Who is the new Zenith coach. Old new "Zenith" of the best coach in the world
Mancini was disgraced.
The Italian coach burst into St. Petersburg with a dashing goal from Daler Kuzyaev and super football from Sebastian Driussi. The stands were inspired: the new president brought in a champion manager who reveals the Russian youth and selects the right legionnaires. Around - a chic stadium. Ahead is a warm-up victory in the Premier League before the comeback to the Champions League. On the way we will grab another European Cup. Finally, everything will be fine. Yeah.
Mancini interrupted the stinking aftertaste from Lucescu's attack. The driven Argentine striker has turned into a second-rate Argentinean diaspora, and it is difficult to imagine such an unsystematic use of Kuzyaev’s talent even under substances. The turn was finally finished off by the castling of Dziuba to Zabolotny. The latter also added fuel to the trolls - a debut goal in a useless () match against a comatose SKA. If anything, even Erokhin put poker there.
But the reaction of the club to the disaster is extremely adequate. Fursenko warned fighting early dismissal of Roberto, and chooses a new coach together with the people. Zenit announced the shortlist of candidates through the millionth fan at Krestovsky - it's beautiful. And then, who from this list should be entrusted with the command. It's farsighted.
Sergey Semak
pros. Sergey Bogdanovich is a self-evident choice. "Zenith" does not need trophies and high-profile transfers: first you need to wipe the dirt from your own emblem. Once the most sincere team in the league turned into a money bag. Own pupils and just Russian guys are knocking out the team with scandals, and mercenaries take their place. Fans have forgotten when a footballer made his way to the base straight from the academy. The club formed a strange connection with politics. The only bright spot is Tymoshchuk's hairstyle on the bench. If Semak appears next to her, a good image can be restored.
There is no doubt about his humanity and orientation. Sergey will find mutual language even with cormorants at Krestovsky. He will not harm or merge ahead of time, like Lucescu with Mancini. He will not put the Russian guy under dubious legionnaires and will definitely fit in for the team in front of the judges. Zenit knew that the fans would choose Semak and made the right move, appointing him, as it were, with the hands of the fans. With him, it will not be shameful to root for the Petersburgers again. Now this is the most important thing.
Minuses. But, probably, it will be necessary to drown for Semakov's "Zenith" through defeats. The result of the young coach in Ufa is extremely worthy in terms of price-quality ratio. But managing a roster with spoiled stars on a win-it-all mission is another matter. This requires either hypertalent (like Zidane) or experience. Semak has neither one nor the other. But then again - are victories really that important?
Appointment Probability: almost certainly
pros. Zenit fails so much with foreign coaches that taking on a new foreigner = unleashing a cold war with the fans. But Sarri is almost the only coach in the world whose authority will make Petersburgers forget about passports and citizenship for at least half a year. His schemes at Napoli are openly admired by Guardiola and Mourinho, and the name can attract really cool players to Krestovsky. For example, Mertens or Jorginho.
Minuses. Maurizio is insanely expensive. He boldly hinted at his desire to leave Naples, automatically lining up a line of superclubs for his labor. Chelsea is trying more actively than the rest - in order to recapture the Italian from Abramovich, you need to lay out a really dangerous amount of money. In the event of poor results (no one is insured), it will be impossible to explain the numbers in Sarri's contract. Then cold war becomes nuclear.
Appointment Probability: first candidate after Semak
Jorge Sampaoli
pros. In the 2016/17 season, Sampaoli and Conte brought the three-back scheme back to life. The Argentinean's Sevilla rolled into the Champions League, and the coach's own shares skyrocketed. Jorge was immediately recruited by the Argentina national team. Surely the last World Cup for Lionel Messi is a serious matter. The quality of Sampaoli is also proved by the fact that the Andalusians crawled down after his departure. This year, the peak of Sevilla is the defeat of Barcelona in the final of the Copa del Rey.
Minuses. The talent of the Argentinean is undeniable. But there is no fundamental difference in the class between Sampaoli, Spalletti and even Mancini. Choice of Jorge - another attempt to get trophies the shortest way rather than build a long-term project through hardships to the stars. If Fursenko again falls for the red carpet strategy, then Sampaoli may not leave Russia after the World Cup.
Appointment Probability: very unlikely
Paulo Fonseca and Marcelo Gallardo
Minuses. These characters have no clear advantages. What could be dumber than poaching the Shakhtar coach almost immediately after Lucescu? To call a no-name from River Plate for a crowd of faded and unloved Argentines. It is pointless to paint further. Let's just hope that these guys are not really on the shortlist of St. Petersburg. And their names in the voting - another self-irony of "Zenith". The blue-white-blues have complete order with her.
