Johann Fichte biography. Key Points of Fichte's Philosophy

In his works, Fichte developed the ideas that the world is reasonable and expedient, and that a person exists in this world in order to fulfill his moral destiny - to act rationally. According to Fichte, absolute reason, a supra-individual subject, lies at the basis of everything that exists. Its essence lies in free, creative activity, but this activity can be realized only through a person whose mind is the ultimate embodiment of absolute mind. It is through man that the mind enters the world. In this regard, the essence and purpose of a person is determined as a free, active being, called to realize the moral ideal in the world, to bring order and harmony into it.

Fichte's most important works include:

• "The basis of general science" (1794)
• "On the concept of science or so-called philosophy" (1794)
• "Several lectures on the appointment of a scientist" (1794)
• "Destination of Man" (1800)

Fundamentals of Fichte's philosophy

Man as a spiritual, rational and moral being is initially focused on purposeful activity. At its core, reason is practical, moral reason, and it requires action. Therefore, the world for man is primarily a sphere of action. “... The need to act is primary; the consciousness of the world is derivative. We do not act because we know, but we know because we are destined to act ... ". Knowledge is only a means for activity. Therefore, Fichte is not interested in things in themselves, but only in the practical concept of them, i.e. knowledge corresponding to the needs of man as an active being. In this regard, the primary issue for Fichte is the origin of knowledge.

But before turning to the problem of the origin of knowledge, it must be understood that the main goal of Fichte's philosophy is the justification of human freedom, because without freedom no moral action would be possible. “I want to determine myself, to be the last foundation myself, I want to freely want and set goals for myself. My existence must be determined by my thinking, and thinking - exclusively by itself. As a free being, man is reduced to thinking, which determines itself, i.e. in its representations does not depend on "things in themselves", but completely produces them from itself. Thus, the whole reality, which for a person always acts as a conceivable reality, turns out to be a product of the activity of thinking. Moreover, we are not talking about finite thinking, otherwise the whole world would be for us an illusion of our own mind, but about absolute thinking, pure I, common to all people. The human mind is the ultimate manifestation of the absolute mind, which explains the unity of sensory experience in all people and the same system of thinking. Deriving the finite human I from the absolute I, Fichte substantiates the cognizability of the world, the universal and necessary nature of knowledge. Thus, the problem of the origin of knowledge is transformed into the problem of deducing knowledge from the cognizing subject.

“We must find the absolutely first, absolutely unconditional foundation of all human knowledge. It cannot be proven or determined, since it must be absolutely the first principle. According to Fichte, self-consciousness has immediate certainty, which does not require proof, which is expressed by him in the proposition “I am I,” or I posits itself. Here we are talking about the absolute I. The reliability of self-consciousness is determined by the fact that it is not a theoretical judgment, but a deed-action - a volitional act of self-positing (self-generation) of thinking, which lies at the basis of any consciousness. Self-consciousness is the original activity of the pure Self, since it is impossible to conceive anything without first having thought of oneself - everything conceivable (object) always presupposes the subject of thinking. “Everything that exists exists only insofar as it is posited in the Self; there is nothing outside the Self.” In self-consciousness there is an identity of subject and object, consciousness and thing. From self-consciousness as the first principle of thinking, Fichte derived consciousness, and then from it he derives the whole world he conceives.

Although the I is primary and cannot be produced from something else, nevertheless, the I could never become aware of itself otherwise than as determined through something other than itself (not-I). Therefore, I strives for self-determination and necessarily posits not-I - I posits not-I. Not-I is the world of things, an objective reality. It turns out that the subject itself creates its own object. The ego is active not only in the perception of sensual intuitions, as in Kant, but also in their creation. The human ego perceives its contemplations as things existing independently of it, because they are the product of the unconscious activity of the pure ego, which eludes our reason.

It is obvious that the not-I is not something outside the I, but in itself, because nothing is conceivable outside the I. The opposition of the I and the not-I in question is found only in the final consciousness. But both of these opposites are produced from the absolute I, and exist in it simultaneously, mutually limiting each other - I opposes in the I to the divisible I the divisible non-I. Mutual limitation of I and not-I assumes two types of relations: 1) I is limited, or defined through not-I. In theoretical activity, the absolute Self unconsciously creates the object of its cognition (non-Self), thereby limiting itself. The human ego comprehends it as things independent of us through sensibility and reason; 2) I limits or defines the not-I. those. is valid. In practical activity, the Self seeks to free itself from the dependence of things as objects, seeks to master the non-Self, to bring it into line with the pure Self, i.e. with reason, our ideal concepts of things and the world. Not-I, produced in theoretical activity, acts as an obstacle for the empirical I, so that it can carry out its activity, overcoming it. I set a limit for myself in order to overcome it, i.e. I am theoretical to be practical. Without the obstacle of the not-I, the infinite activity of the I would be left without content, it would have no object for activity, it would be fruitless.

The activity of the absolute I is carried out through the finite activity of many human I. Only through man does the infinite activity of the absolute I become definite. The human I, in turn, is an endless striving for a never-attainable primordial identity, where subject and object, individual and absolute I would coincide.

Fichte's dialectic

The development of the necessary actions of thinking from self-consciousness is a dialectical process in Fichte. First, the initial position is established (the identity I am I), then, by negation, its opposite is derived (I posits not-I) and, finally, the synthesis of opposites is carried out (mutual limitation of I and not-I, derived from one base), which means a return to original unity, but already as a unity of opposites. The contradiction contained in the very essence of consciousness between the Self and the non-Self is the driving force behind the development of thinking and all reality. From the dialectical interaction of I and not-I, Fichte derives the categories that Kant simply pointed out as a kind of givenness of pure reason. Fichte's categories determine (as if they fix) the necessary actions of thinking that are consistently derived from self-consciousness. For example, the dialectical process leads to the partial determination of the non-Self by the Self and, conversely, the partial dependence of the positing Self on the non-Self, which is fixed in the category of interaction. For Fichte, dialectics is the principle of explaining the development of thinking and reality, as well as the method of constructing the philosophical system itself.

