Was the First Chechen War necessary?

There is very little left until the next memorable “black” date in our calendar. December 11 will mark 15 years since the beginning of the entry of federal troops into the territory of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. By that time, bandit chaos had established itself on its territory. Murders, ethnic cleansing, genocide of the non-indigenous population under the slogan “Chechnya for the Vainakhs!”, money using false advice notes, kidnappings and slave trade, robberies of passenger and cargo trains - this is not a complete list of the “exploits” of supporters of the criminal regime of Dzhokhar Dudayev. This war cost Russia great material losses, it was paid for with the lives of thousands of dead soldiers and officers who became disabled and returned home with a broken psyche. Ultimately, the very expensive victory from our army was stolen by the so-called Khasavyurt agreements signed in August 1996 by A. Maskhadov and A. Lebed. The criminal regime in Chechnya received a respite and managed to recover... As a result, this led to the 2nd Chechen War, which began in 1999, and its new victims.

Second Chechen War. Background

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1996, there was no peace and tranquility in Chechnya and the surrounding regions.

Chechen criminal structures made business with impunity on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the issuance and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. Camps were created on the territory of Chechnya to train militants - young people from Muslim regions of Russia. Mine demolition instructors and Islamic preachers were sent here from abroad. Numerous Arab mercenaries began to play a significant role in the life of Chechnya. Their main goal was to destabilize the situation in the Russian regions neighboring Chechnya and spread the ideas of separatism to the North Caucasian republics (primarily Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria).

At the beginning of March 1999, Gennady Shpigun, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, was kidnapped by terrorists at the Grozny airport. For the Russian leadership, this was evidence that the President of the Chechen Republic, Maskhadov, was unable to independently fight terrorism. The federal center took measures to strengthen the fight against Chechen gangs: self-defense units were armed and police units were strengthened throughout the entire perimeter of Chechnya, the best operatives of units fighting ethnic organized crime were sent to the North Caucasus, several Tochka-U missile launchers were deployed from the Stavropol region ", intended for delivering targeted strikes. An economic blockade of Chechnya was introduced, which led to the fact that the cash flow from Russia began to dry up sharply. Due to the tightening of the regime at the border, it has become increasingly difficult to smuggle drugs into Russia and take hostages. Gasoline produced in clandestine factories has become impossible to export outside Chechnya. The fight against Chechen criminal groups that actively financed militants in Chechnya was also intensified. In May-July 1999, the Chechen-Dagestan border turned into a militarized zone. As a result, the income of Chechen warlords fell sharply and they had problems purchasing weapons and paying mercenaries. In April 1999, Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, who successfully led a number of operations during the First Chechen War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the internal troops. In May 1999, Russian helicopters launched a missile attack on the positions of Khattab militants on the Terek River in response to an attempt by gangs to seize an outpost of internal troops on the Chechen-Dagestan border. After this, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Rushailo, announced the preparation of large-scale preventive strikes.

Meanwhile, Chechen gangs under the command of Shamil Basayev and Khattab were preparing for an armed invasion of Dagestan. From April to August 1999, conducting reconnaissance in force, they made more than 30 forays in Stavropol and Dagestan alone, as a result of which several dozen military personnel, law enforcement officers and civilians were killed and injured. Realizing that the strongest groups of federal troops were concentrated in the Kizlyar and Khasavyurt directions, the militants decided to strike the mountainous part of Dagestan. When choosing this direction, the bandits proceeded from the fact that there were no troops there, and it would not be possible to transfer forces to this inaccessible area in the shortest possible time. In addition, the militants were counting on a possible attack in the rear of federal forces from the Kadar zone of Dagestan, controlled by local Wahhabis since August 1998.

As researchers note, the destabilization of the situation in the North Caucasus was beneficial to many. First of all, Islamic fundamentalists seeking to spread their influence throughout the world, as well as Arab oil sheikhs and financial oligarchs of the Persian Gulf countries, who are not interested in starting to exploit the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Sea.

August 7, 1999 From the territory of Chechnya, a massive invasion of militants into Dagestan was carried out under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The core of the militant group consisted of foreign mercenaries and fighters of the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, associated with Al-Qaeda. The militants’ plan to have the population of Dagestan come over to their side failed; the Dagestanis offered desperate resistance to the invading bandits. The Russian authorities proposed that the Ichkerian leadership conduct a joint operation with federal forces against Islamists in Dagestan. It was also proposed to “resolve the issue of liquidating bases, storage and rest areas of illegal armed groups, which the Chechen leadership in every possible way denies.” Aslan Maskhadov verbally condemned the attacks on Dagestan and their organizers and instigators, but did not take real measures to counter them.

Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks - explosions of residential buildings - were carried out in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk).

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops.

• On September 23, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.” The decree provided for the creation of a Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus to conduct a counter-terrorism operation.
• On September 23, Russian troops began massive bombing of Grozny and its environs, and on September 30 they entered the territory of Chechnya.

Reasons are, on the one hand, objective circumstances, and on the other, subjective. A variety of things are usually cited as reasons and prerequisites: terrible threats from Chechnya that had to be urgently prevented; a terrible amount of oil, or vice versa - the need to lay an oil pipeline through which a terrible amount of oil had to be pumped from the Caspian Sea; protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population. And much more. But upon closer examination, it turns out that none of them worked as an incentive.

