, then Balitsky.
Finkelstein was the head of the camps in the northern regions.
The head of the camps in the Sverdlovsk region was Shklyar.
Polin was the head of the camps on the territory of the Kazakh SSR.
The head of the camps in Western Siberia was first Shabo, then Gogel.
Friedberg was the head of the camps in the Azov-Chernomorsky region.
Pilyar was the head of the camps in the Saratov region.
Raisky was in charge of the camps in the Stalingrad region, Abrampolsky in the Gorky region, Faivilovich in the North Caucasus, Zaligman in Bashkiria, Deribas in the Far East region, and Leplevsky in Belarus.

In general, fellow tribesmen commanded and practically carried out repressions in 95% of the Gulag camps. The main contingent of prisoners in these camps were Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Caucasians. Among them and among their relatives, thoughts and conversations involuntarily arose that the Jews, the heads of repressive institutions, were raging over the rest of the inhabitants of the USSR. This, of course, warmed up the mood of anti-Semitism and, for that reason alone, was harmful to national policy parties. However, everything was for nothing - he continued to stubbornly pump up the leading cadres of the NKVD with "his" people.

This is a clear historical example of how a biased unfair personnel policy can really quarrel the peoples of our multinational state.

An analysis of the deplorable results of the leading “Chekist” activities clearly showed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the need for its urgent replacement by another comrade who, in particular, would be less susceptible to inflating the Jewish diaspora directly in the structures of the special services and, especially, in their leadership.

As part of the OGPU, he also kept “women's units”. When residents and emissaries of the OGPU and the GRU were sent abroad with assignments, it was supposed “for technical needs” to send with them a secretary (or radio operator) of an OGPU employee - a woman, and a situation was encouraged in which “informal relations” arose between both sent. Upon returning from a business trip, the woman “assigned” to the resident in this way made a separate and secret report from her partner about his words, deeds and lifestyle abroad.

So, for example, the former Socialist-Revolutionary already mentioned above, an employee of the OGPU (resident in the Middle East) Ya. Blyumkin, returning to 1929. in the USSR from Baghdad, secretly drove to the Princes' Islands (Turkey), where L. Trotsky was at that time, Blumkin took from Trotsky a secret letter to the Trotskyite Sobelson (i.e., Karl Radek) and propaganda materials for illegal distribution in the USSR. His assistant (she is also his wife) Lisa Blyumkina (in her second marriage, Liza Zarubina, captain of state security), having learned about this in accordance with the charter of the OGPU, reported her husband's behavior to the command. Blumkin, upon arrival in the USSR, was arrested, tried and shot as a traitor.

Upon surrendering the post of head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security (05/21/1935), he appointed him to this most important position, and made him his first deputy, and only the second deputy - - was Russian.

On November 26, 1935, he reached the highest point of his career: by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, he was awarded the title “General Commissar of State Security of the USSR”. At that time, he was already the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and his adventures with Nina Selivanova and Nadezhda Peshkova, which ended in the deaths of the husbands of these women, also belong to the same time of “dizziness from success”. To characterize him as a person, it can be noted that when Yezhov, who replaced him in office, turned to him with a “kind” question: was he interested in the future fate of Nina Selivanova (she was in prison at that time as “the wife of a German spy”), he answered : "Not at all interested." The new (last in his career) rank: "General Commissar of State Security of the USSR" corresponded to the title of "Marshal of the Soviet Union", and the corresponding uniform included a marshal's star on the buttonhole of a tunic (tunic, overcoat).

One step below the General Commissar of the State Security Council of the USSR was the title of “Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank”, which then corresponded to the then rank of “Commander of the 1st rank” or the current one - “General of the Army”. Interestingly, out of the 5 persons who were awarded this title, according to the presentation, three were Jews:, and, the remaining two were Poles: and not a single (!) Russian. (4)

By order of 01.01.2001, he organized in N.K.V. D. special ”Central Department of Trade, Industrial and Consumer Enterprises and Public Catering of the NKVD Contingents”. The NKVD was appointed the head of this sweet and completely uncontrolled feeding trough.

On January 4, 1936, he organized the “Engineering and Construction Department of the NKVD of the USSR” for the construction of buildings, housing, prisons and camps for his department. He was appointed head of the new department.

Finally, on January 28, 1936, a long-standing wish came true: Order No. 000 of the NKVD of the USSR announced the transfer of the most important body from the NPO of the USSR to the NKVD - the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin. By the same order, upon nomination, a certain commander was appointed to the post of commandant of the Kremlin (4).