Fichte on the appointment of man

The purpose of a person is determined in accordance with what he is - a rational, spiritual, moral being. But in order to become what he is, namely, a pure I, a self-determining and active mind, a person must make an effort of will on himself, rise to the consciousness of himself as such. Achieving self-consciousness, a person considers himself a free, self-determining being. Freedom must be realized in practical action - a person is called upon to transform the reality surrounding him, society and nature, and bring them into harmony with reason (with a pure Self), make them correspond to ideal concepts about them. “To subdue everything unreasonable, to master it freely and according to one’s own law is the last and ultimate goal of man ... It is in the concept of man that his last goal should be unattainable, and the path to it is endless. Therefore, the purpose of man is not to achieve this goal. … Approximation to infinity towards this goal, … improvement to infinity is its purpose. He exists to constantly become morally better and improve everything around him ... ".

A common understanding of the purpose of a person determines the purpose of a person in society and in each individual field of activity. All people are different, but their goal is the same - perfection. Although ideals are unrealizable, reality must be transformed in accordance with our ideals. Everyone has an ideal of a person and strives to raise others to it, and thus the improvement of the human race takes place in society. Such interaction should not be coercive, but only free. If all people became perfect, they would be equal to each other, they would be a single, absolute subject. But this ideal is unattainable, and therefore the purpose of man in society is the endless improvement of himself and others as free beings. To achieve his goal, a person has free will, as well as a special skill - culture.

So, the basis of human society and its development is the mind. History unfolds in the direction of greater rationality in the life of society, the moral progress of all and everyone. In the world plan for the realization of the moral goal, each person has a special purpose. Because of this, he recognizes himself as a member of the moral world order and sees his value in the fact that he implements this world order in a separate part intended for him. Everyone should make every effort to achieve, as far as possible, perfection in his field and around him. "Act! Act! - that's why we exist. ... Let us rejoice at the sight of a vast field that we must cultivate! Let us rejoice in the fact that we feel strength in ourselves and that our task is endless!”

Fichte on the appointment of a scientist

Just like every individual person, the state has its own special purpose in the implementation of the moral order in the world. The goal of the state is to instill in citizens the desire to fulfill their true human destiny, namely, constant mental and moral improvement. Thus, Fichte, like Plato, sees the purpose of the state in the education of moral people. From this comes Fichte's idea of ​​the honorable and exalted appointment of a scientist as an educator and teacher of the human race. "... The real purpose of the learned class: this is the highest observation of the actual development of the human race in general and the constant promotion of this development." The scientist must always be ahead of everyone in order to pave the way and lead him along it. It is intended to show mankind the way to the final goal, namely, to moral perfection. “But no one can successfully work on the moral ennoblement of society without being a good person himself. We teach not only with words, we also teach much more convincingly with our example.” Therefore, the scientist must be morally the best person of his time.

Fichte on the concept of science

Philosophy for Fichte is a science, but not a specific science, like physics, mathematics, etc., but the science of the possibility of science itself. Therefore, Fichte called his philosophy the science of science, the doctrine of science. In order to advance in the understanding of philosophy as a science of science, one must first understand the concept of science itself. Scientific knowledge, according to Fichte, must be reliable and systematic, i. constitute a single system. In order for a science to satisfy these conditions, all of its propositions must be derived from one reliable foundation or principle. The foundation of each particular science cannot be proved within the framework of the science itself. And it is the science of science that is called upon to give foundations to specific sciences, it must “substantiate the possibility of foundations in general”, “determine the conditions on which other sciences are based, without defining them themselves”, “reveal the foundations of all possible sciences”. Thus, the reliability of the foundations of specific sciences is guaranteed by the fact that they are derived from the science of science. Scientific teaching, unlike specific sciences, itself guarantees the reliability of its foundation and derives all its content from it. Fichte considers self-consciousness to be such a principle (see above). Thus, the foundations of concrete sciences are the principles of the science of science. Since the content of the sciences is based on their foundations, and all of them are derived from the foundations of the science of science, the science of science determines and substantiates the content of all sciences. This means that science should completely exhaust the area of ​​human knowledge. The exhaustion of all sciences by means of a fundamental principle is achieved in the sense that there is not a single true proposition - already present or future - that would not follow from the principle or not be contained in it. A proposition that contradicts a fundamental proposition must simultaneously contradict a system of whole knowledge, i.e., it cannot be a proposition of science, and, consequently, a true proposition. “Human knowledge in general must be exhausted, which means that it must be unconditionally and necessarily determined that a person can know not only at the present stage of his existence, but also at all possible and conceivable stages. Human knowledge is infinite in degrees, but in its quality it is completely determined by its own laws and can be completely exhausted.

Scientific teaching does not give a person new scientific knowledge, but it explains the origin of this knowledge and gives confidence in its universal and necessary character. Fichte's science of learning is an image of the necessary actions of thinking, common to all people. It establishes "the general measure of the finite (human) mind". In its necessary actions, human thinking is certain and unerring. Therefore, only one scientific teaching, one scientific philosophy is possible. Having acted as a substantiation of science, the science of science will finally eradicate from it errors, accidents, and superstitions. In absolutizing the science of science as the only true philosophy, in his demand for a rigid dependence of science on philosophy, Fichte showed one-sidedness. Philosophy cannot and must not prescribe anything either to science or to the world.

According to Fichte, not every person can and should comprehend the science of science, but only scientists - educators of humanity, and rulers. When they master the science of science, when it acquires its proper influence, then the management of society will become absolutely conscious, people will arrange their relations according to reason. And then “the whole human race will be rid of blind chance and the power of fate. All mankind will take fate into their own hands, it will become subordinate to its own idea, it will from now on with absolute freedom make of itself whatever it wants to make of itself.