They became concerned about the rights of the Russian-speaking population only when they became fully involved in the war. No one had thought about this before. There is practically no oil in Chechnya. It was pumped out over a century of exploitation of the field, now about 2 million tons are mined there per year, this is complete nonsense. Yes, in Chechnya there was a large oil refinery, powerful factories, but nothing remained of them: something was bombed, and what was left was cut up and scrapped by ferrous metallurgists. The pipeline from the Caspian Sea was not particularly popular. As for Chechen crime, this is a myth built from our modern one. The fact is that the Chechens turned out to be incapable of the mafia. Or rather, they are capable to the same extent as statehood. The Chechen, anarchic structure of society (from about the 16th century) did not imply the construction of hierarchical systems.

As of 1992-93, Chechnya largely suited everyone in Russia. She set up the special services as a kind of offshore, where weapons could be transported to third world countries through the Northern Airport; as an offshore where it was possible to hire militants to perform a variety of tasks. For example, in Abkhazia they fought with Russian weapons with Russian instructors, but the detachments of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus were under the command of Shamil Basayev.

Chechnya as an offshore suited large oil (then still state-owned) companies, because it was possible to transport oil through it and lie about the fact that all taxes were paid there, and send it further for export.

It would seem that everyone is happy, but what happened? And then a completely intra-Moscow event happened. By the end of 1992, the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament, where Ruslan Khasbulatov was, intensified. At the same time, in November 1992, Yegor Yakovlev, a man, in general, with a conscience, was removed from Ostankino. And the main propagandist, as it happened, became Mikhail Poltoranin (an old party cadre under Yeltsin, known for his biased attitude towards Jews). But what can you do: there is a parliament, there is a speaker, and he is Chechen. And then the entire propaganda machine, as part of the confrontation with Parliament, is being restructured to “attack this Chechen Khasbulatov!”

That is, if we return to the texts of 1993, it turns out that we do not have a bad parliament there, but Khasbulatov is bad and under him 70-odd objects in Moscow are controlled by the Chechen mafia. It turns out that the White House Security Department guarded about 70 other objects, but they had nothing to do with the Chechens. By October 1993, this had intensified to such an extent that if you listen to radio conversations on the night air on October 3-4, it turns out that the police preparing for the assault were going to take either Grozny or Kabul. They were going to fight either with the Chechens (because Khasbulatov), ​​or with the Afghans (because Rutskoi had the misfortune of being captured in Afghanistan, and for some reason this was blamed on him). One way or another, the campaign was raised. And that’s when conversations started about the Chechen mafia. Then a surprise happens: we took the White House a little and burned it a little on October 4, and on the 12th - bang! – and for some reason there is no majority in the elections. Many seats in parliament were occupied by communists and Zhirinovites. And then the political strategists (who were not yet called that then) came up with a bright idea: in order to intercept the electorate, it is necessary to intercept the slogans of opponents. We need to do something national and patriotic. For example, return a fallen province to the fold of the Empire. Nothing raises ratings like that.

In the second half of December, Shakhrai’s plan for Chechnya, signed a month ago (and shelved), was suddenly taken out from under the cloth: a plan for negotiations against the backdrop of forceful pressure that should ensure a solution to the problems of the separatist region. It turned out that negotiations were very bad, but forceful pressure was very good. Various political strategists and analysts were cut off from this project after six months. It was controlled by the security forces (which then included the Ministry of Nationalities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the FSB). This project was partly supervised by Sevastyanov, head of the Moscow department of the FSK (federal counterintelligence service). But something went wrong. We give the anti-Dudaev opposition money, they take the money, but they do not overthrow Dudayev; we give weapons - Dudayev is also not overthrown; we give weapons with crews - on November 26, 1994, the storming of Grozny takes place (supposedly the opposition, but in fact the tanks were filled with officers hired by the FSK in units near Moscow). We fought a little hybrid. Tanks enter Grozny. In Grozny they think: “Wow, there was someone who was able to build 40 tanks in a column and reach Grozny! My mother! Yes, he can be given power!” Because there was no such person in Chechnya at that time. But suddenly non-locals climbed out from under the armor, and everything changed. They were burned and taken prisoner. Then, as always, the foxes hide in the forest, and small blood can only be washed away with large blood. During the year, no one addressed the analysis of errors and returning to the previous stage. Next - the beginning of the war. What's funny is that this war did not raise the rating. By the beginning of 1996, Yeltsin had it at a background level. And the elections were won partly because it was then that his team said: “Peace!”, “Peace!” Nazran negotiations, Yandarbiev flies to Moscow to negotiate, he is picked up at the ABC special facility in Tyoply Stan. At this time, Yeltsin flies to Chechnya and says: “That’s it, peace has come.” Yeltsin is elected in the second round, but at the same time, he took a third into his team (and Lebed was the third at that time), and appointed him secretary of the Security Council. And Lebed decided to become the winner. Tikhomirov (who then commanded an army group in Chechnya) gave his former deputy for Transnistria Tikhomirov carte blanche to win. And in July 1996, the war resumed as soon as the results of the second round of elections were officially announced. It must be said that the victory did not work out, because three days before Yeltsin’s inauguration, the Chechens entered Grozny and occupied the city. Not that they were a superior force, there were about 800 of them. And no one dared to spoil the master’s mood with bad news. Therefore, paralysis reigned for three days, during which time the Chechens, in surprise, fortified themselves in the city and it was no longer possible to drive them out. After which Lebed, when the fighting resumed, arrived at the place, realized that there was nothing to catch here and concluded the Khasavyurt agreements. That is, here we had one driving force, a simple one: neither oil, nor money, nor anything else. And power, which is more important than oil, money and much more.

