Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich signed a letter of commendation
Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky

Forever with the Russian people. M.I. Khmelko. 1951
In January 1654, a council was assembled in the city of Pereyaslavl (now the Poltava province), which chose an alliance with Russia out of four alliances - Turkish, Crimean, Polish or Moscow.

“On January 1, the hetman arrived in Pereyaslavl. All the colonels, the foreman and many Cossacks gathered. On January 8, after a preliminary secret meeting with the foreman, at eleven o'clock in the morning, the hetman went to the square where the general council was assembled. Hetman said:

"Gentlemen colonels, captains, centurions, all the Zaporizhzhya army! God freed us from the hands of the enemies of our Eastern Orthodoxy, who wanted to eradicate us so that the Russian name would not be mentioned in our land. But we can no longer live without a sovereign. Today we have gathered a clear I am glad to the people that you choose a sovereign from four sovereigns for yourself.The first is the Turkish king, who many times called us under his power; the second is the Crimean Khan; the third is the Polish king, the fourth is the Orthodox Great Russia, the king of the East. you know what oppression our Christian brethren endure from the infidels. The Crimean Khan is also an infidel. Out of necessity, we made friends with him and through that accepted unbearable misfortunes, captivity and the merciless shedding of Christian blood. It is not necessary to remember the oppression from the Polish pans; You know that they revered the Jew and the dog better than our Christian brother.And the Orthodox Christian Tsar of the East is of the same Greek piety with us: we, with the Orthodoxy of Great Russia, are one body of the Church, having Jesus Christ as its head. This great king the Christian, taking pity on the unbearable bitterness of the Orthodox Church in Little Rus', did not despise our six-year prayers, inclined his merciful royal heart to us and sent close people to us with royal mercy. Let us love him with zeal. In addition to the royal high hand, we will not find the most benevolent haven; and if someone is not in the council with us now, he will go where he wants: free road.

There were exclamations:

"Let's go under the king of the east! It's better for us to die in our pious faith than to get to the hater of Christ, the filthy one."

Then the Pereyaslav colonel began to bypass the Cossacks and asked: - Do you all agree? - All! - answered the Cossacks.

"God confirm, God strengthen, so that we are forever one!" The terms of the new contract were read. Its meaning was as follows: the whole of Ukraine, the Cossack land (approximately within the boundaries of the Zborov Treaty, which occupied the current provinces: Poltava, Kiev, Chernigov, most of Volyn and Podolsk), joined under the name Little Russia to the Muscovite state, with the right to retain its own special court, administration, the choice of a hetman by free people, the latter's right to receive ambassadors and communicate with foreign states, the inviolability of the rights of the gentry, clergy and petty-bourgeois estates. Tribute (taxes) to the sovereign must be paid without the intervention of Moscow collectors. The number of registered Cossacks increased to sixty thousand, but more eager Cossacks were also allowed.

When it was necessary to swear an oath, the hetman and the Cossack foremen urged the Moscow ambassadors to swear allegiance for their sovereign, as the Polish kings always did when they were elected to the throne. But the Moscow ambassadors resisted, citing that "Polish kings are unfaithful, non-autocratic, do not keep their oath, and the sovereign's word does not change," and did not take the oath. When, after that, the ambassadors and the stewards and solicitors who came with them went around the cities to swear in the inhabitants, the Little Russian clergy reluctantly agreed to come under the authority of the Moscow sovereign. Metropolitan Sylvester Kossov himself, although he met Moscow ambassadors outside the city, was inwardly not disposed towards Moscow. The clergy not only did not take the oath, but also did not agree to send to the oath the gentry who served under the Metropolitan and other clergy, monastic servants and, in general, people from all estates belonging to churches and monasteries. The clergy looked at the Moscow Russians as a rude people, and they even had doubts about the identity of their faith with that of Moscow. It even occurred to some that Muscovites were ordered to cross themselves. The people swore the oath without resistance, but not without distrust: the Little Russians were afraid that the Muscovites would force them to adopt Moscow customs, forbid them to wear boots and leotards, and force them to put on bast shoes. As for the Cossack foreman and the Russian gentry who stuck to the Cossacks, they generally, reluctantly, only in extreme need gave themselves under the authority of the Moscow sovereign; in their head was formed the ideal of an independent state from Little Russia. Khmelnytsky sent his ambassadors, who were received with great honor. The tsar approved the Pereyaslav Treaty and, on the basis of it, issued a letter of commendation.

Quoted from: Kostomarov N.I. Russian history in the biographies of its main figures. Moscow: Astrel, 2006

History in faces

Russian Ambassador V.V. Buturlin about Pereyaslav Rada:

... The hetman had a secret council with the colonels and with the judges and with the military yasauls; and colonels de and judges and yasauls bowed under the sovereign's high hand. And according to the secret council that the hetman had with his colonels, and from the morning of the same day, at the second hour of the day, the drum was beaten from the hour of time to the meeting of all the people to hear advice about the deed that wants to be done. And as a great multitude of all sorts of ranks of people gathered, they made a lengthy circle about the hetman and about the colonels, and then the hetman himself went out under the bunchuk, and with him the judges and yasauls, the clerk and all the colonels. And the hetman stood in the middle of the circle, and the military yasaul ordered everyone to pray. Then, when everyone was silent. The hetman began to speak to all the people:

"Pan colonels, captains, centurions and all the Zaporizhian Army and all Orthodox Christians! You all know how God freed us from the hands of enemies who persecute the Church of God and embitter all Christianity of our Eastern Orthodoxy. That for six years we have been living without a sovereign in our land in incessant warfare and bloodshed, our persecutors and enemies, who want to uproot the Church of God, so that the Russian name is not remembered in our land. to all the people, so that naturally they will take with us the sovereign of the four whom you want. The first king is the Turks, who many times through his ambassadors called us to his region; the second is the Crimean Khan; now he can accept us in his former kindness; the fourth is the Orthodox Sovereign of Great Russia, Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Eastern Russia, whom we have been asking ourselves for six years with our unceasing prayers. Choose which one you want! The Tsar of Tours is a busurman: you all know how our brethren, Orthodox Christians, Greeks endure misfortune and what is the essence of oppression from the godless. The Crimean Khan is also an infidel, whom we, out of need and in friendship, accepted, what intolerable misfortunes we accepted. What a captivity, what a merciless shedding of Christian blood from the Polish pans of oppression - you don’t need to tell anyone, better a Jew and a dog than a Christian, our brother, they revered. And the Orthodox Christian great sovereign, the Tsar of the East, is with us the same piety of the Greek law, the same confession, we are one body of the Church with the Orthodoxy of Great Russia, the head of the property of Jesus Christ. That great sovereign, the Christian king, taking pity on the unbearable anger of the Orthodox Church in our Little Russia, not despising our six years of unceasing prayers, now bending his merciful royal heart to us, his great neighbors to us with his royal mercy, deign to send, whom there are with let us love with diligence, except for the royal high hand, we will not find the most benevolent haven. And if someone does not agree with us now, where he wants - a wave road.

