Hieroglyph "loyalty". Heavy cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy

During the 2nd Battle of the Philippine Sea in November 1944, many Japanese ships were sunk by mines, torpedoes, bombs and artillery fire. Some of them lay at a relatively shallow depth accessible to divers, and the command of the US Navy decided to search on these ships for secret documents and other information regarding Japan’s military plans. This task was entrusted to the divers and crew of the Chanticleer, a submarine rescue vessel. One of the ships from which the planned operation began was a Japanese light cruiser, lying at a depth of 30 m with a slight list to starboard. The first to go under water was diver Petty Officer Joseph Karnecke. Going down to the deck of the ship, he began to inspect it and soon saw the gun, at which his dead crew was still standing. People froze in the positions in which they were caught by a bomb or shell explosion. Death was instant. In the chart room, Karneke discovered an unusually large number of maps and papers. He collected them all and brought them to the surface. The documents were extremely interesting to the intelligence representative who was on the rescue ship; divers were ordered to thoroughly search all the premises of the sunken cruiser and take away all documents, including personal ones. The papers delivered to Karneke revealed that he had discovered the mythical Nachi, the flagship of Vice Admiral Kyoshide Shima - a ship that the Japanese boastfully claimed was unsinkable. And, indeed, until its last battle, “Nati” managed to withstand hits from 225-kilogram bombs, as well as torpedoes, missiles and shells. However, it was intercepted on May 5, 1944 while trying to break out of Manila Bay and took the hit of 9 torpedoes, 13 bombs of 450 kg and 6 of 110 kg, as well as 16 missiles. This finally turned out to be enough, and the cruiser sank to the bottom. Karneke discovered that each compartment of the ship was completely watertight: it did not communicate with neighboring compartments using hatches or doors, so damage to any compartment did not entail flooding of other rooms. Thick steel armor covered both the deck and the hull plating. The divers acted in pairs, with one of them entering a room that had not yet been inspected, the other monitoring its hoses and line. Once, while such a pair was working, when one diver was shoveling books and documents into a bag, the other briefly stopped watching his comrade and, walking along the corridor, wandered into the next room in search of souvenirs. As soon as he entered there, the door, which slammed shut under the influence of its own gravity as a result of the ship's roll, cut the cable through which electricity was supplied from the surface for underwater lamps. The diver, who found himself in complete darkness, lost his head and, forgetting that he could easily find his way back along the rescue line, began to scream in despair. His ward had to come to his aid. Since then, the hunt for souvenirs at Nati has stopped. “It’s unlikely that anything else disciplines a diver so well,” noted Karneke, “like hearing a cry under water.” Once Karnecke himself cut a hole in the hole using an oxygen-acetylene torch. compartment bulkhead. The explosion of the unburned part of the gas mixture, which had accumulated near the ceiling of the compartment, knocked him off his feet, and the phone earphone, torn out of its socket, hit him hard in the temple. Karneke stood up and, still not quite coming to his senses, stuck his foot into the hole he had cut. At the same instant, he felt something grab his boot in a death grip. I had to call for help from a second diver, Krassika, who took a good 20 minutes to free his comrade’s leg. Karneke went to the surface, and Crassike remained, trying to discover the unknown monster that had so insidiously attacked his colleague. A few minutes later, he joyfully announced on the phone: “Tell Karneke that his leg is stuck in a Japanese toilet.” Divers eventually found the ship's safe and blew open its door using a putty-like substance known as Composition C, which has twice the explosive power of TNT. A diver named Posey was sent down to examine the contents of the safe. When he got there, he reported that the safe was chock full of money. Posey was ordered to return immediately, to which he replied that he was entangled in the cables and hose, but hoped to be free in a few minutes. Finally he appeared on the surface and climbed onto the deck of the rescue ship. Banknotes stuck out from his belt, cuffs, in a word, from any suitable place. Only when his helmet was removed was he able to realize how precariously he had hidden his treasure. “Lord,” he was amazed, “how did all this stick to me?” One way or another, he did not lose much, since the money turned out to be Japanese banknotes in denominations of 10 yen: money was transported on the Nachi to pay the maintenance of Japanese sailors. Intelligence representatives were very happy about the discovery of 2 million yen, since Japanese currency, necessary for carrying out some secret operations, has always been difficult to obtain. But they were even more delighted by the documents found by divers. Among these papers, as a naval intelligence officer later told the divers, were plans for military operations against the Allies, information regarding Japanese defenses and their preparatory measures in the event of an Allied landing. Rarely, if ever, has so much important military information been discovered in one place.

