Developing a large-scale secret military operation, code-named “Plan Barbarossa”, the General Staff of Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler personally set the main goal of defeating the army of the Soviet Union and capturing Moscow as soon as possible. It was planned that the operation "Barbarossa" should be successfully completed even before the onset of severe Russian frosts and fully realized in 2-2.5 months. But this ambitious plan was not destined to come true. On the contrary, it led to the complete collapse of Nazi Germany and cardinal geopolitical changes throughout the world.

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Prerequisites for the emergence

Despite the fact that a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the USSR, Hitler continued to hatch plans to seize the "eastern lands", by which he meant the western half of the Soviet Union. This was a necessary means of achieving world domination and removing a strong competitor from the world map. Which, in turn, unleashed his hands in the fight against the United States and Great Britain.

The following circumstances allowed Hitler's General Staff to hope for a quick conquest of the Russians:

• powerful German war machine;
• rich combat experience gained in the European theater of operations;
• advanced weapons technology and impeccable discipline in the troops.

Since powerful France and strong Poland fell very quickly under the blows of a steel German fist, Hitler was sure that an attack on the territory of the Soviet Union would also bring rapid success. Moreover, the constantly ongoing deep multi-echelon reconnaissance at almost all levels showed that the USSR was significantly losing in the most important military aspects:

• the quality of weapons, equipment and equipment;
• the possibilities of strategic and operational-tactical command and control of troops and reserves;
• supply and logistics.

In addition, the German militarists counted on a kind of "fifth column" - people dissatisfied Soviet power, nationalists of various kinds, traitors and so on. Another argument in favor of an early attack on the USSR was the long process of rearmament carried out at that time in the Red Army. The well-known repressions also played a role in Hitler's decision, practically decapitating the top and middle command staff of the Red Army. So, Germany had all the prerequisites for developing a plan of attack on the Soviet Union.

Description of the plan

essence

As Wikipedia rightly points out, the development of a large-scale operation to attack the Land of the Soviets began in 1940, in July. The main stake was placed on strength, speed and the effect of surprise. Using the massive use of aviation, tank and mechanized formations, it was planned to defeat and destroy the main backbone of the Russian army, then concentrated on the territory of Belarus.

Having defeated the border garrisons, high-speed tank wedges were to systematically cover, surround and destroy large units and formations of Soviet troops, and then quickly move on according to the approved plan. Regular infantry units were supposed to be engaged in finishing off the remaining scattered groups that did not stop resistance.

In order to gain undeniable air supremacy in the very first hours of the war, it was planned to destroy Soviet aircraft while still on the ground, until, due to confusion, they had time to take off. Large fortified areas and garrisons that resisted advanced assault groups and divisions were ordered to simply go around, continuing to move forward rapidly.

In choosing the direction of strikes, the German command was somewhat constrained, since the network of high-quality roads in the USSR was poorly developed, and the railway infrastructure, due to the difference in standards, had to undergo some modernization in order to be able to be used by the Germans. As a result, the choice was stopped on the following main general directions (of course, with the possibility of certain adjustments):

• northern, whose task was to attack from East Prussia through the Baltic to Leningrad;
• central (main and most powerful), designed to advance through Belarus to Moscow;
• southern, whose tasks included the capture of the Right-Bank Ukraine and further advancement towards the oil-rich Caucasus.

The initial implementation dates fell on March 1941, with the cessation of spring thaw in Russia. That's what Barbarossa's plan was, briefly. It was finally approved at the highest level on December 18, 1940 and went down in history under the name "Directive of the Supreme High Command No. 21".

Preparation and implementation

Preparations for the attack began almost immediately. In addition to the gradual and well-camouflaged movement of a huge mass of troops to the common border between Germany and the USSR formed after the partition of Poland, it included many other steps and actions:

• constant stuffing of misinformation about supposedly ongoing exercises, maneuvers, redeployments, and so on;
• diplomatic maneuvers to convince the top leadership of the USSR of the most peaceful and friendly intentions;
• the transfer to the territory of the Soviet Union, in addition to an additional army of spies and intelligence officers, sabotage groups.

All these and many other various events led to the fact that the timing of the attack was postponed several times. By May 1941, an incredible number and power grouping of troops had accumulated on the border with the Soviet Union, unprecedented in the entire history of the world. Its total number exceeded 4 million people (although Wikipedia indicates the figure is twice as much). On June 22, Operation Barbarossa actually began. In connection with the postponement of the start of full-scale hostilities, the deadline for the end of the operation was set for November, and the capture of Moscow was to occur no later than the end of August.

It was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines

The plan originally conceived by the German commanders-in-chief was implemented quite successfully. Superiority in the quality of equipment and weapons, advanced tactics and the notorious effect of surprise worked. The speed of the advance of the troops, with rare exceptions, corresponded to the planned schedule and went at the pace of the Blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg) familiar to the Germans and discouraging the enemy.

However, very soon the operation "Barbarossa" began to noticeably slip and give serious failures. To the fierce resistance of the Soviet army was added an unfamiliar difficult terrain, supply difficulties, partisan actions, muddy roads, impenetrable forests, the exhaustion of advanced units and formations that were constantly attacked and ambushed, as well as many other very diverse factors and causes.

Almost after 2 months of hostilities, it became clear to most representatives of the German generals (and then to Hitler himself) that the Barbarossa plan was untenable. A brilliant operation, designed by armchair generals, ran into a harsh reality. And although the Germans tried to revive this plan, making various changes and amendments, by November 1941, it was almost completely abandoned.

The Germans really reached Moscow, but in order to take it, they had neither the strength, nor the energy, nor the resources. Leningrad, although it was under siege, neither bombed it nor starved the inhabitants either. In the south, German troops were bogged down in the endless steppes. As a result, the German army switched to winter defense, pinning its hopes on the summer campaign of 1942. As you know, instead of the "blitzkrieg", on which the "Barbarossa" plan was based, the Germans got a long, exhausting 4-year war, which ended in their complete defeat, a disaster for the country and almost a complete redrawing of the world map ...

Main reasons for failure

Among other things, the reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan are also the arrogance and pomposity of the German generals and the Fuhrer himself. After a series of victories, they, like the entire army, believed in their own invincibility, which led to the complete fiasco of Nazi Germany.

An interesting fact: the medieval German king and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Frederick I Barbarossa, after whom the operation to quickly seize the USSR was named, became famous for military exploits, but tritely drowned in the river in one of the Crusades.

If Hitler and his inner circle knew at least a little history, they would once again think about whether it was worth calling such a fateful campaign the name of the "Red Beard". As a result, they all repeated the deplorable fate of the legendary character.

However, mysticism here, of course, has nothing to do with it. Answering the question, what are the reasons for the failure of the blitzkrieg plan, it is necessary to highlight the following points:

And this is not a complete list of reasons that led to the absolute failure of the operation.