To these words, all the people cried out: "Let us go under the Tsar of the East, the Orthodox, with a strong hand in our pious faith to die, rather than a hater of Christ, get the trash!" Then the colonel of Pereyaslav Teterya, walking in a circle, asked us in all directions: "Do you all agree like that?" All the people said: "All with one accord." Then the hetman said: "Be like this! May the Lord our God strengthen him under his royal strong hand!" And the people on him, all unanimously, cried out: "God, confirm! God strengthen! So that we may all be one forever!"

Quoted from: Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Documents and materials in 3 volumes. T. 3, M., 1954. S. 373


The territory of Ukraine annexed to Russia in the second half of the 17th century
The reunification of Ukraine with Russia was of great progressive significance for the historical destinies of both peoples.

The Ukrainian people were spared from being enslaved by Pan Poland, being swallowed up by Sultan Turkey, and being ravaged by the hordes of the Crimean Khan. From now on, Russians and Ukrainians began to fight against foreign invaders with joint forces.

The reunification of Ukraine with Russia contributed to the strengthening of the Russian state and the rise of its international prestige.

The entry of Ukraine into Russia created more favorable conditions for the socio-economic and cultural development of Ukraine, which joined the emerging all-Russian market.

Ukrainian merchants sold wool, leather, livestock, and spirits in the central regions of Russia. Saltpeter, used for the production of gunpowder, was an important article of Ukrainian trade. At numerous Ukrainian fairs, Russian merchants sold salt, iron products, and furs. The strengthening of economic ties with Russia contributed to the growth of Ukrainian cities and the development of various crafts.

The struggle for the accession of Ukraine. Russian-Polish war (1654-1667)

In the southern lands of the Commonwealth from the end of the XVI century. the social positions of the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich are being strengthened. In the first half of the XVII century. the confrontation between the Cossacks and the Polish authorities escalates.

The Commonwealth needed Cossacks to counter the Turks, Tatars and Russia, so she supplied them with weapons, hired them (the so-called registered Cossacks) and looked through her fingers at the Cossack arbitrariness in some matters. Meanwhile, the Cossacks had long accumulated hatred for the Polish landowners-tycoons, who oppressed the local peasantry. The Poles were in conflict with the Cossacks, they considered them serfs who take too much "freedom". The introduction of the Union of Brest in 1596 (the union of Orthodoxy and Catholicism) also played a role, according to which a special Uniate church. The Cossacks stood for Orthodoxy. Conflicts began, including armed ones (historian M.V. Dmitriev is inclined to apply the term "religious wars" to this period of Eastern European history).

As you know, the Commonwealth was "the Commonwealth of both peoples", t.s. Polish and Lithuanian. The "third people" - the Rusyns (as the "people Ruskis" or "Russians" called themselves, including the Cossacks, from whom the Ukrainian ethnos was formed) wanted either to become a "third political people" with all the rights in the Polish-Lithuanian state, or to achieve independence from the Poles. The Commonwealth did not want to give them rights or independence. As the Cossacks accumulated strength, the conflict became inevitable. In historiography, the uprising of the Cossacks is called the "liberation movement".

In 1648, a large-scale Cossack uprising began in Ukraine. It was headed by Bogdan Zinoviy Khmelnitsky.

In a fairly short period of time, the Cossacks won two big victories: on May 6, 1648, the Polish punitive army was defeated near Zhovti Vody, and on May 16 in the Korsun region. At the same time, in the second battle, the hetmans N. Pototsky and M. Kalinovsky were captured by the Cossacks, who were handed over to the Tatars. The territory of the uprising expanded, it was already raging on the lands of Belarus. In the autumn of 1648, an army was advanced against the rebels under the command of D. Zaslavsky, N. Ostrorog, A. Konetspolsky. In September 1648, Bohdan Khmelnitsky defeated their army at Pilyavitsy.

Khmelnytsky's movement had a broad social and ethnic base. In addition to the Ukrainian Cossacks and Rusyns, the ethnic ancestors of the Belarusians and Ukrainians, many Poles took part in the uprising, who rebelled against the royal power. Khmelnytsky's ally was the Crimean Tatars, who took the opportunity to fight and plunder the lands of the Commonwealth.

The uprising was successful at first, but the Commonwealth, a huge and powerful state, was a formidable adversary. Therefore, back in June 1648, Khmelnitsky, just in case, began to discuss with Moscow the question of transferring under her protection. Russia's intervention in the conflict could radically change the balance of power. In the winter of 1648/1649, Siluan Muzhilovsky traveled to Moscow as a representative of the rebels. At the end of spring, a delegation headed by Chigirinsky Colonel Fyodor Veshnyak was sent to the tsar.

Moscow diplomacy was at first very cautious about Khmelnitsky's words. Accepting his request was a very risky business. Even if Russia won the war with Poland for Ukraine, it is likely that she would have to wage war with Turkey and Crimea, and this was very dangerous. Such fears led to a long period of Cossack-Russian negotiations. Only in April 1649, a representative of the Moscow government, G. Unkovsky, arrived at Khmelnitsky. At the same time, Moscow did not remain indifferent to what was happening in Ukraine: weapons and supplies were imported there, Ukrainian merchants received the right to duty-free trade within the Muscovite kingdom.

The Polish government tried to negotiate with the rebels. In February 1648, negotiations took place between the Polish delegation under the leadership of the magnate Adam Kisel and the delegation of Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The negotiations only led to a short truce, which the parties used to prepare for the continuation of the struggle.

In the summer of 1649 Khmelnitsky won several more victories, but the political situation changed. The Commonwealth managed to bribe the Crimean Tatars to its side, and the hetman lost an important ally. As a result, on August 8, 1649, Khmelnitsky was forced to sign the Treaty of Zboriv. Under the terms of the agreement, public positions in the Bratslav, Chernihiv and Kiev voivodships could only be occupied by the Orthodox. Polish troops could not be stationed in these voivodeships. The register of Cossacks (which the Commonwealth was obliged to take into service) was now expanded to 40 thousand. The gentry expelled from their lands could return to their estates, the peasants had to return to their landowners. Such an agreement did not suit either side. Khmelnytsky's allies were indignant, and the Polish Sejm, which did not approve the peace agreement, was also dissatisfied. All this pushed Khmelnitsky even more towards an alliance with Russia.