IN PEARL HARBOR

Mainland ports were practically not subjected to any significant destruction during the Second World War. A real tragedy from a military point of view was the unexpected attack of the Japanese on December 7, 1941 on the US Pacific Fleet, which consisted of 86 ships, stationed in Pearl Harbor. Although the Japanese lost 48 of the 100 aircraft that carried out the raid and 3 midget submarines, the US Navy lost 3,303 men and the battleship Arizona. Four other battleships were seriously damaged: Oklahoma, Nevada, California and West Virginia. In addition, three destroyers, a target ship and a minelayer were completely disabled. In Pearl Harbor, divers had to perform a huge amount of work, which also had to be completed as soon as possible and carried out in conditions of constant shortages of materials and various types of supplies. It was necessary to repair the giant holes in the ships lying at the bottom, and then pump the water out of them. Joseph Karnecke was tasked with determining the extent of damage to the 33,000-ton battleship West Virginia. The ship's superstructure remained intact, and from the outside it appeared that the battleship's draft was simply slightly higher than normal. In reality, the ship lay at the bottom. It was assumed, however, that the size of the underwater hole was small and could be easily repaired. Karneke plunged into the water on the starboard side of the battleship, which was listing in the same direction. The rescue vessel was placed almost close to the side of the ship. Having reached the bottom and almost getting stuck in a thick layer of silt, Karneke tried to feel the skin of the battleship with his hand. In vain. He moved forward in the direction where, in his opinion, the side should be. Nothing again. A few more steps. The battleship disappeared. Realizing the absurdity of the situation, the diver reported upstairs by phone: “I can’t find the ship.” “You walked correctly,” the puzzled assistant answered him. – I followed the air bubbles, they disappeared inside the battleship. Only then did Karneke understand: the hole was so large that he entered it without noticing it. He continued on his way and after 10 m he came across some debris. The next day, Karneke and another diver determined the size of the hole. Its length reached almost 32 m, height - 11 m. Five torpedoes dropped one after another carefully pierced the side of the giant ship. The remains of torpedoes carefully collected by divers made it possible to establish that Japanese torpedoes with piston engines were much superior in their combat qualities to American ones equipped with steam turbines. As the examination progressed, it became more and more obvious that raising the West Virginia would be a very complex operation from a technical point of view and ordinary patches and patches hastily applied by divers would not be enough. Nevertheless, the so-called specialists (who understood nothing either in matters of ship lifting or in the practical capabilities of divers) showed concern and impatience. - What are you waiting for? Why don't the divers get to work? - they asked. “We are waiting for you to explain to us what divers should do,” Karneke answered them patiently. - This is already clear! You just need to raise the battleship. Karnecke, who had been appointed head of the diving operations, turned to the already suited diver Tex Rutledge and ordered him to go underwater off the side of the West Virginia. A few minutes later, Rutledge, who had reached the bottom, asked him by phone what he should actually do. Karneke, in turn, turned to a nearby specialist for clarification. – Tell him to get to work! – the important person barked in response. – Which one exactly? Rutledge insisted. “The ship is sitting at the bottom,” Karneke answered him without entering into an explanation. “We have to get him up.” Start working. A little later, moans, groans and groans were heard from the receiver of the amplified telephone, carried by the speaker throughout the rescue vessel. The diver was undoubtedly working as hard as he could on something. - What are you doing? – exclaimed Karneke, skillfully portraying extreme concern. - What am I doing? “Rutledge answered breathlessly. “I climbed under the bottom of this damned battleship and am lifting it up.” But didn't he rise at all?