It must be said that after Khasavyurt they tried to forget about Chechnya, like a bad dream. We did not rescue our prisoners, although this could have been done in the fall of 1996. Hostage-taking began, the situation was in turmoil, and they tried to forget about Chechnya. And so we came to 1999. In the winter of that year, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was kidnapped in Chechnya; a year later his remains would be found in the mountains. And that was the last straw. Prime Minister Stepashin said that we will use force. The war machine spun. For example, the formation of the 77th Marine Brigade began in Dagestan (this is not funny, at that time the Marines were the only units that had at least some mountain training). The transfer of tactical missiles to the south began. And here, even against anyone’s will, we were irresistibly heading towards war, because on the other side the machine was spinning. Why? Let's go to the other side and notice that in 1997 Maskhadov won the elections in Chechnya (he won convincingly), and Shamil Basayev took second place. It was terribly unstable there, because Basayev had detachments. Not that big, but he knew how to unite very restless local comrades under him. At some point, Maskhadov gave him control for six months (somewhere at the turn of 97-98, Basayev headed the government). It must be said that he achieved brilliant success: budget capacity fell 20 times. After which, it seemed his career was over. Having left this post, as promised, six months later, he immediately spoke at the congress of the congress of the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, declaring powerful goals of expansion. Preparations began for what eventually resulted in the invasion of Dagestan.

Basayev, having found himself on the political outcast, found himself on the verge of death not only politically, but also physically. The only thing that saved him from such a prospect was the start of a war, which would inevitably lead to the unity of everyone and save him from death (at least delay this death). And so it happened.

In the summer of 1999, Basayev was already amassing his forces in the Tsumadinsky region in Dagestan. And what boomed there at the turn of July-August 1999 could have boomed a little earlier, or a little later. One way or another, a war began, which was declared a counter-terrorism operation (although there were no explosions in the cities yet). I don’t want to say that these explosions were carried out by the special services, except for the “Ryazan exercises” the role of the special services has not been proven anywhere. But the point is different. The fact is that this war was used. If you look at Vladimir Putin’s rating for August-November 1999, you will see that it suddenly began to grow from insignificant background values. Every week there is some brutal statement like “to wash in the toilet.” And the rating hop - 7% jumped up until it went to stratospheric heights. Actually, this is exactly the situation when we can say something like the following: we don’t know who organized all this, but we know for sure who used it.

Ironically, what failed in the first war (using it as an electoral tool) succeeded perfectly in the second. Afterwards, of course, no one needed the war. For example, already before Putin’s election as president, they tried in every possible way to declare that “Victory, guys! That's it, it's already a victory! There are battles in Komsomolskoye.” However, the terrorist attacks strongly reminded us of the opposite. But they were again used to further strengthen power. But attempts to claim that subsequent large-scale terrorist attacks were organized by special services are also, in my opinion, unfounded. Nevertheless, we see that the reason here turns out to be something much more attractive than oil and than money. Power. Uncontrolled power that does not stop at playing with fire in order to maintain this power.

On September 6, 1991, a military coup was carried out on the territory of what was then the Chechen-Ingush Republic. The Supreme Council of the Republic was dispersed - partially. He was partially thrown out of the window (literally). It must be understood that this Armed Forces supported the State Emergency Committee - therefore Yeltsin reacted to the “local initiative”... not that he was very unkind. And, probably, everything would have gone downhill... if the Chechens of that time had shown at least a little brains in building their state. The government of New Russia for almost three years courageously turned a blind eye to all the arbitrariness that was happening in the republic. To robberies of trains traveling through the region; on de facto genocide against national minorities (“Russians - to Ryazan! Ingush - to Nazran! Armenians - to Yerevan!” (PS - “Yerevan” with a soft sign I write purely for rhyme)), but there the proud highlanders completely lost their shores and began to jackal in the border regions - for example, in the Mineralnye Vody they took hostages in the summer of 1994. Somewhere around here the feds' patience ran relatively thin. They reached an agreement with the anti-Dudaev opposition, providing it with “vacationers” from a number of divisions near Moscow (along with tanks). In this regard, it should be noted that the “graters” in Chechnya itself were serious - for example, Dudayev forcibly dissolved the parliament of “Ichkeria”. The opposition suffered a humiliating defeat when attempting to storm Grozny at the end of November of that year. Since during the battle the Dudayevites captured Russian officers - it was impossible to continue to pretend that everything was “ok” - and Yeltsin signed the Decree “On some measures to strengthen law and order in the territory of the North Caucasus.” The second Decree - “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict” and marked the beginning of the Chechen War.

22 years ago, on December 11, 1994, the First Chechen War began. With the issuance of the decree of the Russian President “On measures to ensure law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” Russian regular army forces entered the territory of Chechnya. The document from the "Caucasian Knot" presents a chronicle of events that preceded the start of the war and describes the course of hostilities up to the "New Year's" assault on Grozny on December 31, 1994.

The first Chechen war lasted from December 1994 to August 1996. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1994-1995 In Chechnya, a total of about 26 thousand people died, including 2 thousand people - Russian military personnel, 10-15 thousand - militants, and the rest of the losses were civilians. According to General A. Lebed's estimates, the number of deaths among civilians alone amounted to 70-80 thousand people and among federal troops - 6-7 thousand people.

