Basement and cellar
Artillery cruisers of the Sverdlov type: the last in the Russian fleet. See what "Sverdlov (cruiser)" is in other dictionaries Baltic Fleet cruiser Sverdlov history

Artillery cruisers of the Sverdlov type: the last in the Russian fleet. See what "Sverdlov (cruiser)" is in other dictionaries Baltic Fleet cruiser Sverdlov history

June 7-18, 1953 - the first post-war friendly visit Soviet ship. flared up" cold war”, Trade, economic and cultural ties have sharply decreased Soviet Union. Bourgeois propaganda presented our people as enemies and rude barbarians. Foreign visits of our ships became an effective countermeasure to this. They clearly demonstrated the high level of development of science and technology in our country, showed its real military power and the culture of our sailors. This contributed to the strengthening of trust and respect for Russia.

And so, at the beginning of 1953, the Soviet Navy (on September 10, 1955, the Soviet Navy was renamed the Navy) received an invitation to take part in the solemn naval parade at the Spithead raid of the Portsmouth naval base on the occasion of the coronation of Her Royal Majesty Elizabeth II. This was the first post-war visit to the naval base of one of the most likely adversaries. The choice fell on the head cruiser of the newest post-war series "68-bis" - "Sverdlov" under the command of Captain 1st Rank O.I. Rudakov.

Interestingly, in the fleet at that time there were many experienced commanders, but this extremely responsible task was entrusted to O.I. Rudakov. He was summoned to Moscow for an appointment with the Minister of Defense N.A. Bulganin, who set the task of being the best at the naval parade! And Rudakov fulfilled it brilliantly. He was the only one of the commanders of foreign ships who literally flew into the Spithead roadstead without the help of a pilot and anchored in three times less time than was allotted for a similar procedure in the British Navy.

Project 68 bis cruisers

The construction of light cruisers of the 68-bis project, of the Sverdlov type, was carried out as part of the first post-war shipbuilding program adopted in 1950. When developing it, they proceeded from the urgent need to strengthen the fleet and revive the shipbuilding industry. 25 ships were planned for construction, but 14 were commissioned. Until the mid-1960s, Project 68-bis cruisers formed the basis of powerful naval groups capable of leading fighting, both in coastal seas and in the vast oceans.

In terms of the combination of combat characteristics, the light cruisers of the 68-bis project were at least at the level of similar ships of foreign fleets. Compared to heavy cruisers, they carried lighter 152mm artillery instead of 203mm. But the high efficiency of their guns compensated for the lower weight of the projectile, but good seaworthiness was ensured and the survivability of the ship was increased. For its time, it was a definite pinnacle of the evolution of naval technology.

When developing this project, they sought to create a new generation ship, taking into account the experience of the war and the new tasks that arose. After 1945, there was not a single clash of large ships, but in local wars, the number of 152-406-mm shells fired along the coast turned out to be commensurate with the total consumption of ammunition of the same calibers during World War II. Based on this, the cruiser's artillery was perfectly adapted for firing at coastal targets. His anti-aircraft weapons were also well thought out and powerful enough.

Olimpiy Ivanovich Rudakov

Portrait of O.I. Rudakova
Photo from the 1950s

This man had a difficult and interesting fate. Outwardly, he resembled a Russian epic hero, and by nature he was an exceptionally decent person. After graduating from the Higher Naval School in 1937, he, as part of the crew of the battleship Marat, arrived in England to participate in the 1937 naval parade on the Portsmouth Spithead raid on the occasion of the coronation of King George VI of Great Britain. Then he served on the destroyers of the Northern Fleet. At the end of 1941, he was appointed assistant commander of the destroyer Smasher.

In November 1942, during a severe storm, the stern of the hull was torn off the ship. Most of the crew was taken to other ships. At the same time, the command of the ship left the "Crushing" among the first. The case of the death of the "Crushing" was considered by a military tribunal. Rudakov was sentenced to "the highest measure", but then he was sent to the penal battalion. After being restored to the officer rank, in February 1944 O.I. Rudakov was recalled to the Northern Fleet and continued to serve on destroyers, quickly rising through the ranks.

Arrival in Portsmouth

The day before the departure of the cruiser "Sverdlov" from Baltiysk, the Minister of the Navy of the USSR, Admiral N.G., arrived on the ship. Kuznetsov. Addressing the crew, he said: “You have been entrusted with the responsible task of the government and, in carrying out it, you will either help the government make policy or interfere. I express confidence in the success of your campaign!

More than 200 ships gathered for the parade on the roadstead of Spithead. The cruiser had to make difficult maneuvers in order to accurately get into the parade. Rudakov rejected the help of the pilot and himself led the ship to the anchorage, which was supposed to be marked with a signal buoy with the state flag of the USSR. "Sverdlov" approached the indicated point, but there was no signal buoy. (The ship's commander later received a formal apology about this). The navigator quickly established that there was no mistake.

Now it was necessary to anchor using the fartoing method, which required precision in managing a huge ship. According to the then accepted standards for ships of this class, staging in 45 minutes was considered excellent. The eyes of all those present at the raid turned to the Soviet cruiser, the observers started their stopwatches. The American cruiser anchored in 2 hours, the French one in 4 hours, and the Swedish cruiser was simply tired of waiting for the completion of the setting. "Sverdlov" anchored in 12 minutes. It created a real sensation. Rudakov's photo appeared on the covers of all British newspapers.

naval parade

The cruiser stood in the road for a week and invariably attracted a lot of attention from the population. Something was constantly happening on the deck of the cruiser: photographing groups gathered, small sports competitions, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet on board imitated the rest of sailors in the form of spontaneous songs and dances on the upper deck. The excellent maritime training of the crew, the high culture of behavior of our sailors on the shore and the interesting rest of the sailors on the upper deck of the ship found a favorable response in the British press.

The cruiser "Sverdolov" at the naval parade in Portsmouth

The friendly visit of our cruiser to England was very successful. According to the Soviet embassy in London, in winning the hearts of ordinary British, the week of the Sverdlov cruiser's stay in England played a greater role than years of painstaking diplomatic activity. After the completion of the celebrations, the cruiser safely returned to Baltiysk. A solemn meeting awaited him at the base. Minister of Defense of the USSR N.A. Bulganin personally presented awards to each member of the crew. O.I. Rudakov was promoted to Rear Admiral and awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War.

Conclusion

After the visit, the cruiser "Sverdlov" immediately became known throughout Europe. He was in combat formation for many more years, making several foreign visits. However, the physical and moral aging of the ship led to the fact that on May 30, 1989, it was excluded from the combat strength of the fleet, and then sold to an Indian company for cutting into metal. By the end of 2001, not a single cruiser of project 68 bis remained in the fleet. Olimpiy Ivanovich Rudakov served for more than 20 years in various command positions in the Navy, and died in 1974 in Leningrad.

When writing the article, the following materials were used:

Skulkin F. Furtoing on Spithead. Newspaper "Moskovskaya Pravda" 4.06.1996
Ammon G.A. Maritime anniversaries. 1987
Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Moscow. 1978
Gorshkov S.G. Maritime power of the state. Moscow. 1979

Ships of the Imperial Russian Navy, the Soviet Navy and modern Russia regularly visit foreign ports with friendly visits. Often this does not attract much public attention, but this visit of the Sverdlov cruiser to England immediately and deservedly became a world sensation. He is still remembered with pride for our fleet and our sailors ...