Fichte made a great contribution to the development of philosophical thought. He substantiated the reasonableness of the world, the freedom of man and his moral destiny. In the theory of knowledge, Fichte developed ideas about the inseparability of the subject and object of knowledge from each other, about the dialectical essence of thinking. The main idea of ​​Fichte's philosophy is the idea of ​​the activity of the subject, i.e. person. Fichte considered the activity of a rational person not only the essence of knowledge, but also the main prerequisite for the development of society. The idea of ​​the need for the reasonableness of human activity, even with such an absolutization of subjectivity as in Fichte, is certainly a valuable contribution of the philosopher to world philosophy.

FICHTE(Fichte) Johann Gottlieb (May 19, 1762, Rammenau - January 29, 1814, Berlin) was a German philosopher and public figure, a representative of German classical idealism. Born into a peasant family. He studied at the theological faculty of the Jena and then Leipzig universities. In 1790 he discovered the works of Kant, and they captured him. Written under the influence of Kant, An Essay on the Criticism of All Revelation (Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung, published anonymously in 1792) was accepted as Kant's work and received high praise. Under the influence of the events of the French Revolution, he wrote a work devoted to the defense of freedom of thought. In 1794–99 he was a professor at the University of Jena; his lectures are a great success; here are his works - "The basis of general science of science" (1794), "The first introduction to science of science" (1797), "The second introduction to science of science for readers who already have a philosophical system" (1797), as well as "Fundamentals of natural law according to the principles of science of science "(1796) and "The system of the doctrine of morality according to the principles of science" (1798) (see. "Science" ). Fichte's influence grows, he receives recognition from Goethe, W. von Humboldt, Fr. Jacobi, draws closer to the Jena circle of romantics, and is friends with Schelling. However, his accusation of atheism, which caused a public scandal, forced him to leave Jena in 1799. Since 1800, he has been working in Berlin, publishing the works “The Destiny of Man” (Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 1800), “The Closed Trading State” (Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, 1800), “The Main Features of the Modern Era” (Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, 1806 ), "Instructions for a blessed life" (Anweisung zum seligen Leben, 1806). In 1807, in Berlin occupied by Napoleon, Fichte read a series of public lectures, "Speech to the German Nation" (Reden an die deutsche Nation, 1808), calling on his compatriots to moral revival and resistance to the invaders. In 1810 he was elected rector of the University of Berlin. During the war with Napoleon, he died of typhus, infected by his wife, who cared for the wounded in the hospital.

Fichte completes the turn begun by Kant from the metaphysics of being to the metaphysics of freedom: if “dogmatism” comes from the object, substance, then “criticism” comes from the subject, self-consciousness, or I. “This is the essence of critical philosophy, which is established in it some absolute I, as something completely unconditional and not determined by anything higher ... On the contrary, that philosophy is dogmatic, which equates and opposes something to the I itself in itself; what happens just in the concept of a thing (ens) that should occupy a higher place, which ... is arbitrarily considered as an unconditionally higher concept ”(Soch. Works 1792–1801. M., 1995, pp. 304–305). The essence of self-consciousness, according to Fichte, is freedom, and he considers his system from beginning to end as an analysis of the concept of freedom.

However, unlike Kant's transcendental philosophy, whose critical edge is directed against the speculative spirit of 17th-century rationalism, Fichte creates a new form of idealism - speculative transcendentalism. Philosophy, according to Fichte, must be strictly scientific and serve as the foundation for all particular sciences. It is philosophy that must substantiate science as a universally significant reliable knowledge, become the "science of science", i.e. "scientific learning" (Wissenschaftslehre). The specificity of scientific knowledge is its systematic form; it is achieved by the fact that all the provisions of science are derived from one principle, which, according to Fichte, must have truth and certainty in itself. Here he is close to Descartes , who sought to find such a self-reliant starting point, starting from which it would be possible to build the entire edifice of science. Self-consciousness, "I am I," is such an obvious and immediately certain principle. Self-consciousness is unique in the sense that it generates itself: in the act of self-consciousness, the generative and the generated, the action and its product, the subject and the object coincide.

Fichte's philosophy is based on the conviction that a practical-active attitude to an object precedes a theoretically contemplative attitude to it, and this distinguishes him in the interpretation of self-consciousness as a self-reliant beginning of knowledge from Descartes: consciousness is not given, it generates itself; its evidence rests not on contemplation, but on action; it is not perceived by the intellect, but is affirmed by the will. "By nature" the individual is something impermanent: his sensual inclinations, impulses, moods are always changing and dependent on something else. From these external determinations he is freed in the act of self-consciousness. By this act the individual gives birth to his spirit, his freedom. Self-determination appears as a requirement, a task to which the subject is destined to strive forever. There is a contradiction: self-consciousness, posited as the beginning of the system, is at the same time the infinitely receding goal of the "I". Fichte takes this contradiction as a starting point, and its consistent development is the construction of a system with the help of the dialectical method. Fichte's system has the structure of a circle: the beginning already contains the end; the movement towards completion is at the same time a return to the source. Kant's principle of the autonomy of the will, according to which practical reason gives itself a law, turns in Fichte into the universal principle of the entire system. Thus, he overcomes the dualism of Kant's teaching, removing the border between the intelligible and sensible worlds, which is impassable for Kant, and sets as his task to derive from the principle of practical reason - freedom - also theoretical reason - nature. For him, cognition constitutes only a subordinate moment of a single practical-moral action.

Any reality, according to Fichte, is a product of the activity of the “I”, and the task of science is to show how and why the activity necessarily takes on an objective form. Not allowing the existence of a consciousness-independent "things in themselves" , Fichte derives the entire content of knowledge from the I. What kind of I is this, which produces the whole world from itself? Who is meant: a separate individual, a person as a representative of the genus (and thus humanity) or God himself? Fichte demands to distinguish the individual "I" from the "I" of the absolute, but at the same time does not recognize the existence of the absolute "I" as a kind of substance independent of the individual "I". When describing the "I" as the initial principle of science, Fichte uses predicates that are usually attributed to God: absoluteness, infinity, unlimitedness, the cause of oneself, all-reality. In early scientific teaching, the absolute “I” has an ideal status and appears most likely as the idea of ​​God in the human mind, an idea identical to the moral world order, which must be implemented in the course of an endless historical process. Therefore, Fichte's individual and absolute "I" either coincide or disintegrate, and this "pulsation" of coincidences and disintegrations forms the core of his dialectic as the driving principle of thought.