PALOMARES

The most expensive operation in the history of mankind to recover sunken property from the seabed lasted almost three months - from January 17 to April 7, 1966. 18 naval vessels took part in it and a total of 3,800 people were employed. The costs associated with this operation amounted to $84 million. Despite the complete technical success of the rescue work, the reputation of the rescuer, played by the US government, was, as they say, seriously tarnished. It all started on Monday, January 17, 1966, with a routine flight in the American Air Force. One of the B-52 strategic bombers, which carries out 24-hour air patrols, was supposed to refuel without landing from a KC-135 refueling aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Spain. Refueling began at 10:11 a.m. The planes - the bomber and the tanker - were separated by a distance of about 50 m, they flew at a speed of 600 km per hour at an altitude of 9300 m. Somewhere below was the Spanish village of Palomares, whose population, engaged in the cultivation of tomatoes, onions, beans and oranges, numbered 1,200 souls . One of the bomber’s eight engines suddenly caught fire and immediately exploded. The flames engulfed his entire wing and instantly spread to the tanker aircraft. At 10:22 a.m., when the planes were a mile from Palomares, the bomber crew decided to make an emergency release of nuclear weapons. At the same moment, the bomber exploded and the tanker plane was engulfed in flames. Those crew members who survived this sea of ​​fire began to jump with parachutes from their planes falling apart. Flaming debris rained down. Both planes fell to the ground and exploded, their debris was scattered over an area of ​​39 km2, the remains of the planes burned out for 5 hours. Fortunately, none of the residents of Palomares suffered from the fire rain that fell from the sky as a result of the disaster, which cost the lives of seven American pilots. At this time, five miles from the coast was a tiny fishing trawler, the Manuela Orts Simo, owned and skippered by forty-year-old Francisco Simo Orts. About 100 m from his ship, a striped parachute splashed down, from which a small light blue object was suspended. A few seconds later, a large gray parachute with a metal object more than human height attached to it fell from the sky. Simo went to rescue three pilots from a B-52 bomber who had splashed down safely nearby, but his visual memory, honed over 17 years of sailing off his native coast, was reliably imprinted on the place where unusual objects fell. Soon the sky over Palomares was filled with search and rescue aircraft, and dozens of fishing vessels, boats, yachts, bulk carriers and even tankers were already plowing the sea off the coast of this little-known village in search of pilots who survived the disaster and the remains of exploded aircraft. The next morning at. Palomares was visited in large numbers by aviation specialists, engineers, accident experts, and scientists; by evening their number reached 300. A tent city was set up to accommodate such a number of people; the fields surrounding Palomares were declared (for reasons still unknown) a restricted area. The strangers roaming around Palomares were holding Geiger counters in their hands. On January 20, the US Air Force issued a terse communiqué admitting that the ill-fated B-52 had nuclear weapons on board: “The Strategic Air Command bomber, which crashed along with the KC-135 aircraft while refueling in an area off the coast of Spain, was equipped with a nuclear weapon. weapons on safety cock. A radiological survey of the area showed that there is no danger to the life or health of people...” Three nuclear bombs were found on land near Palomares eighteen hours after the disaster, although official reports continued to state that there was only one such bomb on board the crashed B-52. The TNT equivalent of each of the bombs found was 25 megatons, in other words, the destructive power of each of these bombs was 1,250 times greater than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. If at least one of them exploded when falling to the ground, absolutely all living things within a radius of 15 km from the epicenter of the explosion would be instantly destroyed (which would mean the death of over 50 thousand people), and everything within a radius of approximately 100 km from the epicenter would burn down. whatever could burn; In the event of such an explosion, destructive radioactive fallout would fall over an area of ​​tens of thousands of square kilometers. Nuclear weapons are designed in such a way as to exclude the possibility of their accidental activation. The Palomares crash was the thirteenth publicly known accident of an American nuclear-armed aircraft; In none of the previous accidents did a nuclear explosion occur. The bombs lost over Palomares are hydrogen bombs, i.e. the fission of hydrogen nuclei is caused by the explosion of a “regular” atomic bomb, and the latter, in turn, explodes with TNT. A TNT explosion occurs as a result of the synchronous activation of several detonators connected to an electric battery, and all detonators must fire simultaneously, otherwise the TNT explosion will be uneven and, instead of compressing the radioactive mass, it will simply scatter it in different directions. So, there was no nuclear explosion in Palomares. However, the combing of the area around Palomares by 600 people (as of January 21), armed with Geiger counters and electronic equipment, suggested that not everything had gone well this time, so all American attempts to keep secret about the consequences of the disaster looked simply ridiculous. Here is one example. The reporter. Is there any danger of radiation, or are you just taking precautions just in case? Public Information Officer, We refrain from making any comments. The reporter. Where can we get the information we are interested in, Colonel? Public Information Officer. At least not for me (pause). I can't say anything regarding anything, and I can't say why I'm refraining from making any comments. In Washington, two days after the disaster over Palomares, an emergency meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met, at which the following decision was made: the search and recovery of weapons located on the seabed will be borne by the naval forces, while the costs associated with the search and recovery carried by the branch of troops at whose disposal the said weapons were before the disaster. In other words, the Navy must lift the bomb from the bottom of the sea, and the Air Force must pay money for this. To carry out this unusual task, an impressive armada of ships has accumulated at sea off the coast of Spain. The sea tug "Kiowa" arrived first, then two minesweepers appeared - "Segacy" and "Pinnacle", which were later joined by two more minesweepers - "Skeel" and "Nimble". In addition to these vessels, the task force created to find and recover the bomb included the destroyer McDana, the landing ship Fort Snelling, the squadron tanker Nespel and the submarine rescue ship Petrel; the latter was equipped with the sonar and diving search equipment necessary for the upcoming operation. The deputy commander of the naval strike forces in Southern Europe, Rear Admiral William Guest, was appointed head of the operation to raise the sunken bomb, and Vice Admiral William Ellis became the commander of the task force. Guest was provided with the latest equipment for underwater work. First of all, Guest requested a Westinghouse sonar from Palomares, designed for studying the seabed - a cigar-shaped “fish” with huge fins-rudders, towed 10 m from the ground at a speed of one knot. Then a deep-sea television installation was delivered to Spain, the cameras of which, adapted to operate at a depth of up to 600 m, transmit the television image to a screen located in the premises of the surface vessel. The Honeywell Corporation delivered a sonar to Palomares that automatically determines the distance to any object detected under water, the direction of its movement and the depth at which it is located. On shore, US Oceanographic Administration staff were busy setting landmarks, because when searching for small objects at sea, it is most difficult for the search team to determine its own location and the location of the discovered object. An impressive group of submarine experts was placed at Guest's disposal; among them were 130 military divers and combat swimmers, many of whom were specialists in defusing unexploded bombs. Guest's main consultant was Commander J.B. Mooney himself, who controlled the bathyscaphe Trieste in August 1964 and discovered the remains of the Thresher submarine. The working group included a large number of civilian specialists who were racking their brains over the question: what were they supposed to be looking for? For officials from the public information department remained deathly silent on this matter. After a few days, however, the search object became an open secret. It became clear to everyone that four bombs had been lost over Palomares and that the fourth bomb, never found despite the most careful searches on land, had probably fallen into the sea. On January 26, Guest first came across a written message about a statement made by Francisco Simo, an eyewitness to the Palomares disaster. The fisherman claimed that he could show the exact location of the fall of unusual objects with