Chechnya's exit from Moscow's control

The turn of the 1980-1990s. in the post-Soviet space was marked by a “parade of sovereignties” - Soviet republics of different levels (both the USSR and the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) one after another adopted declarations of state sovereignty. On June 12, 1990, the first Republican Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. On August 6, Boris Yeltsin uttered his famous phrase in Ufa: “Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.”

On November 23-25, 1990, the Chechen National Congress was held in Grozny, which elected the Executive Committee (later transformed into the Executive Committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (OCCHN). Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev became its chairman. The Congress adopted a declaration on the formation of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho A few days later, on November 27, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty. Later, in July 1991, the second congress of the OKCHN announced the withdrawal of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho from the USSR and the RSFSR.

During the August 1991 putsch, the Chechen-Ingush Republican Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Council and the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In turn, OKCHN, which was in opposition, opposed the State Emergency Committee and demanded the resignation of the government and secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. Ultimately, a political split occurred in the republic between supporters of the OKCHN (Dzhokhar Dudayev) and the Supreme Council (Zavgaev).

On November 1, 1991, the elected President of Chechnya, D. Dudayev, issued a decree “On declaring the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic.” In response to this, on November 8, 1991, B.N. Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia, but practical measures for its implementation failed - two planes with special forces landing at the airfield in Khankala were blocked by supporters of independence. On November 10, 1991, the OKCHN executive committee called for breaking off relations with Russia.

Already in November 1991, supporters of D. Dudayev began seizing military camps, weapons and property of the Armed Forces and internal troops on the territory of the Chechen Republic. On November 27, 1991, D. Dudayev issued a decree on the nationalization of weapons and equipment of military units located on the territory of the republic. By June 8, 1992, all federal troops left the territory of Chechnya, leaving behind a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.

In the fall of 1992, the situation in the region sharply deteriorated again, this time in connection with the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodny region. Dzhokhar Dudayev declared the neutrality of Chechnya, but during the escalation of the conflict, Russian troops entered the administrative border of Chechnya. On November 10, 1992, Dudayev declared a state of emergency, and the creation of a mobilization system and self-defense forces of the Chechen Republic began.

In February 1993, disagreements between the Chechen parliament and D. Dudayev intensified. The emerging disagreements ultimately led to the dissolution of parliament and the consolidation of opposition political figures in Chechnya around Umar Avturkhanov, who became the head of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. The contradictions between the structures of Dudayev and Avturkhanov grew into an assault on Grozny by the Chechen opposition.

At dawn on November 26, 1994 Large forces of Dudayev’s opponents entered Grozny . The tanks reached the city center without any problems, where they were soon shot down from grenade launchers. Many tankers died, dozens were captured. It turned out that they were all Russian military personnel, recruited Federal Counterintelligence Service. Read more about these events and the fate of the prisoners in the information of the "Caucasian Knot" "November assault on Grozny (1994)".

After an unsuccessful assault, the Russian Security Council decided on a military operation against Chechnya. B.N. Yeltsin put forward an ultimatum: either the bloodshed in Chechnya stops, or Russia will be forced to “take extreme measures.”

Preparing for war

Active military operations on the territory of Chechnya have been carried out since the end of September 1994. In particular, opposition forces carried out targeted bombing of military targets on the territory of the republic. The armed formations that opposed Dudayev were armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Su-24 attack aircraft, which had no identification marks. According to some reports, Mozdok became the base for the deployment of aviation. However, the press service of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, the Air Force command and the command of the Army Aviation of the Ground Forces categorically denied that the helicopters and attack aircraft bombing Chechnya belonged to the Russian army.

On November 30, 1994, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin signed secret decree No. 2137c “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” which provided for “disarmament and liquidation of armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

According to the text of the decree, from December 1 it was prescribed, in particular, “to implement measures to restore constitutional legality and order in the Chechen Republic,” to begin disarmament and liquidation of armed groups, and to organize negotiations to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic by peaceful means.

On November 30, 1994, P. Grachev stated that “an operation has begun to forcefully transfer Russian army officers fighting against Dudayev on the side of the opposition to the central regions of Russia.” On the same day, in a telephone conversation between the Russian Minister of Defense and Dudayev, an agreement was reached on the “immunity of Russian citizens captured in Chechnya.”

On December 8, 1994, a closed meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation was held regarding the Chechen events. At the meeting, a resolution was adopted “On the situation in the Chechen Republic and measures for its political settlement,” according to which the activities of the executive branch in resolving the conflict were recognized as unsatisfactory. A group of deputies sent a telegram to B.N. Yeltsin, in which they warned him of responsibility for the bloodshed in Chechnya and demanded a public explanation of their position.

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” By this decree, the president instructed the Russian government to “use all means available to the state to ensure state security, legality, the rights and freedoms of citizens, protect public order, fight crime, and disarm all illegal armed groups.” On the same day, the government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360 “On ensuring state security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus,” which entrusted a number of ministries and departments with duties to introduce and maintain a special regime similar to an emergency on the territory of Chechnya, without formally declaring a state of emergency or martial law.

The documents adopted on December 9 provided for the use of troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the concentration of which continued on the administrative borders of Chechnya. Meanwhile, on December 12, negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides were supposed to begin in Vladikavkaz.