Plan "Barbarossa", conceived as another victorious blitzkrieg in order to expand the "living space for the Germans", turned out to be a fatal disaster for them. The Germans could not derive any benefit from this adventure for themselves, bringing death, grief and suffering to a huge number of peoples, including themselves. It was after the failure of the “blitzkrieg” that a wormhole of doubt crept into the minds of some representatives of the German generals about the imminent victory and the success of the campaign in general. However, it was still far from real panic and moral decay of the German army and its leadership ...

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The basis of the plan.

Plan "Barbarossa"(Directive No. 21. Plan "Barbarossa"; German. Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa, presumably by the name of the King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa) is the code name for the plan of Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR developed in 1940-1941, the implementation of which was subsequently undertaken in the form of the eponymous operation "Barbarossa". the main task - "defeat Soviet Russia in one short campaign" using the experience of applying the "blitzkrieg" strategy in Europe. The economic subsection of the plan, associated with the exploitation of the territory of the USSR, received the name Plan "Oldenburg" ("Green Folder" Goering).

Military-political situation

In 1940, Germany invaded Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and defeated France. Thus, by June 1940, Germany managed to radically change the strategic situation in Europe, withdraw France from the war and expel the British army from the continent. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for an early end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its forces to the defeat of the USSR, and this, in turn, would give her a free hand to fight the United States. However, Germany failed to force Britain to make peace. The war went on fighting were fought at sea, in North Africa and in the Balkans. In June 1940, preparations began for the implementation of the plan for an amphibious operation to land a combined landing on the English coast under the name "Sea Lion". In the course of planning, however, the Wehrmacht command gradually became aware that a throw across the English Channel could turn into an operation with an uncertain result, associated with heavy losses.

In October 1940, the preparation of the "Sea Lion" was curtailed until the spring of 1941. Germany made attempts to bring Spain and France into an alliance against England, and also initiated negotiations with the USSR. At the Soviet-German negotiations in November 1940, Germany offered the USSR to join the Tripartite Pact and the "sharing of the inheritance of England", but the USSR, formally recognizing the possibility of such a step, set conditions that were clearly unacceptable to Germany.

Start of development

First data

In the work of Karl Klee, it is mentioned that more "On June 2, 1940, after the completion of the first phase of the French campaign, Hitler visited the headquarters of Army Group A in Charleville". A. N. Yakovlev further quotes K. Klee:

Before the start of the meeting, he walked ... with the commander of Army Group A (von Rundstedt) and the group's chief of staff (von Sodenstern). As if in a personal conversation, Hitler said that if, as he expected, France "falls away" and is ready to conclude a reasonable peace, then his hands will finally be free to carry out his real task - to deal with Bolshevism. The question is - as Hitler put it verbatim - how "I will tell my child about this."

Collection 1941. Book. 1, doc. No. 3, M .: MF "Democracy", 1998

In the future, G. von Rundstedt and G. von Zodenshtern will take part both in the development of the Eastern Campaign plan and its implementation in 1941.

June 22, 1940, on the day of the signing of the Armistice of Compiegne and exactly one year before the start of the "Eastern Campaign", F. Halder in a military diary suggests: “The near future will show whether our successes will force England to enter the path of prudence or whether she will try to wage war alone and further”. And already on June 25, the Chief of the General Staff of the OKH mentions the discussion of the creation of strike groups (in Poland, a kind of "Springboard in the East"): "new focus: strike force in the East (15 infantry, 6 tanks, 3 mot.)".

"English" and "Eastern problems"

On June 30, 1940, F. Halder writes about "a conversation with Weizsacker, who communicated Hitler's opinion": "The focus is on the East". Ernst von Weizsäcker quoted the Fuhrer:

England, we will probably have to demonstrate our strength once more before she stops fighting and will untie our hands in the East.

F. Halder Military diary. Section June 1940

Based on the results of these negotiations with Secretary of State von Weizsacker, Chief of the General Staff "I considered it necessary to make a note for myself - to analyze the possibilities and prospects of a military campaign against the Soviet Union". July 3, after a discussion with the Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the OKH G. von Greifenberg, already appears "the first concrete entry in Halder's diary relating to the preparation of aggression against the Soviet Union" :

At present, the English problem, which should be worked out separately, and the Eastern problem are in the foreground. The main content of the latter: a method of delivering a decisive blow to Russia in order to force her to recognize the dominant role of Germany in Europe

F. Halder Military diary. Section July 1940

Thus, in early July, "Hitler's main military-political decision" in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff "is already recorded in such a peremptory form." The military leadership then set itself two strategic goals simultaneously: "English problem" and "Eastern problem". By decision of the first - "related to the operation against England"; on the same day, the “creation of a working group headed by Greifenberg” at the General Staff, and the drafting of an operational plan for landing on the British Isles in the near future, were discussed.

On the "Eastern problem" on July 4, Halder talked with the commander of the 18th Army, the "conqueror of Paris", General G. von Küchler and the chief of staff E. Marx: "I instructed them on the tasks of the 18th Army regarding operational problems in the East." Also noted was the report of the head of the "Foreign armies - East" department, Colonel Eberhard Kinzel "on the grouping of Russian troops", which served as the basis for all subsequent calculations in the development of the "Barbarossa" plan. A characteristic feature of the materials presented by Kinzel was the underestimation of the forces located near the border of the 1st strategic echelon, and especially the reserves of the Red Army.

The USSR as the last barrier to Germany's dominance in Europe

Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1971-070-61, Hitler mit Generälen bei Lagebesprechung

The decision to go to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the high military command on July 31, 1940, shortly after the victory over France. In his diary of the Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder quotes Hitler's statement:

The Hope of England - Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in an incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia. […]

If Russia is defeated, England will lose her last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline - spring 1941.

The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough. Stopping action in winter is dangerous. Therefore, it is better to wait, but make a firm decision to destroy Russia.

F. Halder also notes that initially Hitler determined "the beginning [of the military campaign] is May 1941, the duration of the operation is five months". The operation itself breaks down into:

1st hit: Kyiv, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys crossings. Odessa. 2nd strike: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a bilateral strike - from the north and south; later - a private operation to seize the Baku region.

War planning by the headquarters of the OKH and OKW

The leading place in planning the German war against the USSR was taken by the General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH) of the Wehrmacht, headed by its chief, Colonel General F. Halder. Along with the General Staff of the Ground Forces, an active role in planning the "eastern campaign" was played by the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), headed by General A. Jodl, who received instructions directly from Hitler

OKH Plan

On July 22, 1940, Halder set the first specific tasks for the development of draft plans for a war against the USSR before the Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the OKH, Colonel X. Greifenberg. Lieutenant Colonel E. Kinzel, head of the department of foreign armies of the East, was also involved in this work, and from July 24 - the military geographical department of the General Staff. To speed up the development of the "eastern campaign" plan, Halder ordered the involvement of General E. Marx, who since the First World War was considered the best specialist in Russia.

