Armored cruiser Rurik 1892. Armored cruiser Rurik
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Rurik- armored cruiser of the 1st rank, according to the classification of ships of the Russian Imperial Navy in force in those years, was classified as a "big cruiser of the frigate rank". It was colloquially referred to as "armored", like other cruisers of the Russian Imperial Fleet, which had vertical side armor. Built in St. Petersburg at the Baltic Shipyard. Killed during the Russo-Japanese War.
The cruiser project was proposed to the Baltic Shipyard by Admiral Shestakov.
The cruiser became the first ship from the planned series (the subsequent cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboi turned out to be not of the same type, but successively intensified projects) of ocean-going armored cruisers of increased displacement (twice the displacement of the predecessor of the cruiser of the 1st rank "Memory of Azov"), among the requirements to the project - the possibility of intercepting British commercial ships in the event of a war with Great Britain, as well as the possibility of moving from the Baltic to the Far East without refueling with coal. After the cruiser was built, British experts noted that the cruiser looked outdated compared to British ships of a similar class [ ] .
Immediately after construction, the Rurik was sent to Vladivostok, on arrival it was slightly modernized during two repairs in Vladivostok by order of the commander of the Pacific Squadron, Admiral Dubasov. He managed to take part in the landing of an international landing force to suppress the unrest of the "Boxer Rebellion" in China and in the occupation of Port Arthur by Russian ships after the Sino-Japanese War. After the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he participated in several successful raider operations of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Squadron. He died in battle with Japanese ships, heroically resisting more modern and numerous enemy cruisers.
In 1881, the developed 20-year shipbuilding program (the program for the creation of the Pacific cruiser fleet), along with the creation of squadrons from seaworthy battleships, provided for the construction of 30 cruisers: 21 "small" - corvette - and 9 "medium and large" - frigate ranks. Cruisers, taking into account the tactical tasks they solved, were given preference. The implementation of this program marked the next stage in the development of armored cruisers and is characterized by the creation of more powerful, seaworthy sail-propeller cruisers with a metal hull, providing a significant reduction in its relative mass. The development of cruisers was still largely stimulated by the rivalry between Russia and England, which was in dire need of cruisers capable of reliably protecting its sea communications from possible Russian attempts to disrupt its trade with numerous colonies. Tactical requirements for cruisers: the ability to act independently in the absence of their own strongholds and supply bases, to deliver quick and tangible strikes without relying on external support, to achieve the effect not so much by coming into combat contact with single enemy ships, but by creating panic and moral threat to the enemy maritime trade - determined, until 1895, the main characteristics of both Russian and English cruisers: increased seaworthiness, high speed, autonomy, comfortable living conditions, saving crew strength on a long voyage, powerful weapons. Navigation and combat operations in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, in conditions of severe storms, debilitating temperature loads (almost 50-degree drops from tropical heat to cold ice waters), supply difficulties and the impossibility of carrying out major repairs due to the extreme remoteness from their shores required the utmost human effort. forces and exceptionally reliable technology. Under these conditions, Russian and British cruisers were constantly evaluated mutually as potential opponents, constructively developed and improved in the direction of improving their tactical and technical characteristics. The British built cruisers in series, thereby ensuring numerical superiority.
Nevertheless, the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean provided the Russian cruiser forces with practical elusiveness and the expediency of presence. In turn, the specialists of the Russian Maritime Technical Committee (MTK) formed the tactical and technical requirements for armored cruisers of the “frigate rank”, mainly taking into account the advanced English experience in creating similar ships. In particular, the armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" was built by the Baltic Shipyard on the instructions of the ITC on the model of the English armored cruiser "Imperuse". In this competition, the British achieved sustainable superiority, maintaining a monopoly in the creation of ship power plants (steam boilers and steam piston engines). Fulfilling exceptionally profitable Russian orders, English manufacturers deliberately underestimated their capabilities, and sold the most advanced models for their ships. In this regard, power plants ordered in England for Russian cruisers, as a rule, were inferior to British models in terms of power density, efficiency, and weight and size parameters. In addition, the British were the first to abandon sailing weapons on their cruisers due to the presence of several bases for replenishing fuel supplies, while the Russian cruisers had a single base - Vladivostok.
The continuous and clearly expressed rivalry between England and Russia in the creation of ocean cruisers with high speed and autonomy of navigation, reached a qualitatively new level by the mid-1880s, in connection with the creation of first-class transatlantic commercial steamships, which, with a displacement of more than 12,000 tons and a length hulls up to 152 m usually made ocean crossings from average speed up to 18.5-19 knots. At this speed and hull length, approximately one and a half times the average ocean wave length - 103 m, these steamships, having pointed contours and a large elongation of the hull with unloaded extremities, a closed forecastle to the middle of the length - did not rise to the oncoming wave, but cut through it. At the same time, the latest armored ocean cruiser types: empire" (96 m, 16.7 knots), its Russian counterpart " Admiral Nakhimov"(101.5 m, 16.38 knots)," Orlando"(91.44 m, 18.5 knots) could develop design speeds only in calm water, and in stormy conditions these" armored shorties "(relatively short, wide and low-sided) hopelessly lost their speed qualities (developing no more than 5 knots) and could not pursue fast "merchants". In this regard, the British, having excellently studied the features of the construction of ocean-going steamships, stubbornly resisting the extremist calls of E. Reid, eventually came to certain conclusions. According to British experts, long commercial steamships, due to the peculiarities of their structural layout (unloaded bow ends, horizontal decks and platforms remote from the neutral axis of the “equivalent beam”), are similar to armored cruisers in terms of loading conditions. Deck armor lying on the beams with its entire mass like internal cargo does not create destructive stresses in the hull structure, while side armor in the event of a significant increase in the length of the hull will necessarily cause additional stresses in the structure and require its strengthening, and hence an increase in displacement in damage to weight limits on weapons and fuel reserves. The works of White, Reed, Norman theoretically determined the comparative, average values of the relative weight of the hulls for ocean-going steamships within 39-40% of the displacement and for an armored cruiser of great length (more than 103 m) - 41-42% of the displacement. As a result, British experts considered such a high increment in the relative mass of the hull structure to be an excessively large price to pay for high speed to the detriment of the cruiser's combat elements.
“to take an example from long transatlantic steamers when building cruisers”Russian cruiser "Rurik" (1892) from the book by Frederick T. Jane (1865-1916) "The Imperial Russian Navy..."
Recognizing the unsatisfactory seaworthiness and speed of the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, which, in terms of the relative elongation of the hull, the booking system, is more of an “armadillo with cruising weapons”, the Russian shipbuilders of the Baltic Shipyard made an attempt to achieve an increase in seaworthiness and speed for the promising cruiser while maintaining side armor. Taking into account the French experience of creating armored cruisers was designed "semi-armored frigate" - " Memory of Azov". In terms of displacement and power of the machines, it corresponded to the category of "medium cruiser of the frigate rank". Surpassing its predecessor "Admiral Nakhimov" in absolute hull length by 14 m, and relative hull elongation of 7.57 versus 5.46, this project assumed a significantly lower design displacement - 6000 tons versus 8500 tons. Due to the increase in the absolute length and relative elongation of the hull, it was supposed to use a less powerful (4000 versus 8000 hp) and, accordingly, a lightweight and economical power plant, which could provide an increase in speed in storm conditions up to 18 knots, and with a supply of fuel 1000 tons, acceptable cruising range - 3000 miles. However, at the stage of detailed design and construction of the cruiser, the actual displacement significantly exceeded the design one, largely according to the parameters of the power plant ordered in England, which exceeded the established weight and size limits. In this regard, even at the stage of completing the construction of the cruiser "Memory of Azov", it was concluded that, subject to the preservation of onboard armor protection, in order to ensure high speed and long cruising range (increase in coal reserves), it is necessary to further increase the absolute length of the hull, which will inevitably lead to a significant increase in displacement and, accordingly, will require a more powerful power plant.