Project 68-bis cruisers: "Sverdlov" against the British tiger. Part 2.

Start: Project 68-bis cruisers: the backbone of the post-war fleet. Part 1.

Comparing the cruisers of project 68K and 68-bis with foreign light cruisers of pre-war construction and post-war American Worcesters, we have so far ignored such interesting post-war foreign ships as the Swedish light cruiser Tre Krunur, the Dutch De Zeven Provinsen, and, of course, the latest British Tiger-class artillery cruisers. Today we will correct this misunderstanding by starting from the end of our list - the British Tiger-class cruisers.

I must say that the British pretty much dragged out the procedure for creating their latest artillery cruisers. In total, during the war years, eight Minotaur-class ships were ordered, which were a slightly improved version of the Fiji light cruisers. The first three "Minotaurs" were completed according to the original project, and the lead one was transferred to the Canadian Navy in 1944 under the name "Ontario", two more joined the lists of the Royal Navy. The construction of the remaining cruisers was frozen shortly after the war, and two ships that were in the early stages of construction were dismantled, so that by the end of the 40s, the British had three unfinished light cruisers of this type afloat: Tiger, Defense and Blake ".
The British, who fully felt the weakness of the anti-aircraft armament of their own cruisers during the Second World War, nevertheless did not want to limit themselves to the creation of air defense cruisers with 127-133-mm caliber. Such ships, in their opinion, were too weak for both sea battle, and for shelling the coast, and therefore it was decided to return to the development of a universal heavy artillery system. The first such attempt was made before the war, when creating light cruisers of the Linder type, but was unsuccessful. It turned out that turret installations that retain manual operations during loading would not be able to provide an acceptable rate of fire, and the creation of fully automatic artillery systems capable of loading at any elevation angle was beyond the technical capabilities then available. During the war, the British made a second attempt.
In 1947, the British were going to complete the construction of cruisers with 9 * 152-mm universal guns and 40-mm "Bofors" in new installations, then the project was repeatedly changed and, as a result, at the time of commissioning the light cruiser "Tiger", it had two 152- mm with Mark XXVI installations, the figure of which is shown below:

Each of them had two fully automatic guns 152-mm / 50 QF Mark N5, capable of developing a rate of fire (per barrel) of 15-20 rounds / min and a very high speed of vertical and horizontal guidance, reaching up to 40 degrees / sec. In order to make the six-inch gun work at such speeds, it was necessary to significantly increase the mass of the turret installation - if the two-gun 152-mm Linder turrets weighed 92 tons (rotating part), then the two-gun universal Mark XXVI - 158.5 tons, moreover, that turret protection was provided with only 25-55 mm armor. Since, with a rate of fire of 15-20 rounds / min, the gun barrels heated up extremely quickly, the British had to provide for water cooling of the barrels.
Apparently, it was the British who managed to create the world's first completely successful ship-based universal 152-mm installation, although there are references to some problems in its operation. However, it is common knowledge that versatility comes with compromises, and the 152mm Mark N5 is no exception. In fact, the British were forced to reduce its ballistics to the American 152-mm Mark 16: with a projectile weight of 58.9-59.9 kg, it provided an initial speed of only 768 m / s (Mark 16-59 kg and 762 m / s, respectively). In essence, the British succeeded in what the Americans could not do on their Worcesters, but we must not forget that the British completed their development 11 years later.
The second anti-aircraft caliber of the British "Tigers" was represented by three two-gun 76-mm Mark 6 installations of very outstanding characteristics - its rate of fire was 90 shells weighing 6.8 kg with an initial velocity of 1,036 m / s per barrel, while the barrels also required water cooling. The firing range reached a record 17,830 m for 76-mm guns. The author of this article has no information about any problems with the operation of this artillery system, but it is somewhat surprising that it was not used on any other ships of the Royal Navy. Fire control was carried out by five directors with radar type 903 each, and any of them could carry out guidance on both surface and air targets. Moreover, each 152-mm or 76-mm installation had its own director.
As for protection, here the light cruisers of the Tiger type corresponded to the same Fiji - 83-89 mm armored belt from the bow to the stern 152-mm tower, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe engine rooms on top of the main one - another 51 mm armored belt, the thickness of the traverses , deck, barbettes - 51 mm, towers, as mentioned above - 25-51 mm. The cruiser had a standard displacement of 9,550 tons, a power plant with a capacity of 80,000 hp. and developed 31.5 knots.

Light cruiser "Tiger".

Comparing the Project 68-bis cruiser "Sverdlov" and the English "Tiger", we are forced to state that the armament of the British ship is much more modern than the Soviet one and already belongs to the next generation of naval artillery and fire control systems. The combat rate of fire of the Soviet 152-mm B-38 cannon was 5 rounds / min (volleys had to follow at twelve-second intervals during training firing), respectively, a Sverdlov-class cruiser could fire 60 shells from its 12 guns per minute. The British cruiser had only 4 barrels, but with a rate of fire of 15 rounds / min, it could fire all the same 60 shells in a minute. Here it is necessary to give a little explanation - the maximum rate of fire of the British gun was 20 rounds / min, but the fact is that the actual rate of fire is still below the limit values. So, for example, for the MK-5-bis turret installations of Soviet cruisers, the maximum rate of fire is 7.5 rounds / min., But in practical firing, it is “asked” 1.5 times less, i.e. 5 shots / min. Therefore, it can be assumed that the actual rate of fire of the British six-inch is still closer to 15, but not to the maximum 20 rounds per minute.
The domestic radar "Zalp" (two for each cruiser of the 68-bis project) and the Molniya-ATs-68 main caliber fire control system ensured firing only at surface targets. True, it was assumed that anti-aircraft fire of 152-mm artillery could be controlled using the Zenit-68-bis launcher, designed to control 100-mm SM-5-1 installations, but this was not achieved, which is why anti-aircraft fire was fired at tables. At the same time, British directors with type 903 radars issued target designation for both surface and air targets, which, of course, made it possible to control anti-aircraft fire from British six-inch guns many times more effectively. This is not to mention the fact that the vertical guidance angles and targeting speed of the British installation dramatically exceeded those of the MK-5-bis: the Soviet turret installation had a maximum elevation angle of 45 degrees, and the English one - 80 degrees, the vertical and horizontal guidance speed of MK-5-bis is only 13 degrees, the English one has up to 40 degrees.
And, nevertheless, in a duel situation "Sverdlov" against "Tiger" the chances of winning the Soviet cruiser are much higher than those of the "Englishman".
Of course, the huge impression is made by the fact that the light cruiser "Tiger", having only four barrels of the main caliber, is able to provide the same fire performance as the "Sverdlov" with its 12 guns. But this fact should in no way hide from us that in all other respects the British six-inch gun corresponds to the American 152-mm "old woman" Mark 16. And this means that the capabilities of the "Tiger" absolutely do not exceed the 12 six-inch guns of the American "Cleveland" and are even inferior him in fire performance, because the American guns were faster than the Soviet B-38s. But, as we have already analyzed in previous articles, a dozen Soviet 152-mm B-38s gave Soviet cruisers significant advantages in range and armor penetration over both American and more powerful British 152-mm artillery systems. Neither the American cruisers nor the "Tiger" could conduct an effective firefight at a distance of 100-130 kbt, because the maximum firing range of their guns was 123-126 kbt, and the effective firing range was 25 percent lower (less than 100 kbt), since at close to the limiting distances, the dispersion of projectiles is excessively large. At the same time, the Soviet B-38, with its record performance characteristics, ensured reliable target engagement at distances of 117-130 kbt, which was confirmed by practical firing. Accordingly, a Sverdlov-class cruiser can open fire much earlier than a British cruiser, and it’s not a fact that it will even let it get closer to itself, since it surpasses the Tiger in speed, albeit slightly. If the "Tiger" is lucky and he can get close to the Soviet cruiser at a distance of effective fire from his guns, then the advantage still remains with the "Sverdlov", because with equal fire performance of the ships, Soviet shells have a high initial speed (950 m / s versus 768 m / s), and, accordingly, armor penetration. At the same time, the protection of the Soviet cruiser is much better: having an armored deck of the same thickness and an armored belt 12-20% thicker, the Sverdlov has much better protected artillery (175 mm forehead, 130 mm barbette versus 51 mm for the Tiger) , armored wheelhouse, etc. More powerful guns with better protection and equal fire performance provide the Project 68 bis cruiser with an obvious advantage at medium battle distances. And, of course, not a completely “fair” argument - the standard displacement of the Sverdlov (13,230 tons) is 38.5% more than that of the Tiger (9,550 tons), which is why the 68-bis project cruiser has greater combat stability just in the strength of being bigger.