In early August, Marx presented his draft of Operation Ost, which took into account all the data available at the General Staff about the armed forces and the economy of the USSR, about the terrain, climate and road conditions of the future theater of operations. In accordance with the development of Marx for the war against the USSR, it was supposed to deploy 147 divisions. To deliver the main blow, it was planned to create an attack force north of the Pripyat marshes. The second strike was planned to be delivered south of Pripyat. The outcome of the entire campaign against the USSR, it was emphasized in the development, would largely depend on the effectiveness of the strikes of tank and motorized formations. The total duration of the "eastern campaign" was determined by Marx in 9-17 weeks. During this time, the German troops were to reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line.

In early September, General Marx, at the direction of Halder, handed over all the prepared materials for planning the "eastern campaign" to General F. Paulus, who had just been appointed to the post of first chief quartermaster and permanent deputy chief of the general staff. Under his leadership, the staff of the General Staff continued to develop proposals for the creation of a group of troops for the war against the USSR, their strategic concentration and deployment. On October 29, Halder was presented with a memorandum "Initial sketch of the General Staff of the OKH regarding the operational principles of waging war against the Soviet Union". It noted the advantage of the German troops over the Soviet ones in combat experience and, as a result, the possibility of their successful operations in a maneuverable fleeting war.

Paulus proceeded from the assumption that the Soviet forces deployed against Germany would be approximately 125 rifle divisions, 50 tank and mechanized brigades. The arrival of reserves was determined next schedule: before the third month of the war, 3 were expected 0-40 Russian divisions, until the sixth month - more 100 divisions. However, German intelligence was unable to uncover the creation of a second strategic echelon, the appearance of which in July 1941 would be an unpleasant surprise for the command of the ground forces.

Paulus believed that a decisive superiority in forces and means could be ensured due to the surprise of the attack. For this, it was proposed to develop a set of measures to disinform the Soviet leadership. Like Marx, Paulus considered it necessary to deprive the Red Army troops of the opportunity to retreat inland and conduct a mobile defense. The task of the German groups was envelop, surround and destroy enemy troops, preventing them from retreating .

OKW plan

At the same time, at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW, on the instructions of General Jodl, they were developing their own version of the "eastern campaign". Based on the Fuhrer's instructions, Jodl ordered Lieutenant Colonel B. Lossberg from the country's defense department (operational) to prepare a draft directive for the "Eastern campaign" and conduct research related to involving Finland, Turkey and Romania in the war against the USSR. Lossberg completed his development on September 15, 1940. Unlike the version of the OKH General Staff, it provided for the creation of three strategic groupings: two north of the Pripyat swamps and one south of them. The main blow was supposed to be delivered by the central grouping in the area between the Dnieper and the Western Dvina in order to cut through the Soviet forces in the Minsk region, and then advance in the general direction towards Moscow. According to this project, the northern group was to advance from East Prussia to the line of the Western Dvina in order to capture the Baltic states, and then Leningrad. The southern grouping would strike on both flanks with the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the territory of Western Ukraine, and in the course of the subsequent offensive, force the Dnieper, take possession of the rest of Ukraine, while establishing direct contact with the central grouping. In the future, it was planned to combine the actions of three strategic groupings to reach the line Arkhangelsk - Gorky - Volga (to Stalingrad) - Don before flowing into the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov.

Finalization and approval

In November-December 1940, the General Staff of the OKH continued to refine and play on the maps developments on actions in the main strategic directions, on the distribution of forces and means for the offensive, and also coordinated the results of this work with the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW. In the course of clarifying the plan of the campaign, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to dismember the front Soviet defense to separate sections, where to try to block the Soviet troops, depriving them of the opportunity to withdraw. It was considered most expedient to create three strike groups, of which the northern one would advance on Leningrad, the central one - through Minsk on Smolensk, the southern one - on Kyiv, and the most powerful was to be central. In total, it was planned to use 105 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions in the "eastern campaign".

In the first half of December, the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW was engaged in bringing together the options for the "eastern campaign" plan and preparing a draft directive of the supreme commander. On December 17, Jodl reported to Hitler the prepared draft directive. Hitler made a number of remarks. In his opinion, it was very important to ensure the breakthrough of the Soviet defense and the rapid advance of the motorized forces both north and south of the Pripyat marshes, after which they should have turned to the north and south in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army troops in the Baltic and on Ukraine. Hitler considered the attack on Moscow possible only after the capture of the Baltic states and Ukraine, which would isolate the Soviet Union from the Baltic and Black Seas. He also emphasized that all problems related to the war in Europe must be resolved in 1941, since in 1942 the United States would be in a position to enter the war.

Directive No. 21 "Plan Barbarossa"

Option "Barbarossa"

On December 18, 1940, after some clarifications were made to the draft, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command, which received the code name "Barbarossa Option" and became the main guiding document in the war against the USSR. The German armed forces were tasked with "defeating Soviet Russia during one short-term campaign", for which it was supposed to use all the ground forces with the exception of those that performed occupational functions in Europe, as well as about two-thirds of the Air Force and a small part of the Navy. Rapid operations with a deep and rapid advance of tank wedges, the German army had to destroy the Soviet troops located in the western part of the USSR and prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready units deep into the country. In the future, quickly pursuing the enemy, the German troops were to reach the line from where the Soviet aviation would not be able to carry out raids on the Third Reich. The ultimate goal of the campaign is to reach the line Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan, creating there, if necessary, the conditions for the German Air Force to "influence the Soviet industrial centers in the Urals".

As the immediate strategic goal of the war against the USSR, the defeat and destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic States, Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine were set. It was assumed that during these operations the Wehrmacht would reach Kyiv with fortifications east of the Dnieper, Smolensk and the area south and west of Lake Ilmen. The further goal was to timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk coal basin, and in the north to quickly reach Moscow. The directive demanded that operations to take Moscow be started only after the destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt.

The task of the German Air Force was to disrupt the opposition of Soviet aviation and support their own ground forces in decisive directions. The naval forces were required to ensure the defense of their coast, preventing the breakthrough of the Soviet fleet from the Baltic Sea. After the neutralization of the Soviet fleet, they were to provide German sea transportation in the Baltic and supply the northern flank of the ground forces by sea.

The invasion was scheduled to begin May 15, 1941. The estimated duration of the main hostilities was 4-5 months according to the plan.

Operational-strategic planning

With the completion of the development of the general plan for the war of Germany against the USSR, operational-strategic planning was transferred to the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and associations of troops, where more specific plans were developed, tasks for the troops were clarified and detailed, measures were determined to prepare the armed forces, the economy, and the future theater of military actions.