parachutes. Since the operation command had literally hundreds of eyewitness reports, Simo's statement was not given due attention. The command believed that when searching for the missing bomb, one should be guided primarily by logic, combined with method and perseverance, as was the case with Thresher. To do this, it is necessary, taking into account all available data, to determine the area within which the most likely bomb impact location is located, and then “comb” this area using the most modern search equipment. Based on these considerations, Guest issued orders of the following nature: to search for and locate all remnants of the disaster, including the lost bomb; make sure that the found debris is indeed related to the strategic bomber that exploded over Palomares and mark them with buoys; to raise everything that remains from the disaster. Finding a hydrogen bomb on the seabed was a very difficult task. The bottom topography of Palomares is very uneven. The rocky ground is intersected by gorges up to a kilometer or more deep. The rocks in many places are covered with silt and other bottom sediments, which rise from the bottom when underwater vehicles approach them or when divers approach them, thus impairing visibility under water. During the work, sonar devices registered several “contacts” at a depth of 150 m or more, but there was no way to lift the detected objects to the surface. A sonar contact is simply a reflection of a signal from a sensor submerged in water. Such a signal could equally indicate that the sensor has detected the remains of a long-ago shipwreck, a rock, or the desired bomb. Gest demanded that equipment be sent to him for lifting objects from great depths. The bathyscaphe "Trieste-II" and "Deep Jeep" - a cigar-shaped underwater vehicle, no larger than a minicar, were sent to Palomares. The Deep Jeep, lowered under water, could move thanks to the presence of its own propulsion system and inspect the soil using television cameras and powerful searchlights. The big drawback of this device was the lack of equipment for lifting any objects from under the water. At the request of the then US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Alvin and Aluminaut experimental underwater vehicles belonging to American private organizations were given to Guest. Alvin, a 6.7 m long and 13.5 t underwater vehicle, is capable of staying underwater at a depth of 1,800 m for 24 hours and carrying a crew of two people. At the specified depth, “Alvin” moves at a maximum speed of 4 knots, its underwater swimming range is 15 miles. This device was equipped with a magnetic compass, echo sounder, sonar communication system, closed-circuit television system and all-round sonar. In addition, it was planned to install a telescopic manipulator for grabbing objects, which was not yet ready by the time Alvin arrived in Palomares. The Aluminaut submersible was even larger. Its length was 15.5 m, weight - 81 tons. It was assumed that it would be equipped with two metal manipulators for grasping objects. The US Department of Defense sent another underwater vehicle, the Kabmarin, to the bomb search site, capable of staying underwater at a depth of up to 270 m for six hours and moving there at a speed of 2 knots. This device was equipped with much worse electronic equipment than the Alvin or Aluminaut, but it made it possible to visually survey the seabed and place marker buoys over objects found under water. "Aluminaut" was delivered to the search site on February 9. By this time, over 100 objects that could be related to the exploded bomber were discovered at the bottom of the sea in the Palomares area. Navy specialists, meanwhile, tried to use computers and complex mathematical methods to establish the true coordinates of the tanker and bomber at the time of the explosion. As a result of calculations, which were based on data on the location of hydrogen bombs discovered on land, the zone of greatest probability of a “stray” bomb falling was determined - a triangle up to 10 miles high and a base of about 20 miles. On February 10, the Aluminaut and Alvin devices were ready to go underwater, but the mistral, blowing at a speed of 60 miles per hour, stirred up the bottom silt, and visibility under water was reduced to 1 m. The wind tore the Alvin's moorings, which slightly was not sunk. All search operations had to be suspended for several days. On February 15, the underwater vehicles began work. Objects previously spotted using sonar equipment were examined; some of them turned out to be the wreckage of a B-52 bomber. Soon the underwater vehicles had more work to do: a mock-up of a nuclear bomb was dropped from a B-52 bomber in order to get at least an approximate idea of ​​what could have happened to the real one that fell from the flaming bomber. This model was also lost in the depths of the sea. The Mistral subsided, the storm ended, and search efforts began in full force. A unique division of labor was established. Scuba divers worked at a depth of up to 40 m; the depth from 40 to 60 m was managed by divers using breathing apparatus with a helium-oxygen mixture; at a depth of 60 to 120 m, reconnaissance was carried out using hydroacoustic instruments and the Kabmarin underwater vehicle, hastily equipped with a mechanical “arm” for grasping objects. Depths of 120 m or more were “combed” with a sonar for studying the seabed, underwater television cameras and the Alvin and Aluminaut devices. More and more specialized vessels, stuffed with sophisticated equipment, arrived in the search area. For example, the oceanographic research vessel Mizar was equipped with winches on which a reinforced cable about 5 thousand long was wound. m, designed for towing so-called “fish sleds” along the seabed. An underwater installation for tracking a target, a sonar, and television and photo cameras were mounted on these sleds. In other words, this ship was equipped with everything necessary to find the missing bomb and “point” underwater vehicles at it. The squadron tug "Luiseno" was equipped with a decompression chamber, a towing winch and a lifting winch for heavy cargo; the latter very soon came in handy for lifting a wing section of a B-52 bomber discovered by scuba divers, weighing 9 tons. Another “key” vessel was the Hoist rescue vessel, equipped with two cargo booms with a lifting capacity of 10 and 20 tons; "Hoist" was intended exclusively for lifting aircraft wreckage. The ship "Privateer", placed at the disposal of the Navy by the American corporation "Reynolds Aluminum", was equipped with the latest electronic equipment, including a hydroacoustic communication system, with the help of which negotiations were carried out between "Privateer" and "Aluminaut" at a distance of up to 11 km. Seven weeks have passed since the death of the B-52 bomber. On March 1, 1966, the US government finally decided to publicly admit that several hydrogen bombs were lost in the disaster, one of which has not yet been found. One might guess that the person most pleased with this revelation was the hapless public information officer, who until now had to dodge at press conferences something like this: “Perhaps you think we’ve found what you think we’re looking for.” ? (Long pause). So, you can think what you want. But don't imagine that this is true. Having announced the loss of the bomb, Washington decided to tell the world the whole truth. It was announced that the fragments of two of the three hydrogen bombs found on land were destroyed, the TNT charge in them exploded, scattering around the radioactive metal of the atomic “fuse” - uranium-235 and plutonium-239, the half-life of which is about 24,400 years. Of course, there is nothing to worry about. You just have to carefully remove the top layer of fertile soil from an area of ​​100 hectares, load this soil into 5 thousand 200-liter barrels, take them to the USA and bury them in a cemetery for radioactive waste. By March 3, 200 underwater objects had been discovered and recorded. "Alvin" made 50 dives under water. With the help of "Alvin" and "Aluminaut", a large amount of debris from the dead bomber was raised to the surface. Meanwhile, Francisco Simo Orts did not stop taking search participants to his section of the sea, patiently watching as the Americans plotted on maps the coordinates of the parachute splashdown site indicated by him. and then go away. The depth of the sea at the place indicated by the fisherman exceeded 600 m, so only the Alvin and Aluminaut devices could dive to such a depth. Distrustful Navy specialists performed this experiment several times: taking advantage of the fact that Simo left the deck in order to have a snack with whatever God sent, they quietly took the ship to a new place, and upon Simo’s return to the deck, they casually asked him if he really I am sure that this is the very place where the parachutes fell. And Simo invariably answered: “After all, you moved the ship.” The place I indicated is over there. Head of the operation. Gest began to incline to the idea that Simo was one of those rare people who were truly endowed with excellent powers of observation. On March 8, the US Ambassador to Spain Angier Biddle Duke, risking a cold, took a bath in the sea near Palomares in order to demonstrate to the world that the sea was not contaminated with radioactive substances. Unfortunately, the press did not report how the world reacted to such a bold act by the