Beginning of a full-scale military campaign

On December 11, 1994, Boris Yeltsin signed decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” repealing decree No. 2137c. On the same day, the president addressed the citizens of Russia, in which, in particular, he stated: “Our goal is to find a political solution to the problems of one of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation - the Chechen Republic - to protect its citizens from armed extremism.”

On the day the decree was signed, units of the troops of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops advanced in three columns from three directions: Mozdok (from the north through areas of Chechnya controlled by the anti-Dudaev opposition), Vladikavkaz (from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia) and Kizlyar (from the east, from the territory of Dagestan).

Troops moving from the north passed unhindered through Chechnya to settlements located approximately 10 km north of Grozny, where they first encountered armed resistance. Here, near the village of Dolinsky, on December 12, Russian troops were fired from a Grad launcher by a detachment of field commander Vakha Arsanov. As a result of the shelling, 6 Russian soldiers were killed and 12 wounded, and more than 10 armored vehicles were burned. The Grad installation was destroyed by return fire.

On the line Dolinsky - the village of Pervomaiskaya, Russian troops stopped and installed fortifications. Mutual shelling began. During December 1994, as a result of shelling of populated areas by Russian troops, numerous casualties occurred among civilians.

Another column of Russian troops moving from Dagestan was stopped on December 11 even before crossing the border with Chechnya, in the Khasavyurt region, where mainly Akkin Chechens live. Crowds of local residents blocked the columns of troops, while individual groups of military personnel were captured and then transported to Grozny.

A column of Russian troops moving from the west through Ingushetia was blocked by local residents and fired upon near the village of Varsuki (Ingushetia). Three armored personnel carriers and four cars were damaged. As a result of the return fire, the first civilian casualties occurred. The Ingush village of Gazi-Yurt was shelled from helicopters. Using force, Russian troops passed through the territory of Ingushetia. On December 12, this column of federal troops was fired upon from the village of Assinovskaya in Chechnya. There were killed and wounded among the Russian military personnel; in response, fire was also opened on the village, which led to the death of local residents. Near the village of Novy Sharoy, a crowd of residents of nearby villages blocked the road. Further advance of Russian troops would lead to the need to shoot at unarmed people, and then to clashes with a militia detachment organized in each of the villages. These units were armed with machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers. In the area located south of the village of Bamut, regular armed formations of the ChRI, which had heavy weapons, were based.

As a result, in the west of Chechnya, federal forces consolidated along the line of the conditional border of the Chechen Republic in front of the villages of Samashki - Davydenko - New Sharoy - Achkhoy-Martan - Bamut.

On December 15, 1994, against the backdrop of the first setbacks in Chechnya, Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev removed from command and control a group of senior officers who refused to send troops into Chechnya and expressed a desire “before the start of a major military operation that could entail large casualties among civilians.” population", receive a written order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel General A. Mityukhin.

On December 16, 1994, the Federation Council adopted a resolution in which it invited the President of the Russian Federation to immediately stop hostilities and the deployment of troops and enter into negotiations. On the same day, Chairman of the Russian Government V.S. Chernomyrdin announced his readiness to personally meet with Dzhokhar Dudayev, subject to the disarmament of his forces.

On December 17, 1994, Yeltsin sent a telegram to D. Dudayev, in which the latter was ordered to appear in Mozdok to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Minister of Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy N.D. Egorov and FSB Director S.V. Stepashin and sign a document about the surrender of weapons and a ceasefire. The text of the telegram, in particular, read verbatim: “I suggest you immediately meet with my authorized representatives Egorov and Stepashin in Mozdok.” At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation issued decree No. 2200 “On the restoration of federal territorial executive authorities on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”

Siege and assault of Grozny

Starting from December 18, Grozny was bombed and bombed multiple times. Bombs and rockets fell mainly on areas where residential buildings were located and there were obviously no military installations. As a result, there were large casualties among the civilian population. Despite the Russian President's announcement on December 27 that the bombing of the city had ceased, air strikes continued to strike Grozny.

In the second half of December, Russian federal troops attacked Grozny from the north and west, leaving the southwestern, southern and southeastern directions practically unblocked. The remaining open corridors connecting Grozny and numerous villages of Chechnya with the outside world allowed the civilian population to leave the zone of shelling, bombing and fighting.

On the night of December 23, federal troops attempted to cut off Grozny from Argun and gained a foothold in the area of ​​the airport in Khankala, southeast of Grozny.

On December 26, bombing of populated areas in rural areas began: in the next three days alone, about 40 villages were hit.

On December 26, it was announced for the second time about the creation of a government of national revival of the Chechen Republic headed by S. Khadzhiev and the readiness of the new government to discuss the issue of creating a confederation with Russia and enter into negotiations with it, without putting forward demands for the withdrawal of troops.

On the same day, at a meeting of the Russian Security Council, a decision was made to send troops to Grozny. Before this, no specific plans were developed to capture the capital of Chechnya.

On December 27, B.N. Yeltsin made a televised address to the citizens of Russia, in which he explained the need for a forceful solution to the Chechen problem. B.N. Yeltsin stated that N.D. Egorov, A.V. Kvashnin and S.V. Stepashin were entrusted with conducting negotiations with the Chechen side. On December 28, Sergei Stepashin clarified that this is not about negotiations, but about presenting an ultimatum.