Under the leadership of Paulus, the OKH General Staff prepared for more than a month a directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops, taking into account Hitler's instructions made at a meeting of the Wehrmacht leadership in the Berghof on January 9, 1941. Speaking at the meeting, the Fuhrer emphasized that the armed forces of the USSR should not be underestimated, although they are a "clay colossus without a head." He demanded that the best forces be allocated and that operations be carried out in such a way as to cut off Soviet troops in the Baltic states as quickly as possible and not to gradually push them out along the entire front.

OKH directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of the Wehrmacht

In January 1941, a series of card games were held, and the basics of the actions of the German troops in each of the operational directions were formulated. As a result, a meeting was held in Berlin on January 31, 1941, at which Field Marshal von Brauchitsch informed that the German plan was based on the assumption of a battle of the Red Army west of the line of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. A. V. Isaev notes that “regarding the last remark, von Bock noted skeptically in his diary”:

When I asked Halder if he had any accurate information that the Russians would hold the territory in front of the mentioned rivers, he thought for a while and said: "It could very well be."

Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. Stopped blitzkrieg.

According to Isaev, "German planning from the very beginning proceeded from a kind of assumption based on general reasoning", because "the actions of the enemy, that is, the Red Army, could differ from those assumed by the German high command".

However, on January 31, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, signed OKH directive No. 050/41 on the strategic concentration and deployment of the Wehrmacht, and on February 3, together with Halder, reported it to Hitler. The directive, which developed and concretized the principles of the war against the USSR, set forth in Directive No. 21, defined specific tasks for all army groups, armies and tank groups to a depth that ensured the achievement of the immediate strategic goal: the destruction of the Red Army troops west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina. Measures were envisaged for the interaction of ground forces with the Air Force and Navy, cooperation with the allied states, the transfer of troops, etc.

The main task, according to the directive, was to " carry out extensive preparatory measures that would make it possible to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the war against England is over". This was planned to be achieved by inflicting quick and deep strikes by powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps in order to disunite and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops in the western part of the USSR, preventing the retreat of their combat-ready units into the vast interior regions of the country. The implementation of this plan, it was said in the directive, will be facilitated by the attempts of large formations of Soviet troops "to stop the German offensive on the line of the rivers Dnieper, Western Dvina".

The German leadership proceeded from the need to ensure the defeat of the Soviet troops along the entire length of the front line. As a result of the grandiose "border battle" planned, the USSR should have had nothing left but 30-40 reserve divisions. This goal was supposed to be achieved by an offensive along the entire front. The Moscow and Kiev directions were recognized as the main operational lines. They were provided by Army Groups "Center" (48 divisions were concentrated on the front of 500 km) and "South" (40 German divisions and significant allied forces were concentrated on the front of 1250 km). Army Group North (29 divisions on a front of 290 km) had the task of securing the northern flank of the Center group, capturing the Baltic states and establishing contact with Finnish troops. The total number of divisions of the first strategic echelon, taking into account the Finnish, Hungarian and Romanian troops, was 157 divisions, of which 17 were tank and 13 motorized, and 18 brigades.

On the eighth day, German troops were to reach the line Kaunas - Baranovichi - Lvov - Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture the territory and reach the line: the Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv) - Mozyr - Rogachev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Velikiye Luki - south of Pskov - south of Pyarnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was supposed to concentrate and regroup formations, rest the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

Particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow: " The capture of this city means both politically and economic relations decisive success, not to mention the fact that the Russians will lose the most important railway junction". The Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army would send the last remaining forces to defend the capital, which would make it possible to defeat them in one operation.

The Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line was indicated as the final line, but the German General Staff did not plan the operation so far.

After the report to Hitler, OKH directive No. 050/41 was sent to the headquarters of the army groups, the air force and the navy. On the recommendation of the General Staff, bilateral command and staff games were held in the army groups. After discussing their results at meetings of the main command of the ground forces with representatives of the army groups, the headquarters of the army groups developed operational plans for their formations, which were considered on February 20 at the OKH General Staff.

Adjustment of attack plans

In connection with Hitler's decision to expand the scope of Operation Marita (attack on Greece), which required the involvement of additional forces, in mid-March 1941, changes were made to the war plan against the USSR, mainly relating to actions on the southern flank of the German group. The 12th Army, which was supposed to operate here, was fully engaged in Greece by order of Hitler and was left there after the end of the Balkan campaign. In this regard, it was considered possible at the first stage of the war against the USSR to confine itself on the eastern border of Romania to the fettering actions of the German-Romanian troops, for the leadership of which a new army administration, the 11th, was formed on the territory of Romania, which by mid-May was to be completely redeployed there. .

Hitler's instructions to change the plan for Operation Barbarossa were reflected in Brauchitsch's directive No. 644/41 of April 7, 1941. It indicated that the allocation of additional forces for the Balkan campaign required the postponement of the start of the operation for more late deadline- for four to six weeks. All preparatory measures, including the transfer of mobile formations necessary for an offensive in the first operational echelon, were required by the directive to be completed approximately by 22nd of June .

V. I. Dashichev noted that at a meeting on April 30, 1941, where Hitler announced the date for the start of the war against the USSR - June 22, - the commander-in-chief of the OKH von Brauchitsch gave the following forecast of military operations on the Eastern Front: “ Presumably, major border battles lasting up to 4 weeks. In the future, only minor resistance should be expected.».

In order to maintain secrecy, the armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland received specific tasks just before the start of the war.

Military-political, economic and ideological goals of Operation Barbarossa

The plan for attacking the USSR also provided for the use of the resources of the occupied territories, determined by the Oldenburg plan, developed under the leadership of Reichsmarschall Goering and approved by Hitler on April 29, 1941. This document provided for the acquisition and placement at the service of the Reich of all stocks of raw materials and large industrial enterprises in the territory between the Vistula and the Urals. The most valuable industrial equipment was supposed to be sent to the Reich, and those that could not be useful to Germany would be destroyed. The territory of the European part of the USSR was planned to be economically decentralized and made an agricultural appendage of Germany. The territory of the European part of the USSR was proposed to be divided into four economic inspectorates (Leningrad, Moscow, Kyiv, Baku) and 23 economic commandant's offices, as well as 12 bureaus. Later it was supposed to divide this territory into seven states economically dependent on Germany.

On May 9, 1941, Alfred Rosenberg made a report to the Fuhrer on the plan for the dismemberment of the USSR and the creation of local governments. On the territory of the USSR, it was planned to create five Reichskommissariats, subdivided into general commissariats and, further, into districts. The plan was adopted with a number of amendments.

A number of Hitler's statements testify to the military-political and ideological goals of Operation Barbarossa.

As follows from the words of the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the OKW, General A. Jodl (entry dated March 3, 1941), Hitler stated the following:

The forthcoming war will be not only an armed struggle, but at the same time a struggle between two worldviews. In order to win this war in conditions where the enemy has a huge territory, it is not enough to defeat his armed forces, this territory should be divided into several states, headed by their own governments, with which we could conclude peace treaties ...