Fichte formulates three basic propositions of theoretical philosophy: "I" initially posits itself - the thesis; The "I" posits itself as determined by the "Not-I" - the antithesis; the thesis and antithesis contradict each other and, as two opposing definitions, should destroy each other. However, in order to preserve the unity of consciousness, the thesis and antithesis must partially destroy each other, i.e. limit. As a result, a synthesis arises: the "I" determines partly itself, and the "Not-I" is partly determined. Limitation means the emergence of a divisible "I" and a divisible "Not-I", for only the divisible can be limited. The meaning of synthesis is revealed through the distinction between the absolute and the final “I”: “I” (meaning the absolute “I”) opposes the divisible “I” (i.e., the empirical subject) to the divisible “Not-I” (i.e., the empirical nature ).

With the help of three principles, Fichte gives a dialectical derivation of logical laws and categories; thesis - "I am I" - the source of the law of identity and, accordingly, the category of reality; antithesis is the source of the law of contradiction and the category of negation, while synthesis generates the law of reason and the category of quantity, the premise of which is divisibility.

The fluctuation of the “I” between the requirement to synthesize opposites and the impossibility of fulfilling this requirement, this struggle with itself, is carried out by the productive ability of the imagination, which is, therefore, the central ability of the theoretical I. “The ability of synthesis has as its task to unite opposites, to think them as a single ... But she is not able to do this ... and so. there is a struggle between incapacity and demand. In this struggle, the spirit lingers in its movement, oscillating between the two opposites... but it is precisely in such and such a state that it holds them both at the same time... lends them to them by touching them, bounces off them, and then touches them again, in relation to to oneself some definite content and some definite extension... This state is called... contemplation... The ability effective in it... is the productive power of the imagination” (ibid., p. 384).

Everything that for theoretical consciousness appears as a sphere of things independent of it, is a product of the unconscious activity of the imagination, the limitations it imposes, which appear to consciousness as sensation, contemplation, representation, reason, reason, etc. up to time, space and the entire system of categories of the theoretical "I". The positing of these restrictions, as well as the theoretical "I" in general, is necessary for the existence of a practical "I" that sets goals and realizes them. The activity of the "I" in Fichte is absolute; she provides herself with tasks, doing this, however, unconsciously. The “I” that puts up “obstacles” and the one that overcomes them know nothing about each other. The world generated by the unconscious activity of the absolute "I" is not something independent: nature is only an object, a means for realizing the goals set by the practical "I", an obstacle that must be constantly overcome; it has no independent existence and independent value. Such is not only external nature, but also nature in man himself, i.e. his sensual inclinations and inclinations, which, like everything natural, have the power of inertia, inertia and must be overcome by moral activity, since they constitute the root of primordial evil in man. Freedom is conceived by Fichte as an active principle, opposite to the passive inertia of nature. Overcoming external and internal obstacles one after another, the practical subject, without realizing it at first, is increasingly approaching identity with itself. Fichte's ideal of the whole movement and development of mankind is the coincidence of the individual and the absolute "I", and thereby the realization that the entire objective sphere of a person is only a product of the "I"'s own activity, alienated from him and acting as an external reality to him. However full achievement this ideal is impossible, because it would lead to the cessation of activity, which, according to Fichte, is absolute; all human history is but an endless approximation to the ideal. In the early Fichte, the Absolute is not actual, but potential being, realized through the finite “I”; The Absolute acts, therefore, in the form of a multitude of finite self-consciousnesses, which by their activity for the first time realize the Absolute as an ideal, as a moral world order.

In the teaching that comes from the “I”, the question arises: how to justify the existence of other “I”, many self-consciousnesses? To attribute only phenomenal reality to other “Selves” means, from a theoretical point of view, to fall into solipsism, and from a practical point of view, to leave unresolved precisely the problem of freedom, the key one for Fichte. Fichte carries out the deduction of the other (other "I") not in theoretical, but in practical philosophy. In the work "Fundamentals of Natural Law", discussing the problems of the possibility of human freedom, Fichte proves that the consciousness of the freedom of the "I" is due to the recognition of other "I" as free. “Man (like all finite beings in general) only becomes a man among people;... it follows from this that if there must be people at all, then there must be many” (Werke, Auswahl in sechs Bänden, hrsg. von F. Medicus. Lpz., 1908-11, Bd. 2, S. 43). We do not know, but recognize the existence of other beings like us. Fichte points out two ways of recognizing other "I". In the philosophy of law, this is the external call of another free person addressed to me as the reason for my self-determination for freedom; in the philosophy of morality, the recognition of other personalities occurs through the moral law, which prohibits considering them only as a means and requiring that everyone be seen as an end in itself. Thus, the presence of many free individuals serves as a condition for the possibility of the “I” itself as a reasonable free being. At the same time, the legal category of recognition acts as a constitutive moment of human consciousness, generic in nature.

After 1800, Fichte introduced significant changes to his system: he now considers the science of science not as a theory of the Absolute, but as a theory of absolute knowledge. As for the Absolute itself, according to Fichte, it cannot have any definition, for it stands above all knowledge. Therefore, it cannot be called either being, or knowledge, or the indifference of being and knowledge, as Schelling defined the Absolute in the early 1800s in a polemic with Fichte. Thus, Fichte draws closer to Neoplatonism and mysticism. Eckhart , where the highest beginning is United , not involved in much. The One, which does not allow participation in itself, is outside of any relation, and therefore is incomprehensible. And that unity, to which many things are involved, Fichte calls absolute knowledge and sees in it the discovery of the Absolute, a way of revelation, its manifestation for the “I”, also calling it an image, or a scheme. “In itself there is only one God, and God is not a dead concept ... but ... the purest life. It cannot change or be determined in itself and make itself a different being... If knowledge still must be and must not be God himself, then, since there is nothing but God, it can only be God, but God outside of God. ; the being of God outside of his Being; His discovery, in which He is wholly as He is, remaining in Himself wholly as He is. And such a discovery is an image or a scheme” (“The Facts of Consciousness”, St. Petersburg, 1914, p. 135). As a result, Fichte rethinks the nature of the connection between the Absolute and the finite individual. Previously, the absolute "I" acted as an unattainable goal of the activity of an individual subject, as the potential infinity of this activity itself, which was essentially the only real being. Now the Absolute was understood as actual being, as God, therefore the principle of activity was deprived of its universal significance; For Fichte, mystical contemplation acquired the highest religious meaning as a way to achieve "unio mystica" - merging with God.