Now he could let any terrorist team into the Kremlin.

Some of the old Chekists who served at the time believe that he had far-reaching plans to "enter power" in the country and that for this purpose he even created some kind of "elite unit" of 2000 fighters who underwent special military sports training, however, the unlucky omnipotent the minister forgot that here he is playing against a much larger political grandmaster - .

In the midst of the troubles described above, the all-powerful People's Commissar and General Commissar of State Security of the USSR on September 26, 1936, was unexpectedly relieved of his posts and rank with the appointment of the People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR. Sunset has begun.

Further fate corresponded to the spirit of the time. On April 3, 1937, by the Decree of the USSR, he was removed from the post of the People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR, on the same days he was arrested. On March 13, 1938 (this year was needed to participate as a defendant in the Bukharin trial), he was sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR to be shot, but immediately filed a request for pardon to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

In his request, the former General Commissar of State Security of the USSR sensibly wrote: “My guilt before the Motherland is great. Don't redeem it in any way. It's hard to die. Before all the People and the Party, I kneel and ask for mercy on me, saving my life. The petition was rejected and G. G. Yagoda was shot on March 15, 1938 (4).

The time has come for a new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and a new General Commissar of State Security of the USSR - Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, this time a representative of the indigenous people.

2.3 Changes in the personnel of the NKVD of the USSR when he was the People's Commissar

Remembering this time, the well-known Soviet intelligence officer (later a KGB general) Pavel Sudoplatov writes (5): “I remember the oral (!) instruction of Obruchnikov, Deputy Minister for Personnel, not to accept Jews for officer positions. I could not imagine that such an openly anti-Semitic order came directly from Stalin.” Of course, the husband of the Lieutenant Colonel of the State Security Service Emma Koganova took this order with resentment, but let us ask ourselves, how else could the Government of the USSR clear away the huge diaspora of Jews in the special services, which the “Polish Jew” cherished for many years? Apparently, common sense suggested: we should at least limit the influx of new Jewish replenishment into the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR already sufficiently filled with Jewish Chekists.

Implementing this new personnel policy, the USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs began to gradually replace cadres with Chekists from among the overwhelming majority of the People of the USSR.

The case, apparently, went with great creaking and noticeable resistance from the “already recruited” personnel.

Nevertheless, things moved forward: on March 17, 1937, he was expelled from the Central Office of the NKVD to the Saratov Region, but on the other hand, deputies were appointed (10/16/36) and (09/29/36). At the same time, 4 more Chekists of Russian nationality (,) and a Pole were immediately appointed as deputies.

These first steps gave rise to the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the VChK-OGPU-NKVD of the USSR on December 20, 1937, to declare: “... Yezhov created in the NKVD a wonderful backbone of Chekists, Soviet intelligence officers, expelling alien people who penetrated the NKVD and hindered his work. Yezhov achieved these successes thanks to the fact that he worked under the leadership of Stalin, learned and was able to apply the Stalinist style of work in the field of intelligence. ”(4)

The purge in the apparatus of the NKVD was cardinal. From the central apparatus of the NKVD, which consisted (in Last year work) 22,283 operational workers were dismissed (from 01.10.36 to 01.01. operational workers, that is, 1/4 of the personnel (about 25%). Of this number, about 1,700 officers were arrested “for counter-revolutionary activities in the organs”, “for disruption of work” - 373 officers and “for criminal offenses” - 35 officers.

Among the arrested leaders of the NKVD of the USSR were: former People's Commissar, head of the Engineering and Construction Directorate, head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, head of the Security Department (Government) of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

However, no matter how hard he tried to get rid of the “Jewish bias” in the composition of the personnel of his department, the process of equalizing the national composition central authorities The NKVD moved slowly, with great resistance from external and internal (in relation to the NKVD) influential intercessors.