Every revolution on a large scale brings to life phenomena that cannot simply be brushed aside. Socialist ideas in today's Russia can no longer be eradicated. These ideas can serve as an internal political basis for the creation of new states and governments. The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, which is the oppressor of the people, must be removed from the scene. The former bourgeois-aristocratic intelligentsia, if it still exists, primarily among emigrants, should also not be allowed to power. It will not be accepted by the Russian people and, moreover, it is hostile to the German nation. This is especially noticeable in the former Baltic states. In addition, we must by no means allow the replacement of the Bolshevik state by a nationalist Russia, which in the end (as history testifies) will once again oppose Germany.

1) On June 22, 1941, a coalition of four states led by Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war:

• 5.5 million enemy soldiers, united in 190 divisions, took part in the attack;
• aggression was carried out from the territory of four states at once - Germany, Hungary, Romania and, from July 31 - Finland;
• the armed forces of not only Germany, but also Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Finland took part in the war against the USSR.

2) The German attack was carried out in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. According to this plan.

• the war was supposed to have a lightning-fast character (“blitzkrieg”) and end within 6-8 weeks;
• such a quick conduct and end of the war should have occurred due to the rapid defeat of the Soviet army, stretched along the entire western border of the USSR;
• the main goal of the military operation was, first of all, the complete and rapid defeat of the Red Army in the west of the USSR;
• The USSR, deprived of an army for 1 - 2 months of the war, had, according to the German command, either to ask for peace, like Brest, or had to be occupied by the German army without a fight (German strategists did not count on a long war for several years) .

Based on the main strategic task (the rapid defeat of the army), the plan of the entire attack was also built, which was carried out along the entire western border of the USSR - from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

The offensive was carried out by three groups of armies:

• "North" - advanced in the direction of the Baltic states and Leningrad;
• "Center" - advanced through Belarus to Moscow;
• "South" - advanced through Ukraine towards the Caucasus.

Between the main army groups there were many other smaller groups that were supposed to surround the Red Army between the army groups North, Center and South and destroy it.

In the future, it was planned until the autumn of 1941 to occupy the territory of the USSR up to the Urals and end the war. According to the general plan "Ost" (post-war device), it was planned to turn the European part of the USSR into a raw material colony of Germany - a source of food and cheap labor for Germany. In the future, it was planned to populate this territory with German colonists, halve the Russian population and turn it into illiterate servants and low-skilled workers.

In the Asian part of the USSR, in the event of the capitulation of the Soviet government, it was planned to preserve the USSR (as an option, led by the Bolsheviks and Stalin), provided total absence the USSR had an army, the payment of annual reparations, the transition to allied relations with Germany. "Asian Russia", allied to Germany, was to become the place where Germany planned to move its numerous concentration camps from Europe. Mortal danger hangs over the USSR, its normal development, its peoples.

3) Despite repeated warnings from British intelligence officers who deciphered German codes, Soviet intelligence officers (R. Sorge and others), German communist defectors about the impending German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, the Stalinist leadership did not take early measures to repel aggression. Moreover, as early as June 13, 10 days before the war, TASS published an official statement in which it refuted "rumors of an impending German attack on the USSR." This statement, as well as the position of the leadership, which forbade responding to provocations at the border, lulled the vigilance of both the Red Army and the population of the USSR.

As a result, for the majority of the Soviet people, as well as for the Red Army, the attack by Germany and its allies on June 22, 1941 was sudden.

The USSR was forced to start a war in a clearly unfavorable strategic situation for itself:

most of the Red Army was stretched in a narrow strip along the entire western border of the USSR;

in most areas the rear was exposed;

the German army, like the armies of its allies, was also stretched along the entire western border of the USSR - in such a situation, the one who hit first received a clear advantage, while the defending side risked being destroyed in the first days of the war;

when the German army attacked along the entire front (which happened on June 22), the entire army of the USSR was immediately put under attack;

the western border was poorly fortified (in 1939, almost the entire western border of the USSR was moved 100–250 km to the west, as a result of which the “new border” was not yet strengthened, and the “old border” was dismantled in most sections);

the advance of the Red Army to the positions it occupied on June 22 began on June 12, 1941, from the area of ​​the "old border"; part of the army was on the way on the night of the aggression;

most of the Soviet equipment (tanks, aircraft, artillery) were also concentrated along the western border. Such an arrangement of the army on the eve of the war, the lack of a rear and the inaction of the leadership were explained by the fact that:

starting from the 1920s. in the military circles of the USSR, the idea of ​​a “retaliatory strike” was popular, according to which, in case of any aggression, the Red Army had to quickly go on the counteroffensive and finish off the enemy on its territory;

based on this doctrine, most of the Red Army was prepared for the offensive and little was ready for defense,

a number of facts (flaunting military power in 1938 and the USSR’s proposal to Czechoslovakia after the “Munich Pact” to unilaterally fight Germany on the territory of Czechoslovakia in the event of a German attack on it, bringing Soviet troops into full offensive combat readiness back in June 1940 (when the rear of the Germans was practically unprotected) and its cancellation after the swift victory of the Germans in France, which began on June 12, 1941, the advancement of Soviet troops to the Soviet-German border to offensive positions) indicate that the leadership of the USSR did not exclude the option of a preemptive attack on Germany in June - July 1941, but only a few days late, which was discouraged;

the idea of ​​"offensive defense" was so imposed on soldiers and officers by political instructors that even in the first hours of the war, many commanders inadequately assessed the situation - they demanded that the troops advance on Lublin and Warsaw and cared little about defense;

thanks to propaganda, statements at the highest level, the majority of the army and the population believed in the Non-Aggression Pact and hoped that there would be no war; was psychologically unprepared for war.

As a result of the above circumstances, the armies of the Nazi bloc gained a significant advantage in the first days and months of the war:

The Soviet Union was practically deprived of military aviation, about 1200 aircraft were destroyed at airfields - Germany received an unhindered opportunity to bomb Soviet targets and the army;

fascist German troops immediately broke into the unprotected rear of the Red Army and marched deep into the territory of the USSR, overcoming 100 - 200 km a day;

on the 5th day of the war, Minsk was taken by the Germans;

2/3 of the Red Army ended up in "cauldrons"; surrounded on all sides by enemy armies were captured or destroyed;

about 3/4 of the entire Soviet military equipment(tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, cars), due to the rapid advance of the Germans, ended up in the rear of the advancing Nazi troops and was captured by them.

The collapse of the Barbarossa plan. Volume II [Foiled Blitzkrieg] Glantz David M

Tasks of Operation Barbarossa

Tasks of Operation Barbarossa

According to the plans of Hitler and his generals, during the implementation of the Barbarossa plan they had conceived, Smolensk was by no means assigned the role of a cemetery of armies, the ancient Russian city of Smolensk was to become only a milestone on the way to Moscow and a quick victory. The German plan "Barbarossa" called for an invasion of the Soviet Union by three army groups of over 3 million men, led by an armada of four panzer groups, consisting of 19 panzer and 15 motorized divisions and approximately 3,350 tanks. Having suddenly attacked with the support of the Luftwaffe consisting of 2770 fighters and bombers, these forces were to "destroy the main forces of the Russian ground forces in Western Russia with bold actions penetrating far into enemy territory with tank wedges, preventing the withdrawal of combat-ready enemy troops into the interior of the country" 1 . In other words, defeat the bulk of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers.