By this time, the British managed to create an unusually powerful, economical and compact steam power plant, which opens up new opportunities for a promising high-speed ocean cruiser, but on condition that side armor is abandoned. Taking into account these circumstances, the development of the project of the world's longest armored ocean cruiser of the type "Blake", with a design displacement of 9000 tons, having dimensions of 121.94 × 19.81 × 7.32 m, the total capacity of the power plant is 13,000 hp. under natural draft and 20,000 hp. with artificial (forced) flue gas draft, providing it with a design speed of 20-22 knots and a maximum cruising range of 10,000 miles at an economic speed of 10 knots. It is noteworthy that the British Admiralty considered this project so successful that they generally abandoned the construction of armored cruisers of the 1st class for English fleet for an indefinite period. In fact, this period expired only in 1900, due to qualitative achievements in the development of naval technology, weapons and tactical requirements for a promising cruiser.
The originality of the project of the highly autonomous and highly seaworthy ocean cruiser "Rurik" was predetermined by the initiative of its development by the Baltic Shipyard, without receiving a technical assignment from the Marine Technical Committee (MTC), on the basis of the personal sanction of the head of the Naval Ministry - Admiral N. M. Chikhachev. The project was developed by a ship engineer, senior assistant shipbuilder - N. E. Rodionov, in contrast to the Blake-class high-speed cruisers that were started in England. The project was a constructive development of the cruiser "Memory of Azov". Project features: armored deck, partial side armoring over 85 m long, 203 mm thick; the relative length of the armorless hull extremities - up to 20%, for the first time in shipbuilding practice, in order to unload the hull extremities - protected by rubber dams filled with cellulose; increased side height, closed elongated forecastle; design displacement - up to 9000 tons; full length - 131 m; length according to design waterline - 128 m - surpassed all existing for that period warships; body elongation - 6.88; two steam engines (developed by the Baltic Plant) with a total capacity of 12,600 hp to ensure the design design speed - 18.5 knots; full supply of coal - 2000 tons, to ensure a cruising range of up to 20,000 miles at a speed of 9 knots; armament: 16 - 152-mm, 13 - 37- and 47-mm guns.
On June 14, 1888, the project was submitted for consideration to Admiral N.M. Chikhachev and in July of the same year - to the MTK.
The conclusion of the ITC was based on the opinion of N. A. Subbotin, acting chief ship engineer of the St. Petersburg port, supported by a number of additional considerations. Subbotin positively assessed the desire for high design characteristics of the cruiser: but at the same time, referring to the practice of English cruiser building, he objected to an excessive increase in the length and elongation of the hull, due to the need, in this case, to significantly strengthen the hull structure and, as a result, an increase in its relative mass, to the detriment of the combat elements of the cruiser. Additional arguments of the MTC specialists: limited docking capabilities of the 130-meter cruiser - the only dry dock in Yokohama, difficulties in maneuvering in cramped roads, the harmful effect of cofferdam compartments pierced by water, increased friction resistance, excessive roll and insufficient stability of the narrowed hull of large elongation. The MTC categorically objected to the partial armoring of the side, pointing out the inevitability of an increase in the weight of the armor due to the increase in the length of the hull. As a result, the MTK proposed to rework the project, without going beyond the limits of a displacement of 9000 tons, taking into account all the comments.
“The project meets the needs of our Russians. He is so tempting, so exciting and so, really desirable for the Russian fleet.The ship engineers present at the meeting did not agree with the verdict of the ITC: N. E. Titov, N. E. Rodionov - the author of the project, and M. I. Kazi - the manager of the Baltic Shipyard. The general position of the dissenters was expressed by M.I. Kazi in a letter to the chairman of the ITC dated November 18, 1888, in which he cited the following arguments:
But the MTC "bit the bit", leaving all Kazi's arguments unanswered. In the magazine No. 149 dated 11/28/1888, the MTC repeated all its objections against the excessive elongation of the cruiser hull, since the armored cruiser "Memory of Azov", which is being completed, has not yet proven its strength in practical navigation. The MTC warned the "higher naval authorities" that if they nevertheless agree with the project of the Baltic Shipyard, then the weight of the hull "with all accessories, to achieve a proper fortress" will increase to 42% displacement, instead of the design 34%, which will lead to an increase in displacement up to 10,000 tons. As a result, by order of the General-Admiral - Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich (brother of Emperor Alexander III), the initiative project of the Baltic Shipyard was rejected and the development of the project was entrusted to the MTC.
In fact, having intercepted the initiative of the Baltic Shipyard, the ITC, under the leadership of N. E. Kuteynikov, began processing the preliminary design, in variants with a displacement of 9,000 and 10,000 tons. By mid-January 1889, the project was completed and on January 17, 1889, its first discussion took place, in the presence of invited representatives of the floating fleet. On May 25, 1889, at the final discussion, the main design characteristics of the cruiser were approved. In comparison with the rejected project of the Baltic Shipyard, the MTK project had the following distinctive features:
On July 1, 1889, ten drawings of the cruiser (preliminarily approved by Emperor Alexander III) were sent to the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supply (GUK and S) to place an order for construction. On July 20, 1889, the specification was prepared.
The design of the cruiser was based on the traditional desire for Russian armored cruisers to increase autonomy and seaworthiness to the detriment of other characteristics, including speed. This was justified by the fact that, according to the views of the Russian Admiralty, armored cruisers were supposed to serve as raiders in the Pacific Ocean, where, with the exception of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky (which could be easily blocked), there were no other friendly parking lots. The probability of meeting with a strong enemy ship in the Pacific Ocean was relatively small: therefore, the speed and power of weapons could be sacrificed in favor of cruising range and security.
"Rurik" was one of the last large ships that still had an anachronistic sail spars. It was assumed that due to the use of sails, it would be possible to save coal on long-distance crossings: in practice, the sails turned out to be completely useless and they were abandoned on subsequent ships. The cruiser had a high side with a raised forecastle for better ascent to the wave. Its seaworthiness was rated by the crew as excellent. At the same time, the cruiser's steam engine was not powerful enough, and the speed was only 18 knots.
Along the waterline, the central part of the cruiser's hull was covered with an armor belt made of steel-nickel armor with a thickness of 127 to 254 mm. The belt rested on a convex armored deck 37 mm thick, covering the underwater part. From the ends of the belt, the citadel was covered by armored traverses 203 mm thick.