When in the Central Office of the NKVD continued their activities:
- the head of the Gulag (that is, the officer who directly led the repressions);
- Head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR (his affairs are mentioned above);
- Specially authorized under the Collegium of the NKVD;
- commandant of the Moscow Kremlin;
- Head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the NKVD Secretariat;
- Head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- head of the 3rd department of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD;
- head of the 7th department of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the Central Trade Department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- head of the 5th department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 1st Department of the Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
head of the 9th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the Resettlement Department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- (obviously, the brother of the previous one) - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

- Head of the 2nd Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
responsible officer of the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR;
Nikolaev - - head of the operational department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the USSR;
- executive secretary of the Special Conference under the NKVD of the USSR (a body for sentencing in political cases, consisting of 3 members of the OSO);
- Head of the personnel department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Operational Secretary of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

This list refers only to the top leaders of the apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, it includes only 23 Chekists of Jewish nationality. In total, this top nomenclature of leaders included 50 posts, including the people's commissar and his deputies.

Consequently, in the top leadership of the NKVD of the USSR until 1936-38. the Jewish stratum was about 45%, the rest of the chiefs were Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc. This shows that the task of correcting the “national bias” in the top leadership of the NKVD did not completely cope.

One of the reasons for the weakening of his activity is moral degradation: the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs drank heavily. Women in the apparatus of the NKVD were afraid to stay for evening work in the building on Lubyanka, because the drunk People's Commissar walked along the corridors and molested employees. The personal circumstances of life are confused. He seduced the wife of a famous diplomat Evgenia Solomonovna Gladun (Khayutina), whom he had known since 1929 in Odessa (where he worked). The diplomat was immediately captured and, in the best tradition, shot as a "Trotskyist terrorist." Finally married. However, he could not establish a normal family life, he drank and was jealous of his second wife for the writer Isaac Babel, with whom she had a relationship in Odessa. As a result, Isaac Babel also ended up in the Gulag and died there. To “strengthen the family”, a child (girl) was taken from a children's boarding school, however, the family was clearly going to collapse, and the People's Commissar appeared daily at the workplace in an inoperable state.

This continued until the end of his career. At the time of his political collapse (Yezhova) shot herself, and the child ended up again in a boarding school.

It should be noted that even according to official statistics as of 01.01.32, only in the Central Office of the NKVD, Russians accounted for 65%, Jews - 7.4%, while among the top leadership (see above) the ratio was different: Russians and other nationalities -55%, Jews - Chekists - 45%.

Hence the conclusion follows: 1937 was the year of the “great terror” in the USSR after the assassination, therefore, the Jewish Chekists also made a very significant contribution to this wave of repressions.

Therefore, the cries of the “democratic” press of our time about the “special suffering” of the Jews at this time are political demagogy. A significant stratum of Jewish Chekists carried out the repressions of the 1920s and 1930s “fully” without any hesitation. The victims of the repressions were mostly Russians, but Jews, Slavs, Caucasians and Muslims also got it. To put the question in such a way that the Jews were not at all involved in the repressions of the 1920s and 1930s is historically wrong.(4)

Further career developed in a descending line. On April 8, 1938, being the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he was appointed, concurrently, the People's Commissar of Water Transport of the USSR. On November 23, 1938, he addressed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally with a statement in which he asked the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to relieve him of the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

In a statement he wrote: “The most neglected section in the NKVD turned out to be personnel. ... Over the decades, foreign intelligence services have managed to recruit not only the top of the Cheka, but also the middle level, and often even ordinary workers. I calmed down on the fact that I defeated the top and some of the most compromised middle managers. Many of the newly nominated, as it now appears, are also spies and conspirators.”

By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 01.01.01, the request of N. And Yezhov was satisfied "in view of the motives set forth by Yezhov, and also, taking into account the painful condition." On November 25, 1938, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dismissed the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

By another decree, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia was appointed to this position on the same day.

In April 1939 he was arrested and in February 1940, by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was shot along with a large group of his former subordinates.

From these times, a decisive change began in the personnel policy of the NKVD (later the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR), in particular, in the direction of correcting the bias in the national composition of the leaders of the Special Services.

The general direction of policy in this area was to bring the quantitative composition of national personnel in the leadership of the Special Services in line with the proportions of the national composition of the population of the USSR.

Around the person following Yezhov, the People's Commissar (then Minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR, our propagandists of "true democracy" and their corrupt newspapers raised whole fountains of mud. Meanwhile, this was a complex and contradictory personality, unfortunately, stained by the further development of the “Yagoda-Yezhov-Clinton syndrome”, that is, by the constant hunt for women.

As for his political activity, if you approach it objectively, he did a lot of useful things for the country.

Suffice it to note his great role in organizing work on the rapid creation of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which allowed the USSR to quickly achieve parity with the United States in nuclear weapons.