Appointment Probability: tends to zero
He leaves, who will replace him is unknown. Budget trainer, ready to work with those who will be given? Another top manager who will reshuffle the team completely?
There is no certainty that the team will remain: he wanted to return the status of the best club in the country to Zenit, but the expenses did not materialize. The season is close to complete failure.
When there is no understanding of who will manage the club and who will lead the team, it is extremely difficult to predict the future of the players. We only indicate the main issues that will face the new "Zenith".
12 players on loan
Of these, the contract ends only with Alexander Ryazantsev, the remaining 11 players can return to the club. It will be necessary to do something: leave or attach. It is desirable that new coach participated in this process. Colossal work.
- Luis Neto, Fenerbahce
- Ivan Novoseltsev, Arsenal
- Evgeny Chernov, "Tosno"
- Ibragim Tsallagov, Dynamo
- Ernani, Saint-Etienne
- Oleg Shatov, Krasnodar
- Christian Noboa, Rubin
- Artur Yusupov, Rostov
- Robert Mac, Paok
- Artem Dziuba, Arsenal
- Luka Djordjevic, Arsenal
Goalkeepers and defense
Already several times I was going to leave Zenit, but at the last moment I decided to stay. 27 years old, the status of the second goalkeeper - something needs to be changed. Most likely, in the summer Lodygin will decide to leave for playing practice.
The captain, who wants to return to his native Genoa club, has already announced his departure from Zenit. The Italian refused to negotiate a contract extension and will go to free agents. The loss of the captain, the leader, the most prolific Zenit defender in history, who can play both on the flank and in the center of defense, is very serious.
Will miss the first part of next season and that damaged crosses. The recovery period is 6-9 months. Ivanovic will definitely remain, but reinforcements will still be required in the center of defense. Although it all depends on the vector of development. Perhaps they will bet on the schoolboy Skrobotov.
Zenit - Dynamo. 2:1. Ilya Skrobotov
It is doubtful that the new Zenith will need, whose transfer cost the club two million euros. During the season, he received only 160 minutes of playing practice and could hardly count on more in St. Petersburg.
The contract expires in June and will turn 35 in August. It seems that Zenit and the player want to extend the contract, but this has not happened yet.
Midfield
He came to Zenit near Mancini and does not want to stay. Back in February and March, Football Italia wrote that the Argentine wanted to leave the club in the summer. Now other media are writing about this, citing Russian sources. There is a demand for Paredes in Italy and he is likely to leave. Zenit will bargain frantically, but it is very difficult to contain a player who wants to leave. According to Whoscored, Criscito and Paredes are the best players of Zenit this season.
Arsenal - Zenit. 1:1. Leandro Paredes spun the ball into the goal from a corner!
As the Argentines came - one after another, so they can start and leave. Paredes will leave - they will start looking at the exit,. They don’t shine anyway, but what will happen if they start thinking about leaving? Probably already started. All of them are very close.
Attack
Will begin to gain shape only in the summer. He should recover by August, but he will definitely need time at the beginning of the season. It is very difficult to return the form after crosses. The new coach will not be able to immediately fully rely on the leader of the team's attacks.
He scored against Zenit and alienated the club that pays him a salary from the Champions League. He kind of pricked Mancini, but at the same time touched the fans and management on a tangent. Who will like this? How to come back after this?
The experience of cooperation with Vlstimil Petrzhela should be recognized as successful: from that moment up to the present, the club invites specialists from abroad to work (exceptions are Anatoly Davydov and Sergey Semak, who worked with the prefix "acting" several matches in 2009 and 2014, respectively *). It is curious that if at first each new foreign specialist worked almost as much and even longer than his predecessor, then lately foreign coaches do not stay at Zenit for a long time. Vlastimil Petrzhela and Dick Advocaat worked for more than three years, Luciano Spalletti - almost four years, André Villas-Boas lasted for two years, and Mircea Lucescu and (most likely) Roberto Mancini "shelf life" was only a season. During our work, in this case, we take the interval from the first to the last official match at the head of Zenit.
If Mancini leaves Zenit at the end of the 2017/18 season, he will become the first foreign coach in history to fail to win a single title with blue-white-blue.
* - at the end of the 2009 season, Davydov was approved as the head coach; after the 30th round, he left his post.