On December 31, 1994, the assault on Grozny by Russian army units began. It was planned that four groups would carry out “powerful concentric attacks” and unite in the city center. For a variety of reasons, the troops immediately suffered heavy losses. The 131st (Maikop) separate motorized rifle brigade and the 81st (Samara) motorized rifle regiment, advancing from the northwestern direction under the command of General K.B. Pulikovsky, were almost completely destroyed. More than 100 military personnel were captured.

As stated by deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation L.A. Ponomarev, G.P. Yakunin and V.L. Sheinis stated that “a large-scale military action was unleashed in Grozny and its environs. On December 31, after fierce bombing and artillery shelling, about 250 units of armored vehicles. Dozens of them broke into the city center. The armored columns were cut into pieces by the defenders of Grozny and their crews were systematically killed, captured or scattered throughout the city.

The head of the press service of the Russian government admitted that the Russian army suffered losses in manpower and equipment during the New Year's offensive on Grozny.

On January 2, 1995, the press service of the Russian government reported that the center of the Chechen capital was “completely controlled by federal troops” and the “presidential palace” was blocked.

The war in Chechnya lasted until August 31, 1996. It was accompanied by terrorist attacks outside Chechnya ( Budennovsk, Kizlyar ). The actual result of the campaign was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements on August 31, 1996. The agreement was signed by Secretary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of Chechen militants Aslan Maskhadov . As a result of the Khasavyurt agreements, decisions were made on “deferred status” (the issue of the status of Chechnya was supposed to be resolved before December 31, 2001). Chechnya became a de facto independent state .

Notes

1. Chechnya: ancient turmoil // Izvestia, 11/27/1995.
2. How many died in Chechnya // Arguments and Facts, 1996.
3. The assault that never happened // Radio Liberty, 10/17/2014.
4. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to restore constitutional legality and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic."
5. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
6. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict."
7. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
8. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
9. 1994: War in Chechnya // Obshchaya Gazeta, 12/18.04.2001.
10. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
11. Grozny: bloody snow of New Year's Eve // ​​Independent Military Review, 12/10/2004.
12. Chronicle of an armed conflict // Human Rights Center "Memorial".
13. Signing of the Khasavyurt agreements in 1996 // RIA Novosti, 08/31/2011.

Throughout my school years, television showed reports about the war in Chechnya - at that time television still covered such things quite objectively, showing this war through the eyes of both sides of the conflict. From the outside, it looked like the Chechens were fighting for the right to live according to their customs and pursue a policy independent of Moscow, and Moscow wanted to deprive them of this right and force them to live according to its own rules.

And then the First Chechen War died down, and then the second. "Wikipedia" in the column "results of the Second Chechen War" writes: "The result is the victory of Russia, the restoration by Russia of full control over the territory of Chechnya." One can agree with the “restoration of full control” (albeit with reservations), but I would argue about the “victory of Russia”.

Let's look at the facts:

— De jure Federal legislation is in force in Chechnya, but de facto there are many legislative nuances, this is noted by many Russian journalists and political scientists, for example, a quote from Yaroslav Trofimov: “Theoretically, Chechnya - although it is predominantly Muslim - is an integral part of the secular Russian Federation, and in The same laws apply there as in Moscow. However, in practice, this North Caucasian republic with a population of 1.4 million people, destroyed and tormented by two wars in a row, lives by completely different rules."

These rules apply, for example, to weddings and other aspects of civil life - at the internal level, even those laws apply that may run counter to federal legislation.

— The leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, pursues a largely independent policy, this is noted by many researchers of the issue. This is what Mikhail Khodorkovsky said in one of his interviews published in The New York Times: “In many respects, Chechnya is a practically independent Islamic republic, where Sharia law is widespread. Some neighboring republics have only the appearance of belonging to a federal structure.”

That is, in essence, the Chechens retained the right to live the way they want and resolve issues in their own way.

— From the 2000s to the present, the Chechen Republic has been one of the most subsidized regions of Russia; colossal funds are sent there. I have come across different figures, but in general, all the graphs put Chechnya in the top 5 among the subsidized regions of Russia; only Dagestan, Kamchatka and Crimea are higher than Chechnya (data for 2016). In my opinion, this state of affairs suits both the central Russian government and the Chechens themselves, this is what Chechen parliament member Magomet Khambiev (former assistant to Dudayev) says: “If Dudayev were alive now, he would like everything he saw . He would say: “Ramzan managed to do what I couldn’t do.”

In this regard, I have a question - why were two Chechen wars needed and what was their real outcome?

Because now everything looks as if Chechnya did not lose in that struggle for independence, but won - the Chechens live the way they want, and even receive colossal funds from Moscow.

There are many wars written into the history of Russia. Most of them were liberation, some began on our territory and ended far beyond its borders. But there is nothing worse than such wars, which were started as a result of the illiterate actions of the country’s leadership and led to terrifying results because the authorities solved their own problems without paying attention to the people.

One of such sad pages of Russian history is the Chechen war. This was not a confrontation between two different peoples. There were no absolute rights in this war. And the most surprising thing is that this war still cannot be considered over.

Prerequisites for the start of the war in Chechnya

It is hardly possible to talk about these military campaigns briefly. The era of perestroika, so pompously announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, marked the collapse of a huge country consisting of 15 republics. However, the main difficulty for Russia was that, left without satellites, it was faced with internal unrest that had a nationalistic character. The Caucasus turned out to be especially problematic in this regard.