After completing this task, the Wehrmacht had to destroy the remnants of the Red Army in the course of its rapid advance, capture cities such as Leningrad and Kyiv, Ukraine, the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, and Moscow, the capital of the Stalinist Soviet Union. The Barbarossa plan did not contain a timetable for the advance of the troops, but prescribed a line “because of which the Russian Air Force would not be able to carry out raids on objects in the territory of the German Reich,” that is, to the foothills of the Urals east of Moscow. Although the completed plan allowed the tank forces to turn north (“Thus, strong mobile units should be provided with conditions for turning north”), if necessary, the capture of Moscow, the version of the operation presented by Hitler to the generals on December 5, 1940, provided that “ the decision whether or not to advance on Moscow or to the territories east of Moscow cannot be made until the final defeat of the Soviet forces trapped in the supposed Northern and Southern pockets. Hitler also stressed that "the Russians must not be allowed to set up a defensive line" 2 .

Thus, the key prerequisites on which the Barbarossa plan was built were the following:

- the main forces of the Russian ground forces should be defeated west of the rivers Western Dvina and Dnieper;

- Luftwaffe surprise strikes destroy the red air force on the ground or in the air in the first days after the start of the operation;

- not to allow the Russian troops to retreat and create rear defense lines;

- the Wehrmacht does not launch an offensive against Moscow until the complete defeat of the Russian forces in the alleged Northern and Southern pockets [but in final version Hitler's plan was only about the Northern Cauldron].

Other important prerequisites that were not clearly formulated in the plan:

- judging by the failures of the Soviet-Finnish war and actions during the occupation of Eastern Poland, the Red Army, although numerous, is extremely clumsy;

- as a result of the Stalinist purges of 1937-1938. the commanding cadres of the Red Army are inexperienced, highly "politicized" and lack initiative;

- The Red Army consists of 190 divisions capable of conducting active combat operations and numerous tank brigades, and in the event of a general mobilization being declared, it is capable of recruiting human potential into its ranks, allowing the staffing of more than 300 divisions;

- the undeveloped network of communications of the Soviet Union does not allow for prompt mobilization, therefore, the regular army must be defeated even before, as a result of mobilization, the enemy will be able to bring the army to the previous level or increase the size of the army;

- the Slavs, unlike the Germans, are in principle not capable of conducting effective military operations;

- the national minorities of the Soviet Union (Ukrainians, Belarusians, peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia) were and remain disloyal to the existing state system and will not fight for the communist regime of Stalin.

Thus, Germany, having invaded the Soviet Union, was unshakably sure of an imminent victory. And in accordance with the plan on June 22, the German Luftwaffe really destroyed most of the Red Army Air Force on the ground, and its armies and tank groups, breaking into the Russian defenses, rushed deep into the Soviet Union. Although the Germans were quite surprised that the Russians had a large number of tanks and armored vehicles that were in no way inferior to modern German vehicles and even surpassed German ones (for example, KV and T-34 tanks), the German troops managed to destroy and encircle many of the Soviet armies defending border areas. With the exception of Ukraine, where huge Soviet tank and mechanized forces slowed down the advance of Army Group South. As for the armies and tank groups of Army Group Center and Army Group North, they managed to defeat three Soviet armies in Belarus and two in the Baltic, forcing them into a disorderly retreat.

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Plan Barbarossa, or Directive 21, was developed with great care. Much attention was paid to the flow of disinformation designed to cover up intentions to attack the Soviet Union. But during the operation "Barbarossa" difficulties arose. The reason and details of the failure of the blitzkrieg in the USSR.

Adolf Hitler examines the map of the Barbarossa plan, on the left, Field Marshals Keitel, 1940.

By 1940, things were going well for Hitler. The political struggle with opponents was left behind. The power was already completely concentrated in his hands. Plans to take over Europe were carried out, almost without a hitch, without a hitch. The new tactics of blitzkrieg fully justified the hopes placed on it. However, Hitler understood that in order to dominate the conquered states, he needed to provide the people with agricultural and industrial resources. And the German economy was already working at full capacity, and it was unrealistic to squeeze something else out of it. The time has come to begin a new chapter in German history. The chapter to which Adolf Hitler decided to codename the plan "Barbarossa".

The German Fuhrer dreamed of building a great empire that would dictate its will to the whole world. In the first half of the 19th century, German foreign policy brought a number of independent states to their knees. Hitler managed to subjugate Austria, Czechoslovakia, part of Lithuania, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium and France. Moreover, a little more than a year has passed since the beginning of World War II. By that time, England was the most obvious and problematic enemy for Germany. Despite the signed official non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, no one had any illusions on this score. Even Stalin understood that an attack by the Wehrmacht was simply a matter of time. But he felt calm while the confrontation between Germany and England was going on. The experience gained in the First World War gave him such confidence. The Russian Generalissimo was firmly convinced that Hitler would never start a war on two fronts.

Contents of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's plans

According to the living space policy in the East, the Third Reich needed a territory rich in natural resources and large enough to comfortably accommodate the master race. Today, the phrase "living space" will say little to the non-specialist. But since the end of the thirties, for any German it has been as familiar as today, for example, the phrase "integration into Europe." There was an official term "Lebensraum im Osten". Such ideological preparation was also important for the implementation of Operation Barbarossa, the plan of which at that time was under development.

Plan Barbarossa Map

On December 17, 1940, Hitler was presented with a document detailing the operation to seize the Soviet Union. The ultimate goal was to push the Russians beyond the Urals and create a barrier along the line from the Volga to Arkhangelsk. This would cut off the army from strategically important military bases, functioning factories and oil reserves. In the original version, it was supposed to achieve all the goals in one jerk.

Hitler was generally pleased with the design, but made some adjustments, the most significant of which was the splitting of the campaign into two stages. First it was necessary to capture Leningrad, Kyiv and Moscow. This was followed by a strategic pause, during which the army of the victors received rest, strengthened morale and built up strength at the expense of the resources of the defeated enemy. And only then was the final victorious breakthrough to occur. However, this did not cancel the blitzkrieg technique. The whole operation took two, maximum - three months.

What was Barbarossa's plan

The essence of the approved Barbarossa plan, which the Fuhrer signed in December 1940, was to break through the Soviet border with lightning speed, quickly defeat the main armed forces and push the demoralized remnant away from strategically important points for defense. Hitler personally chose the code name for the German command. The operation was called Plan Barbarossa or Directive 21. The ultimate goal is to completely defeat the Soviet Union in one short-term campaign.