Near Berestechko in 1651, due to the betrayal of the Tatar Khan, Khmelnitsky was defeated. The hetman himself was taken hostage by the khan and released a few days later for a large ransom. This defeat worsened the position of the rebels, in September 1651 they had to conclude the Bila Tserkva peace with the Commonwealth. Its conditions were much harder than the Zborov treaty. Now the Cossacks were left with only one Kiev province, the Cossack register was set at 20 thousand. It is obvious that under such conditions the war could not stop.

• On June 22–23, 1652, Khmelnytsky defeated the Polish army in the Batoga area, scoring one of his most brilliant victories. It resulted in the signing of an alliance treaty between the hetman and the Moldavian ruler Vasily Lupu. In the winter of 1652/1653, ambassadors from the Cossacks headed by Samuil Bogdanovich were in Moscow, who asked for Russian mediation in negotiations with the Poles. In April 1653, the mission of K. D. Burlyai and S. A. Muzhilovsky arrived in Moscow. Already at the beginning of May, an order was drawn up for the "great embassy", which was led by B. A. Repnin-Obolensky, B. M. Khitrovo and the clerk A. I. Ivanov. The embassy was faced with the task of negotiating the conditions for concluding peace between the Cossacks and the Polish government. In case of "stubbornness" on the Polish side, it was ordered to threaten war. Negotiations were held in Lvov in August 1653 and ended in vain. It became clear that if Moscow really wants to support the Cossacks, then it is necessary to intervene in the conflict.
• On October 1, 1653, the Russian Zemsky Sobor decided to take Ukraine "under the high royal hand." The Commonwealth tried to take emergency measures to keep Ukraine. King Jan II Casimir Vasa personally led the Polish army, which marched to the city of Zhvanets in Podolia. The Cossacks and Tatars surrounded the Poles, and their troops were on the verge of disaster. From this situation, the Tatars benefited the most, who held separate negotiations with the king and signed the Zhvanets peace, which gave them a great advantage. At the same time, the Crimean Khanate received large cash payments.

The Zhvanets Treaty had the opposite effect on the Cossacks. The Cossacks regarded the behavior of the khan as a betrayal, and the ego further contributed to their rapprochement with Moscow. sent to Ukraine Russian embassy as part of the boyar V. Buturlin, okolnichi I. Alferyev, clerk L. Lopukhin.

January 8, 1654 in Pereyaslav, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, together with the Cossack foreman, swore allegiance to the Russian Tsar. On March 14 of the same year, the tsar signed the so-called March Articles, which regulated the rights and obligations of the Zaporizhzhya Sich as part of the Moscow kingdom.

Ukraine recognized the supreme power of the Russian tsar, but completely retained its republican form of statehood within Russia. The All-Ukrainian Rada was preserved as supreme body legislature, the position of hetman, the election of local and central authorities, etc. Moscow did not encroach on the administrative division, financial and tax systems, forms of land ownership. Ukraine had its own army, judiciary, could pursue an independent foreign policy. Cossacks and peasants were guaranteed their traditional privileges.

As a result of the Pereyaslav Rada, the Commonwealth lost almost a third of its possessions. It was obvious that she would not accept this. Russia began to prepare for war. The first step was to send embassies to European countries with a call to conclude an anti-Polish alliance. The action had an unprecedented scope. The missions, which also carried messages about the "untruths" of the Polish king, went to the Holy Roman Empire, France, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Venice, Courland, Brandenburg, the Crimean Khanate, Moldavia and Wallachia. The West did not support Moscow and preferred to remain neutral. Most countries politely congratulated the Russian Tsar, but were slow to acknowledge the inclusion of new lands in his title. Only Sweden, a longtime sworn enemy of the Commonwealth, expressed its intention to attack Poland. She promised, in the event of Khmelnitsky's success, to advance the 80,000th corps to Livonia and Brandenburg.

Russia planned to hit the Commonwealth in three directions. As A. V. Malov showed, the main blow to Smolensk was to be delivered by the army of Ya. K. Cherkassky, N. I. Odoevsky and M. M. Temkin-Rostovsky. The northwestern army under the command of V.P. Sheremetyev planned to move to Polotsk and Vitebsk. The southwestern (Sevskaya) army of Prince A.N. Trubetskoy was to advance from Bryansk to Rostislavl, Mstislavl and Borisov. The actions of the three Russian armies were supposed to be supported by their performance in Ukraine Bogdan Khmelnitsky with the Cossacks, who were given the seven thousandth Belgorod regiment of B. B. Sheremetev to help. Colonel I. I. Zolotarenko was sent to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with a 20,000-strong army.

On June 26, 1654, the Russian advanced regiment under the command of N. I. Odoevsky began the siege of Smolensk. On September 23, after the city was surrounded by 32 regiments led by Alexei Mikhailovich himself, the garrison surrendered. Smolensk returned to the Russian state.

Of the other successes of 1654, the capture of Roslavl (June 27), Mstislavl (July 12), Polotsk (July 17), Mogilev (August 26) and Vitebsk (November 17) should be noted. It is also worth recalling that after the Pereyaslav Rada, Kyiv was under the control of Russia, the population of which swore allegiance to Alexei Mikhailovich.

In the autumn of 1654, Poland and the Crimean Khanate acted jointly against Russia. On January 1, 1655, their armies united near Bratslav. At the same time, the corps of V. B. Sheremetev joined the troops of Khmelnitsky. Between the cities of Stavischi and Akhmatov, one of the largest battles of this war took place, which lasted from January 19 to 22, 1655. The Polish commander Stanislav Pototsky suffered a crushing defeat, in which the gentry blamed the Crimeans.

Further fighting were held with varying success with a gradual increase in the advantage of the Russian side. In May 1655, the Russian attack on Vilna began, which lasted several months. The key fortresses of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in this direction were captured - Minsk, Grodno and Kovno. On July 31, Vilna was taken by the Russian army. In July 1655, Khmelnitsky, with the support of Russian units under the command of V. V. Buturlin, occupied the Bratslav region, Podolia, and Volyn. In September, Lvov was besieged. Sweden intervened at this stage. On July 8, 1655, the Swedish king Charles X ordered an attack on Poland.

The Swedish strike was unexpected and brought the Commonwealth to the brink of disaster. In Polish historiography, in relation to these events, the term " Flood"- he shows that the Swedish invasion for the Poles was akin to the biblical Flood.