Back in 1990, the National Congress was created. This organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former major general of aviation in the Soviet Army. The Congress set its main goal to secede from the USSR; in the future, it was planned to create a Chechen Republic, independent of any state.

In the summer of 1991, a situation of dual power arose in Chechnya, since both the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself and the leadership of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, proclaimed by Dudayev, acted.

This state of affairs could not exist for long, and in September the same Dzhokhar and his supporters seized the republican television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. This was the beginning of the revolution. The situation was extremely precarious, and its development was facilitated by the official collapse of the country carried out by Yeltsin. Following the news that the Soviet Union no longer existed, Dudayev's supporters announced that Chechnya was seceding from Russia.

The separatists seized power - under their influence, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic on October 27, as a result of which power was completely in the hands of ex-General Dudayev. And a few days later, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree stating that a state of emergency was being introduced in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In fact, this document became one of the reasons for the start of the bloody Chechen wars.

At that time, there was quite a lot of ammunition and weapons in the republic. Some of these reserves had already been captured by the separatists. Instead of blocking the situation, the Russian leadership allowed it to get even more out of control - in 1992, the head of the Ministry of Defense Grachev transferred half of all these reserves to the militants. The authorities explained this decision by saying that it was no longer possible to remove weapons from the republic at that time.

However, during this period there was still an opportunity to stop the conflict. An opposition was created that opposed Dudayev's power. However, after it became clear that these small detachments could not resist the militant formations, the war was practically already underway.

Yeltsin and his political supporters could no longer do anything, and from 1991 to 1994 it was actually a republic independent of Russia. It had its own government bodies and had its own state symbols. In 1994, when Russian troops were brought into the territory of the republic, a full-scale war began. Even after the resistance of Dudayev’s militants was suppressed, the problem was never completely resolved.

Speaking about the war in Chechnya, it is worth considering that the fault for its outbreak, first of all, was the illiterate leadership of first the USSR and then Russia. It was the weakening of the internal political situation in the country that led to the weakening of the outskirts and the strengthening of nationalist elements.

As for the essence of the Chechen war, there is a conflict of interests and an inability to govern a vast territory on the part of first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin. Subsequently, it was up to the people who came to power at the very end of the twentieth century to untie this tangled knot.

First Chechen war 1994-1996

Historians, writers and filmmakers are still trying to assess the scale of the horrors of the Chechen war. No one denies that it caused enormous damage not only to the republic itself, but to all of Russia. However, it is worth considering that the nature of the two campaigns was quite different.

During the Yeltsin era, when the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996 was launched, Russian troops could not act coherently and freely enough. The country's leadership solved its problems, moreover, according to some information, many people profited from this war - weapons were supplied to the territory of the republic from the Russian Federation, and militants often made money by demanding large ransoms for hostages.

At the same time, the main task of the Second Chechen War of 1999-2009 was the suppression of gangs and the establishment of constitutional order. It is clear that if the goals of both campaigns were different, then the course of action was significantly different.

On December 1, 1994, airstrikes were carried out on airfields located in Khankala and Kalinovskaya. And already on December 11, Russian units were introduced into the territory of the republic. This fact marked the beginning of the First Campaign. Entry was carried out from three directions at once - through Mozdok, through Ingushetia and through Dagestan.

By the way, at that time the Ground Forces were led by Eduard Vorobiev, but he immediately resigned, considering it unwise to lead the operation, since the troops were completely unprepared for conducting full-scale combat operations.

At first, Russian troops advanced quite successfully. The entire northern territory was occupied by them quickly and without much loss. From December 1994 to March 1995, the Russian Armed Forces stormed Grozny. The city was built up quite densely, and Russian units were simply stuck in skirmishes and attempts to take the capital.

Russian Defense Minister Grachev expected to take the city very quickly and therefore did not spare human and technical resources. According to researchers, more than 1,500 Russian soldiers and many civilians of the republic died or went missing near Grozny. The armored vehicles also suffered serious damage - almost 150 units were damaged.

However, after two months of fierce fighting, federal troops finally took Grozny. Participants in the hostilities subsequently recalled that the city was destroyed almost to the ground, and this is confirmed by numerous photographs and video documents.

During the assault, not only armored vehicles were used, but also aviation and artillery. There were bloody battles on almost every street. The militants lost more than 7,000 people during the operation in Grozny and, under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, on March 6 they were forced to finally leave the city, which came under the control of the Russian Armed Forces.

However, the war, which brought death to thousands of not only armed but also civilians, did not end there. The fighting continued first on the plains (from March to April), and then in the mountainous regions of the republic (from May to June 1995). Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were taken successively.

The militants responded with terrorist attacks carried out in Budennovsk and Kizlyar. After varying successes on both sides, a decision was made to negotiate. And as a result, on August 31, 1996, agreements were concluded. According to them, federal troops were leaving Chechnya, the republic's infrastructure was to be restored, and the question of independent status was postponed.

Second Chechen campaign 1999–2009

If the country's authorities hoped that by reaching an agreement with the militants, they would solve the problem and the battles of the Chechen war would become a thing of the past, then everything turned out to be wrong. Over several years of a dubious truce, the gangs have only accumulated strength. In addition, more and more Islamists from Arab countries penetrated into the territory of the republic.

As a result, on August 7, 1999, the militants of Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan. Their calculation was based on the fact that the Russian government at that time looked very weak. Yeltsin practically did not lead the country, the Russian economy was in deep decline. The militants hoped that they would take their side, but they put up serious resistance to the bandit groups.