American diplomat. By March 9, 358 underwater objects had already been discovered off the coast near Palomares. The identity of over 100 of them had yet to be determined, and 175 pieces of aircraft, weighing from several hundred grams to 10 tons each, were raised to the surface. But the bomb has not yet been discovered. Gest began to have concerns that the bomb with a parachute attached to it could be dragged out to sea by strong tidal currents. He decided to declare an area of ​​70 km2 around the location identified by Simo as the "second most likely bomb impact zone." In accordance with this decision, on March 15, the Alvin submersible entered the sea area indicated by the Spanish fisherman; The Alvin crew decided to make a test dive and test the operation of the equipment at great depths. The dive began at 9:20 am. At the bottom of the sea in this area there are deep valleys with steep slopes. At 11:50 a.m., the Alvin, following the curves of one of these slopes, reached a depth of 777 m. Visibility at this depth was only 2.5 m, but the crew members noticed a fragment of a parachute through the window. For several minutes, “Alvin” hovered over a depression about 6 m wide, illuminating it with its powerful searchlights, after which the code name of the hydrogen bomb was transmitted to the support vessel using a hydroacoustic communication system: “Dashboard”. In order to find the bomb, operating from the starting point indicated by Simo Orts, Alvin needed only 80 minutes. But finding the ill-fated bomb is not all. There was immediately a danger that Alvin, while photographing an object covered with a parachute (to finally identify it with a hydrogen bomb), could push it into a nearby crevice, too narrow for even a very small underwater vehicle to enter. In addition, there was a danger of detonation of the TNT charge of a hydrogen bomb from the slightest blow or shock. For four hours, the Alvin crew photographed the object with a parachute, then, after receiving the appropriate order, all the lights and engines on the Alvin were turned off, and the device continued to remain near the find as a sentry until the approach of the shift, the deep-sea submersible Aluminaut. "Aluminaut" sank to the ground an hour later. With its help, a transponder device intended for sonar recognition was attached to the parachute. A hydroacoustic signal from a search vessel, arriving at this device, activates it, and the transponder emits its own signal at a different frequency, allowing one to identify an object with a transponder attached to it and find it. Attaching the defendant to the parachute took three hours. “Aluminaut” had to stay at the find for another 21 hours - upstairs they were waiting for the processing of the photographs taken by “Alvin” to finish. The photographs finally obtained confirmed that the find was indeed a bomb. Guest gave the find the name “Contact-261”, the bomb was codenamed “Robert”, and the parachute was codenamed “Douglas”. The underwater vehicles began to take turns trying to hook the parachute lines with lifting cables. With each such attempt, “Robert” buried itself deeper and deeper into the silt and slid closer and closer to the edge of the crevice, inaccessible to underwater vehicles. On March 19, Guest ordered that these attempts be abandoned due to their futility. He ordered the submersible crew members to try to hook the anchor lines or parachute canopy in order to pull the Robert to a more convenient place in shallow water, from where they could try to lift the bomb to the surface. On the same day, a strong storm broke out, making any work of the underwater vehicles impossible. Only on March 23, “Alvin” was able to sink under water again. The submariners feared that as a result of the storm the bomb would move, become completely buried in the mud, or fall into an inaccessible crevice. But “Robert” was patiently waiting for them in the same place. A strong nylon cable with an anchor was lowered from the rescue vessel, and Alvin began to maneuver, trying to hook the lines or parachute panel with the anchor. It was very difficult to do this, since after each approach of the Alvin, in order to hook the parachute, clouds of silt rose from the bottom, reducing visibility under water to almost zero, and each time we had to wait about half an hour for the silt to settle. After one of the attempts, the bomb suddenly shifted and slid a meter towards the edge of the crevice. "Alvin" hastily surfaced, giving way to "Aluminaut", which continued unsuccessful attempts to hook the parachute. Guest and his consultants began to fear that Alvin and Aluminout would never be able to cope with the task assigned to them. Therefore, they decided to call an underwater search vehicle controlled from the surface to the lifting site. It was equipped with three electric motors, photo and television cameras, sonar equipment, as well as a mechanical arm for grasping various objects. This device was located in California and was designed to operate at a depth of no more than 600 m; the deployment of his mechanical arm was not sufficient to capture the bomb. It was quickly converted to a depth of 850 m and delivered to Palomares on March 25. They decided to use a mechanical arm to capture not the bomb itself, but its parachute. On the same day, or rather on the same night, “Alvin” made another attempt to hook with its anchor the lines of the parachute to which the bomb was attached. At the same time, the underwater vehicle literally sat on the bomb and was almost covered by a parachute stirred by the movement of the water. When surfacing, the Alvina's anchor firmly caught on the nylon lines. The Hoist rescuer was immediately called to the scene and began to pull the bomb with a parachute along the slope of the underwater valley to a more convenient place. The bomb with a parachute weighed less than a ton, the nylon cable with which the Hoyst tried to pull out the find was designed for a load of over 4.5 tons; and yet, when the bomb was raised 100 m from its original position on the ground, the cable broke. He rubbed against the sharp edge of the anchor paw. The crew of the "Alvin" sadly watched through the windows as the "Robert" tumbled along the bottom slope with a parachute, approached the edge of the crevice and disappeared into a cloud of silt raised from the bottom. “Alvin” was forced to surface because its batteries were discharged, and was replaced by “Aluminaut”, which, following the signals of the transponder device attached to the parachute, discovered “Robert” at a depth of 870 m near the edge of a deep crevice. Meanwhile, a storm raged on the surface of the sea, and lifting operations were suspended. "Alvin" was able to go under water only on April 1, but by that time "Robert" had disappeared. It took four days to find the “prodigal bomb”. On April 5, the television cameras of the underwater search vehicle again discovered “Robert” - the current washed away the silt in which the deadly projectile was buried. The mechanical arm managed to grab the silk of his parachute. “Alvin” descended under the water and made several attempts to attach a strong nylon cable to the mechanical arm, which was disconnected from the search apparatus. During one of these attempts, “Robert” began to slide towards the crevice. In just over a day, it moved 90 m. “Alvin” made one more pass, trying to attach a lifting cable to the mechanical arm; at the same time, he came too close to the parachute and became firmly entangled in it. The Alvin's situation was aggravated by the fact that the charge of its batteries was supposed to run out in four hours. Fortunately, he managed to escape from the Douglas's embrace and float to the surface. The next morning, "Alvin", despite the stormy weather, again worked on the ground. The crew of the device finally managed to attach the lifting cable to the mechanical arm. A few hours later, a search vehicle controlled from the surface descended to the ground, which, as if imitating the Alvin, also became entangled in the parachute lines. There was no crew on this device that could, with the help of skillful maneuvering, free the device from its tenacious nylon bonds. Quickly assessing the situation, Guest decided to raise the nuclear bomb, along with the parachute and the search apparatus entangled in it, before it was too late. The bomb and search apparatus were lifted at a speed of 8 m/min. During the ascent, the search apparatus suddenly broke free of its parachute restraints. The operators managed to move it to the side without damaging the lifting cables. When "Robert" was pulled to a depth of 30 m, the ascent was stopped and scuba divers joined the operation; they encircled the deadly cylinder with several slings. On April 7, at 8:45 a.m. local time, a three-meter bomb appeared above the surface of the sea. Lifting it took 1 hour 45 minutes. The hydrogen bomb remained on the seabed for 79 days, 22 hours and 23 minutes. Dosimetric monitoring showed no leakage of radioactive substances. Demining experts disarmed the bomb's detonators. At 10:14 a.m. Guest uttered the phrase that ended the odyssey of “Robert”: “The bomb has been defused.” The next day, journalists accredited at the site of this unusual rescue operation were allowed to inspect and photograph the bomb - just in case, to suppress possible rumors about the failure of the rescuers. This ended the world's most expensive rescue operation.