In early September 1655, Swedish soldiers entered Warsaw, and soon the second capital of Wormwood, Krakow, also fell. King Jan Casimir fled to Silesia. Only Lvov, Torun, Brest and Czestochowa recognized his authority. On August 17, 1655, the hetman of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Janusz Radziwill, signed an agreement with Charles X on the secession of the principality from the Commonwealth and the transfer to the rule of Sweden (Keydan Union). This meant the actual collapse of the Polish state.

The Swedish attack put Russia in a difficult position. If she had continued active hostilities against the Commonwealth, then, undoubtedly, the Polish-Lithuanian state would have suffered an early death. But at the same time, this would mean an excessive strengthening of Sweden, and in general, drastic changes in the balance of power in the region. Russia did not want the rise of Sweden and therefore made a mistake: it stopped the war with Poland, concluded a truce with it and attacked Sweden. It was a serious political blunder. First, the war did not bring good luck. Secondly, the Commonwealth received the necessary respite, managed to overcome the military-political crisis and already in 1656 expelled the Swedes from their lands. Thirdly, relations between Russia and Ukraine became more complicated, since Bohdan Khmelnitsky, who was counting on Sweden's help in the war with Poland, did not understand the diplomatic somersaults of Russian diplomacy.

By the end of the Russo-Swedish War, Poland was able to conclude an alliance with the Empire and Brandenburg, which significantly strengthened its position. In addition, on July 27, 1657, Bogdan Khmelnitsky died, which caused serious political complications in Ukraine.

“Despite important blunders and mistakes, Khmelnitsky belongs to the largest engines of Russian history. In the centuries-old struggle between Russia and Poland, he gave a decisive turn to the side of Russia and inflicted such a blow on the aristocratic system of Wormwood, after which this system could no longer hold on in moral strength. Khmelnitsky in the middle of the 17th century outlined that liberation of the Russian people from panism, which finally took place in our time. This is not enough: through his efforts, Western and Southern Russia was already in fact under the same authority with Eastern Russia. It is not his fault that the short-sighted, ignorant policy of the boyars did not understood him, brought him prematurely to the coffin, spoiled the fruits of his ten years of activity, and for many generations put off deeds that would have been accomplished with incomparably less effort if Moscow understood the meaning of Khmelnitsky's aspirations and listened to his advice.

Ivan Vyhovsky, elected as the new hetman, in 1658 signed an agreement with the Poles in the town of Gadyach, according to which Ukraine again became part of the Polish-Lithuanian state. Vyhovsky wanted to play on the contradictions between Moscow and Warsaw and create a Ukrainian state under the protectorate of a neighboring power. In the choice between Russia and the Commonwealth, the new hetman chose the latter. Ego dramatically complicated the situation in Ukraine. The Gadyach Treaty meant a rejection of the decisions of the Pereyasla Rada, a break with Moscow. Not all Cossacks agreed with this: after all, it meant the rejection of all the conquests of Bogdan Khmelnitsky. It was obvious that Russia, too, would not renounce the agreements reached without a struggle; it could not be expelled from the acquired lands with a simple stroke of the pen.

A split arose among the Cossacks (the leaders of the opposition to Vyhovsky were Colonel Martyn Pushkar and the ataman Yakov Barabash), uprisings began in different parts of Ukraine, fighting on the fronts of the Russian-Polish war (near Vilna, Mstislavl, Old Bykhov, etc.) became fierce Mikhailovich regarded it as a betrayal.

The largest battle at this stage of the war is the battle of Konotop on June 28, 1659. The troops of the Cossacks and Crimean Tatars allied to them under the command of Ivan Vygovsky and Mehmed IV Giray defeated the Russian army of S. R. Pozharsky and S. P. Lvov. The losses of the Russian side amounted to about 5 thousand people. However, this defeat did little to change the general situation at the front: the battle was lost, but not the war.

In the summer of 1659 Vyhovsky was overthrown. Instead, they elected Yuri Khmelnitsky, the son of Bogdan Khmelnitsky. He began to pursue a policy aimed at an alliance with Russia. At the beginning of 1660, the situation was favorable for the Russian troops. Prince I. Λ. Khovansky on January 3 took Brest. But in the spring of 1660, a Polish-Swedish peace agreement was signed in Oliva, and now the Commonwealth got the opportunity to transfer troops against Russia that had been released in the Swedish theater of operations. On June 28, 1660, the Russian army of I. A. Khovansky and S. Zmeev was defeated near the village of Polonka. In the fall, fierce battles unfolded on the river. Basho. Russian garrisons in the cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were under siege (for the most part successfully repulsing the attacks of the troops of the Commonwealth).

In the autumn of 1660, the position of the Russian troops in Ukraine became more complicated. They were defeated by the Poles at Chudnov. On October 23, 1660, the army of V. B. Sheremetev surrendered to the Polish-Tatar army (Sheremetev will remain in Tatar captivity until his old age). Historian A. V. Malov calls the Chudnovsky defeat the most severe military disaster for Russia in the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667.

As early as October 17, 1660, Yuri Khmelnytsky signed the Slobodischensky treatise with the Commonwealth, largely repeating the terms of the Gadyach Treaty of 1658, only without granting Ukraine wide autonomy. In fact, the Cossacks again submitted to Poland and assumed the obligation to fight against Russia. Alexei Mikhailovich regarded Khmelnitsky's act as treason. The situation was saved by the Kiev commandant Yuri Baryatinsky, who refused to obey the order of the governor Vasily Sheremetev to surrender Kyiv. The famous phrase is attributed to him: "I obey the decrees of the Tsar's Majesty, and not Sheremetev; there are many Sheremetevs in Moscow!" Not all of Ukraine supported Yuri Khmelnitsky. His opponents were led by colonels Yakim Somko and Vasily Zolotarenko. The Commonwealth failed to develop success, and she withdrew troops beyond the Dnieper.

Unsuccessfully for Russia, the war develops at the end of 1661: it loses many of its acquisitions of the first stage of the campaign. In October, Russian troops are defeated in the battle on the Kulishkovy mountains. In November 1661, the Russian garrison in Vilna fell, having withstood a year and a half siege. By the time it was taken from the garrison, 78 people remained alive. In the winter of 1662, the Polish troops occupied Mogilev and Borisov.

In June 1662, Russian troops launched a counterattack and devastated the surroundings of Chyhyryn - the headquarters of the Ukrainian hetmans. In November 1663, the Polish army of King Jan Casimir and the leader of the Cossacks P. Teteri invaded Ukraine. They hoped that most of the fortresses would open the gates for them, but this did not happen, on the contrary, heavy fighting began (in particular, the siege of Glukhov). The campaign of Jan Casimir was not successful, in March 1664 he retreated, his rearguard was defeated by the Russians near Mglin. The war broke up into many small theaters of military operations throughout Ukraine and Belarus, in which by 1664 Russia and the Commonwealth completely exhausted each other. The whole of 1664 and 1665 were filled, in the words of the historian A. V. Malov, with "small mutual raids." It became clear that it was time to end the war.