The concept of "self" in the late Fichte turned from a positive into a negative one: the "affect of independence" became for the philosopher an expression of the fundamental evil in man - the self-assertion of an egoistic individual. He now understands freedom as liberation not only from sensual inclinations, but in general from everything individual, i.e. as a renunciation of the self.

Fichte's socio-political views also underwent a significant evolution: from the enthusiasm for the ideals of the French Revolution in the early period to the development of the idea of ​​nationality as a collective personality with its own special vocation, during the struggle against Napoleon (Speech to the German Nation). The idea of ​​assigning separate nations culminates in Fichte's philosophy of history. The history of mankind, according to Fichte, is a process of development from a state of original innocence (unconscious domination of reason) through the general fall and deep corruption characteristic of the contemporary era, to the conscious kingdom of reason. Fichte's philosophy had a great influence on the development of German classical idealism - early Schelling and Hegel, on the formation of the philosophical and aesthetic ideas of the Jena romantics, as well as on the neo-Kantians ("neofichteans") W. Windelband, G. Rickert, and partly G. Cohen and P. Natorp. Under the influence of Fichte's ideas, the teachings of R. Aiken, G. Münsterberg, F. Medicus, R. Lauth and others were also formed. Later, Schelling and Hegel, overcoming Fichte's subjective idealism, subjected his philosophy to versatile criticism.

Compositions:

1. Sämtliche Werke, Bd. 1–8. V., 1845–46;

2. Werke, Bd. 1–6. Lpz., 1908–12;

3. Briefwechsel, Bd. 1–2. Lpz., 1925;

4. in Russian per.: The main features of the modern era. St. Petersburg, 1906;

5. Facts of consciousness. SPb., 1914;

6. Fav. soch., vol. 1. M., 1916;

7. Closed trading state. M., 1923;

8. On the appointment of a scientist. M., 1935;

9. Clear as the sun, a message to the general public about the true essence of the latest philosophy. M., 1937;

10. Compositions. Works 1792–1801. M., 1995.

Literature:

1. Fisher K. History of New Philosophy, vol. 6. St. Petersburg, 1909;

2. Questions of philosophy and psychology, 1914, book. 122(2);

3. Vysheslavtsev B.P. Fichte's ethics. M., 1914;

4. Oizerman T.I. Philosophy of Fichte. M., 1962;

5. Gaidenko P.P. Fichte's philosophy and modernity. M., 1979;

6. She is. Paradoxes of freedom in Fichte's doctrine. M., 1990;

7. Lask E. Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte. Tube., 1914;

8. Leon X. Fichte et son temps, vols. 1–2. P, 1922–1927;

9. Medicus F. Fichtes Leben, 2 Aufl. Lpz., 1922;

10. Heimsoeth H. Fichte. Munch., 1923;

11. Schulte G. Die Wissenschaftslehre des spaten Fichte. Fr./M., 1971;

12. Verweyen H. Recht und Sittlichkeit in J. G. Fichtes Gesellschaftslehre. Freiburg-Münch., 1975;

13. Tietjen H. Fichte and Husserl. Fr./M., 1980;

14. Der transzendentale Gedanke. Die gegenwärtige Darstellung der Philosophie Fichtes, hrsg. v. Κ.Hammacher. Hamb., 1981;

15. Fichte-Studien. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Systematik der Transzendentalphilosophie, Bd. 1–3, hrsg. von K.Hammacher, R.Schottky, W.H.Schrader. amst. - Atlanta, 1990-91.

FICHTE, JOHANN GOTLIB(Fichte, Johann Gottlieb) (1762–1814), philosopher, representative of German classical philosophy, public figure. Born May 19, 1762 in the village of Rammenau (Saxony) in a large peasant family. With the help of a wealthy relative, after graduating from the city school in Meissen in 1774, he was admitted to a closed noble family. educational institution- Pfort. Studied at Jena (1780) and Leipzig (1781-1784) universities. In 1788 he received a job as a home teacher in Zurich. Then he met his future wife, Klopstock's niece, Johanna Ran.

In 1799 Fichte, accused of atheism (for publishing an article On the Foundation of Our Faith in the Divine Rule of the World, where he argued that God is not a personal being, but a moral world order), left the University of Jena.

From 1800 he lived and worked in Berlin (with the exception of one semester at the University of Erlangen in 1805).

When, due to defeat in the war with Napoleon, the Prussian government was forced to move to Königsberg (1806), Fichte followed him and taught at the University of Königsberg until 1807. In 1810 he returned to Berlin again and became the first elected rector of the University of Berlin (1810–1812)

The cycle of his lectures Speeches to the German nation (Reden an die Deutsche Nation, 1808), read shortly after the defeat of the Prussian army at Jena and calling on the German people to fight against the French occupiers, made him one of the intellectual leaders of the German resistance to the Napoleonic regime.

He died in Berlin on January 29, 1814 from typhus, having contracted it from his wife, who was caring for the wounded in the hospital.

Among the most famous works: On the appointment of a scientist (Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, 1794); About the appointment of a person (Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 1800); Clear as the sun, a message to the general public about the true essence of the latest philosophy. An attempt to force readers to understand (Sonnerklare Bericht an das grössere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie. Ein Versuch, die Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen, 1801); (Die Grundzüge des gegenwartigen Zeitalters, 1806).