Outside the citadel, the hull had no armor (excluding the conning tower). The cruiser's artillery armament - four 203 mm / 35, sixteen 152 mm and six 120 mm guns - was located in unprotected installations on the main deck. At the same time, the armament layout was outdated: 203-mm guns were located along the sides in protruding sponsons, and 152-mm guns were in the battery. Neither the gun servants nor the guns themselves were completely protected by anything, and one successful hit could lead to dire consequences. The ship also had a ram and six 381 mm torpedo tubes.
Russian ships entered into battle with the Japanese, but in view of the obvious superiority of the Japanese in firepower, it was decided to withdraw the ships to Vladivostok. Around 05:30 "Rurik" received a hole in the stern below the waterline, slowed down and went out of wake formation. At 06:28, in response to the request of the flagship, he raised the signal: "The rudder is not working." "Rurik", having received several Japanese shells in the stern, had the tiller and steering compartments flooded, and the steering gears were broken. At first, the attempt to restore control was successful, but by an unfortunate coincidence, after a few minutes, another Japanese shell jammed the steering blade to the starboard side, and at least return it to straight position already failed. The cruiser tried to stay on course, slowing down the left vehicle or even backing it up, but could no longer keep up with the other ships of the detachment. By order of Admiral Jessen, Russia and Gromoboy repeatedly attempted to cover the cruiser, push Japanese ships away from Rurik and divert fire towards themselves, but as a result, under heavy Japanese fire, with heavy damage and casualties among crew members, they were forced to leave from the battlefield. At 8:20 on the flagship they decide to go to Vladivostok, pulling the Japanese armored cruisers towards themselves, in the hope that the Rurik will be able to fight off the light armored cruisers, repair the damage and continue sailing on their own, reach Vladivostok, or at least jump onto the Korean coast. The departed ships were pursued by the Japanese, but when they began to run out of shells, at 10:04 Kamimura ordered to turn back.
In the battle with Japanese light cruisers, Rurik, having lost steering control, maneuvered by varying the speed of the left and right vehicles, which made it possible to change the speed and radius of circulation. Since the cruiser's fire was significantly weakened, the Japanese ships approached the Rurik, continuing to methodically finish it off. At this time, the Russian cruiser, sharply increasing its speed, on the next circulation tried to ram one of the enemy ships, simultaneously firing a second torpedo from the last serviceable torpedo tube. Having evaded these maneuvers, the Japanese cruisers retreated to a long distance and no longer made attempts to rendezvous until the Rurik began to sink. This was one of the only cases in history of the use of torpedo weapons by a large surface ship in a real battle, as well as one of the last cases of an attempted ramming by a large ship using an underwater bow "ram protrusion" specially made for this purpose.
The commander (captain of the 1st rank) Evgeny Alexandrovich Trusov and the senior officer were mortally wounded at the very beginning of the battle. Of the 22 officers killed and died of wounds, 6, wounded 9, remained unharmed 7. Of the 800 people of the team, 200 were killed, seriously and lightly wounded 278. By the time the five-hour battle ended, only one lieutenant Ivanov remained alive on the Rurik 13th (according to the numbering of namesakes adopted then in the Russian fleet), only one 47-mm gun remained in service, which shot all the ammunition. Returning with the main forces, Admiral Kamimura was waiting for the surrender of the Rurik, about which the Japanese ships signaled several times. Convinced that all means of resistance had been exhausted, Ivanov-Thirteenth gave the order to destroy the cruiser. Since the demolition charges were damaged, the kingstones were opened. The cruiser's stern gradually sank into the water; at 10:20 the roll intensified, and the cruiser capsized to the port side, the ram was exposed for a moment, and at 10:42 the cruiser finally sank near the island of Ulsan.
The battle of the outdated and poorly armored "Rurik", first in general formation with two other Russian cruisers against the armored cruisers of Kamimura, and then in a helpless state, without a rudder, with the cruisers "Naniva" and "Takachiho" was evaluated as an example of valiant behavior not only by Russians , but also by a number of foreign, including Japanese authors.
The armored cruiser "Rurik" was created within the framework of the traditional raider doctrine of Russian armored cruisers. Considered primarily as a strategic weapon in case of war with Great Britain, the cruisers were created for long-term autonomous cruising in the Pacific Ocean.
The British fleet from the Chinese Station, of course, could easily block Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky - the main bases of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean. But in the vast expanses of the Pacific and Indian Ocean, the likelihood of a Russian raider meeting with heavy British ships was extremely small. The most likely enemy for Russian cruisers would be the British armored cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, over which the Rurik would have an advantage due to its powerful artillery and belt armor. At the same time, Rurik was not designed to collide with armored cruisers of the "traditional" type, which had an advantage in speed and well-protected artillery. This led to the death of the cruiser in battle, when - due to the limited scale of Japanese shipping - Russian cruisers were forced to operate in relative proximity to Japan, which was not expected during their construction. However, it is worth noting that the death itself was due to a combination of a number of circumstances, which include both technical (obtaining a hole that reduced speed) and managerial (earlier "Rurik", the slowest of the Vladivostok cruisers, tried not to take on risky campaigns and only requests Witgeft persuaded Jessen to take such a risky step).
deck - 37 mm
16 × 6 ″ / 45 calibers of the Canet system (152 mm),
6 × 120 mm in 45 calibers of the Canet system,
6 × 47 mm, 10 × 37 mm
The cruiser project was proposed to the Baltic Shipyard by Admiral Shestakov.
The cruiser became the first ship from the planned series (the subsequent cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy turned out to be not of the same type, but successively intensified projects) of ocean-going armored cruisers of increased displacement (twice the displacement of the predecessor cr. 1 p. "Memory of Azov"), among the requirements to the project - the possibility of intercepting British commercial ships in the event of a war with Great Britain, as well as the possibility of moving from the Baltic to the Far East without refueling with coal. After the cruiser was built, British experts noted that the cruiser looked outdated compared to British ships of a similar class.
Immediately after construction, the Rurik was sent to Vladivostok, on arrival it was slightly modernized during two repairs in Vladivostok by order of the commander of the Pacific Squadron, Admiral Dubasov. He managed to take part in the landing of an international landing force to suppress the unrest of the "Boxer Rebellion" in China and in the occupation of Port Arthur by Russian ships after the Sino-Japanese War. After the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he participated in several successful raider operations of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Squadron. He died in battle with Japanese ships, heroically resisting more modern and numerous enemy cruisers.
Heroic battle in the Korea Strait
Russian ships entered into battle with the Japanese, but in view of the obvious superiority of the Japanese in firepower, it was decided to withdraw the ships to Vladivostok. Around 05:30 "Rurik" received a hole in the stern below the waterline, slowed down and went out of wake formation. At 06:28, in response to the request of the flagship, he raised the signal: "The rudder is not working." "Rurik", having received several Japanese shells in the stern, had the tiller and steering compartments flooded, and the steering gears were broken. At first, an attempt to restore control was successful, but by an unfortunate coincidence, after a few minutes, another Japanese shell jammed the steering blade to the starboard side, and at least it was not possible to return it to a straight position. The cruiser tried to stay on course, slowing down the left vehicle or even backing it up, but could no longer keep up with the other ships of the detachment. By order of Admiral Jessen, "Russia" and "Gromoboy" repeatedly made attempts to cover the cruiser, push the Japanese ships away from the "Rurik" and divert fire to themselves, but as a result, under heavy fire from the Japanese, with heavy damage and casualties among the crew members, they were forced to leave from the battlefield. At 8:20 on the flagship they decide to go to Vladivostok, pulling the Japanese armored cruisers towards themselves, in the hope that the Rurik will be able to fight off the light armored cruisers, repair the damage and continue sailing on their own, reach Vladivostok, or at least jump onto the Korean coast. The departed ships were pursued by the Japanese, but when they began to run out of shells, at 10:04 Kamimura ordered to turn back.