2.2. Actions in the Aleutian Islands area.

2.2.1. Composition of forces and plans of the parties.

To combat the supply of Japanese reinforcements and supplies to the islands of Attu and Kiska, the American command formed Rear Admiral McMorris's task force of cruisers and destroyers. This formation, which began operations on the approaches from Japan and the Kuril Islands, began to intercept Japanese transports and fire at structures on Attu. American base aircraft were also active; on January 5, they sank a 6,577-ton transport at Kiska and a 6,101-ton transport at Attu, both filled with troops and equipment.

The Japanese command decided to strengthen Vice Admiral Hosogaya's 5th Fleet with another heavy cruiser and several light ships so that he could restore order in the northern waters. On February 23, the day after arriving in Ominato, the Maya set out for Paramushir, where it arrived on the 27th. There he was joined on March 4 by the flagship Nati. Under their escort, from March 7 to 13, a convoy was conducted to Attu Island. On March 23 (22nd Western Hemisphere time), Hosogaya went to sea again, taking with him the heavy cruisers Nati (flagship), Maya, light cruisers Tama and Abukuma, 4 destroyers and 3 transports with supplies for Attu. This exit resulted in a collision with US Fleet Task Force TG 16.6.

On March 26 (27 Japanese time), McMorris's task force, consisting of the old light cruiser Richmond (flagship), the heavy Salt Lake City and 4 destroyers of the 14th Flotilla, cruised from north to south and back 180 miles to the west. from Attu and 100 miles south of the nearest Commander Islands. Speed ​​15 knots, course NbE, formation - the Americans' favorite wake column with two destroyers in the vanguard and rearguard. Almost on the same course, but slightly ahead, Hosogaya’s column was moving: “Nachi” (flagship), “Maya”, “Tama”, destroyers “Wakaba” and “Hatsushimo”, “Abukuma” (flag of the commander of the 1st flotilla, Rear Admiral Tomokazu Mori), the destroyer Ikazuchi, the fast 7,000-ton auxiliary cruisers Asaka Maru and Sakito Maru (used as transports) and the destroyer Inazuma. Hosogaya was rendezvousing with the slow-moving freighter Sanko Maru, which had been sent ahead under destroyer escort.

Shortly after dawn, the radars of the lead American destroyer and flagship cruiser Richmond detected five targets almost directly ahead at a distance of 7.5-12 miles. At the same time, the navigator from the Asaka Maru noticed first one ship behind the mast, then several. Hosogaya ordered his ships to turn sequentially to the right to SE to take the fight, and both auxiliary cruisers to follow their previous course. The Japanese had almost double superiority in strength (4 Japanese cruisers had 20 203 mm and 12 140 mm guns in their broadsides against 10 203 mm and 7 152 mm, not counting the multiple advantage in torpedo tubes) and were 2-3 knot is faster. But McMorris, hoping for support from base aviation, decided not to rush into a retreat, but first tried to chase the transports. The Americans did not launch planes for correction: the Salt Lake City did not have gasoline for it, and the admiral decided to use the Richmond plane a little later. The Japanese launched one or two from the Nati, but due to the powerful anti-aircraft fire of the American ships, the spotters were of no use.

At 08.40, even before the Americans closed formation for battle, the Japanese cruisers opened fire on the Richmond from a distance of 100 meters, achieving coverage with the second salvo. Then their attention switched to Salt Lake City - the strongest opponent, who also annoyed the Japanese at Cape Esperanz. At 08.42, the “Swayback Maru” (rocking ship), as the Americans called their heavy cruiser half in English and half in Japanese for its rapid roll, began to respond, hitting the “Nachi” on the third and fourth salvos from a distance of 90 kb. A fire started on the Japanese flagship, although it was quickly extinguished (most likely there were no hits, and the Americans mistook flashes from shots for a fire).

Hosogaya continued to move closer in order to quickly realize his advantage in artillery and torpedo weapons. McMorris had no choice but to forget about the transports and begin to retreat. At 08.45 he ordered a sharp turn 40° to the left and increased speed to 25 knots. Suddenly “Nati” stopped shooting. The carelessness of its mechanics led to the fact that when the speed increased, the steam generators found themselves without steam (they were early switched to a boiler that had not yet gained pressure), and the ship was temporarily deprived of electricity. The guns froze almost at the extreme elevation angle, but the Maya fired regularly. At 08.46, “Nati” fired 8 torpedoes, which, due to the long distance and the sharp turn of the Americans, missed. After 4 minutes, two 203-mm shells hit the Nati: one tore the antenna on the mainmast, and the other exploded in the bow superstructure on the starboard side, killing and wounding several people. After another 2 minutes, the third shell hit the torpedo compartment, where there were again casualties. Shrapnel from nearby explosions covered the bridge.

"Richmond" fired very rarely, since the distance of 90 cables was excessive for him. Both American cruisers desperately zigzag, trying to throw off the Japanese gunfire.

At about 09.02 "Tama" left the general formation, turning to the right by almost 8 points. Apparently he wanted to take a position between the Americans and his transports. Behind him, “Abukuma” made the same maneuver. Only heavy cruisers with 4 destroyers continued to sail south to cut off the Americans from their bases. After turning to SW, “Maya” at 08.07 fired 8 torpedoes almost in pursuit of the enemy, which, naturally, did not hit. But at 09.10 he achieved the first hit with a 203-mm projectile in the middle of the Salt Lake City from the starboard side - directly into the plane (2 people were killed). The Kingfisher that caught fire had to be thrown into the water. Ten minutes later, Nati and Salt Lake City got hits. The first one slowed down and began to burn, while the second one, on the contrary, was flooded with cascades of water from a shell that hit below the waterline. Apparently the Nati was hit by a 127-mm shot from a destroyer: it passed through the gun port of turret No. 1 and, exploding, killed all the servants there. Another similar shell exploded above the deck and killed several people (according to Japanese data, these hits took place more than two hours later).