Solving the problem posed by I. Kant of overcoming the gap between the cognitive sphere of human activity and the moral world of man, G. Fichte created a philosophical doctrine about the determining creative activity of human self-consciousness. He considered the evidence and reliability of the result obtained by him to be the key principle of philosophy. This result was the dialectical mechanism for the deployment of self-reflection. But, unlike Descartes, who also proceeded from the reliability of self-consciousness (cogito ergo sum - “I think, therefore I exist”), Fichte considered an act of volitional self-assertion, in which action is at the same time the product of its activity. In the act of self-consciousness, the subject (acting) and the object (passive) of action coincide. From his point of view, this discovery was so clear and obvious that subsequently he often cited it as the basis of his philosophical constructions.

He formulates three main provisions of his philosophy. The first says: "I am I." Imagine, - says Fichte, - your "I", realize yourself as "I". At the same time, it is clear that everything that is outside of you does not belong to your "I". Second: "I am not-I." In order to understand this, it is necessary to look at oneself from the point of view of an individual who thinks of his "I". That is, simultaneously evaluate and control the activity of one's own consciousness. This duality of our consciousness, its active and passive sides must limit each other, which mutually determines the emergence of the absolute "I". This emergence is the third proposition of Fichte's philosophy: "The 'Absolute Self' (Ichheit) is the 'I' and the 'not-I'". the whole reality of this activity.However, the "not-I" can also have reality for the "I", but only in those moments when the "I" is in a state of affect (passiveness, passivity, according to Fichte).

Having opened the complex, changeable structure of human consciousness, he tried to deduce from the deployment of this structure all the values ​​of the moral world of man and his categories. cognitive activity(science). Moreover, if in the early Fichte the “absolute I” could be interpreted as a certain structure of human consciousness, then in his later works it acquires the attributes of a divine nature. Therefore, his philosophy in his early writings can be considered speculative transcendentalism, and in later works - absolute idealism.

Fichte's socio-political views were closely connected with the concept of freedom. The essence of self-consciousness for him was its freedom. Freedom itself was understood as the activity of self-consciousness, opposed to passive nature. The development of consciousness towards the absolute "I" is possible only in overcoming external and internal obstacles that often arise as a product of the individual's own passive side of the "I". Thus, the entire objective sphere of a person can act as a product alienated from the consciousness of the individual “I”'s own activity. Only the coincidence of the individual and the absolute "I" can ideally overcome the problem of alienation. This raises the problem of introducing the theme of the “other self” into the philosophical system. In work Fundamentals of Natural Law Fichte writes that: "A man only among men becomes a man; ... It follows from this that if there should be people at all, then there must be many." Recognition of the other occurs either through the sphere of law, or through the moral law, calling to see in each person the purpose of his own existence. That. the plurality of free individuals is a condition for the free existence of the Self itself. From this, in Fichte's later work, the idea of ​​state socialism based within the framework of the nation-state emerges. It must be remembered that the "nation" in the early 19th century. in the German states it was rather an idea that united their citizens in the fight against foreign invaders. According to Fichte, the ideal state was given the task of educating future generations capable of achieving perfection in a historical perspective. History, being the realization of freedom, is the progressive abolition of the natural world in the name of morality. The empirical state of nature, in which force and injustice rule, gives way to a reasonable moral state, in which free will and equality reign. It is moral consciousness that unites people. All history is nothing but an attempt by mankind to establish dominance over natural necessity.

Fichte editions: The main features of the modern era. St. Petersburg, 1906 Facts of Consciousness. St. Petersburg, 1914; Selected writings, vol. 1. M., 1916 ne Closed trading state. M., 1923; On the appointment of a scientist. M., 1935; ne As clear as the sun, a message to the general public about the true essence of modern philosophy. M., 1937; Works. Works 1792–1801. M., 1995.

Fedor Blucher

The name of Johann Gottlieb Fichte is usually attributed to classical German philosophy. Continuing the movement begun by Kant, he created a separate philosophical direction, which was called subjective idealism. Fichte's works are of a socio-historical and ethical nature. Fichte's practical philosophy defines the ultimate goals of human actions on the scale of society, the world.

Biography

Johann Fichte was born on May 19, 1762 in a small village called Rammenau into a peasant family. The boy might not have become a philosopher, if not for an accident. Baron Miltitz did not come to church, and the future philosopher was able to accurately retell the sermon. The baron was so impressed that he helped the boy get a job at the Jena and Leipzig universities.

Fichte was educated as a theologian and wanted to become a pastor at the behest of his mother, but Miltitz died, and Johann was left without influential support. To improve the difficult financial situation of his family, after graduation, the young man was forced to give lessons at home.

Since 1790, Fichte began to get acquainted with the works of Kant, with whom Johann felt spiritual unity. Trying to meet with Kant, Fichte sent him one of his manuscripts. A year later they managed to meet in Koenigsberg. Then, Fichte's essay was published anonymously. Initially it was believed that the authorship belongs to Kant, but later Johann woke up famous.

Three years later, Johann Fichte, a professor at the University of Jena, began teaching in the field of ethics and the theory of law. Five years later, the philosopher was accused of promoting atheism, which is why he moved to Berlin.

With the arrival of the French army, the philosopher moved to Konigsberg, where in the period from 1807-1808. read patriotic speeches calling for the unification and reform of the education system.

In 1810, Fithe received the post of professor and rector of the University of Berlin. He stayed in this post for four years, but could have held it longer if he had not joined the ranks of the popular movement against Napoleon. He soon contracted typhus from his wife working in the hospital and died on January 27, 1814.