Peace negotiations began in April 1666 in the village of Andrusov. The Russian delegation was headed by an experienced diplomat A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin. On January 30, 1667, the Andrusovo truce was signed for a period of 13 and a half years. According to the points of the armistice of Russia, Smolensk, Chernigov, Starodub, Belaya, Dorogobuzh returned. Poland recognized that Left-bank Ukraine remained behind Russia. Kyiv was planned to be left to Russia for only two years, but it was never returned to the Commonwealth.

The Armistice of Apdrusov in 1667 can be considered the goy border, where the centuries-old attempts of Poland to subjugate the Moscow kingdom ended. Poland never fully recovered from the wars of the mid-17th century. Russia annexed part of Ukraine and thereby began the construction of a huge Russian Empire, which will reach its apogee in the XVIII-XIX centuries.

The fact of Ukraine's transition "under the high hand of the Tsar of Moscow" received a different assessment in historical science. For a long time, the term "reunification of Ukraine and Russia" was attached to this event in Russian and Soviet historiography. There is logic in its use: both Ukraine and Russia are the heirs of Kievan Rus, have common historical roots, and therefore there is reason to talk not about accession Ukraine to Russia, according to reunion Ukraine and Russia. Soviet and Russian historical science has always talked about the fraternal friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, the voluntary nature of the unification of Russia and Ukraine in 1654, the help of Russian Ukrainians in their national liberation struggle against the Commonwealth.

In Ukrainian national historiography, the "aggressive role" of Moscow is emphasized, which in the second half of the 17th century. began to restrict the rights and freedoms of the annexed Ukrainian Hetmanate (Hetmanate). Thus, Ukrainian historiography believes that Moscow did not so much assist in the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people as, on the contrary, wanted to take advantage of the situation and subjugate Ukraine. Period 1650–1680s in Ukrainian national historiography it is called the "era of ruins", when the Hetmanate lost its "territorial integrity" and "actually found itself on the verge of civil war".

It is important to note that in the middle of the XVII century. Russia did not see the Orthodox Cossacks as its enemy, but the Commonwealth. The accession of Ukraine should be considered primarily in the context of the Russian-Polish conflict. The goal of Russia was to defeat the Commonwealth, to tear away new lands from it in the same way as the Muscovite state did during the "frontier wars" of the late 15th - early 16th centuries. These territories in Moscow were considered former Russian lands, "patrimony of the Rurikids", which corresponded to historical reality: in fact, these were the lands of the former Kievan Rus, the possessions of the Rurik dynasty. Ukraine, on its own, for Alexei Mikhailovich was not a military and political opponent, on the contrary, they wanted to see an ally in it. Russia initially fought not with Ukraine, but with Poland. In Moscow in 1653–1654. there were no aggressive plans for Ukraine proper. On the contrary, support for the movement of Bogdan Khmelnytsky was regarded as solidarity with the Orthodox brothers.

Another thing is that the inclusion of new, Ukrainian lands in the Russian state led to conflict of political cultures. The Ukrainian Cossacks were brought up in the liberties of the Commonwealth and behaved accordingly, which did not always meet the expectations of Russia. Misunderstanding arose already at the conclusion of the agreement of the Pereyaslav Rada. The Russian embassy, ​​headed by V. V. Buturlin, demanded an oath of allegiance from the Cossack foreman. However, the elected Cossack body itself wanted to obtain an oath of the Russian ambassadors to the hetman on behalf of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich that Russia would "not extradite" the Cossacks to Poland and would never violate their liberties. Amazed, Buturlin declared that the Russian Tsar could not swear an oath to his subjects. The Cossacks appealed to the experience of the Commonwealth, where the Polish king swears allegiance to his subjects. Bogdan Khmelnitsky managed to extinguish the conflict that had begun by persuading the foreman to take a one-sided oath. But there were many such episodes in the future, and they demonstrated the fundamental difference in political cultures.

Moscow looked at Ukraine like any other annexed territory: since the Cossacks asked to be accepted "under the high hand of the Tsar of Moscow," they became his subjects and must correspond to this status. Russia, in the conditions of wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey in the second half of the 17th century, which took place, among other things, on Ukrainian territory, wanted from the population of this territory not rebellions and "self-will", but political unity and a military alliance (after all, about patronage, protection , joint actions against Poland asked Alexei Mikhailovich Bogdan Khmelnitsky). The Cossacks, on the other hand, wanted to reserve the right to act according to their own will, up to the choice of foreign policy allies, the revision of treaties, etc. Moscow saw this as a danger of treason, rebellion, and cooperation of the Cossacks with Russia's military opponents. There was a mutual tragedy of misunderstanding of the parties, which quite often accompanies unification processes, the creation of empires and powers (recall the annexation of Novgorod by Ivan III, etc.).

The situation was complicated by the fact that for the Cossacks to demand from the authorities the satisfaction of their needs in exchange for political loyalty, to threaten a rebellion against the ruler, to bargain with the authorities was a habitual model of behavior within the framework of the Commonwealth. In Russia, such a style of relationship was impossible and was considered treason, rebellion. That is why the attempts of some Ukrainian politicians of the 17th century. abandon the decisions of the Pereyaslav Rada and maneuver between Russia and Poland (for example, the Gadyach Treaty) were regarded by Alexei Mikhailovich as a betrayal and rebellion.

This was the reason for the complications in Russian-Ukrainian relations in the second half of the 17th century. Ukrainian Cossacks took part in hostilities against Russia (the most famous is the Battle of Konotop in 1659, which today in Ukrainian national historiography is revered as a victory of Ukrainian weapons over the "Muscovites"). In turn, Russia was suspicious of disloyal hetmans, curtailed their powers, used force against the Cossacks who opposed her. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was no unity among the Ukrainian elite, and its representatives often sent denunciations to Moscow themselves, accusing each other of "treason."

Moreover, since 1658, from the battle in the tract Zhukov Bayrak between the supporters of Martin Pushkar and Ivan Vyhovsky, clashes between Ukrainians began. Hetmans, colonels, Cossack foremen, supporters of Russia, Polynia, Turkey and just their "field commanders" began to fight each other. In fact, in the second half of the XVII century. broke out in Ukraine Civil War, complicated by frequent military clashes with foreign troops. Battles with Turkey during the so-called Chigirin Wars of 1677–1681 turned Ukraine into a "man-made desert". It really was the Ruin. According to the Ukrainian historian Η. N. Yakovenko, it ended only in the 1680s. "not because the brothers were horrified, looking back at the rivers of spilled blood, but because there was no one to kill each other."