Vlastimil Petrzhela (Czech Republic): 3 years, a month and 18 days
Statistics in all tournaments: 145 matches +73 =41 -31; balls 245-151; 59.7% points
Titles: Premier League Cup (2003)
Dick Advocaat (Holland): 3 years, a month and 3 days
Statistics in all tournaments: 139 matches +68 =42 -29; balls 234-143; 58.9% points
Titles: champion of Russia (2007); Russian Super Cup (2008); UEFA Cup (2007/08); UEFA Super Cup (2008)
Luciano Spalletti (Italy): 3 years, 11 months and 24 days
Statistics in all tournaments: 184 matches +105 =47 -32; balls 325-176; 65.5% of points (including two technical defeats in the Czech Republic)
Titles: champion of Russia (2010, 2011/12); Cup of Russia (2009/10); Russian Super Cup (2011)
André Villas-Boas (Portugal): 2 years, a month and 27 days
Statistics in all tournaments: 101 matches +62 =20 -19; balls 195-88; 67.9% points
Titles: champion of Russia (2014/15); Russian Cup (2015/16); Russian Super Cup (2015)
Mircea Lucescu (Romania): 9 months and 28 days
Statistics in all tournaments: 41 matches +26 =7 -8; balls 76-34; 71.9% points
Titles: Russian Super Cup (2017)
Roberto Mancini (Italy): 9 months and 17 days (today)
Statistics in all tournaments: 43 matches +21 =13 -9; balls 68-34; 58.9% points
Titles: -
Photos used: FC Zenit; "Sport Day after Day" (Igor Ozersky)
Dmitry ZELENOV
"Zenith" was the most principled and consistent supporter of the policy of foreign coaches. In St. Petersburg, in fact, they set this trend by inviting a Czech in November 2002 Vlastimila Petrzhela.
Over the next 15 years, Zenit was led by a Dutchman Advocate, Portuguese villas boas, Romanian Lucescu, Italians Spalletti and Mancini. The approach did not change even in short periods Anatolia Davydov in 2009 and the same Semak in 2014 They were not going to work with them for a long time. The first one held the seat while making arrangements with Spalletti, the second acted until the official signing Villas Boasha. “Zenith” and the status of a foreign coach – it seemed to be inseparable concepts.
And why was it necessary to abandon a foreign course if it somehow (in combination with other measures) gave a result? At Petrzhele"Zenith" climbed to second place, Advocate brought victory in the championship, the UEFA Cup and the European Super Cup, Spalletti turned St. Petersburg into the hegemon of Russian football, with him the team showed the most powerful football in the country.
It seemed that one more step had to be taken to reach the long-awaited level of the top teams in the Champions League.
But it so happened that with each following after Spalletti coach "Zenith" from this goal moved away. villas boas still managed to win the championship and get out of the Champions League group, Lucescu already finished third, well Mancini- fifth.
The system has crashed. And it is obvious that in several areas, because the level and status of a specialist did not allow Zenith to be pulled back to the top. This was not possible for any super fashionable at that time villas boasu, nor the most experienced Lucescu, nor modern Mancini.
Purpose Semak says that in St. Petersburg they chose the second option. And it seems that the turn is confident and long-term.
Semak came to Zenit as an independent and mature coach, they signed with him, if not a space, but a full-fledged contract (according to our data, a million euros a year plus bonuses). In the end, Semak won the competition. You can relate to the "casting of coaches" that Zenit arranged (the names of the candidates were called almost in the reality show mode), but it is obvious that the leadership did not have a single opinion at first. And Semak, who, during the negotiations, told how he sees the future of the team, eventually convinced everyone.
It is clear that the status and coaching achievements do not allow Semaku come to Zenith on your own terms. His contract has no armor, failure to complete the task (and it is always the same for Zenit - first place), perhaps, will raise the question of resignation. But term (2+1) Semaku allows you to look to the future with confidence. There are many interesting things ahead - both for him and for the club.
Konstantin Lemeshev*June 1987
USSR Champion 1984
USSR Cup Winner 1985
July 1, 1989
November 4, 1996
November 22, 1998
November 24, 1998 -
April 25, 2000
May 31, 2000 -
July 5, 2002
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2001
Finalist of the Cup of Russia 2001/02
August 26, 2002, and. about.