Key Ideas

At the beginning, the thinker put philosophy at the head of other disciplines, adhering to subjective idealism. Fithe admitted the existence of a defining reality, called the "absolute Self". This reality is reasonable, it creates the world and laws that are inherently opposite to the laws of people. The work of this reality is aimed at moral consciousness. During this period, Fichte's philosophy includes several key ideas. Let's look at them briefly:

1. Man is a being in which there is spirituality, rationality and morality. Its main goal is purposeful activity.
2. Man has a moral mind that constantly requires action. The world is the domain of action.
3. The world for Fichte was secondary. At the head he put the need to act. Knowledge is a means of action.
4. Fichte is interested in the original nature of knowledge.
5. The central idea of ​​the philosopher lies in human freedom, without which he is not able to fulfill his mission - to act.
6. The human "I" is expressed in the desire for the starting point, where the subject coincides with the object, and the absolute "I" - with the individual

The next period can be marked by the philosophy of Fichte's activity. During this period, an idealistic revolution takes place. Subjective idealism remains in the past, and it is replaced by an objective one, revealing the creative principle of human thinking.

Cognition is a dynamic and contradictory process. A person is perceived as a subject, the object is external reality. The result of the interaction of the subject and the object is the mutual transformation of each of them. The philosopher believed in the ability of a person to know the world and subdue it to his will.

Dialectics

Fichte studied cognition from its active side. He viewed action as reality. Substance is considered simultaneously and as a subject. Understanding the subject is possible only through its development.

In the interaction of opposites, the philosopher sees the main law according to which the movement of the human spirit occurs. He does not consider dialectics as separate provisions and moments, but develops it as an independent philosophical method.

Fichte revealed dialectical relations only in the field of consciousness. The manifestation of dialectics is especially pronounced in the science of science. The human "I" acts as a subject. This is an absolute point, based on which the consideration and explanation of phenomena occurring in reality takes place. "I" is considered not from the position of a thing, object or phenomenon, but as a perfect action, or work of consciousness. Through the actions of the human "I" are opposites, (thesis and antithesis), which are later combined in a synthesis.

Appointment of a person

A person has morality, rationality, and spirituality - these are his three main qualities. Willpower and awareness of oneself as such will help to achieve the state of pure "I". Through self-consciousness, a person feels freedom and the ability to define himself. Freedom is achieved only by action.

The individual must transform the surrounding reality, society and natural conditions, bring them into line with the concepts of the ideal. Subjugation of the unreasonable and reasonable possession on legal grounds is the main goal of human existence.

The last goal of a person must be obviously unrealizable in order to go to it all his life. Target human life- getting what you want, approaching infinity and endless self-improvement.

Everyone has their own ideal of a person and the desire to become one. Thus, not only an individual person is improved, but people as a whole. Interaction ideally takes place without coercion.

Perfect individuals have the same, equal rights and are interconnected. This is an unattainable ideal, therefore the main goal of a person is his own improvement of equal, free people. This is possible through free will and culture.

Appointment of a scientist

Like many philosophers, Fichte considered the main tasks of man and the state, their interaction with each other. The purpose of a person and the state is individual and serves as a means for establishing moral order. The main state goal is to cultivate the desire to fulfill the true duty - to improve in terms of intelligence and morality. . Under the scientist, the philosopher understands the educator and teacher of people.

The true purpose of the class of scientists is to monitor the development of the human race, and constant assistance in this development. Their calling is to show a person the direction to his final goal - moral perfection, but first he must independently reach it and show others this path.

A person who is not moral is in a state of anger, so a scientist must be kind and calm. The teaching is not in words, but in examples. A scientist sets an example of a moral ideal during his whole life.

Definition of science

Philosophy is perceived by Johann not as a separate science, but as its primary source. It should explain how possible the very existence of science. Therefore, he called his philosophizing the science of science, that is, the doctrine of science.

Truthfulness and consistency are the main qualities of science. All propositions must be derived from a reliable statement, provable within the framework of science itself. The main task of science is to provide a basis for the development of science, revealing the main provisions of other disciplines.

The reliability of other disciplines is guaranteed, as they are derived through the science of science. It defines and explains the positions of other sciences and disciplines. Scientific teaching must be exhaustive for human knowledge. It must contain all provisions that do not contradict science. If one of them contradicts, then it contradicts all knowledge and is excluded from it, because it is not true.

Thinking does not make mistakes when it is in the process of action. Only one science and one philosophy are certain. Having become the basis for science, it will exclude errors, superstitions, accidents.

Johann Fichte himself called himself a priest of truth, developing reflections on the reasonableness and expediency of the world. The main task of a person in this world, his destiny is to perform reasonable deeds.

Absolute mind is the source of everything on the planet. The task of absolute reason is to create, using a person for this purpose. Man seemed to him a free, active being, the main task which to realize the moral ideal, to live in peace and harmony. The theory of knowledge contained reflections on the indivisibility of the subject with the object and the dialectical nature of thinking. In the activity of the philosopher saw the development of society.

“Today I have to talk about the appointment of a scientist. On this subject I am in a special position. You, Gracious Sovereigns, or at least most of you, have chosen science as the goal of your life, and so have I; all of you, so it is supposed, are exerting all your strength to be honorably ranked among the learned class, and I have done and continue to do the same. As a scientist, I have to talk to novice scientists about the vocation of a scientist. […]

The entire development of the human race directly depends on the development of the sciences. Who delays the first, delays the last. And the one who delays this, what characteristic feature does he reveal before his era and before future generations? Louder than a thousand voices, he calls out to his contemporaries and descendants with his actions, deafening them: the people around me should not become wiser and better, at least while I am alive, because in their violent development, despite all the resistance, I would be although I am captured by something, and this is hateful to me, I do not want to become more enlightened, I do not want to become more noble: darkness and lies are my element, and I will put my last strength not to let myself be pulled out of it. Humanity can do without everything. Everything can be taken away from him without affecting his true dignity, except for the possibility of improvement. Coolly and more cunningly than the creature hostile to people that the Bible describes to us, these enemies of man thought, calculated and found in the most sacred depths where they would have to attack humanity in order to destroy it in the bud, and they found it. Against its will, humanity turns away from its image. [...]