Light cruiser "Sverdlov".

Thus, the Soviet cruiser in an artillery duel is superior to the British one, despite the fact that the latter's artillery armament is much more modern. As for the air defense capabilities, here, it would seem, one should testify to the obvious and multiple superiority of the English cruiser, but ... Not everything is so simple.
It is very interesting to compare the Soviet 100-mm installation SM-5-1 and the English 76-mm Mark 6. With the simplest arithmetic calculation, a completely bleak picture for domestic cruisers is obtained. The British 76-mm "spark" is capable of sending 180 shells weighing 6.8 kg each (90 per barrel) to the target in a minute. 1224 kg/min. The Soviet SM-5-1, at the same time making 30-36 rounds / min with 15.6 kg shells (15-18 per barrel) - only 468-561 kg. It turns out to be a uniform apocalypse, one single 76-mm gun mount of the British cruiser shoots almost as much metal per minute as three onboard SM-5-1 Soviet cruisers ...
But that's bad luck, in the description of the 76-mm creation of the "gloomy British genius" completely strange numbers are indicated - the ammunition load directly in the turret mount is only 68 shots, and the feed mechanisms that each gun is equipped with are capable of supplying only 25 (twenty-five) shells per minute. Thus, in the first minute of firing, the 76-mm “spark” will be able to fire not 180, but only 118 shells (68 rounds from the ammunition rack + another 50 raised by reloading mechanisms). In the second and subsequent minutes of the battle, its rate of fire will not exceed 50 rds / min (25 rds per barrel). How so? What kind of terrible design miscalculation is this?
But can we reproach the British developers for their inability to add up "2 + 2"? Hardly - of course, in the 50s of the last century, British science and industry were no longer the first in the world, but still, the pejorative "Camel is a horse made in England" is still very far away. The rate of fire of the English 76mm Mark 6 is indeed 90 rounds per minute per barrel. But this does not mean at all that it is capable of firing 90 shots from each barrel every minute - from this it will simply overheat and become unusable. In the first minute, she will be able to fire 59 shells per barrel - in short bursts, with breaks. Every next minute, she will be able to give short bursts with a total "capacity" of no more than 25 shells per barrel - obviously, in order to avoid overheating. This, of course, is nothing more than the author's assumption, and the respected reader will decide for himself how true it can be. However, one more thing should be noted: the enchanting ballistics of the British gun was achieved, including very high pressure in the bore - 3,547 kg per cm2. This is higher than that of the domestic 180 mm B-1-P gun - it had only 3,200 kg/cm2. Does anyone seriously expect that in the 50s it was possible to create an artillery system with such ballistics and the ability to conduct a long fire battle in long bursts with a rate of fire of 1,5 shots / sec?
However, regardless of the reasons (the danger of overheating or the impenetrable alternative talent of the designers of the installation), we can only state that the actual rate of fire of the British Mark 6 is significantly lower than the arithmetic calculation according to the passport value of the rate of fire. And this means that in 5 minutes of fire combat, the Soviet SM-5-1, firing 15 rounds / min per barrel (nothing prevents it from firing for a long time with such intensity), is capable of firing 150 shells weighing 15.6 kg or 2340 kg. A three-inch "Englishwoman" in the same 5 minutes will release 318 shells weighing 6.8 kg or 2162.4 kg. In other words, the fire performance of the Soviet and British installations is quite comparable, with a slight advantage of the Soviet SM-5-1. But the Soviet “hundredth” strikes much further - its projectile flies at 24,200 m, the English one - 17,830 m. The Soviet installation is stabilized, but it is not known how things were with the British Sparky. The Englishwoman had shells with radio fuses, but by the time the Tiger entered service, the SM-5-1 also had them. And in the end, we come to the conclusion that, despite all its advancement and automaticity, the British 76-mm Mark 6 was still inferior in terms of combat capabilities to the single Soviet SM-5-1. It remains only to remember that there were six SM-5-1s on the Sverdlov-class cruisers, and only three on the British Tigers ... It is possible, of course, that the individual directors of the SLA for each British installation provided better guidance than two SPN- 500, which controlled the firing of the Soviet "hundredths", alas, the author of this article does not have information to compare the domestic and British SLAs. Nevertheless, I would like to remind respected lovers of Western technology that the artillery armament of British surface ships turned out to be almost useless against the attacks of Argentine aircraft (even primitive light attack aircraft) - and after all, during the Falklands conflict, much more advanced radars and SLAs controlled the English "trunks", than what was on the "Tiger".