November 17, 2002
May 3, 2006
Premier League Cup Winner 2003
August 10, 2009
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2008
UEFA Cup Winner 2007/08
UEFA Super Cup Winner 2008
October 3 -
December 11, 2009
March 11, 2014
Champion of Russia 2010
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2011
Champion of Russia 2011/12
Finalist of the Russian Super Cup 2012
Silver medalist of the Russian Championship 2012/13
Finalist of the Russian Super Cup 2013
May 21, 2016
Champion of Russia 2014/15
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2015
Cup of Russia 2015/16
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2015/16
** Lasin in September 1950 replaced K. Lemeshev in away matches, Kornev replaced Zonin in August-October 1977, Davydov replaced Byshovets in October 1998. The match statistics are credited to Lemeshev, Zonin and Byshovets, for Kornev they are highlighted separately for clarity.
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Notes
Links
| Trainers FC Zenit St. Petersburg | |
|---|---|
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P. Butusov (1935) Filippov (1936-1938) Ivin (acting) (1938) Egorov (1938-1940) Filippov (1940) K. Lemeshev (1944-1945) M. Butusov (1946) Talanov (1946-1948) K. Lemeshev (1949-1950) Lasin (1950-1951) V. Lemeshev (1952-1954) Lyukshinov (1954-1955) Alov (1956-1957) Zharkov (1956-1960) Bondarenko (1960) Eliseev (1961-1964) Fedorov (1964-1966) Alov (1967) Fallan (1968-1970) Goryansky (1970-1972) Zonin (1973-1977) Morozov (1977-1982) Sadyrin (1983-1987) Golubev (1987) Zavidonov (1988-1989) Golubev (1989) Skates (1990) Bulavin (1990) Morozov (1991) Melnikov (1992-1994) Sadyrin (1995-1996) Byshovets (1997-1998) Davydov (1998-2000) Morozov (2000-2002) Biryukov (acting) (2002) ( |
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| Media | |
| Other | |
| Seasons | |
An excerpt characterizing the List of head coaches of FC Zenit (St. Petersburg)
If the commanders were guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed, as it should have been clear to Napoleon, that, having gone two thousand miles and accepted the battle with the probable accident of losing a quarter of the army, he was going to certain death; and it should have seemed just as clear to Kutuzov that, accepting the battle and also risking losing a quarter of the army, he was probably losing Moscow. For Kutuzov, this was mathematically clear, as clear as it is that if I have less than one checker in checkers and I change, I will probably lose and therefore should not change.When the opponent has sixteen checkers, and I have fourteen, then I am only one-eighth weaker than him; and when I exchange thirteen checkers, he will be three times stronger than me.
Before the battle of Borodino, our forces were approximately in relation to the French as five to six, and after the battle as one to two, that is, before the battle one hundred thousand; a hundred and twenty, and after the battle fifty to a hundred. And at the same time, the smart and experienced Kutuzov accepted the battle. Napoleon, the brilliant commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of the army and stretching his line even more. If it is said that by occupying Moscow he thought he would end the campaign by occupying Vienna, then there is much evidence against this. The historians of Napoleon themselves say that even from Smolensk he wanted to stop, knew the danger of his extended position, knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he saw in what position the Russian cities were left to him, and did not receive a single answer to their repeated statements about their desire to negotiate.
Giving and accepting the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and senselessly. And historians, under the accomplished facts, only later summed up the intricate evidence of the foresight and genius of the generals, who, of all the involuntary tools of world events, were the most slavish and involuntary figures.
The ancients left us models of heroic poems in which the heroes are the whole interest of history, and we still cannot get used to the fact that for our human time this kind of history has no meaning.
To another question: how the battles of Borodino and the Shevardino battles preceding it were given - there is also a very definite and well-known, completely false idea. All historians describe the case as follows:
The Russian army, as if in its retreat from Smolensk, was looking for the best position for itself. pitched battle, and such a position was allegedly found at Borodin.
The Russians allegedly fortified this position forward, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk), at almost a right angle to it, from Borodino to Utitsa, on the very spot where the battle took place.
In front of this position, a fortified advanced post on the Shevardinsky barrow was allegedly put up to observe the enemy. On the 24th, Napoleon allegedly attacked the forward post and took it; On the 26th, he attacked the entire Russian army, which was in position on the Borodino field.
So the stories say, and all this is completely unfair, as anyone who wants to delve into the essence of the matter will easily be convinced of.