In the battle with Japanese light cruisers, Rurik, having lost steering control, maneuvered by varying the speed of the left and right vehicles, which made it possible to change the speed and radius of circulation. Since the cruiser's fire was significantly weakened, the Japanese ships approached the Rurik, continuing to methodically finish it off. At this time, the Russian cruiser, sharply increasing its speed, on the next circulation tried to ram one of the enemy ships, simultaneously firing a second torpedo from the last serviceable torpedo tube. Having evaded these maneuvers, the Japanese cruisers retreated to a long distance and no longer made attempts to rendezvous until the Rurik began to sink. This was one of the only cases in history of the use of torpedo weapons by a large surface ship in a real battle, as well as one of the last cases of an attempted ramming by a large ship using an underwater bow “ram ledge” specially made for this purpose.
The commander (captain of the 1st rank) Evgeny Alexandrovich Trusov and the senior officer were mortally wounded at the very beginning of the battle. Of the 22 officers killed and died of wounds, 6, wounded 9, remained unharmed 7. Of the 800 people of the team, 200 were killed, seriously and lightly wounded 278. By the time the five-hour battle ended, only one lieutenant Ivanov remained alive on the Rurik 13th (according to the numbering of namesakes adopted then in the Russian fleet), only one 47-mm gun remained in service, which shot all the ammunition. Returning with the main forces, Admiral Kamimura was waiting for the surrender of the Rurik, about which the Japanese ships signaled several times. Convinced that all means of resistance had been exhausted, Ivanov-Thirteenth gave the order to destroy the cruiser. Since the demolition charges were damaged, the kingstones were opened. The cruiser's stern gradually sank into the water; at 10:20 the list intensified, and the cruiser capsized to the port side, the ram was exposed for a moment and at 10:42 the cruiser finally sank near the island of Ulsan. Of the 796 sailors on the cruiser, 193 were killed and 229 were wounded. Of the 22 officers, 9 were killed and 9 wounded.
The battle of the outdated and poorly armored "Rurik", first in general formation with two other Russian cruisers against the armored cruisers of Kamimura, and then in a helpless state, without a rudder, with the cruisers "Naniva" and "Takachiho" was evaluated as an example of valiant behavior not only by Russians , but also by a number of foreign, including Japanese authors.
see also
Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak served on the Rurik as an assistant watch officer.
Other ships with the same name
Links
- R. M. Melnikov."Rurik" was the first.
| Armored cruisers of the Navy of the Russian Empire | ||
|---|---|---|
| Type of Prince Pozharsky | Prince Pozharsky Minin |  |
| Type of General-Admiral | General Admiral Duke of Edinburgh (Alexander Nevsky) | |
| Type of Dmitry Donskoy | Dmitry Donskoy Vladimir Monomakh | |
| Type of Admiral Nakhimov | Admiral Nakhimov | |
| Type of Memory of Azov | ||
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Rurik | ||
|---|---|---|
| basic information | ||
| Type of | Cruiser | |
| flag state | ||
| Shipyard | Baltic plant | |
| Construction started | May 19, 1890 | |
| Launched into the water | October 22, 1892 | |
| Commissioned | October 16, 1895 | |
| Modern status | Died August 14, 1904 | |
| Options | ||
| Tonnage | 10993/11960 t | |
| Length | 126 m | |
| Width | 20 m | |
| Height | 7.9 m | |
| Technical details | ||
| Power | 13250 hp | |
| Speed | 18 knots (33 km/h) | |
| Autonomy of navigation | 6700 miles / 10 knots, 12400 km / 19 km / h | |
| Crew | 22/719 people | |
| Armament | ||
| Artillery | 4 x 8in. in 35 gauges (203mm), 16 x 6in.in in 45 gauges Canet (152mm), 6 x 120mm in 45 gauges Canet, 6 x 47mm, 10 x 37mm | |
| Torpedo-mine armament | 6 × 15dm. (381 mm) torpedo tubes | |
Rurik- a cruiser of the 1st rank, according to the classification of ships of the Russian Imperial Navy that was in force in those years, was colloquially referred to as "armored" like other cruisers that had vertical side armor of the Russian Imperial Navy. Built in St. Petersburg at the Baltic Shipyard. Killed during the Russo-Japanese War
The cruiser project was proposed to the Baltic Shipyard by Admiral Shestakov.
The cruiser became the first ship from the planned series (the subsequent cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy turned out to be not of the same type, but successively intensified projects) of ocean-going armored cruisers of increased displacement (two of the displacement of the predecessor cr. 1 r. "Memory of Azov"), one of the requirements to the project there was the possibility of intercepting British commercial ships in the event of a war with Great Britain, as well as the possibility of moving from the Baltic to the Far East without refueling with coal.After the construction of the cruiser, British experts noted that the cruiser looked outdated compared to British courts similar class.
Immediately after construction, Rurik was sent to Vladivostok, upon arrival it was slightly modernized during two repairs in Vladivostok by order of the commander of the Pacific squadron, Admiral Dubasov. Arthur after the Sino-Japanese War. After the start of the Russo-Japanese War, he participated in several successful raider operations of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Squadron. He died in battle with Japanese ships heroically resisting more modern and numerous enemy cruisers.
Fight in Korea Strait
On August 14, 1904, three cruisers of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment: "Rurik", "Russia", and "Gromoboi", advancing to the aid of the besieged Port Arthur and the ships of the Port Arthur squadron breaking through from its bay, were met in the Korean Strait by the Japanese squadron consisting of four armored and two armored cruisers. Japanese armored cruisers were significantly superior in firepower to Russian ones and had much better armor protection. In addition, the rate of fire of Japanese guns was 4-5 times greater than on Russian cruisers, as was the power of the explosive used in the shells. Russian ships entered into battle with the Japanese, but due to the complete superiority of the Japanese in terms of firepower, it was decided to withdraw the ships to Vladivostok. Already at the very beginning of the battle, Rurik, already the slowest and armed with long-obsolete guns, was badly damaged and lost speed and control, constantly lagging behind the formation. By order of Admiral Jessen, Russia and Gromoboi repeatedly made attempts to push the Japanese ships away from Rurik and divert fire towards themselves, but as a result, under heavy Japanese fire, with heavy damage and casualties among the teams, they were forced to leave the battlefield. The departed ships were pursued by the Japanese. By the time the five-hour battle ended, only one of the senior officers remained alive on Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov 13th (according to the numbering of namesakes adopted then in the Russian fleet), only one gun was in operation.
Cruiser "Rurik"
Brief information about Berezhny's handbook
Cruiser "Rurik"
Type "Rurik", in a series of 3 sisterships "Rurik", "Russia" and "Gromoboy". They differed in armor thickness, later ships had more powerful armor, so the Rurik was the most poorly armored.