It is interesting, by the way, that the masses of Mark 6 and CM-5-1 differ slightly - 37.7 tons of Mark 6 versus 45.8 tons of SM-5-1, i.e. in terms of weights and space occupied, they are comparable, although it can be assumed that the "Englishwoman" requires less calculation.
So, we came to the conclusion that the air defense capabilities of the 152-mm artillery of the light cruiser "Tiger" are many times superior to those of the main caliber of the ships of the 68-bis project, but at the same time, the 76-mm British "second caliber" is very inferior to the Soviet "hundreds" " Sverdlov" both in quality and quantity. How to compare the overall air defense capabilities of these ships?
A rather primitive method can be proposed - in terms of fire performance. We have already calculated one for a five-minute battle for the 76 mm British and 100 mm Soviet mounts. The English 152-mm twin-gun turret is capable of firing 30 anti-aircraft shells weighing 59.9 kg each in a minute, i.e. 1,797 kg per minute or 8,985 kg in 5 minutes, respectively, two such towers will release 17,970 kg in the same time. Add to this the mass of shells of three 76-mm "sparks" - 6,487.2 kg and we get that within 5 minutes of intense combat, the light cruiser "Tiger" is capable of releasing 24,457.2 kg of anti-aircraft shells. Six SM-5-1s of the Soviet "Sverdlov" have a lower fire performance - together they will release 14,040 kg of metal. One can, of course, object that the author compares the capabilities of ships when firing on both sides, but in the event of an attack from one side, the British cruiser will have an overwhelming advantage, and this is true: two 76-mm installations and 2 152-mm towers for 5 minutes will release 22.3 tons of metal, and three Soviet SM-5-1 - just a little more than 7 tons. However, it should be remembered that the same Americans, both then and much later, sought to organize air attacks from different directions, like the famous “star” Japanese raids in World War II, and it would still be more logical to consider just this (and not “single-breasted”) form of air attack .
And we must not forget this: in terms of range, the Soviet “weave” SM-5-1 is ahead of not only 76-mm, but also 152-mm British gun mounts. The flight time at medium distances of 100-mm shells is lower (since the muzzle velocity is higher), respectively, it is possible to adjust the fire faster. But even before enemy planes enter the SM-5-1 kill zone, they will be fired upon by the main caliber of the Sverdlov - the practice of the exercises shows that Soviet 152-mm guns managed to fire 2-3 volleys at targets like LA-17R, having a speed of 750 to 900 km / h. And besides, the Soviet cruiser also has 32 barrels of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, which, although old, are still quite deadly for an enemy aircraft approaching a distance of fire - the English Tiger has nothing like it.
All of the above, of course, does not provide the Soviet cruiser with superiority or at least equality in air defense capabilities, but you need to understand that although the British Tiger has an advantage in this parameter, it is not absolute. In terms of air defense, the British light cruiser outperforms the ships of the 68-bis project - perhaps by tens of percent, but by no means by orders of magnitude.
In general, we can say that the light cruisers "Sverdlov" and "Tiger" are comparable in their capabilities, with a slight advantage of the Soviet ship. The Sverdlov is larger and has greater combat stability, it is better armored, slightly faster and has an advantage in range (up to 9 thousand nautical miles versus 6.7 thousand). Its capabilities in artillery combat against a surface enemy are higher, but against an air one - lower than that of a British cruiser. Accordingly, it can be stated that due to the use of more modern (in fact, we can talk about the next generation) artillery and SLA, the British were able to make a cruiser comparable to the Sverdlov in a significantly smaller displacement - yet the Tiger is almost 40% smaller.
But was it worth it? In retrospect, one can say - no, it was not worth it. After all, what actually happened? Both the USSR and Great Britain after the war felt the need for modern artillery cruisers. But the USSR, having taken proven equipment, by 1955 completed 5 ships of the 68K project, laid down and handed over to the fleet 14 68-bis cruisers, thereby creating the basis of the surface fleet and the "forge of personnel" of the oceanic Navy of the future. At the same time, the USSR did not try to introduce universal six-inch "superguns", but developed a fundamentally new naval weapon.

And what did the British do? Having spent time and money on the development of universal large-caliber artillery systems, they did put into operation three Tiger-class cruisers - in 1959, 1960 and 1961, respectively. They really became the pinnacle of artillery, but at the same time they did not have a tangible superiority over the previously built Sverdlovs. And most importantly - they were not his analogues. The lead cruiser of Project 68-bis entered service in 1952, 7 years before the lead Tiger. And some 3 years after the Tiger went into operation, the US and USSR fleets replenished the Albany and Grozny missile cruisers - and now they have much more reason to be considered the same age as the British cruiser than the Sverdlov ".
Perhaps if the British had devoted less time and money to their purely artillery Tigers, then their County-type URO cruisers (subsequently reclassified to destroyers) would not look so flawed against the background of the first Soviet and American missile cruisers. However, that's a completely different story...
Unfortunately, there is almost no information about Swedish and Dutch cruisers either in domestic sources or on the Russian-language Internet, and the available data are very contradictory. For example, the Swedish "Tre Krunur" - with a standard displacement of 7,400 tons, it is credited with a reservation weighing 2100 tons, i.e. 28% of the standard displacement! Not a single foreign light cruiser had a similar ratio - the weight of the armor of the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi was 2131 tons, the Soviet Chapaevs - 2339 tons, but they were much larger than the Swedish ship. At the same time, information about the armor scheme is very sketchy: it is alleged that the ship had an internal armor belt 70-80 mm thick, and at the same time two flat armored decks, 30 mm thick each, adjacent to the lower and upper edges of the armor belt. But how can this be? After all, engine and boiler rooms are not made of rubber - light cruisers, and indeed any other ships, never had a flat armored deck along the lower edge of the armored belt. The armored deck either lay on the upper edge, or else had bevels in order to provide sufficient space between the armored deck and the bottom in the area of \u200b\u200bthe boiler rooms and engine rooms. Russian-speaking sources claim that in addition to the indicated 30 mm armored decks:
"Above vital places there was additional armor 20-50 mm thick"
Usually this is understood as boiler rooms and engine rooms, as well as areas of artillery cellars, but the point is that to speculate specifications warships is a very dangerous business. We have already considered the case when, on the basis of incorrect and incomplete information, it was asserted that the American Cleveland was 1.5 times more armored than the Soviet 68-bis cruisers, while in fact its protection was weaker than that of the Sverdlov. Let's assume, nevertheless, that we are talking about the protection of boiler rooms, engine rooms and areas of the main caliber towers, but then one would expect an indication of the total thickness of the armored decks at the level of 80 - 110 mm, while sources report only 30 + 30 mm!
Even more confusing is the statement about the similarity of the Tre Krunur armor schemes and the Italian light cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi. The latter had two spaced armored belts - the side was protected by 30 mm armor, followed by a second armored belt 100 mm thick. Interestingly, the armored belt was curved, i.e. its upper and lower edges were connected to the upper and lower edges of the 30 mm outer armor belt, forming, as it were, a semicircle. At the level of the upper edge of the armored belts, a 40 mm armored deck was superimposed, and above the armored belt, the side was protected by 20 mm armored plates. Thus, contrary to claims of similarity, according to the descriptions of Russian-speaking sources, the Garibaldi booking scheme has nothing in common with Tre Krunur. The drawings of the Swedish cruiser confuse the situation even more - almost all of them clearly show the outer armor belt, while from the description it follows that the Tre Krunur belt is internal, which means it should not be visible in the picture.

Here we can assume banal translation errors: if we assume that the “two 30-mm armored decks” of the Swedish cruiser are actually an external 30 mm armor belt (which we see in the figures), to which the main, internal, 70-80 mm thick adjoins and the lower and upper edges (similar to the Garibaldi), then the Tre Krunur armor scheme really becomes like an Italian cruiser. In this case, “additional armor” with a thickness of 20-50 mm is understandable - this is an armored deck, differentiated by the importance of protection areas. The Tre Krunur towers had mediocre protection - a 127 mm frontal plate, a 50 mm roof and 30 mm walls (175, 65 and 75 mm, respectively, for Soviet cruisers), but sources say nothing about barbets, although it is doubtful that the Swedes about they have been forgotten. If we assume that the barbettes had a thickness comparable to the frontal plate, then their mass turned out to be rather big, in addition, the sources note the presence of a thick (20 mm) upper deck, which, strictly speaking, was not armor, since it was made of shipbuilding steel, but still could provide some additional protection. And if we assume that "Tre Krunur" had barbets at the level of "Garibaldi", i.e. about 100 mm, vertical armor 100-110 mm (30 + 70 or 30 + 80 mm, but actually even more, because the second armored belt was curved and its reduced thickness turned out to be greater) and 40-70 mm armored deck (where, in addition to the actual 20 mm of shipbuilding steel were also taken into account, which is not true, but some countries did this) - then the total mass of the armor, perhaps, will reach the desired 2100 tons.