The Russians did not look for a better position; but, on the contrary, in their retreat they passed many positions that were better than Borodino. They did not stop at any of these positions: both because Kutuzov did not want to accept a position that was not chosen by him, and because the demand for a popular battle had not yet been expressed strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet approached with the militia, and also because other reasons that are innumerable. The fact is that the former positions were stronger and that the Borodino position (the one on which the battle was given) is not only not strong, but for some reason is not at all a position more than any other place in Russian Empire, which, guessing, would indicate with a pin on the map.
The Russians not only did not fortify the position of the Borodino field to the left at a right angle from the road (that is, the place where the battle took place), but never before August 25, 1812 did they think that the battle could take place on this place. This is evidenced, firstly, by the fact that not only on the 25th there were no fortifications in this place, but that, begun on the 25th, they were not completed on the 26th; secondly, the position of the Shevardinsky redoubt serves as proof: the Shevardinsky redoubt, in front of the position on which the battle was taken, does not make any sense. Why was this redoubt fortified stronger than all other points? And why, defending it on the 24th until late at night, were all efforts exhausted and six thousand people lost? To observe the enemy, a Cossack patrol was enough. Thirdly, the proof that the position on which the battle took place was not foreseen and that the Shevardinsky redoubt was not the forward point of this position is the fact that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration until the 25th were convinced that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of the position and that Kutuzov himself, in his report, written hastily after the battle, calls the Shevardinsky redoubt the left flank of the position. Much later, when reports about the battle of Borodino were written in the open, it was (probably to justify the mistakes of the commander in chief, who had to be infallible) that unfair and strange testimony was invented that the Shevardinsky redoubt served as an advanced post (whereas it was only a fortified point of the left flank) and as if the battle of Borodino was accepted by us in a fortified and pre-selected position, while it took place in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified place.
The case, obviously, was like this: the position was chosen along the Kolocha River, which crosses the main road not at a straight line, but at an acute angle, so that the left flank was in Shevardin, the right flank was near the village of Novy and the center was in Borodino, at the confluence of the Kolocha and Vo rivers. yn. This position, under the cover of the Kolocha River, for the army, whose goal is to stop the enemy moving along the Smolensk road to Moscow, is obvious to anyone who looks at the Borodino field, forgetting how the battle took place.
Napoleon, having left for Valuev on the 24th, did not see (as the stories say) the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodin (he could not see this position, because it was not there) and did not see the advanced post of the Russian army, but stumbled in the pursuit of the Russian rearguard on the left flank of the position of the Russians, on the Shevardinsky redoubt, and unexpectedly for the Russians transferred troops through Kolocha. And the Russians, not having time to enter into a general battle, retreated with their left wing from the position they intended to take, and took up a new position, which was not foreseen and not fortified. Having crossed to the left side of Kolocha, to the left of the road, Napoleon moved the entire future battle from right to left (from the side of the Russians) and transferred it to the field between Utitsa, Semenovsky and Borodino (in this field, which has nothing more advantageous for the position than any another field in Russia), and on this field the whole battle took place on the 26th. In rough form, the plan for the proposed battle and the battle that took place will be as follows:
If Napoleon had not left on the evening of the 24th for Kolocha and had not ordered to attack the redoubt immediately in the evening, but had begun the attack the next day in the morning, then no one would have doubted that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of our position; and the battle would have taken place as we expected it to. In that case, we would probably have defended the Shevardino redoubt, our left flank, even more stubbornly; they would attack Napoleon in the center or on the right, and on the 24th there would be a general battle in the position that was fortified and foreseen. But since the attack on our left flank took place in the evening, following the retreat of our rearguard, that is, immediately after the battle of Gridneva, and since the Russian military leaders did not want or did not have time to start a general battle on the 24th evening, the first and main action of Borodinsky the battle was lost on the 24th and, obviously, led to the loss of the one that was given on the 26th.
After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt, by the morning of the 25th we found ourselves without a position on the left flank and were forced to bend back our left wing and hastily strengthen it anywhere.
But not only did the Russian troops stand only under the protection of weak, unfinished fortifications on August 26, the disadvantage of this situation was further increased by the fact that the Russian military leaders, not recognizing a completely accomplished fact (the loss of a position on the left flank and the transfer of the entire future battlefield from right to left ), remained in their stretched position from the village of Novy to Utitsa and, as a result, had to move their troops from right to left during the battle. Thus, during the entire battle, the Russians had twice the weakest forces against the entire French army, directed at our left wing. (The actions of Poniatowski against Utitsa and Uvarov on the right flank of the French constituted actions separate from the course of the battle.)