Seeing clouds of smoke above the Japanese flagship, Rear Admiral Mockmorris decided it was time to deal with the transports and turned right - north. But at 09.30, when the main battery on the Nati became operational again, he, along with the Maya and the destroyers, gave chase. Meanwhile, the cruiser Tama took a position to the right of the Americans at a distance of 90 cables in order to adjust the fire of its heavy cruisers. But Salt Lake City drove him away with eight salvos. At 10.02, just at the wrong moment, when the American heavy cruiser began to be covered by salvoes from Nati and Maya, problems with the steering gear began on it - the spool in the hydraulic drive of the steering gear failed due to its own firing. The rudder angle was limited to 10 degrees, but the aft turrets continued to fire intensely. "Nati" and "Maya" approached gradually, maneuvering every now and then to fire full salvos. About 200 shells fell within a cable's distance of the Salt Lake City, until one 203-mm armor-piercing shell hit the deck at 10.10 and came out of the side under water. Now there was no question of intercepting transports - McMorris had to save his ships. At 10.18 the Americans set up a powerful smoke screen and, under its cover, began to retreat to the SW. The Japanese did not have radar and fired only when enemy ships appeared in bursts of thick smoke. "Maya" fired 4 torpedoes, followed by "Nati" and "Abukuma", but the distance was very long. The Americans didn't even see the torpedo marks. McMorris ordered the speed to be increased to 30 knots and headed towards Kamchatka: Richmond in front, Salt Lake City 15 cables behind, and the destroyers, which continued to set up a screen using all means, stayed on the left beam of the end cruiser and a little behind. With every minute the distance from Adak increased, and to Paramushir it decreased. So the Japanese had a better chance of waiting for their planes than the Americans.

At 11.03, “Salt Lake City” received the fourth and final hit, as a result of which the gyrocompass compartment and aft MO were flooded (the water in the latter rose by more than a meter). Despite the 5-degree roll to port, the cruiser was still able to maintain high speed. However, at 11.25 the stern control system failed and the speed dropped to 20 knots. McMorris ordered three destroyers to cover the cruiser with a torpedo attack, but at 11.38 he canceled the order because Salt Lake City's boilers were able to be activated. This display of attack did play a role in forcing the Japanese to turn away. At 11.50 a new disaster struck: Arctic water got into the fuel and all the nozzles in the cruiser’s boilers failed. Steam pressure dropped, generators and turbines stopped. The ship was left without speed and energy, raising the signal “Speed ​​- zero” at 11.55, and the “Zero” flag was immediately pierced by a Japanese shell. It is unlikely that anyone would now bet even a dollar on the life of Salt Lake City.

“Nati” and “Maya” were 95 cables away on the left shell of their victim, quickly closing in and not stopping firing. Light cruisers were approaching from the other side, and Japanese destroyers were moving into position for the decisive torpedo salvo. The impatient Hatsushimo fired six torpedoes at 11.54, but retained the rest. "Salt Lake City", which had turned into a "sitting duck", continued to fire from the aft turrets under local control, shooting down the last 15% of its ammunition.

At this critical moment, the American destroyers launched a torpedo attack on the Nati and Maya from a distance of 85 cables. But before they had time to get closer to the enemy, they saw that he began to turn west. What happened and why did Hosogaya not want the victory that was falling into his hands?

There are several explanations for the strange act of the Japanese admiral. The fuel on the Japanese ships was running out and there might not be enough to reach the base. The situation was similar with the ammunition (although more than 40% remained on the Nati, and about 25% of the main battery shells remained on the Maya), and Hosogaya did not see that the enemy cruiser had lost speed. He was also wary of American bombers, expecting their arrival any minute, and his flagship Nati received two dangerous hits from three approaching American destroyers at 11.48. One of them - “Bailey” (the only one who managed to fire 5 torpedoes) - received two hits from 203-mm shells in response and was forced to turn away. Others followed him.

A few minutes later, the Salt Lake City was able to get going: first 15 knots, then 23 knots. At 12.12 the opponents dispersed and the American formation headed for Dutch Harbor. The Japanese ships returned to Paramushir the next day, including all three transports. So they did not complete their task and this battle (for the Japanese, “the battle at Atgu Island”) can be considered an asset for the Americans. Despite the enemy's clear advantage, their losses were negligible: 7 killed and 20 wounded, a destroyer and a heavy cruiser were damaged. Although the Japanese fired a huge number of shells: “Nachi” 707 203 mm and 276 127 mm, “Maya” 904 and 9, respectively, “Abukuma” 95 140 mm, etc., as well as 43 torpedoes.

Damage to the cruiser "Nati"

According to Japanese data, only 5 127-mm shells hit the cruiser: 3 on the starboard side at about 03.50 and 2 around 06.48 (Tokyo time), so the Salt Lake City fired its 832 203-mm shells into the “milk”. The first shell hit the aft part of the navigation bridge, killing 11 and wounding 21; the second damaged one of the mainmast supports; the third hit the aircraft deck, damaged the catapult, killed 2 and wounded 5 people in the torpedo room below deck. Of the two later shells, one hit the front plate of turret No. 1 from the right: the turret jammed, killing 1 person inside and wounding 1 person. The last shell hit the signal platform from the starboard side, but the damage was minor. The number of casualties was greater than that of the Americans: 14 killed and 27 wounded.

2.2.3. Subsequent actions of heavy cruisers in northern waters.

After returning to Paramushir, Nati and Maya left for Yokosuka on March 31, where the former repaired damage from April 3 to May 11. "Maya" again went to Ominato on April 15th, stayed there from the 19th to the 27th, when it left for Paramushir, arriving there on April 29th. Vice Admiral Hosogaya was removed from his post as commander of the 5th Fleet for indecisive leadership of the battle and replaced by Vice Admiral Shiro Kawaze.