In terms of armament, the ships are almost identical: as the main caliber, the De Zeven Provinsen has eight guns of 152-mm / 53 guns of the 1942 model produced by the Bofors company, against seven absolutely the same guns on the Tre Krunur. The De Zeven Provinsen guns were housed in four twin-gun turrets - exact copies of those that adorned the stern of the Swedish cruiser. The only difference is that De Zeven Provinsen had a pair of two-gun turrets in the nose, and Tre Krunur had one three-gun turret. The number of anti-aircraft guns is also comparable: - 4 * 2-57-mm and 8 * 1-40-mm "Bofors" at "De Zeven Provinsen" against 10 * 2-40-mm and 7 * 1-40-mm "Bofors" at Tre Krunur.
But the armor of the De Zeven Provinsen is noticeably weaker than that of the Swedish ship - the outer armor belt is 100 mm thick, decreasing to the extremities to 75 mm, the deck is only 20-25 mm. The power plant of the Dutch cruiser for 5,000 hp weaker than Swedish. But at the same time, De Zeven Provinsen is much larger than Tre Krunur - it has 9,529 tons of standard displacement against 7,400 tons of the Swede!
It is possible that "Tre Krunur" became a victim of the admirals' overestimated ambitions - shipbuilders somehow managed to shove the sailors' "Wishlist" into a very small displacement, but this certainly affected the efficiency of the ship. Attempts of this kind existed at all times of military shipbuilding, but they almost never became successful. It is also possible that the Swedish cruiser had more modest performance characteristics, distorted in Western print, as happened with the American light cruiser Cleveland. In any case, the comparison of Tre Krunur with Sverdlov based on tabular performance characteristics will not be correct.
As for "De Zeven Provinsen", here the comparison is extremely difficult almost total absence information on its main caliber: 152-mm / 53 Bofors guns. Various sources indicate a rate of fire of either 10-15 or 15 rds / min., But the latter figure is highly doubtful. If the British, creating a 152-mm gun with a similar rate of fire for the "Tiger", were forced to use water-cooled barrels, then we do not observe anything like this on the cruisers of Sweden and the Netherlands.

Stern turrets of the Tre Krunur-class light cruiser.

English sources are also not encouraging - for example, the famous electronic encyclopedia NavWeaps claims that the rate of fire of this gun depended on the type of projectile - 10 rounds per minute for armor-piercing (AR) and 15 for anti-aircraft (AA). Everything would be fine, but in the ammunition section, the encyclopedia indicates the presence of only high-explosive fragmentation (NOT) shells!
Nothing is clear about the horizontal and vertical aiming speeds of the 152-mm turrets, without which it is impossible to assess the ability of the guns to fire at air targets. It is alleged that the guns had fully mechanized loading at any elevation angle, but at the same time, the mass of the De Zeven Provinsen turret is much lighter than that of the Tiger light cruiser - 115 tons against 158.5 tons, and in fact the British created their tower for 12 years later. The universal two-gun 152-mm turrets for the Worcester-class cruisers, which entered service a year later than the Tre Krunur, weighed over 200 tons, were supposed to provide 12 rounds per minute, but were technically unreliable.
The 152-mm guns "De Zeven Provinsen" fired a 45.8 kg projectile, accelerating it to an initial speed of 900 m / s. In terms of its ballistic qualities, the brainchild of the Bofors company was inferior to the Soviet B-38, which reported a 55 kg projectile with a speed of 950 m / s. Accordingly, the effective fire distance of the Dutch cruiser was approximately 107 kbt, and this is already closer to the capabilities of the main caliber of the Sverdlov. If the De Zeven Provinsen was indeed capable of developing a rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute per barrel in combat conditions, then it had a greater fire performance compared to the Soviet cruiser - 80 rounds per minute versus 60 for the Sverdlov. But still, the Project 68-bis cruiser had an advantage in range and projectile power: the 25 mm De Zeven Provinsen armored deck could not resist the 55 kg Soviet projectile at distances of 100-130 kbt, but the 50 mm Sverdlov deck armor hit a light Dutch projectile would most likely be repelled. In addition, we know that the SLA of the Soviet ship ensured effective firing of the main caliber at long distances, but we know nothing about the fire control devices and the De Zeven Provinsen radar, which could not be so perfect.
As for anti-aircraft fire, with a maximum passport rate of fire of 15 rounds / min, eight De Zeven Provinsen main guns fired almost 5.5 tons of shells per minute. Six SM-5-1 Soviet cruisers (the maximum was also taken - 18 rounds / min per barrel) - only 3.37 tons. This is a significant advantage, and it became overwhelming in the event of shelling a single air target ("Sverdlov" could not, unlike from De Zeven Provinsen, to fire with all installations on one side). But it should be borne in mind that, unlike the cannons of the Dutch ship, the domestic SM-5-1s were stabilized, and this provided them with better accuracy. In addition, shells with radio fuses came into service with Soviet installations (although, apparently, this happened in the middle or late 50s), but the author of this article does not have information that Swedish or Dutch cruisers had such shells. . If we assume that De Zeven Provinsen did not have shells with radio fuses, then the advantage in air defense goes to the Soviet cruiser. In addition, the above figures do not take into account at least modest, but still existing opportunities for firing the Sverdlov's main caliber at an air target. And most importantly - as in the case of the main caliber, we do not have information about the quality of the anti-aircraft fire control devices of the Dutch and Swedish cruisers.
As for the effectiveness of anti-aircraft guns, the Soviet cruiser is certainly the leader in terms of the number of barrels, but the effectiveness of the 57-mm Bofors installations should be significantly higher than the domestic 37-mm V-11 machine gun. However, in order to equalize in capabilities with the Soviet ship, one 57-mm “spark” should be equivalent to three B-11 installations, which is somewhat doubtful.
In general, it can be stated that the De Zeven Provinsen is inferior to the Soviet cruiser of project 68 bis in artillery combat, but significantly superior (in the presence of shells with radio fuses) in terms of air defense. However, this conclusion is correct only if the main caliber of the Dutch cruiser is fully consistent with the characteristics given to it by Russian-language sources, if the cruiser's launcher and radar are not inferior to the Soviet ones, if the main caliber was provided with shells with a radio fuse ... Despite the fact that the above assumptions are very doubtful . But even in the most favorable version for De Zeven Provinsen, in terms of the combination of combat qualities, it does not have superiority over the Soviet cruiser of the 68-bis project.
This article was supposed to complete the cycle about the artillery cruisers of the Soviet fleet, but the comparison of ships of the Sverdlov type with foreign cruisers unexpectedly dragged on, and there was no more room left for describing the tasks of artillery cruisers in the post-war Soviet Navy.