Some stabilization in the Ukrainian lands begins only after 1687. The new hetman Ivan Mazepa (1687–1709), who came to power, managed to suppress all internal uprisings and improve relations with the Russian monarchy. In 1687, a new treaty was concluded - the "Kolomatsky Articles", which regulated the position of Ukraine in the nascent Russian Empire. According to them, both the "Little Russian" and the "Great Russian" peoples were equalized in status and were now called "unanimously everywhere": "subjects of Their Tsarist Most Serene Majesty of the autocratic state" of the Russian tsar.

Officially, the reunification of Ukraine with Russia took place January 8, 1654 at the Pereyaslav Rada. The Rada is a meeting of representatives of the Cossacks, at which fateful decisions concerning all Cossacks were approved. In this case, those people who lived in the territory gathered in Pereyaslavl Hetmanate. This public education arose in 1649 as a result of the war with the Polish pans.

The Zaporizhian Cossacks, led by Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky, expelled the Poles from their lands and declared them independent. But the enemy was strong, it seemed to be a very difficult task to cope with him. We needed a strong ally. Such was the Moscow kingdom. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich gave the go-ahead for reunification. The Cossacks supported this decision in their Rada. Thus, all formalities were settled.

Reunification of Ukraine with Russia

After that, political demands were already agreed in Moscow. They provided for broad autonomy and were considered by the tsar together with the Zemsky Sobor. Everything that the Cossacks wanted to receive, they were given. March 27, 1654 the relevant documents were signed, and the Cossack or Ukrainian state became part of the Muscovite kingdom.

After that, Russia got involved in a war with the Commonwealth, because it was necessary to prove by force its right to new lands. The 13-year war (1654-1667) began. It was aggravated by the war with the Swedes (1655-1659). And the death of Bohdan Khmelnitsky in 1657 was completely inopportune. His heir was his son Yuri, who was still a child. Therefore, the gentry was elected hetman Vyhovsky. This turned out to be a very serious political mistake of the Russian state.

Vyhovsky, although he belonged to the Orthodox people, could not stand Muscovy. He sought to get the patronage of the Polish king. In 1658, the war between Russia and Poland for the possession of Lithuania and Ukraine broke out with renewed vigor. At the most decisive moment, the new hetman concluded a political alliance with the Polish lords. It was called Gadyach Union. According to it, Ukraine returned to the Commonwealth as a third equal participant.

Moscow sent an army under the command of Prince Trubetskoy to Ukraine. But it was defeated at the Battle of Konotop in 1659. The joint forces of Hetman Vyhovsky and the Tatars came out against the Russian troops. They won and it seemed that Ukraine was lost to Russia forever.

But the insidious hetman and his Polish masters did not take into account the mood of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. They did not want to again be in bondage to the Polish pans. The Cossack foremen gathered and nominated Yury Khmelnytsky as hetman. His name became like a banner and attracted people. The Cossacks created a militia. In September 1659, it met under the White Church with the Cossacks of Vyhovsky. And they began to move to Khmelnitsky. The insidious hetman fled to Poland and disappeared from the political arena forever.

In 1660, the Moscow army under the command of the boyar Sheremetev moved to the aid of Yuri Khmelnitsky. The Polish-Tatar army met the Moscow warriors in Volyn, and surrounded them near Chudnov. Here, the low moral and volitional qualities of Yuri appeared, who was nothing like his great father. He did not dare to join the battle, betrayed the Russians and submitted to the Poles. After that, Sheremetev was forced to capitulate and spent 20 years in Crimean captivity.

Upon learning of the betrayal of the hetman, the Cossacks became agitated. A "black council" was assembled, which deposed the son of Bogdan Khmelnitsky. Colonels Zolotarenko, Somko and Ataman Bryukhovetsky stood at the head of the Cossacks. Somko and Zolotarenko had a clear program to fight the Poles, and Bryukhovetsky was an unscrupulous adventurer. And, as often happens, the Cossacks supported him and chose him as hetman.

He demagogically exposed himself as a defender of the homeless and an enemy of the wealthy Cossacks. As a result, many honored Cossacks lost not only their property, but also their heads. In 1663, the hetman's political rivals, Somko and Zolotarenko, were also executed.

Meanwhile, the Polish king Jan-Kazimir made peace with the Swedes and transferred hostilities to the territory of Ukraine. He sought to pass through the lands of the Left-Bank Ukraine, go to the rear of the Russian army and face defenseless Moscow. In 1664, the king tried to implement this idea, but the Russian border guards did not allow the Poles to cross the Dnieper.

Exhausted by a long war, Poland needed a respite. In 1667 it was concluded Andrusovo truce. According to him, the cities of Smolensk and Kyiv, as well as the entire Left-Bank Ukraine, departed the Russian kingdom. It seemed that the reunification of Ukraine with Russia was finally completed and it was possible to put an end to this issue.

But the victory over Poland did not lead to the unity of the Cossacks. Back in 1665, the foremen of the Right-Bank Ukraine gathered their council and elected him a hetman Petra Doroshenko. He adhered to the idea of ​​creating an independent Ukraine. That is, a separate state, in no way independent of Poland and Russia.

Doroshenko entered into a struggle with Hetman Bryukhovetsky. And he also betrayed Russia and conspired with the Turks. They even promised to help him. But the Cossacks, having learned about this, in 1668 tore the traitor to pieces.

After the death of Bryukhovetsky, Demyan Mnohohrishny became hetman. He recognized the power of Moscow. Then in 1672 he received the hetman's mace Samoilovich. But under him, the troops of the Turkish Sultan Mohammed IV invaded Podolia. Doroshenko, a champion of independent Ukraine, joined the invaders. Poland capitulated to the Ottomans and ceded to them most of the Right Bank. Hetman Doroshenko sat on these lands as a vassal of the Turkish Sultan.

The reunification of Ukraine with Russia obliged the Muscovite kingdom to intervene in this difficult political situation. Through the Dnieper, the Moscow rati crossed along with the regiments of the left-bank Cossacks. In 1676, Doroshenko surrendered, Samoylovich became the hetman of both sides of the Dnieper. The invaders failed to gain a foothold in Right-Bank Ukraine for a long time. What the Turks succeeded in Bulgaria and Serbia proved impossible to accomplish in Podolia and Volhynia. Regular Moscow troops and Cossack regiments in the early 80s saved Ukraine from the Ottoman threat.