01/22/1890 as an armored cruiser enrolled in the lists of ships Baltic Fleet and 05/19/1890 was laid down on the slipway of the Carr and McPherson plant in St. Petersburg, launched on 10/22/1892, and commissioned on 11/04/1895. 02/01/1892 assigned to the subclass of the cruiser of the 1st rank. On July 7-13, 1895, he took part in the celebrations on the occasion of the opening of the Kiel Canal. In 1901 he passed overhaul. Participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 - 1905 (raiding operations as part of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers on enemy communications between Japan and Korea; together with other cruisers sank the Japanese transport Nakanoura Maru on 01/29/1904, 04/12/1904 transport Haginura Maru ", 04/13/1904 transport "Kinsu Maru", and in the period from 07/04/07 to 07/19/1904 - 6 Japanese schooners, the English steamer "Night Comender" and the German steamer "Tea", 06/02/1904 torpedoed and severely damaged the Japanese the steamer Sado Maru, and on April 26-27, 1904, captured and sent the schooners Koey Maru, Taiey Maru, Hokusey Maru and Senrio Maru to Vladivostok according to the prize right). 08/01/1904 died heroically in the Korean Strait in an unequal battle with the Japanese squadron and 09/11/1904 was excluded from the lists of ships of the Baltic Fleet.
Displacement - 11930 tons.
Length - 129.85 meters.
Width - 20.42 meters.
Draft - 7.85 meters.
Machine power - 2 X 6794 hp
The maximum speed is 18.84 knots.
Range - 7800 miles.
Booking:
- Towers - 203 - 254 mm.
- Deck - 51 - 76 mm.
- Cabin - 152 mm.
Armament: 4 - 203 mm AU, 16 - 152 mm AU, 6 - 120 mm AU, 2 - 64 mm AU, 10 - 47 mm AU, 12X5 - 37 mm AU, 6 - 381 mm AU .
Crew - 719 people.
MONOGRAPH
On July 29, 1904, the headquarters of Admiral Skrydlov in Vladivostok received a short and inconsistent cipher from the headquarters of the governor: "The Amur squadron has left, is fighting the enemy, send cruisers to the Korea Strait." Having hastily completed the current repairs, "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik" weighed anchor a day later. The exit of the detachment was classified. The Japanese command received no information about him. Skrydlov himself did not go into the operation. The detachment moved south under the flag of Admiral Jessen. As in Shantung, it was not the sovereign commander who had to act, but the junior flagship. According to the instruction of the command of the fleet, he was to assist the porters in the Sea of Japan and the Korean Strait. The instruction, in contrast to that of the viceroy, was lengthy and overly detailed. In particular, it indicated exactly where and how long to wait for the meeting. Cruisers were forbidden to engage in battle. When the enemy appeared, it was necessary to retreat, throwing overboard supplies of coal and water (?). The orders were paradoxical. They were criticized both by participants in the war (V.E. Egoriev) and researchers (R. Daveluy, I.M. Koktsinsky, A.I. Sorokin). Three cruisers, one of them obsolete, were once again to help a much stronger squadron of six battleships and four cruisers! Meanwhile, Witgeft's route and his squadron speed remained unknown factors in the task. And the permission to get rid of excess cargo at full speed was like a fantasy. The weak link of the detachment was the low-speed, worn-out and poorly protected sail-steam Rurik. It could be useful in blockades and cruising raids, but not in a protracted battle. It made sense not to take him on a dangerous long-range operation. But considerations of nominal numerical superiority prevailed: after all, without the Rurik, the detachment lost more than a third of its artillery. The participation of the old cruiser in the campaign did not increase the chances of victory (however, it was not mentioned in the instructions), but the risk to which the detachment was exposed.
As before, the Vladivostok residents were sent blindly to the area dominated by the enemy fleet. Staff members were good at giving intricate orders, but intelligence still could not obtain reliable information about the situation. Where Admiral Kamimura is located, what are approximately his strengths, whether the Port Arthur squadron was successful, what route it follows - was not known. A day later, a trip to the "Russia" revealed a malfunction in the boilers. They were a direct consequence of the wear and tear of the mechanisms and poorly executed repairs.
Since the evening of July 31, our detachment has been cruising between Korea and Japan, 40 miles from Fuzan. The order demanded to spend a day here, then return at full speed. The main core of Admiral Kamimura's forces of 4 heavy cruisers. He was faced with the task of blocking the strait and preventing the passage of the Askold and Novik escaped from Port Arthur to the north. Nearby, Kamimura deployed several light cruisers. Kamimura's headquarters had no information about the withdrawal of the Vladivostok troops, although they considered it probable. Not seeing each other in the dark, the opponents dispersed. The Japanese were at the same time north of the enemy.
Before dawn, Japanese signalmen spotted lights in the fog, and Kamimura immediately went to approach. The Russians, tensely waiting for the appearance of their own, were late in identifying the enemy and therefore found themselves at a disadvantage. In addition, the faulty flagship cruiser could not give full speed. Our ships with artillery in deck installations had an advantage in fuel supply and displacement. Japanese turret cruisers - in the number of combat units, armor protection, firepower and mobility. Their ships, smaller in size and tonnage, also had smaller affected areas. The high-sided hulls of our ships, their numerous funnels and high masts made it easier for the enemy gunners to aim. The Japanese bases were 2-3 hours away, our only base was 36 hours away. The enemy was burning with the desire to take revenge on the Vladivostok residents for their daring raids on the shores of Japan. Inspired, Kamimura gave on the air an order to pull reinforcements to the strait, and imposed a battle, giving at 5 hours 10 minutes, the first volley from a 6-mile distance. Having shot in a matter of minutes, his detachment developed the strongest fire to kill. There was no such heavy shooting under Shantung. The orders of the Japanese commander were given on the air in plain text. They were intercepted by radiotelegraphers of "Russia", which helped Jessen to navigate the situation. The Russians did not take advantage of the opportunity to create interference on the air and kill the negotiations of the Japanese. Strange as it may seem at first glance, the fast and accurate shooting of the Japanese gunners and the great destructive power of their shells at first almost did not bear fruit. Our detachment, which fired worse than the enemy, did not suffer much from the accelerated fire of the Japanese for more than an hour. There were 3 reasons for this:
Firstly, the Russian detachment for the first time in a minute of the fight reached the Japanese terminal ships - Iwate and Tokiwa, causing several explosions and fires on them. The flagship Iwate, although it was considered a well-protected heavy cruiser, immediately caught fire in 2 places. According to official Japanese data, one of the hits on the Iwate destroyed 4 guns at once and disabled up to 80 team members.
Secondly, Kamimura in the outset of the battle inadvertently gave maximum speed, because of which his column slipped forward, fighting mainly with the lead "Russia", the design of which was distinguished by strength and reliability. The Iwate and Tokiwa, who did not have time to raise steam, fell behind the flagship, and the Japanese column temporarily split up, which affected the effectiveness of its shooting.
Thirdly, when our ships entered the battle, they spontaneously formed a formation not provided for by the charters. They followed a broken ledge - a triangle, the top of which was "Russia" under the flag of the admiral, and the base - its two brothers. Due to malfunctions in the mechanisms, "Russia" greatly slowed down, which forced the "Gromoboy" to also slow down, and the "Rurik" to completely leave the wake column.