June 7-18, 1953 - the first post-war foreign visit of a Soviet ship took place to England on the occasion of the coronation of Elizabeth II. Our Navy and in peacetime performs very important and responsible tasks of demonstrating the country's flag in the vast oceans, increasing the international prestige of the state, as well as strengthening the trust and respect for Russia of the peoples of the visited countries. All these tasks were perfectly solved during the first post-war foreign visit of the cruiser "Sverdlov" to England. After that, friendly visits of our ships to foreign ports will be carried out quite often, but the first visit cost our sailors both a lot of work and a huge nervous tension

In the first years after the Great Patriotic War there was a fundamental change in the relations of the Soviet Union with the countries of the West. The Cold War began, and in the 1950s the United States began to actively pursue a policy of brinkmanship. This led to a significant aggravation of international tension, an increase in the threat of a world war. Western countries have sharply reduced trade, economic, cultural and other ties with the Soviet Union. In the bourgeois press, the Soviet person was presented as an enemy and a potential aggressor. An important role in the implementation of this course was assigned to the US Navy, and for our country the threat to security from ocean directions became more and more real.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Naval Forces (on September 10, 1955, the Soviet Navy was renamed the Navy) were one of the effective instruments of our diplomacy in pursuing a peace-loving policy, in preventing and deterring aggressive aspirations, and also in countering security threats to our country. One of the means of carrying out this important mission was the friendly visits of our ships to the ports of foreign states. A warship is a clear indicator of the level of development of science, technology and industry in a country, an indicator of its real military power. The imperialist states actively used this to intimidate potential opponents.

The visits of our ships have always been and are exclusively friendly in nature, demonstrating the high cultural level of our sailors. This serves as an excellent counter to any attempt by bourgeois propaganda to portray us as enemies and crude barbarians. Foreign visits contributed to the growth of sympathy and friendly feelings for our country, strengthened mutual understanding between peoples and increased the international prestige of our country.

In the first post-war decade, our navy was replenished with new ships, new military equipment and weapons, which were not inferior to foreign samples. During this period, the Sverdlov-class cruisers of project 68 bis began to enter service. They were intended for operations as part of a squadron during the withdrawal of light forces into an attack, as well as to support ship patrol and reconnaissance, and to protect the squadron from attacks by enemy light forces.

These cruisers were the most advanced and most powerful artillery ships and became the pinnacle of the evolution of the naval technology of the domestic fleet. They, of course, surpassed their English counterparts, who were in service in the mid-50s. Especially significant was the superiority of the Sverdlov-class cruisers when firing at coastal targets. It should be noted here that after 1945, in local wars, the number of 152-406-mm shells fired along the coast was commensurate with the total consumption of ammunition of the same caliber during the Second World War.

In early 1953, the Soviet Navy received an invitation to take part in the Royal Navy parade at the Speedheid raid of the Portsmouth Naval Base on the occasion of the coronation of Her Royal Majesty Elizabeth II. The first official friendly visit of a Soviet ship to a Western European naval base in the post-war period was coming, and even with such a responsible mission. The choice fell on the lead cruiser of the newest post-war series "68-bis" - "Sverdlov". It took three months to prepare the crew and the ship for this campaign.

A day before leaving the main base of the fleet - the city of Baltiysk, the Minister of the Navy of the USSR, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, arrived on the cruiser. Addressing the crew of the cruiser, he said: "You have been entrusted with the responsible task of the government, and by doing it, you will either help the government make policy, or interfere. I express confidence in the success of your campaign!"

More than 200 ships gathered in the roadstead of Spitheid in anticipation of the parade british navy and guests of the queen. The cruiser had to make difficult maneuvers in order to find its place, marked by a signal buoy with the state flag of the USSR. The commander of the cruiser, Captain 1st Rank Olimpiy Ivanovich Rudakov, rejected the help of the pilot and steered the ship himself. At the entrance to the raid thundered volleys of the salute of nations. The cruiser headed for the anchorage. The ship is to be anchored using the fertoing method, which requires the highest professionalism from the boatswain's crew and jewelry precision in managing a huge ship from its commander. According to the then accepted standards for ships with a displacement of 12-16 thousand tons (like the Sverdlov), setting in 45 minutes is considered excellent. We do not use such a setting at all due to lack of need.

The exchange of salutes drew the attention of all those present on the raid to our ship. "Sverdlov" entered the anchorage zone, but there is no signal buoy. (Later, the ship's commander received an official apology for the absence of a signal buoy.) The navigator quickly established that there was no mistake, the cruiser left accurately. The command sounds and the first anchor goes to the bottom of the raid. All eyes are turned to the cruiser, the observers have started their stopwatches: the countdown has begun. The English communications officer who arrived on the cruiser also started his stopwatch. The results of the furtoing productions of the ships that arrived earlier are well known: the American cruiser - 2 hours, the French - 4 hours, and the Swedish one even more, they simply got tired of waiting for the completion of its production. "Sverdlov" anchored in 12 minutes. It was a triumph.

The cruiser stood on the roads for a week and invariably enjoyed great popularity among the population. Something was constantly happening on the deck of the cruiser: photographing groups gathered, small sports competitions, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet on board imitated the rest of sailors in the form of spontaneous songs and dances on the upper deck. The excellent maritime training of the crew, the high culture of behavior of our sailors on the shore and the interesting rest of the sailors on the upper deck of the ship found a favorable response in the British press.

The parade took place on June 17th. All ships are in festive decoration. The crew of the ship is lined up along the side. Coloring flags flap in the wind. On the foremast yard of the cruiser, the British and Soviet flags are our salute to the English Queen and her fleet. Elizabeth II on a yacht bypasses the formation of ships. Our sailors greet her with a powerful triple "Hurrah!" After the parade on the flagship of the squadron, the queen gives the traditional reception for the naval elite. Senior officers are not subject to invitations, however, O. I. Rudakov, although he had the rank of captain of the 1st rank, received an invitation and even had the honor to greet the queen among the first. The celebrations ended with fireworks and illuminations.

The holiday and the entire period of our cruiser's stay in the Speedheid roadstead were very successful. According to our embassy in London, in winning over the hearts of ordinary Britons, a week of the Sverdlov's stay in England played a greater role than years of painstaking diplomatic activity. After the completion of the celebrations, the cruiser safely returned to Baltiysk. At the base he was greeted as a winner. The ship was visited by the Minister of Defense of the USSR N. A. Bulganin and personally awarded each member of the crew. The commander of the ship, O. I. Rudakov, was promoted to rear admiral and awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War. In honor of the cruiser "Sverdlov" a radio concert was given. After that, friendly visits and business visits by Soviet warships and auxiliary vessels to foreign ports became a widespread phenomenon.

The further fate of the cruiser "Sverdlov"

The cruiser "Sverdlov" from October 12 to 17, 1955 paid visits to Portsmouth (Great Britain), from July 20 to July 25, 1956 - to Rotterdam (Holland), from October 5 to October 9, 1973 and from June 27 to July 1, 1975 - to Gdynia (Poland), from April 16 to April 22, 1974 - to Algeria, from June 21 to June 26, 1974 - to Cherbourg (France), from October 5 to October 9, 1976 - to Rostock (GDR) and from June 21 to June 26 1976 - in Bordeaux (France). From December 24, 1955, he was part of the KBF. In the period from December 24, 1960 to July 14, 1961 and from February 12, 1966 to April 29, 1966 was held in Leningrad overhaul, after which it was withdrawn from service, mothballed and put to rest, but on February 11, 1972 it was mothballed and re-commissioned, on February 7, 1977 it was again put into overhaul, on February 14, 1978 it was mothballed again and put in Liepaja for long-term storage , and on May 30, 1989 it was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, on October 31, 1989 it was disbanded and in 1990 sold to a private company in India for cutting into metal.