The reluctance to allow Islamists into their territory and the help of federal troops forced the Islamists to retreat. True, this took a month - the militants were driven out only in September 1999. At that time, Chechnya was led by Aslan Maskhadov, and, unfortunately, he was not able to exercise full control over the republic.

It was at this time, angry that they failed to break Dagestan, that Islamist groups began carrying out terrorist attacks on Russian territory. Horrible terrorist attacks were committed in Volgodonsk, Moscow and Buynaksk, which claimed dozens of lives. Therefore, the number of those killed in the Chechen war must include those civilians who never thought that it would come to their families.

In September 1999, a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation” was issued, signed by Yeltsin. And on December 31, he announced his resignation from the presidency.

As a result of the presidential elections, power in the country passed to a new leader, Vladimir Putin, whose tactical abilities the militants did not take into account. But at that time, Russian troops were already on the territory of Chechnya, again bombed Grozny and acted much more competently. The experience of the previous campaign was taken into account.

December 1999 is another painful and terrible chapter of the war. The Argun Gorge was otherwise called “Wolf Gate” - one of the largest Caucasian gorges. Here, the landing and border troops carried out the special operation "Argun", the purpose of which was to recapture a section of the Russian-Georgian border from Khattab's troops, and also to deprive the militants of the weapons supply route from the Pankisi Gorge. The operation was completed in February 2000.

Many people also remember the feat of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. These fighters became real heroes of the Chechen war. They withstood a terrible battle on the 776th height, when they, numbering only 90 people, managed to hold back over 2,000 militants for 24 hours. Most of the paratroopers died, and the militants themselves lost almost a quarter of their strength.

Despite such cases, the second war, unlike the first, can be called sluggish. Perhaps that is why it lasted longer - a lot happened over the years of these battles. The new Russian authorities decided to act differently. They refused to conduct active combat operations carried out by federal troops. It was decided to exploit the internal split in Chechnya itself. Thus, Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov went over to the side of the federals, and situations were increasingly observed when ordinary militants laid down their arms.

Putin, realizing that such a war could last indefinitely, decided to take advantage of internal political fluctuations and persuade the authorities to cooperate. Now we can say that he succeeded. It also played a role that on May 9, 2004, Islamists carried out a terrorist attack in Grozny, aimed at intimidating the population. An explosion occurred at the Dynamo stadium during a concert dedicated to Victory Day. More than 50 people were injured, and Akhmat Kadyrov died from his injuries.

This odious terrorist attack brought completely different results. The population of the republic was finally disappointed in the militants and rallied around the legitimate government. A young man was appointed to replace his father, who understood the futility of the Islamist resistance. Thus, the situation began to change for the better. If the militants relied on attracting foreign mercenaries from abroad, the Kremlin decided to use national interests. The residents of Chechnya were very tired of the war, so they already voluntarily went over to the side of the pro-Russian forces.

The counterterrorism operation regime, introduced by Yeltsin on September 23, 1999, was abolished by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. Thus, the campaign was officially over, since it was not called a war, but a CTO. However, can we assume that veterans of the Chechen war can sleep peacefully if local battles are still taking place and terrorist acts are carried out from time to time?

Results and consequences for the history of Russia

It is unlikely that anyone today can specifically answer the question of how many died in the Chechen war. The problem is that any calculations will only be approximate. During the period of intensification of the conflict before the First Campaign, many people of Slavic origin were repressed or forced to leave the republic. During the years of the First Campaign, many fighters from both sides died, and these losses also cannot be accurately calculated.

While military losses can still be more or less calculated, no one has been involved in ascertaining losses among the civilian population, except perhaps human rights activists. Thus, according to the current official data, the 1st war claimed the following number of lives:

• Russian soldiers - 14,000 people;
• militants - 3,800 people;
• civilian population - from 30,000 to 40,000 people.

If we talk about the Second Campaign, the results of the death toll are as follows:

• federal troops - about 3,000 people;
• militants - from 13,000 to 15,000 people;
• civilian population - 1000 people.

It should be borne in mind that these figures vary greatly depending on which organizations provide them. For example, when discussing the results of the second Chechen war, official Russian sources talk about a thousand civilian deaths. At the same time, Amnesty International (an international non-governmental organization) gives completely different figures - about 25,000 people. The difference in these data, as you can see, is huge.

The result of the war is not only the impressive numbers of casualties among killed, wounded, and missing people. This is also a destroyed republic - after all, many cities, primarily Grozny, were subjected to artillery shelling and bombing. Their entire infrastructure was practically destroyed, so Russia had to rebuild the capital of the republic from scratch.

As a result, today Grozny is one of the most beautiful and modern cities. Other settlements of the republic were also rebuilt.

Anyone interested in this information can find out what happened in the territory from 1994 to 2009. There are many films about the Chechen war, books and various materials on the Internet.

However, those who were forced to leave the republic, lost their relatives, their health - these people hardly want to immerse themselves again in what they have already experienced. The country was able to withstand this most difficult period of its history, and once again proved that dubious calls for independence or unity with Russia are more important for them.

The history of the Chechen war has not yet been fully studied. Researchers will spend a long time looking for documents about losses among military and civilians and rechecking statistical data. But today we can say: the weakening of the top and the desire for disunity always lead to dire consequences. Only the strengthening of state power and the unity of people can end any confrontation so that the country can live in peace again.