The resourcefulness and reasonable initiative of the experienced and knowledgeable leadership of Rurik - Captain 1st Rank Trusov and his senior officer Lieutenant Khlodovsky were beneficial. It was not for nothing that Khlodovsky wrote the analytical work “Experience in Squadron Combat Tactics”. The original system revealed indisputable merits. The well-armored Gromoboy, which was closer to the enemy, covered the vulnerable Rurik from the Japanese with its hull and smoke from the chimneys. It should be noted that “Rurik”, nicknamed “grandfather” by his crew, and “slow” in the detachment, nevertheless, raised steam in time in old worn-out boilers and confidently walked with a general squadron of 17-18 knots, without delaying newer brothers. The improvisation of the commanders gave our detachment some chances to break through to Vladivostok without significant damage. The order of the high command was carried out. The Vladivostok detachment fettered the superior armored forces of the enemy, dragged them along, and thereby assisted the Porturturians. But here, not an accident intervened in the events, as in the case of Shantung, but a pattern. (The times of the creative Potemkin, Spiridov and Ushakov have long passed. In all our command instances, the fear of violating at least one letter of the charter, ingrained in the flesh and blood, dominated. In wartime, the situation did not change. Jessen and his headquarters, despite the frankly stressful situation, found the location of one of the cruisers outside the wake line not meeting the statutory requirements... And these requirements dictated to all serviceable ships to strictly observe the classical formation - wake, front, ledge, bearing or wedge). Therefore, after an hour of an equal battle, our commander raised the signal: "Rurik" to join the ranks. And so that the cruiser would not ram its neighbor, the Thunderbolt, during rebuilding, they gave another signal: “Rurik has less speed.” The orders proved fatal. They did not correspond to the risky situation in which the detachment was located.
The enemy did not lose combat capability after several of our direct hits on Kamimura's ships. The Japanese admiral and his captains managed to restore the wake line at regular intervals. It cleared the fires faster than we expected and, in addition, maintained a high rate of fire. Kamimura's column inevitably overtook our ships; she was hanging on the flank of the Russians in the full sense. The cruisers were already suffering from heavy Japanese gunfire in armored rotating turrets. Our new hits on the enemy were not noted. (It was necessary to achieve not a thorough observance of the charter system and not a decrease, but a maximum increase in speed - or else use an unexpected maneuver to “shake off” the pursuers). The results of the strict implementation of the letter of the statutes (of course, with the best intentions!) turned out to be the worst.
"Rurik" under enemy fire, having stopped the cars, let the "Gromoboy" go ahead and got up, as it was supposed to, in the trailer formation - and very soon several explosions burst on it. Now nothing prevented the Japanese from shooting at the weak link of the enemy detachment. The cruiser flared up, "roared" on the course and greatly reduced speed. Then, an alarming sounding signal "Rudder out of action" appeared on his mast. The reply signal of "Russia": "Control the machines" was theoretically correct, but useless. A direct hit of an 8-inch projectile in the stern of the cruiser's steering gear was destroyed. A few minutes later, the cruiser left the wake formation, which, by order from above, had just entered. The column of Jessen, who made the most difficult miscalculation, was reduced to two ships. Meanwhile, reinforcements in the form of 3 ships approached the Japanese from different points - light cruisers and gunboats under the flag of Admiral Uriu.
In a difficult situation, Admiral Jessen, whose cruising forces were fading, showed the best qualities of a sailor. He, along with the commander of "Russia" and its chief mechanic, was guilty of leaving the flagship cruiser on a long and dangerous trip with faulty mechanisms. By following the letter of the 100-year-old Naval Charter, he endangered the weakest link in the detachment. But he did not celebrate the coward.
At the 2nd hour of the battle, the Kamimura ships, enthusiastically firing at the Rurik, fell behind, and a free path to Vladivostok opened up in front of our column. But instead of retreating, Jessen made a 180-degree turn and rushed back. He acted on the principle of Russian sailors "Die yourself, but hand over your comrade." The Rurik crew, inspired by the return of their comrades, made desperate efforts to fix the steering wheel. It was not possible to break the control of our detachment Kamimura. The admiral and the ranks of his staff, who were on the open bridge of the "Russia", remained unharmed and led the battle. For almost 2 hours, "Russia" and "Gromoboy" described circulation around the flames of "Rurik", covering the seriously wounded sistership with their own sides. The superiority of the enemy was more and more revealed. The Japanese, according to our estimates, fired "extremely quickly and accurately." Lieutenant Kolokolov later wrote: “the tenth gun was withdrawn, the twelfth, the eighth ... The left side guns do not work ... The pipes are in pieces ... two masts in holes are kept on parole ... ". Many of our guns were out of action due to technical breakdowns. After 3 hours of battle, more than half of the artillery of the detachment fell silent. The explosion of a shell near the armored cabin of the "Gromoboy" disabled the commander and 2 helmsmen. A loaded torpedo tube exploded on the Rurik. Huge fires broke out on it and on the Rossiya. Repeatedly, the flames penetrated the powder magazines and covered the charges. True, due to the strong moistening of the gunpowder, the charges only burned, which saved the ships from internal explosions. The detachment, chained to the wrecked brother, suffered severe losses in manpower. There was a danger of the death of all ships or their capture by the enemy.
Admiral Kamimura firmly held the initiative. With armored forces, he acted against 2 ships of Jessen, with light cruisers and gunboats he slowly shot the doomed Rurik. At the same time, he pulled several destroyers to the battlefield. Neither to break the enemy ring around the "Rurik", nor to fix its steering wheel, the Russians failed. Around 8:30, Jessen ordered a withdrawal to the north. The departure caused the sailors of "Russia" and "Gromoboy" anxiety instead of relief. Although the crews suffered great damage and were tired, they were against leaving a comrade in trouble.
“Where are we going and have we abandoned Rurik?” many officers demanded an answer. Those had to answer that “we are dragging the enemy along with us in order to allow Rurik to recover, repair and follow us. But in fact, few people believed this, ”says the ship's logs of the Vladivostok cruisers. Kamimura, with his best strength, immediately gave chase. The battle of 4 Japanese heavy cruisers with 2 of ours lasted about 2 more hours. The Japanese tried to press our detachment to the Korean coast, but they were not successful. As in the battle of Shantung, they ran out of ammunition, and the quality and rate of fire fell due to the fatigue of the gunners. There were also damages. On the flagship Izumo, the bow 8-inch tower was broken and there was a struggle with an underwater hole. "Azuma" rolled out of the convoy due to a malfunction of the car and fell behind. Malfunctions were discovered on another cruiser - the Tokiva, which took the place of the Azuma and did not keep well in the ranks. The course of the combatants decreased to 13 - 14 knots: among the Russians - due to torn chimneys and malfunctions in the boilers, among the Japanese - due to underwater holes. At about 10 o'clock, the Japanese column lay down on the return course and went to connect with the ships of Uriu.