May 1992 40 years have passed since the commissioning of the artillery cruiser Sverdlov, the lead ship of one of the first post-war projects. His birth was preceded by a great work that lasted almost 15 years. The fact is that as a prototype ship for the cruisers of this series (the project received the code 68-bis), a light, according to the then classification of the ships of the Navy, the cruiser pr. project 68 ship wars. The pre-war program for the construction of a large sea and ocean fleet (1938-1942) by the end of 1942 was supposed to build 5 light cruisers, project 68 (a total of 17 units were to be laid). The first four ships of this project were laid down in 1939, the fifth - a year later.

They were finally completed already at the end of the 40s, taking into account the experience of the war, according to the so-called "corrected" project 68-k. A. S. Savichev was first appointed chief designer of the 68-k project, and since 1947 - N. A. Kiselev. Head - "Chapaev" became part of the Navy in the fall of 1949. Soon the rest were accepted by the fleet.
Simultaneously with the completion of the ships of pre-war projects, scientific and practical work on the creation of warships of new generations, in which already during the design it would be possible to take into account as much as possible the experience of the war, and everything new that post-war science and production could give. It was impossible to leave the fleet without large ships, and therefore they decided to build the cruisers pr. 68 bis.

The ships of this project, developed under the guidance of A. S. Savichev, include the Sverdlov, marking the beginning of the commissioning of a large series of artillery cruisers into the Navy. The construction of the cruiser under the serial number O-408 was carried out at the Baltic Shipbuilding Plant named after S. Ordzhonikidze (at that time - Plant No. 189 of the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry). It was launched on July 5, 1950. After being completed afloat, the ship passed factory and state tests, and from November 29, 1951 to January 16, 1952. in the area of the Osmusaar-Pakri Islands, in conditions of sea waves of 4-7 points - seaworthy. On May 15, 1952, the Commission for the State Acceptance of Ships signed an act on its inclusion in the Navy.

What were the cruisers of Project 68 bis?
More “larger” in terms of their weight and dimensions than ships of the Chapaev type, they had a displacement of: standard - 13,600 tons, normal - 15,120 tons, and full - 16,640 tons. With normal displacement, the main dimensions of the ship's hull (along the design waterline) were: length 205 m, width 21.2 m, average draft 6.9 m. drinking water, as well as provisions, provided the ship with an estimated autonomy of 30 days and a cruising range of up to 9,000 miles at optimal economic speeds. For the first time on this project, Soviet shipbuilders managed to realize the idea of creating a “fully welded hull” from low-alloy steel, which, according to calculations, not only increased the manufacturability of the building, but also reduced economic costs.

To protect the vital parts of the ship in battle from enemy artillery, traditional general and local armor was used: anti-ballistic - the citadel, the main caliber towers, the conning tower; anti-fragmentation and anti-bullet - combat posts of the upper deck and superstructures. Mostly homogeneous armor was used, the bulk of the armor was the mass of the "armored citadel", structurally formed from deck (armor - lower deck), side and traverse armor. The thickness of the armor used in this design was: side - 100 mm, bow beam - 120 mm, aft - 100 mm, lower deck - 50 mm.

Structural underwater protection against the effects of enemy torpedo and mine weapons included a double hull bottom (length up to 154 m), a system of side compartments (for storing liquid cargo) and longitudinal bulkheads, as well as 23 main watertight autonomous hull compartments formed by transverse sealed bulkheads. In the general and local strength of the ship, a mixed hull framing system also played a significant role - mainly longitudinal - in the middle part and transverse - in its bow and stern ends.

The location of service and residential premises practically did not differ from that adopted on the cruisers of pr. 68-k. As the main caliber on the ships of Project 68-bis, four 152/57 mm / cal, improved three-gun gun mounts MK-5-bis were used; the universal caliber was represented by six twin stabilized 100/70 mm/cal, SM-5-1 installations (from the fifth cruiser of the CM-5-1-bis series), and the anti-aircraft gun - by sixteen twin 37/67 mm/cal, V-11 assault rifles , later replaced by modernized - type V-11-m.

A feature of the cruisers of Project 68-bis was also the presence of special artillery radar stations in addition to optical means of aiming the guns at the target. So, in addition to two command and rangefinder posts KDP-8 andDM-8-2 turret artillery rangefinders, on these ships the Rif radar and Zalp radar were used to control the firing of the main caliber, and their own radio rangefinders were mounted on the II and III MK-5-bis towers.The effective combat use of the main caliber artillery was provided by the new system of fire control devices "Lightning AC-68-bis A".

The universal caliber of the ship, represented by two on-board batteries (each of three installations), was equipped with two stabilized aiming posts SPN-500 attached to them (provided firing at air targets in the conditions of the ship's pitching) and two - battery-by-battery, optical rangefinders ZDMS-4. In addition, the Anchor radar was used to control the fire of 100-mm universal artillery.

V-11 anti-aircraft guns were installed on superstructures, at the bow and stern corners relative to the diametrical plane of the ship. Like the SM-5-1-bis installations, the V-11 assault rifles were paired with a system of fire control devices
"Zenith-68-bis".

The torpedo armament of the Sverdlov-class ships included two 53-cm five-pipe induced deck-mounted torpedo tubes of the PTA-53-68-bis type, mounted side by side on the spardeck, and the Stalingrad-2T-68-bis PUTS control system, coupled with a special torpedo radio station "Zarya" and a universal torpedo sight. In overload, the cruiser of this project could take more than 100 ship mines or contact mine defenders.Ships of the "Sverdlov" type were also equipped with navigation and radio equipment, modern for that time, and communications equipment.

The ship power plant of the 68-bis cruisers as a whole did not differ from the power plant of the Chapaev-class ships. Six vertical water-tube steam boilers KV-68 were also used here as the main steam boilers (one in the boiler room, each with a steam capacity of about 115,000 kg / h at full speed); two main turbo-gear units of the TV-7 type (total maximum design power at full forward speed 118,100 hp, at the rear - 25270 hp).

By the mid-50s, out of the planned 25 units of Project 68-bis, the fleet was replenished with only 14 cruisers of this project, which, after the decommissioning of the battleships of the Sevastopol type, became the main ships in the nuclear surface forces of the Navy. Most of the 68-bis cruisers built shortly after the Sverdlov were named either in honor of prominent Russian military figures (Admiral Lazarev, Admiral Nakhimov, Admiral Ushakov, Admiral Senyavin, Alexander Nevsky , "Alexander Suvorov", "Mikhail Kutuzov", "Dmitry Pozharsky"), or knownparty leaders ("Dzerzhinsky", "Zhdanov", "Ordzhonikidze"), or by the name of the cities - "Murmansk" and "Molotovsk" (later renamed the "October Revolution"). Some ships of this project, whose construction, starting from 1956city, was first suspended, and two years later, in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, it was discontinued, had the names: "Vladivostok" (former "Dmitry Donskoy"), "Arkhangelsk" (former "Kozma Minin"), " Varyag, Shcherbakov, Kronstadt, Tallinn, Admiral Kornilov.