Now the son - - has filed a petition for the rehabilitation of his father from charges in the Khrushchev trial of 1953. Mr. Yeltsin's rehabilitation commission is now chaired by the well-known renegade of the Communist Party, Yakovlev. And even this "violent democrat" and fighter against Soviet power I was forced to admit in the press that the accusations against (except for the above-mentioned moral and everyday) are not supported by any evidence and evidence.

Without attempting to give an analysis of all activities, we note here what is directly related to the topic under consideration.

The fact is that in 1953 he clearly understood the importance of observing the principle of proportional representation of the nations of the USSR in the governing bodies of the Union republics. On June 8, 1953, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR addressed a letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the national composition of the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR, pointing out the weak promotion of local workers of Belarusian nationality to senior positions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus. Of the 22 heads of departments of the apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, he wrote, only 7 are ethnic Belarusians; out of 148 senior officials of the regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, only 37 are Belarusians, out of 173 heads of regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, only 33 are Belarusians. Therefore, with the permission of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Beria by his order released the Minister of Internal Affairs of Belarus and appointed the Minister of Belarus, obliging him "... to take measures to staff the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus with proven local personnel." A similar order was issued for the Lithuanian SSR. Major General was dismissed from the post of the Minister of the Interior of Lithuania, and Lithuanian Lieutenant Colonel Viljunas was appointed the Minister of the Interior instead. Beria issued the same orders to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Estonian SSR and the Latvian SSR. In Estonia, the Russian Minister of the Interior, a Ukrainian colonel, gave way to an Estonian lieutenant colonel; in Latvia, the Minister of the Interior, a Russian lieutenant general, gave way to a Latvian lieutenant colonel as Minister of the Interior. (7) The same orders were prepared for the rest of the Union Republics of the USSR. No matter how you evaluate the personality, however, one cannot fail to note the usefulness of the mentioned measures of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR for correcting distortions in personnel policy on the ground, which increased the real level of management of the affairs of the national republics by the forces of their indigenous nations and emphasized the equality of all peoples within the USSR.

3. Key Findings

From the facts and circumstances discussed above, the following conclusions should be drawn: The Jewish people were widely (disproportionate to their numbers in the country's population) represented in the bodies of the Cheka, the OGPU, the NKVD of the USSR.

"Great Terror" was implemented in the USSR with the active participation of Chekists-Jews. There were frequent cases when a Chekist-Jew applied "unauthorized methods of investigation" to a Jewish prisoner. A classic example: the practical implementation of the murder of Leiba Davidovich Bronstein (Trotsky) by security officers Spiegelglass and Eitingon and their team. The national and even more family concentration of “compatriots” and “friends” in the highest echelons of power is a hidden form of violation of socialist democracy, since such national or family distortions in personnel policy violate the natural rights of the broad masses of the people to equal representation in the organs of people's power.

A person's nationality objectively exists in society and therefore should be reflected in accounting documents (passports, questionnaires, personnel statistics). The exclusion of the column "nationality" in the current passports of the Russian Federation objectively leads to the concealment of the concentration of persons of one or another nationality in the highest echelons of power in the country. And the concealment of distortions in the national composition of government bodies is a violation of the democratic right of an indigenous nation to govern its state directly.

It should be self-critically admitted that the strict daily control over the activities of the governing bodies of the Cheka, the OGPU-NKVD by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (then the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) in the historical period under consideration. failed to implement. Conclusions on correcting mistakes were made after the mistakes were made. Outside the strict control of the Party was the selection of new personnel for the USSR Special Services. The mistakes of the VChK, OGPU, and NKVD bodies were of a massive nature, concerned a large number of Party members and non-Party people, and therefore really influenced the attitude of the broad masses towards the work of the security agencies in a negative direction. In addition, the leaders of the Special Services (,) were “forgiven” for the lawlessness and even crimes committed against the personality of Soviet citizens (the Selivanov case, the Gladun case, the cases of the victims).

The foregoing should be taken into account after the restoration of democracy in the form of Soviets in Russia and the USSR.

Used materials

What do Jews believe...

(2) - Pravda-5, 12.08.97, p.3, V. Prussakov “Dangerous guarantor”

(3) - B. Bazhanov “Kremlin, 1920s”, Ogonyok magazine, October 1989.

(4) - Y. Kozhurin, N. Petrov “From Yagoda to Beria”, Pravda-5, No. 17

(5) - P. Sudoplatov "Intelligence and the Kremlin", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1993.