The main forces of the Red Army were concentrated on the western border. Previous military campaigns have proven the effectiveness of the use of panzer divisions. And the concentration of the Red Army was in the hands of the Wehrmacht. Tank wedges cut into the enemy ranks like a knife through butter, sowing death and panic. The remnants of the enemy were taken into the environment, falling into the so-called boilers. The soldiers were either forced to surrender or finished off on the spot. Hitler was going to advance the offensive on a wide front in three directions at once - southern, central and northern.

For the successful implementation of the plan, surprise, speed of advance and reliable detailed data on the disposition of Soviet troops were extremely important. Therefore, the start of the war was postponed until the end of the spring of 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

In order to successfully launch Operation Barbarossa, the plan involved a secret concentration of Wehrmacht forces to the borders of the country. But the movement of 190 divisions had to be somehow motivated. Since the second World War was in full swing, Hitler threw all his strength into trying to convince Stalin of the priority of the capture of England. And all the movements of troops were explained by redeployment for waging war with the West. Germany had 7.6 million people at its disposal. Of these, 5 million had to be delivered to the border.

The general balance of forces on the eve of the war is shown in the table "The balance of forces of Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War."

The balance of forces of Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War:

From the above table it can be seen that the superiority in terms of the number of equipment was clearly on the side of the Soviet Union. However, this does not reflect the real picture. The fact is that economic development Russia at the beginning of the century was significantly slowed down civil war. This affected, among other things, the state of military equipment. Compared to German armament, it was already outdated, but worst of all, a very large part of it was physically unusable. She was only conditionally combat-ready and very often needed repairs.

In addition, the Red Army was not completed for wartime. There was a catastrophic shortage of personnel. But even worse, even among the available fighters, a significant part were untrained recruits. And from the German side, veterans who had gone through real military campaigns spoke. Given this, it becomes clear that Germany's attack on the Soviet Union and the opening of a second front was not such a self-confident action.

Hitler took into account the development of Russia at the beginning of the century, and the state of its weapons, and the deployment of troops. His plan to cut deep into the Soviet army and reshape the political map of eastern Europe to suit him looked quite feasible.

Direction of the main attack

The German attack on the Soviet Union was not like a single point javelin strike. The attack came from three directions at once. They are indicated in the table "Goals of the offensive of the German army." This was the Barbarossa plan, which marked the beginning of the Great Patriotic War for Soviet citizens. The largest army, led by Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt, advanced south. Under his command were 44 German divisions, 13 Romanian divisions, 9 Romanian brigades and 4 Hungarian brigades. Their task was to capture the whole of Ukraine and provide access to the Caucasus.

In the central direction, an army of 50 German divisions and 2 German brigades was led by Field Marshal Moritz von Bock. The most trained and powerful tank groups were at his disposal. He was supposed to capture Minsk. And after that, according to the approved scheme, through Smolensk, move to Moscow.

To the north, the advance of 29 German divisions and the army "Norway" was led by Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb. His task was to occupy the Baltic, establish control over the sea exits, take Leningrad and move to Murmansk through Arkhangelsk. Thus, these three armies were eventually to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.

Goals of the German offensive:

Direction	South	Center	North
Commanding	Carl von Rundstedt	Moritz von Bock	Wilhelm von Leeb
Army strength	57 divisions	50 divisions 2 brigades	29 divisions Army "Norway"
Goals	Ukraine Caucasus (exit)	Minsk Smolensk	the Baltics Leningrad Arkhangelsk Murmansk

Neither the Fuhrer, nor the field marshals, nor ordinary German soldiers doubted a quick and inevitable victory over the USSR. This is evidenced not only by official documents, but also by the personal diaries of military commanders, as well as letters sent by ordinary soldiers from the front. Everyone was in euphoria from previous military campaigns and looked forward to a quick victory on the eastern front as well.

Implementation of the plan

The outbreak of war with the Soviet Union only strengthened Germany's belief in a quick victory. The German advanced divisions managed to easily crush the resistance and enter the territory of the USSR. The field marshals acted strictly, as prescribed by a secret document. The Barbarossa plan began to materialize. The results of the first three weeks of the war for the Soviet Union were extremely discouraging. During this time, 28 divisions were completely disabled. The text of Russian reports indicates that only 43% of the army remained combat-ready (from the number at the beginning of hostilities). Seventy divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.

The first German attack on the USSR was on June 22, 1941. And by July 11, the main part of the Baltic states was occupied, and the approach to Leningrad was liberated. In the center, the advance of the German army took place at an average speed of 30 km per day. Von Bock's divisions reached Smolensk without much difficulty. In the south, they also made a breakthrough, which was planned to be made at the first stage, and the main forces were already in sight of the Ukrainian capital. The next step was to take Kyiv.

There were objective reasons for such dizzying successes. The tactical surprise factor disorientated not only Soviet soldiers in places. Heavy losses in the first days of the war were suffered due to uncoordinated defense actions. Do not forget that the Germans followed a clear and carefully planned plan. And the formation of a Russian defensive rebuff was almost spontaneous. Often, commanders simply did not receive reliable reports about what was happening in time, so they could not react accordingly.

Among the reasons why Soviet Russia suffered such significant losses at the beginning of the war, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor G.F. Krivosheev identifies the following:

• The suddenness of the impact.
• Significant numerical superiority of the enemy at the points of collision.
• Deployment of troops.
• The real combat experience of German soldiers, as opposed to a large number of untrained recruits in the first echelon.
• Echelon disposition of troops (the Soviet army was drawn to the border gradually).

German failures in the north

After the vigorous capture of the Baltic states, it was time to sweep away Leningrad. An important strategic task was assigned to the army "North" - it was supposed to provide for the army "Center" freedom of maneuver during the capture of Moscow, and for the army "South" the ability to perform operational and strategic tasks.

But this time, the Barbarossa plan failed. The newly formed Leningrad Front of the Red Army on August 23 managed to stop the Wehrmacht forces near Koporye. On August 30, after heavy fighting, the Germans were able to reach the Neva and cut off the railway communication to Leningrad. On September 8th they occupied Shlisselburg. Thus, the northern historical capital was enclosed in a blockade ring.

Blitzkrieg clearly failed. Lightning capture, as in the case of the conquered European states, did not work. On September 26, the advance of the army "North" to Leningrad was stopped by the Red Army under the command of Zhukov. A long blockade of the city began.

The situation in Leningrad was very difficult. But for the German army, this time was not in vain. I had to think about the supply, which was actively interfered with by the activities of the partisans along the entire length of the route. The joyful euphoria from the rapid advance inland also subsided. The German command planned to reach the extreme lines in three months. Now, at the headquarters, more and more often they openly recognized the Barbarossa plan as a failure. And the soldiers were exhausted by the protracted endless battles.