The cruisers of the Sverdlov type, put into operation, had a different fate. Ordzhonikidze was subsequently sold to Indonesia and was listed as part of its Navy under the name Irian. "Admiral Nakhimov" (scheduled for re-equipment according to project 71 with the replacement of the AGK with missiles), in the 60s was expelled from the fleet after participating in the testing of the first samples of anti-ship missile weapons. "Dzerzhinsky" was converted in accordance with Project 70-e.

The scientific and technological revolution in military affairs, which began in the Navy in the mid-fifties, soon required the strengthening of anti-aircraft fire weapons of the Sverdlov-class cruisers. A part of the previous anti-aircraft systems was replaced, first with V-11-m assault rifles, and then new systems of the 30-mm shipborne MZA were additionally installed. The ships were re-equipped and equipped with more modern radar and radio equipment. All this on some cruisers of the Sverdlov type was carried out according to the 68-a project. Two cruisers - "Zhdanov" and "Admiral Senyavin" - later in accordance with pr. 68-u-1 and68-u-2 were converted into control ships.

Prior to the replenishment of the Navy with new ships of the "oceanic, nuclear-missile fleet", the cruiser pr. 68 bis and its above modifications were accepted as long as they allowed technical resource and the situation, active participation in long-distance campaigns, solving the tasks of military service. And the best memory of them - our latest cruisers of the "purely artillery type" - is the breastplate of the Navy "3a long-distance voyage", where under the blue-and-white Naval flag is the silhouette of one of these ships.

From Wiki:
Furtoing is a method of placing a ship at two anchors, in which the ship in any position during deployment is between the anchors. For ships of the battleship class - heavy cruiser, setting two anchors using the fartoing method is a very complex maneuver that requires excellent training of the mooring team and the impeccable serviceability of the ship's mooring equipment. According to the rules of the Admiralty, this maneuver should take 1.5-2.5 hours.

June 7-18, 1953 - the first post-war friendly visit of a Soviet ship. Our Navy, even in peacetime, performs very important and responsible tasks of demonstrating the flag of the country in the expanses of the World Ocean, raising the international prestige of the state, as well as strengthening the trust and respect for Russia of the peoples of the visited countries. All these tasks were perfectly solved during the visit of the Sverdlov cruiser to England.

In the early 1950s, the Cold War began. International tensions escalated significantly, Western countries sharply reduced trade, economic, cultural and other ties with the Soviet Union. An important role in carrying out this course was assigned to the Naval Forces. The imperialist states actively used them to intimidate potential opponents. The visits of our ships have always been and are exclusively friendly.
Under these conditions, the Naval Forces (on September 10, 1955, the Navy was renamed the Navy) were one of the most effective tools of our diplomacy in promoting the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union among the population of Western countries. The friendly visits of our ships were especially effective in this respect. They clearly demonstrated the level of development of science and technology in the country, its real military power and the high cultural level of our sailors. This served as an excellent counter to any attempt by bourgeois propaganda to portray us as crude barbarians.

In the first post-war decade, our military fleet was replenished with ships, military equipment and weapons that were not inferior to foreign models. During this period, cruisers of the 68-bis type "Sverdlov" began to enter service. They were intended for combat operations as part of a squadron, as well as to support ship patrols and reconnaissance, to protect the squadron from attacks by enemy light forces.

These cruisers were the most powerful artillery ships and became the pinnacle of the evolution of the naval technology of the Russian fleet. They, of course, surpassed their English counterparts, who were in service in the mid-50s. Especially significant was the superiority of the Sverdlov-class cruisers when firing at coastal targets. It should be noted here that after 1945, in local wars, the number of 152-406-mm shells fired along the coast was commensurate with the total consumption of ammunition of the same caliber during the Second World War.

In early 1953, the Soviet Navy received an invitation to take part in the naval parade on the Spithead raid of the Portsmouth naval base on the occasion of the coronation of Her Royal Majesty Elizabeth II. The first official friendly visit of a Soviet ship to a Western European naval base in the post-war period was coming, and even with such a responsible mission. The choice fell on the head cruiser of the latest post-war series "68-bis" - "Sverdlov" under the command of Captain 1st Rank O.I. Rudakov.

This man had a difficult and interesting fate. Outwardly, he resembled a Russian epic hero, and by nature he was an exceptionally decent person. In 1937, as part of the crew of the battleship Marat, he took part in the naval parade on the Portsmouth Spithead raid on the occasion of the coronation of King George VI of Great Britain. At the end of 1941, he was appointed assistant commander of the destroyer Smasher of the Northern Fleet.

In November 1942, during a severe storm, the stern of the hull was torn off the ship. When saving the crew, the command of the ship left the "Crushing" among the first. The trial took place, O.I. Rudakov was sentenced to "the highest measure", but then he was sent to the penal battalion. After being restored to the officer rank, in February 1944 O.I. Rudakov returned to the Northern Fleet and continued his service on destroyers, quickly rising through the ranks.

A day before leaving the main base of the fleet - the city of Baltiysk, the Minister of the Navy of the USSR, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, arrived on the cruiser. Addressing the crew of the cruiser, he said: "You have been entrusted with the responsible task of the government, and by doing it, you will either help the government make policy, or interfere. I express confidence in the success of your campaign!"

More than 200 ships gathered for the parade on the roadstead of Spithead. The cruiser had to make difficult maneuvers in order to take its place in the parade, which was to be marked with a signal buoy with the state flag of the USSR. Rudakov rejected the help of the pilot and steered the ship himself. It was necessary to anchor using the fartoing method, which required precision in managing a huge ship. According to the then accepted standards for ships of such a class as the Sverdlov, staging in 45 minutes was considered excellent.

"Sverdlov" entered the anchorage zone, but there was no signal buoy. (The ship's commander later received a formal apology about this). The navigator quickly established that there was no mistake, the cruiser came out exactly. At the entrance to the raid thundered volleys of the salute of nations. This drew everyone's attention to our ship. The results of the furtoing productions of the ships that arrived earlier are well known: the American cruiser - 2 hours, the French - 4 hours, and the Swedish one even more, they simply got tired of waiting for the completion of its production. "Sverdlov" anchored in 12 minutes. It was a triumph.

The holiday and the entire period of our cruiser's stay in the Speedheid roadstead were very successful. According to our embassy in London, the week of the Sverdlov's stay in England played a greater role in winning over the hearts of ordinary British than years of painstaking diplomatic activity. After the completion of the celebrations, the cruiser safely returned to Baltiysk. At the base he was greeted as a winner. The ship was visited by the Minister of Defense of the USSR N. A. Bulganin and personally awarded each member of the crew. The commander of the ship, O. I. Rudakov, was promoted to rear admiral and awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War. In honor of the cruiser "Sverdlov" a radio concert was given. After that, friendly visits and business visits by Soviet warships and auxiliary vessels to foreign ports became a widespread phenomenon.
Vladimir Dodonov - author of the article