(6) - “Red Chapel”, magazine “Foreign Literature”, February 1990, Moscow.

Description

The calendar consists of an upper "header" with an image and three calendar blocks.
The approximate size of the unfolded calendar is 80 cm long and 33 cm wide.

Cheka(7) December 20, 1917 By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was formed to combat counter-revolution and sabotage in Soviet Russia. F.E. Dzerzhinsky was appointed its first chairman. He held this post until February 6, 1922. July to August 1918 the duties of the chairman of the Cheka were temporarily performed by Ya.Kh. Peters

GPUFebruary 6, 1922 The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution on the abolition of the Cheka and the formation of the State Political Directorate (GPU) under the NKVD of the RSFSR.

OGPUNovember 2, 1923 The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR created the United State Political Administration (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Until the end of his life (July 20, 1926), F.E. Dzerzhinsky remained the chairman of the GPU and the OGPU, who was replaced by V.R. Menzhinsky, who headed the OGPU until 1934.

NKVDJuly 10, 1934 in accordance with the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the state security bodies were included in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the USSR. After the death of Menzhinsky, the work of the OGPU, and later the NKVD, from 1934 to 1936. led by G.G. Yagoda. From 1936 to 1938. The NKVD was headed by N.I. Yezhov. November 1938 to 1945 L.P. Beria was the head of the NKVD.

NKGBFebruary 3, 1941 The NKVD of the USSR was divided into two independent bodies: the NKVD of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) of the USSR. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - L.P. Beria. People's Commissar for State Security - VN Merkulov. In July 1941 The NKGB of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR were again merged into a single people's commissariat - the NKVD of the USSR. In April 1943 The People's Commissariat for State Security of the USSR was re-formed, headed by V.N. Merkulov.

MGBMarch 15, 1946 The NKGB was transformed into the Ministry of State Security. Minister - V.S. Abakumov. In 1951 - 1953. the post of Minister of State Security was held by S.D. Ignatiev. In March 1953 a decision was made to merge the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR headed by S.N. Kruglov.

MIA March 7, 1953 a decision was made to merge the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR headed by S.N. Kruglov.

KGBMarch 13, 1954 The State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was created.
From 1954 to 1958 the leadership of the KGB was carried out by I.A. Serov,
from 1958 to 1961 - A.N. Shelepin,
from 1961 to 1967 - V.E. Semichastny,
from 1967 to 1982 - Yu.V.Andropov,
from May to December 1982 - V.V. Fedorchuk,
from 1982 to 1988 - V.M. Chebrikov,
from 1988 to August 1991 - V.A. Kryuchkov,
August to November 1991 - V.V. Bakatin.
December 3, 1991 The President of the USSR MS Gorbachev signed the Law "On the reorganization of state security agencies". On the basis of the Law, the KGB of the USSR was abolished and, for the transitional period, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (currently the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation) were created on its basis.

SMENovember 28, 1991 The President of the USSR MS Gorbachev signed the Decree "On the Approval of the Provisional Regulations on the Inter-Republican Security Service".
Head - V.V. Bakatin (from November 1991 to December 1991).

KGBMay 6, 1991 Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov signed a protocol on the formation in accordance with the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia of the Committee for State Security of the RSFSR, which has the status of a Union-Republican State Committee. V.V. Ivanenko was appointed its leader.

MBJanuary 24, 1992 The President of the Russian Federation Boris N. Yeltsin signed a Decree on the formation of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation on the basis of the abolished Federal Security Agency of the RSFSR and the Inter-Republican Security Service.
Minister - V.P. Barannikov since January 1992 to July 1993,
N.M. Golushko since July 1993 to December 1993

FSKDecember 21, 1993 Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed a Decree on the abolition of the Ministry of Security and the creation of the Federal Counterintelligence Service.
Director - N.M. Golushko since December 1993. to March 1994,
S.V.Stepashin since March 1994 to June 1995

FSBApril 3, 1995 The President of the Russian Federation Boris N. Yeltsin signed the Law "On the Bodies of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation", on the basis of which the FSB is the legal successor of the FSK.
Director - M.I.Barsukov since July 1995. to June 1996,
N.D. Kovalev since July 1996 to July 1998,
V.V. Putin since July 1998 to August 1999,
N.P. Patrushev since August 1999 to May 2008
A.V. Bortnikov since May 2008