Deprived of control, and then losing its course, the commander and a third of the team (Trusov, Khlodovsky and other officers died), the Rurik shrouded in smoke and steam turned into a pile of warped metal, but continued to fight. His gunners, under a hail of enemy fragments, repaired part of the guns and put them into action. Increasing the range of fire, the sailors, without instructions from the officers, got the hang of using their own backs to raise the gun barrels at a large angle, which the artillery department before the war found unthinkable and unnecessary. Thus, from the few guns remaining in the ranks, the Naniwa and Takachiho, which had inadvertently approached 2 miles, were hit several times. When there were no shells and gunners, the "Rurikites" fired a torpedo from the only serviceable device. When Uriu's ships dodged the torpedo, the crippled, burning, almost uncontrollable cruiser went to ram. Of course, it was impossible to make a ram in this position, but the Japanese rushed back and sharply increased the distance.
Japanese sailors said that "Rurik" reminded them of a terrible fairy-tale dragon, in which another one immediately grows instead of a severed head. The Japanese official history of the war says: “The cruiser Rurik continued to offer valiant resistance. A hail of shells rained down from our ships; both bridges were demolished, the masts were knocked down; there was not a single place where our shells would not hit ... Four boilers were broken, and steam poured out of them ... The cruiser gradually sank astern ... "
The death of the ship was inevitable. The crew had reason to stop the fight and escape. But Lieutenant K.I., who took command, Ivanov ordered to open the kingstones first. At the 6th hour of the battle, at half past eleven, "Rurik", in front of a much superior enemy, went to the bottom, without lowering the flag. About half of the sailors raised by the enemy from the water were wounded, shell-shocked and burned. The English correspondent S. Wright noted that the captured sailors behaved with dignity and even arrogance, and the Japanese sailors showed them genuine respect.
13 years after the battle, Japanese diplomats presented Rear Admiral Ivanov, who was in exile, with a gift - a silk St. Andrew's flag embroidered by the emperor's wife, as a token of admiration for the valor of the Rurik crew.
The Russian cruiser "Rurik" became known to the whole world thanks to an unequal battle in the Korean Bay during the Russo-Japanese War. Surrounded by the crew decided to flood the ship so that it would not go to the enemy. Before the defeat in the Korean Gulf, the cruiser managed to disperse the forces of the Japanese fleet for several months, leaving for raids from Vladivostok.
Construction
The famous armored cruiser "Rurik" became the brainchild of the Baltic Shipyard. This ship was created in the heat of a military race with british navy. The ship was supposed to be a worthy analogue of the British Blake fast cruisers. In 1888, the engineers of the Baltic Shipyard proposed a draft of the project to Admiral Chikhachev and the Marine Technical Committee (MTK).
The draft design has been revised. In the MTK, the future cruiser "Rurik" got rid of some design flaws and technical equipment. The drawings were approved by Emperor Alexander III. Construction began on May 19, 1890. After two years of work, the Baltic Shipyard prepared the Rurik cruiser. It was launched in 1892, and in 1895 the ship was commissioned.
It was assumed that the ship would be the first in a series of cruisers of the same type. Built after him, "Gromoboy" and "Russia" became not twin brothers, but modifications (with increased displacement). Interestingly, the Rurik cruiser was created as a potential interceptor for English merchant ships. It was intended to be so used in the event of war with Great Britain. In addition, the terms of reference included a requirement to create a ship capable of crossing from the Baltic Sea to the Far East without resorting to refueling with coal. In order to pass this route, the crew had to sail the southern seas and go around almost all of Eurasia.
in the Pacific Fleet
Almost immediately after the Rurik cruiser was built, the fleet decided to transfer it to the Pacific Ocean. This redeployment was linked to the escalation of tensions in Far East. The port of Vladivostok became the place of registration of the new ship. The alleged conflict with Great Britain did not happen.
Instead, the Russo-Japanese War began in February 1904. At this time, "Rurik" as usual was in Vladivostok. An order followed to go to sea and strike at the Japanese-Chinese trade and water communications. The ships leaving for the voyage exchanged salutes with the city. They were escorted by crowds of civilians. The main task of the squadron, which in addition to "Rurik" included "Bogatyr", "Russia" and "Gromoboy", was to divert the Japanese forces. If the enemy fleet were divided, then it would be easier to defend the fortress of Port Arthur.
"Rurik", acting in was supposed to destroy transport ships carrying troops and military cargo, coastal ships and enemy structures located on the shore. Since the cruiser was noticeably outdated, it was possible to go on a campaign only as a whole detachment, and not individually. The squadron returned to Vladivostok only for parking, which was necessary to replenish the stocks that had run out.
First campaign
On the first trip, the cruisers went to It was planned that the city of Genzan (modern Wonsan) would be the next target. However, on the way, the ships got into a storm. Since it was winter on the calendar, the water that got into the guns soon turned into ice. Because of this, the squadron became incapacitated. Weather and climatic conditions were really not the best. In order to leave Vladivostok, the cruisers had to wait for the icebreaker to open their way through the frozen bay.
It was this inconvenience that forced the Russian leadership to occupy the Chinese fortress of Port Arthur. Its strategically important and convenient Port Arthur was also wanted by the Japanese. The city and the ships in it were blocked. The squadron "Rurik" was supposed to disperse the enemy's forces in order to alleviate the situation of the port, while the ships of the Baltic Fleet came to the rescue. Due to the icing of the guns, the detachment briefly returned to Vladivostok.
Defense of Vladivostok
In the port, the craftsmen repaired the Rurik. The cruiser (whose type was armored) was replenished with food supplies, and he set off again. The second trip has begun. There were no Japanese ships in the sea. But even this voyage of the Russian squadron forced the enemy to transfer part of his forces in order to intimidate the Russians.
In March, the enemy squadron, leaving, headed for the Peter the Great Bay near Vladivostok. The detachment included the latest Japanese turret cruisers Azuma, Izumo, Yakumo and Iwate. They were accompanied by several light ships. The squadron opened fire on Vladivostok. The shells did not reach the city, but the inhabitants were seriously frightened. "Rurik" weighed anchor in the port ten minutes after the first volleys were fired. There were ice in the bay. They prevented a quick exit from the port. The detachment of cruisers ended up at the moment when the Japanese were already leaving their positions. Dusk was falling, and the ships, having traveled another twenty miles and seeing the enemy on the horizon, stopped. In addition, in Vladivostok, they began to fear that the Japanese had left mines somewhere nearby.
New challenges
The failures of the first days of the war led to personnel rotations in the leadership of the fleet. The tsarist government appointed Admiral Makarov as commander. He set new tasks for Rurik and his squadron. It was decided to abandon the strategy of raids on the Japanese coast. Instead, "Rurik" was now supposed to prevent the transfer of enemy troops to Genzan. This Korean port was the Japanese foothold, land operations began from there.
Makarov allowed to go to sea in any composition (it does not matter if it is a squadron or individual ships). He reasoned on the basis that Russian guns were more powerful and more effective than Japanese ones. The admiral was wrong. Hat-throwing moods in Russia on the eve of the war were commonplace. The Japanese were not perceived as serious opponents.
The economy of this Asian country has been in isolation for a long time. And only in last years Tokyo began forced reforms in the army and navy. The new armed forces were built according to the Western European model. Equipment was also purchased foreign and only best quality. The Japanese intervention in the Far East was looked down upon in Moscow, considering the Japanese to be upstarts. It was because of this frivolous attitude that the whole war was lost. But so far the prospects were unclear, and the headquarters hoped for a chance and courage of the Russian sailors.