Science itself is a branch of human development, each of its branches must be developed further if all the inclinations of mankind are to be further developed; therefore, every scientist, just like every person who has chosen a certain class, is characterized by the desire to develop science further and in particular the part of science he has chosen; it is peculiar to him, as it is to every person in his specialty, but it is peculiar to him much more. He must observe the successes of other estates and contribute to them, but he himself would not like to succeed? Success in other areas of human development depends on its success; he must always be ahead of them, to make a path for them, to explore it, and to lead them along that path. - and he wanted to lag behind? From that moment he would cease to be what he should have been; and since it is nothing else, it would become nothing.

I am not saying that every scientist should really develop his science further; Well, what if he can't? I say that he should strive to develop it, that he should not rest, should not consider that he has fulfilled his duty until he has developed it further. As long as he lives, he could still move it further; death overtakes him before he reaches his goal - well, then he is released from his duties in this world of appearances, and his serious desire is counted as fulfillment. If the following rule is valid for all people, then it is especially important for the scientist: let the scientist forget what he has done as soon as it is done, and let him think constantly about what he still has to do. T he has not gone far, for whom the field of his activity does not expand with each step he takes.

The scientist is preeminently destined for society: insofar as he is a scientist, more than a representative of any other class, he exists only thanks to society and for society; hence it is chiefly the duty upon him to develop in himself social talents, receptivity (Empfanglichkeit) and transmission capacity (Mitteilungsfertigkeit) par excellence and to the full extent. Receptivity would already have to be especially developed in him if he had duly acquired the necessary empirical knowledge. He must be familiar in his science with what has already been before him: he can learn this only through training, whether oral or bookish, but he cannot develop it through reflection from the foundations of the mind alone. Constantly studying new things, he must preserve this susceptibility and strive to protect himself from the often encountered, sometimes in excellent independent thinkers, complete isolation in relation to other people's opinions and method of presentation, for no one is so educated that he could not always learn something new. and sometimes he would not be compelled to learn something else very necessary, and rarely is someone so ignorant that he could not tell even the most learned something that he does not know. The ability to communicate is always necessary for a scientist, since he owns his knowledge not for himself, but for society. From youth he must develop it and must always keep it active. By what means, we will investigate this in due time.

His knowledge, acquired for society, he must now apply really for the benefit of society; he must instill in people a sense of their true needs and acquaint them with the means of satisfying them. But this, however, does not mean that he should embark on deep investigations with them, which he himself would have to resort to in order to find something obvious and true. In that case, he would have in mind to make people as great scientists as he is, perhaps himself. And this is impossible and inappropriate. We must work in other areas, and for this there are other classes; and if the latter were to devote their time to scientific research, then scientists too would soon have to cease being scientists. How can and should he spread his knowledge? Society could not exist without trust in the honesty and ability of others; and this trust, therefore, is deeply impressed upon our heart; and by the special happy arrangement of nature we never have this assurance more than when we most need the honesty and ability of another. He can count on this confidence in his honesty and ability, when he has duly acquired it. Further, in all people there is a sense of truth, which, of course, is not enough alone, this feeling must be developed, tested, purified - and this is precisely the task of the scientist.

For the unlearned, this would not be enough to show him all the truths that he would need, but if it, however - and this often happens precisely thanks to people who consider themselves scientists - if, however, it has not been artificially faked , - it will be enough for him to recognize the truth for the truth, even without deep grounds, if another points it out to him. The scientist can also count on this sense of truth. Therefore, the scientist, since we have so far developed the concept of him, to his appointment as a teacher of the human race.

But he is obliged to acquaint people not only in general with their needs and means for satisfying them, but in particular he must indicate to them at any time and in any place the needs that have arisen right now, under these definite conditions, and certain means for achieving the now set goals. goals. He sees not only the present, he also sees the future; he sees not only the present point of view, he also sees where the human race must now move if it wants to stay on the path to its final goal and not deviate from it and not go back along it. He cannot demand that the human race immediately find itself at the goal that only attracts his eye, and cannot jump over his path, and the scientist must only take care that he does not stand still and does not go back. In this sense, the scientist is the educator of humanity. At the same time, I especially note that the scientist in this matter, as in all his affairs, is under the rule of the moral law, the predetermined consent with himself ... It influences society - the latter is based on the concept of freedom, it and every member of it are free and he cannot act upon him otherwise than by means of moral means.

The scientist will not be led into the temptation to force people to accept his beliefs by coercive measures, by the use of physical force - against this stupidity one should not waste a single word in our age; but he must not mislead them either. Not to mention the fact that by doing so he commits a misdemeanor in relation to himself and that the duties of a person in any case should be higher than those of a scientist, he thereby commits an offense in relation to society as well. Each individual in the latter must act of free choice and according to a conviction that he himself recognizes as sufficient, he must, in each of his actions, be able to consider himself as an end and must be considered as such by every member of society. Whoever is deceived is treated like a naked tool.

The ultimate goal of each individual person, just like the whole society, and therefore the whole work of the scientist in relation to society, is the moral ennoblement of the whole person. It is the duty of the scientist to always establish this last goal and have it before his eyes in everything he does in society. But no one can successfully work on the moral ennoblement of society without being a good person himself. We teach not only with words, we also teach much more convincingly by our example, and everyone living in society owes him a good example, because the power of example arises from our life in society. How many times more must a scientist do this, who in all manifestations of culture must be ahead of other classes? If he lags behind in the main and highest, in that which has the goal of all culture, how can he be an example, which he still should be, and how can he believe that others will follow his teaching, which he himself is in front of contradicts everyone with every act of his life? (Words with which founder of the Christian religion turned to his students, they actually relate completely to the scientist: you are the salt of the earth, if the salt loses its strength, then what to salt with? If the elect among men are corrupt, where else should one look for moral goodness?)

Consequently, the scientist, considered in the latter respect, must be the morally best man of his age, he must represent the highest stage of moral development possible in a given era. This is our common purpose, gracious sirs, this is our common destiny.”

Johann Fichte, Lecture IV. On the appointment of a scientist / Several lectures on the appointment of a scientist. Appointment of a person. The main features of the modern era, Minsk, Potpourri, 1998, p. 37-47.