Hetman Mazepa

Samoylovich remained in the post of hetman for a long time, until the signing of " Treatise on Eternal Peace"between Russia and Poland in 1686. But in 1687, Samoilovich was removed from his post. Mazepa's intrigues played a decisive role in this. He entered into the confidence of Princess Sophia's favorite, Prince Golitsyn, and accused the hetman of treason. Togo was arrested and exiled to Siberia .

But Golitsyn paid dearly for his boundless trust. Mazepa. He, elected hetman, first betrayed Golitsyn, and then Peter I, going over to the side of Charles XII. He decided that with the support of the Swedes he would become an independent sovereign. However, Mazepa's call for an independent state did not arouse support among the Cossacks. Only his Serdyuks (guards) and those Cossacks who were opposed to an alliance with Russia followed the hetman. The rest of Ukraine supported the Muscovite tsar. She kept Poltava, under which in 1709 an ally of the hetman Charles XII was defeated.

The Battle of Poltava was the final stage in the long process of reunification of Ukraine with Russia. The process was painful and was accompanied by bloodshed. Hetmans from Vyhovsky to Mazepa tried to prevent the unification of the two peoples into a single state. They sought either to recognize the power of Poland, or to gain independence. But the Ukrainian people considered the Russians to be their own.

There was a general sense of unity. About him, like granite rocks, the aspirations of all those who sought power were broken. Russians and Ukrainians united despite the political situation. The will of the people invariably broke those initiatives that did not correspond to the interests ordinary people. In the future, Ukraine became one of the richest and most prosperous corners of the Russian Empire. And the Ukrainians themselves lived calmly and securely under the protection of the Russian crown.

By Union of Lublin (1569) united Poland and Lithuania into a single state - the Commonwealth, it also included Belarus, most of Ukraine. The population of Ukraine and Belarus experienced triple oppression: serf ( serfdom in Poland legally took shape in the middle of the 16th century), national (Polish magnates called the subservient peasants nothing more than “cattle” (cattle)) and religious (there were real persecutions of Orthodoxy, the closure Orthodox churches, expulsion of priests, etc., especially after Union of Brest 1596.). The growth of national, religious and social oppression in Ukraine in the XVII century. turned the Cossacks into advanced fighters for faith and nationality, for freedom and social equality. Zaporozhye became the main center of protest and struggle: from the end of the 16th century. an almost continuous series of Cossack uprisings against Poland begins. A series of Cossack uprisings, brutally suppressed by the Polish government, ended in 1648. successful uprising led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Calling on a large detachment of Crimean Tatars to help him, Khmelnitsky with the Cossacks defeated the Polish troops twice, he called on the people to revolt against the oppressors, and the uprising began throughout the Kiev region, Volhynia and Podolia and the left bank of the Dnieper. After his death in 1648 Polish king Vladislav, the new king Jan Casimir in 1649. opposes the rebellious Cossacks. The Crimean Khan came to the aid of the Cossacks with a large army. The allied army of Cossacks and Tatars forced Jan-Kazimir to conclude peace, the Treaty of Zborowski, on conditions unfavorable for the Poles: the number of registered Cossack troops is 40 thousand people, there will be no Polish garrisons, Jesuits and Jews in the places of residence of the Cossacks, for all positions in these voivodeships only Orthodox will be appointed, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev will sit in the Polish Senate. However, the terms of the Zborow Treaty turned out to be unfeasible for both parties. The Polish gentry did not want to accept concessions to the rebellious serfs. And Khmelnitsky could not force many peasants to go into Polish captivity again. In 1651 the war resumed, and the enemy troops converged at Berestechko (in Volhynia), because of the betrayal of the Crimean Khan, the Cossacks suffered a terrible defeat. Khmelnytsky had to agree to an unfavorable peace near the White Church: the number of registered Cossacks was reduced to 20 thousand, the gentry took possession of their estates. A significant part of the peasants and Cossacks, not wanting to return to the lord's captivity, went in droves to Moscow Ukraine and settled in the upper reaches of the Donets and Oskol, where they founded the cities of Kharkov, Izyum, Sumy, etc.

Khmelnytsky saw that the liberation of Ukraine on his own and with the help of such an unreliable ally as the Crimean prince was impossible, and he turned to the Moscow Tsar for help with an urgent request to accept the Zaporizhzhya army and the whole Ukraine of Little Russia under the high royal hand (otherwise threatening to succumb to the Turkish Sultan ). Moscow waited and hesitated for a long time, realizing that such a step would entail a new war with Poland. Convened in 1653. The Zemsky Sobor decided that Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky should be under the sovereign's hand "for the Orthodox Christian faith", which suffers persecution from the Poles. The royal ambassadors went to the hetman and January 8, 1654 famousPereyaslav Rada at the suggestion of the hetman, she decided to accept the citizenship of the "Tsar of the Eastern Orthodox" and take an oath of allegiance to him. Russia recognized the election of the hetman, the local court and other authorities established during the liberation war, confirmed the class rights of the Ukrainian nobility. Ukraine received the right to establish diplomatic relations with all countries except Poland and Turkey, and to have registered troops of up to 60 thousand people. Taxes were supposed to go to the royal treasury.

The decision of the Council of 1653 led to a war with Poland, which lasted 13 years from 1654-1667. In 1654, the Russians captured Smolensk and part of Belarus. This war, in which the Swedes also intervened, took on a protracted character. In 1661, negotiations began, which continued until 1667, when it was concluded Andrusovo truce. Russia acquired Smolensk and Left-bank Ukraine. Right-bank Ukraine and Belarus remained with Poland. A compromise decision was made on Kyiv - it passed to Russia for two years. However, subsequently Russia never returned Kyiv to Poland.

Reunification of Ukraine with Russia was of great historical importance. It saved the people of Ukraine from national and religious oppression, saved them from the danger of being enslaved by Poland and Turkey. It contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nation.

56. War with Poland in the second half.XVIIV.

The growth of national, religious and social oppression in Ukraine in the XVII century. gave rise to the liberation movement of the Ukrainian people under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnitsky. Having no reliable allies, Ukraine could only count on the help of Russia of the same faith. Khmelnitsky, from the very beginning of the liberation struggle, repeatedly turned to Moscow with a request for patronage. However, the Russian government did not dare to take such a step for a long time, realizing that it would entail a new war with Poland.

It was only in 1653 that the Zemsky Sobor decided to accept Ukraine "under the high hand" of the tsar. January 8, 1654 Ukrainian Rada in Pereyaslav approved the transition under Moscow patronage and swore allegiance to the tsar.