The failures of the army "Center"

While the army "North" was trying to conquer Leningrad, Field Marshal Moritz von Bock led his people to Smolensk. He clearly understood the importance of the task assigned to him. Smolensk was the last step before Moscow. And the fall of the capital, according to the plans of German military strategists, was to completely demoralize the Soviet people. After that, the conquerors would only have to trample down individual scattered pockets of resistance.

Although by the time the Germans approached Smolensk, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, who commanded the North Army, was unable to ensure the unhindered deployment of troops in the direction of the upcoming main attack, the Center Army was still developing successfully. They reached the city with a vigorous march and, in the end, Smolensk was taken. During the defense of the city, three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated, 310 thousand people were taken prisoner. But the fighting continued from July 10 to August 5. The German army again lost the pace of advance. In addition, von Bock could not count on support from the troops of the northern direction (as was supposed to be done if necessary), since they themselves were stuck in one place, holding the cordon around Leningrad.

It took almost a month to capture Smolensk. And for another month there were fierce battles for the city of Velikiye Luki. It was not strategically important, but the battles delayed the advance of the German army. And this, in turn, gave time to prepare for the defense of Moscow. Therefore, from a tactical point of view, it was important to keep the defense as long as possible. And the Red Army soldiers fought furiously, despite the losses. They not only defended themselves, but also raided the enemy's flanks, which further dispersed his forces.

Battle for Moscow

While the German army was held near Smolensk, the Soviet people managed to thoroughly prepare for the defense. For the most part, the fortifications were erected by the hands of women and children. A whole layered defense system has grown up around Moscow. Managed to staff the people's militia.

The attack on Moscow began on 30 September. It was supposed to consist of a rapid one-time breakthrough. Instead, the Germans, although moving forward, did so slowly and painfully. Step by step they overcame the defense of the capital. Only by November 25 did the German army reach Krasnaya Polyana. Moscow was 20 km away. No one believed in the Barbarossa plan.

The Germans did not go beyond these lines. And already in early January 1942, the Red Army threw them back 150 kilometers from the city. A counteroffensive began, as a result of which the front line was pushed back 400 km. Moscow was out of danger.

The failures of the army "South"

Army "South" met with resistance all the way through the territory of Ukraine. The forces of the Romanian divisions fettered Odessa. They could not support the attacks on the capital and serve as reinforcements for Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt. However, the Wehrmacht forces reached Kyiv relatively quickly. It took only 3.5 weeks to advance to the city. But in the battles for Kyiv itself, the German army got stuck, as in other directions. The delay was so significant that Hitler decided to send reinforcements from the Center Army units. The Red Army suffered huge losses. Five armies were encircled. Only 665 thousand people were taken prisoners. But Germany was wasting time.

Each of the delays delayed the moment of impact on the main forces of Moscow. Each day won gave more time to the Soviet army and militia forces to prepare for defense. Every extra day meant the need to bring supplies for German soldiers who were far away in the territory of a hostile country. It was necessary to deliver ammunition and fuel. But worst of all, the attempt to continue to adhere to the Barbarossa plan approved by the Fuhrer launched the reasons for its failure.

Firstly, the plan was thought out and calculated really well. But only under the condition of blitzkrieg. As soon as the pace of advance through enemy territory began to decrease, his installations already became untenable. Secondly, the German command, in an attempt to patch up their crumbling offspring, sent many additional directives, which often directly contradicted one another.

Map of the German advance plan

When considering the plan for the advance of the German troops on the map, it is clear that it was developed holistically and thoughtfully. For more than one month, German intelligence officers meticulously collected information, photographed the territory. The wave of the trained German army was supposed to sweep away everything in its path and liberate fertile and rich lands for the German people.

The map shows that the first blow should have been concentrated. Having destroyed the main military forces, the Wehrmacht spread across the territory of the Soviet Union in breadth. From the Baltics to Ukraine. This made it possible to continue to disperse enemy forces, lock them into an environment and destroy them in small portions.

Already on the twentieth day after the first strike, the Barbarossa plan ordered to take the line Pskov - Smolensk - Kyiv (including cities). Further, a short rest was planned for the victorious German army. And already on the fortieth day after the start of the war (by the beginning of August 1941), Leningrad, Moscow and Kharkov were to submit.

After that, it remained to drive away the remnants of the defeated enemy behind the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad - Saratov - Kazan and finish it off on the other side. This freed up space for a new Germany spread across central and eastern Europe.

Why did the blitzkrieg fail in Germany?

Hitler himself claimed that the failure of the operation to take over the Soviet Union was due to false premises based on incorrect intelligence. The German Fuhrer even claimed that having the correct information, he would not have approved the start of the offensive.

According to the data available to the German command, only 170 divisions were available in the Soviet Union. And all of them were concentrated on the border. There was no information about reserves or additional lines of defense. If this were true, Barbarossa's plan would have every chance of being brilliantly executed.

Twenty-eight divisions of the Red Army were completely destroyed during the first breakthrough of the Wehrmacht. In 70 divisions, approximately half of all equipment was disabled, and personnel losses were 50% or more. 1200 aircraft were destroyed, which did not even have time to take to the air.

The offensive really crushed and divided the main enemy forces with one powerful blow. But Germany did not count on powerful reinforcements, on the incessant rebuff that followed this. After all, having captured the main strategic points, the German army could really deal with the remnants of the scattered parts of the Red Army in a month.

Reasons for failure

There were other objective factors why the blitzkrieg failed. The Germans did not particularly hide their intentions regarding the destruction of the Slavs. Therefore, they resisted desperately. Even in conditions of complete cut-off, lack of ammunition and food, the Red Army soldiers continued to fight literally until their last breath. They understood that death could not be avoided, so they sold their lives dearly.

Difficult terrain, poor road conditions, swamps and swamps, which were not always mapped in detail, also added to the headache of the German commanders. At the same time, this area and its features were well known to the Soviet people and they made full use of this knowledge.

The huge losses suffered by the Red Army were greater than among the German soldiers. But the Wehrmacht did not do without dead and wounded. None of the European campaigns had such significant losses as on the eastern front. It also did not fit into the tactics of blitzkrieg.

The front line, spreading like a wave, looks pretty nice on paper. But in reality, this meant the dispersal of parts, which, in turn, added difficulties for the convoy and supply units. In addition, the possibility of a massive strike on points of stubborn resistance was lost.

The activity of partisan groups also distracted the Germans. They counted on some help from the local population. After all, Hitler assured that ordinary citizens oppressed by the Bolshevik contagion would gladly stand under the banner of the newly arrived liberators. But this did not happen. There were very few defectors.

Numerous orders and directives that began to pour in after the main headquarters recognized the failure of the blitzkrieg, along with outright competition between the generals of the advancing army, also contributed to the deterioration of the Wehrmacht's position. At that time, few people realized that the failure of Operation Barbarossa marked the beginning of the end of the Third Reich.