Distracting maneuvers
More than a month "Rurik" was in the port. Meanwhile, Admiral Makarov died near Port Arthur. He was on the battleship Petropavlovsk, which hit a mine. The Japanese command decided that after the tragic death of the admiral, the Russians would not lean out of the encircled Port Arthur for a long time. Therefore, Tokyo gave the order to defeat the group based in Vladivostok.
At this time, "Rurik" again went on a campaign. This time the squadron moved towards the Japanese city of Hakodate. At sea, she came across a transport ship, which was sunk by a torpedo launched by Rossiya. The prisoners told that the squadron of Admiral Kamimura was nearby. Then the Russian ships turned back to Vladivostok, never reaching Hakodate. Luckily, the teams did not meet this time. Kamimura's ships were much stronger than the Russian ones, which could lead to an unconditional defeat.
But even in such a dubious position, "Rurik" successfully completed its goal. The Vladivostok squadron was supposed to divert part of the enemy forces from Port Arthur. Since April, Kamimura's ships have not left the Sea of Japan, which was only in the hands of Russia. In May, due to an unfortunate coincidence, the Bogatyr cruiser had an accident, buried in the rocks of Cape Bruce. After this incident, three ships remained in the squadron.
Fight in Shimonoseki Strait
On the last day of the spring of 1904, three cruisers again set off for combat navigation. Before entering the Shimonoseki Strait, they stumbled upon Japanese transport ships. The radio operators skillfully set up radio interference, due to which the enemy was unable to send a distress signal to Admiral Kamimura. Japanese ships rushed in all directions. In the morning, the patrol cruiser Tsushima appeared on the horizon through the fog.
The ship tried to hide and reach the shore. A general chase began. The Russian squadron managed to overtake the Izumo Maru transport ship. It was sunk after heavy shelling. About a hundred people were removed from the ship. The rest swam away in different directions. The crews of "Rurik" and "Russia" did not dare to part with the "Gromoboy" and stopped the pursuit.
At the entrance to the Shimonoseki Strait, another enemy transport caught fire. The ship even tried to ram the Thunderbolt, but nothing came of it. He was shot at point-blank range and finally finished off with a torpedo. The ship sank. It had about a thousand soldiers and eighteen powerful howitzers, which the Japanese were going to use to lay siege to Port Arthur. The situation of the surrounded city became worse and worse. Under these conditions, the Vladivostok squadron almost did not leave the sea, and if it stopped at its port, it was only in order to quickly replenish supplies. There was no time to repair and replace worn parts.
Last encounter
After long maneuvers on August 14, 1904, the cruisers Rossiya, Gromoboy and Rurik finally collided with the Japanese squadron. It had six ships. They were superior to Russian ships in terms of armor protection and firepower. The Vladivostok detachment went to the rescue of ships trying to break out of the encirclement in Port Arthur.
Japanese guns were 4 times faster and more powerful. This ratio predetermined the sad outcome of the battle. Already at the beginning of the clash, it became clear that the enemy had the advantage. Then it was decided to return the ships to the port of Vladivostok. It failed to do so. The guns of the cruiser "Rurik" tried to keep the enemy at a safe distance, but after another well-aimed salvo of the ship's feed, it received a dangerous hole.
Due to the hit, the steering wheel stopped working, control was lost. Water rushed into the compartments. The steering and tiller cabins were flooded within an hour. The blades jammed, due to which the crew on the ship became a helpless hostage of the situation. The speed of the vessel continued to decrease, although it kept its previous course. "Rurik" (cruiser of 1892) began to lag behind other ships of the squadron. The distance between them steadily increased.
Surrounded
The Russian squadron entered the Korean Strait under the command of Karl Jessen. When the captain realized that things were bad, he gave the order to "Russia" and "Gromoboy" to cover the "Rurik" from Japanese fire. The distraction proved pointless. The crews of these ships suffered heavy losses. Sailors and officers fell dead under heavy enemy fire.
For this reason, "Russia" and "Gromoboy" were forced to leave the Korea Strait. At first, Jessen hoped that the armored cruisers of the Japanese, representing the greatest danger, would chase the flagship and leave the Rurik alone. The ship's guns could protect it from attacks by light ships. If the team had promptly repaired the damage, the cruiser would have been able to continue on its way back home, or at least go towards the Korean coast.
The Japanese really rushed after the "Russia". However, when she was out of range of the ships of the imperial fleet, they returned to the battlefield. At this time, "Rurik" tried to maneuver and continued to resist, although due to damage, its firepower was significantly weakened. Then the crew made an attempt to ram light Japanese ships. They were able to dodge, and as a precaution, they retreated to a great distance. All that remained for them was to wait until the encircled ship began to sink, and the death of the Rurik cruiser would become inevitable. Finally, Russian sailors launched a torpedo at the enemies from the last surviving torpedo tube. However, the projectile did not hit the target.
Order of Ivanov-Thirteenth
At the very beginning of the battle, the captain of the Rurik Yevgeny Trusov died. The senior officer who was supposed to replace him was also mortally wounded. In total, out of 800 people in the team, 200 were killed and about 300 more were injured. The last surviving senior officer was Konstantin Ivanov. At the end of the five-hour battle, when its outcome was already clear, this man took command.
Meanwhile, the Japanese began to give signals that they were ready to accept the surrender of the enemy. The squadron was commanded by Admiral Hikonojo Kamimura. He was just returning from the pursuit of "Russia" and "Gromoboy" and now he was waiting for a response from the encircled crew. When Ivanov realized that all means of resistance had been exhausted, he ordered the ship to be scuttled. Usually the Russian fleet used special charges for this purpose, which undermined the ship. However, this time they were damaged. Then the crew decided to open the kingstones - special valves. After that, the water rushed into the ship's system even more strongly. "Rurik" (cruiser of 1892) quickly sank, first capsizing on the port side, and then completely under water.
The feat and glory of the cruiser
Russia lost the Russo-Japanese War, but its army and navy again demonstrated their courage and loyalty to duty to the whole world. In the Korean Strait, the Rurik cruiser collided with ships that were much more modern and more powerful than it. An outdated vessel with poor armor, however, took the fight. The feat of the cruiser "Rurik" was highly appreciated not only at home, but also in foreign countries and even in Japan itself.
Officer Konstantin Ivanov wore number 13 in his crew. This was a naval tradition that extended to namesakes. After the end of the war and returning to his homeland, he was awarded numerous awards (like all his comrades). The emperor, having learned about his number, changed the name of the officer by his highest order. Konstantin Ivanov became Konstantin Ivanov the Thirteenth. Today, the Russian fleet continues to remember the feat and faithful service of the cruiser. It is curious that back in the 1890s, Alexander Kolchak served as an assistant to the head of the watch on the ship. Much later, he became an admiral, and after that - one of the leaders of the white movement and the main opponents of the new Bolshevik government.
In 1906, the cruiser Rurik 2 was launched. It was named after its predecessor, which was sunk during the Russo-Japanese War. The ship became the flagship of the Baltic Fleet. The cruiser "Rurik 2" took part in the First World War, leading a constant firefight with German ships. This ship also sank. It hit a mine on November 20, 1916, off the coast of the island of Gotland.