Having started in 1654 war, Moscow troops took Smolensk, occupied the whole of Belarus and then the territory of Lithuania proper with the capital city of Vilna. Khmelnitsky took Lublin and a number of cities in Volhynia and Galicia.

Taking advantage of the failures of Poland, Sweden opened hostilities against it and created a threat to the western borders of Russia. Poland was on the brink of destruction. After the death of King Jan-Casimir, in the conditions of the absence of a queen, Alexei Mikhailovich hoped to take the royal throne and declared war on Sweden(1656-1658). An armistice was signed between Poland and Russia. Both sides pledged to act jointly against Sweden. Russia inflicted a number of defeats on Sweden. However, all successes were crossed out by the betrayal of the new hetman of Ukraine, Vygodsky, who was elected after the death of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who concluded a secret treaty with Poland against Russia. Part of the Cossack elite, which replaced the exiled Polish gentry, was not averse to freeing itself from Moscow power and joining Poland on the rights of broad political autonomy. However, not all Cossack regiments followed Vygodsky - the Cossack regiments on the left bank of the Dnieper and a significant part of the right-bank regiments did not support anti-Russian actions. In 1658, Russia concluded a truce with Sweden, as a result of which it returned the territories conquered during the war. The Baltic remained with Sweden, the problem of access to the Baltic Sea remained.

After the election of a new hetman, Yuri Khmelnitsky (son of Bogdan), he made peace with Moscow. According to which the power of the Moscow government was strengthened, in particular, the right of external relations was taken away from the hetman. However, he soon (1660) went over to the side of the king. Once again, Zaporozhye and the Left Bank of Ukraine did not follow the hetman. In Zaporozhye, a new ataman, a supporter of Moscow, was elected - Bryukhovetsky. The hetman of the right-bank Ukraine, Petro Doroshenko, decided to succumb to the Turkish sultan in order to oust both Moscow and Poland from Ukraine with his help.

Russia and Poland, having exhausted their forces in 13 years old the war concluded Andrusovsky treaty (1667.) (near Smolensk). Russia abandoned Belarus, but left behind Smolensk and the Left-Bank Ukraine. Kyiv, located on the right bank of the Dnieper, was transferred to Russia for two years (after this period, it was never returned). Zaporozhye passed under the joint control of Moscow and Poland.

Reunification of Ukrainewith Russia was of great historical importance. It saved the people of Ukraine from national and religious oppression, saved them from the danger of being enslaved by Poland and Turkey. It contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nation.

The reunification of Left-bank Ukraine with Russia was an important factor in strengthening Russian statehood. Thanks to the reunification with Ukraine, Russia managed to return the Smolensk and Chernigov lands, which made it possible to start a struggle for the Baltic coast. In addition, a favorable prospect opened up for expanding Russia's ties with other Slavic peoples and Western states.

Until 1651, for almost 20 years, Ukraine waged a war of liberation against Poland, under whose rule it was. Poland at that time was tormented by internal strife, which allowed the Ukrainians to drag out this war so much. But by 1651, it became clear that Ukraine alone would not be able to defeat Poland. For Ukrainians, it became obvious that this was the only chance to get rid of dependence on Poland. As a result, Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky turned to the Russian Tsar, Alexei Mikhailovich, with a request to accept Ukraine into Russia. Many citizens opposed the accession, since for the past 20 years Russia has not been at war with Poland. Peace reigned in the country. To accept Ukraine actually meant to independently declare war on Poland. Russia was not ready for such a war. In order to discuss in more detail annexation of Ukraine to Russia Tsar Alexei assembled the Cathedral. Opinions were divided. The majority of those who took part told the tsar that Ukraine should not be accepted in order to avoid a war with Poland. The council dragged on until 1653. For Ukraine, such a delay was like death, so Khmelnitsky announced to the Russian tsar that if Russia did not accept Ukraine, then Khmelnitsky would turn to Turkey with the same proposal. These threats worked because the war with Poland was more acceptable to Russia than the common Russian-Turkish border. As a result of these actions, a war broke out between Russia and Poland.

Bogdan Khmelnitsky died in 1657. His place was taken by the new hetman Ivan Vyhovsky. He decided to use to his own advantage the fact that Russia was engaged in battles with the Swedes, and made an alliance with Poland. Poland, which by that time was falling apart due to the war, as well as due to internal problems, gladly accepted an ally. The Russian tsar at that moment, probably for the first time, realized what worthwhile advice the nobles gave him, who dissuaded the tsar from joining Ukraine. It turned out that just 4 years after it happened annexation of Ukraine to Russia, Ukraine betrayed Russia. To the credit of the bulk of the Ukrainian people, it is worth noting that the people were against serving Poland. In 1659, Vygovskoy was expelled, and Yuri Khmelnitsky, the son of Bogdan, took the place of the hetman. Theoretically, this was supposed to contribute to the rapprochement of peoples, but in reality it turned out differently.

In 1660, the united Russian-Ukrainian army set off on a campaign against Lvov. The Russians put up 30 thousand people, the Ukrainians - 25. The beginning of the campaign was successful, but it ended with the largest military defeat of Russia in the 17th century. It happened on September 5, 1660. Near the city of Lyubara, the Russian commander Sheremetev stumbled upon the Polish army, which was reinforced by the Crimean army. For more than two weeks, Sheremetev held back the onslaught of the enemy. The Russians fought to the last. They were given strength by the confidence that from day to day the Ukrainian army, headed by Khmelnitsky, should appear on the battlefield and deliver a decisive blow to the Poles. But Khmelnytsky and his army never came to the aid of the Russians. Moreover, he made peace with the Poles and pledged not to fight against them. As a result, the Russian army capitulated on October 23, 660 near the city of Chudnov. Most of the Russians died, the rest were taken into slavery by the Crimean Tatars. Only a few managed to return to their homeland after slavery. Among them was Sheremetev, who returned to Russia only 21 years later. The Ukrainians, because of whom the Russians got involved in the war with Poland, betrayed the Russians twice in just 4 years.

The results of the accession of Ukraine

As a result, annexation of Ukraine to Russia cost the Russians not only good neighborly relations with Poland, but also the whole army, which was destroyed due to the betrayal of Yuri Khmelnitsky. After these events, the war with Poland did not progress very actively, since both countries were preoccupied with internal problems and could not fight each other properly. As a result, in January 1661, a peace treaty was signed, which announced a truce for 13.5 years.

The results of the annexation of Ukraine:

• Russia started a war with Poland
• Ukraine received the opportunity to fully form its nation.
• Ukraine acquired a special status (national, religious, state).