After the Americans landed on Attu Island on May 11, the Maya, under the flag of Kawaze, went to sea the next day, but returned to base on the 15th, where the Nachi, which left Yokosuka on the 11th, arrived on the same day. Both cruisers stood ready at Paramushir for almost 2 months (between June 18 and July 5, Maya went to Ominato, where it stayed from the 21st to the 1st), waiting for reinforcements from Japan to give battle to the American fleet near the Aleutian Islands . On May 19, the 5th squadron ("Mioko" and "Haguro") arrived at Paramushir, temporarily assigned to the Northern Union of Vice Admiral Kawadze, who also received additional submarines and aircraft. It was also planned to transfer more impressive forces: 3 battleships led by the giant Musashi, 4 aircraft carriers, 5 heavy ones (3 Mogami type, 2 Tone type), 2 light cruisers and 16 destroyers. But these forces assembled in Tokyo Bay too late to really help the Japanese garrisons in the Aleutian Islands, and their passage north was canceled. But the absence of these ships on Truk allowed the Americans to land on Rendova (Solomon Islands) at the end of June.

Considering the difficulties of supplying the Kiski garrison given the dominance of enemy base aviation in that area, the Japanese command decided to secretly evacuate troops from this island. On July 10, “Nati” and “Maya” left Paramushir to cover the evacuation, but it was canceled due to bad weather. Both cruisers returned to base on July 15. After a successful second evacuation attempt, Maya left Paramushira for Yokosuka on August 3, where it arrived on the 6th for further repairs and modernization. On August 5, the Northern Union was disbanded, the ships of the 5th Fleet were transferred to the newly formed North-Eastern Region Fleet. "Nati" left Paramushir on August 10, arriving at Ominato on the 13th, where it remained in readiness until September 6.

The sea is raging!
Far from Savo Island,

The Milky Way is creeping.

...On the night of August 9, 1942, a group of samurai walked around Savo Island counterclockwise, killing everyone who crossed their path. The cruisers Astoria, Canberra, Vincennes, and Quincy became victims of the crazy night battle; Chicago and two other destroyers were seriously damaged. The permanent losses of the Americans and their allies amounted to 1,077 people, the Japanese had three cruisers moderately damaged and 58 sailors killed. Having destroyed the entire American formation, the samurai disappeared into the darkness of the night.

The pogrom at Savo Island was described in American history as a “second Pearl Harbor” - so great was the severity of the losses and the great disappointment with the actions of the sailors. It remains unclear how the Yankees did not notice at a distance of 20 miles the roar and flashes of a naval battle, the beams of searchlights rushing across the sky and clusters of flare bombs. No! The watchmen on the cruisers of the Northern formation serenely dozed under the thunderous peals of 203 mm guns - until the Japanese, having finally destroyed the Southern formation, moved to the North and attacked the second group of American ships.

The impressive Japanese victory off Savo Island was credited to the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Kako, Kunugasa and Furutaka. The cruising forces of the Imperial Navy became one of the main arguments in that war - ships of this class recorded many high-profile victories: a night battle off Savo Island, the defeat of an Allied squadron in the Java Sea, a battle in the Sunda Strait, raids in the Indian Ocean... - exactly those events , which glorified the Japanese fleet.

Even as radar appeared on American ships and the sea and air began to buzz with U.S. Navy technology, Japanese cruisers continued to fight, often achieving sporadic victories. High security allowed them to operate relatively successfully in conditions of numerical superiority of the enemy and withstand numerous hits from bombs, artillery and torpedoes.

As practice has shown, the combat stability of these ships was exceptionally high. The only thing that could destroy the armored monsters was extensive damage to the underwater part of the hull. Only after this, tormented by American explosives, they lay exhausted on the seabed.

There were 18 of them in total. Eighteen samurai, each with their own unique version of birth, history of service and tragic death. No one lived to see the end of the war.

Constructors' Championship

Japanese heavy cruisers built in the interwar period were, perhaps, the most successful ships in their class - powerful offensive weapons, solid armor (the Japanese did everything that was possible under international restrictions), successful anti-torpedo protection and effective counter-flooding schemes, high speed and autonomy sufficient to operate in any area of ​​the Pacific Ocean.

The calling card of the Japanese became “long lances” - oxygen super-torpedoes of 610 mm caliber, the most powerful examples of underwater weapons in the world (for comparison, their main opponent - the US Navy cruisers were completely devoid of torpedo weapons). The downside was the great vulnerability of Japanese cruisers - a stray shell hitting a torpedo tube on the upper deck could be fatal for the ship. The detonation of several Long Lances completely disabled the ship.

Like all cruisers of the “Washington period,” the samurai suffered severely from overload. No amount of bluff or forgery with the declared displacement could correct the situation - the engineers had to dodge in the most amazing ways so that, in the figurative expression of the Americans, who also suffered from the terms of the international Naval Arms Limitation Treaty, “pour a quart of liquid into a pint-sized container.”

We had to save on something: the main blow was dealt to the habitability of the ship and the conditions for accommodating personnel (within 1.5 square meters per person). However, little Japanese quickly got used to the cramped space - the main thing is that the ventilation works well.

The desire to forcibly reduce the cruiser to the coveted “10 thousand tons” yielded unusual results. The uncontrollable imagination of engineers, a “masquerade” with the main caliber - according to secret calculations, on some cruisers it was possible to quickly replace 6-inch guns with powerful 8-inch barrels, as well as some traditional solutions of the Japanese school of shipbuilding (for example, the shape of the bow ) - all this led to the creation of amazing examples of naval weapons, which brought many victories to the Land of the Rising Sun.

The Japanese cruisers were good in everything, except for one thing - there were too few of them: 18 desperate samurai could cope with the American cruisers of pre-war construction, but for every lost ship the Americans immediately “pulled out of their sleeves” five new ones. Total US industry from 1941 to 1945 built about 40 cruisers. Japan - 5 light cruisers, 0 heavy.

The effectiveness of the use of cruising forces was greatly affected by the scientific and technical backwardness of Japan. Thanks to the presence of torpedoes and high-quality preparation for conducting night artillery duels, Japanese cruisers had priority at the initial stage of the war, but with the advent of radars, their advantage disappeared.
In general, the whole story about Japanese heavy cruisers is a cruel experiment on the topic: how long can an armored monster survive under continuous attacks from the sea surface, from the air and from under water. In conditions of many times superior enemy forces and the absence of even the slightest chance of salvation.

I invite our dear readers to get acquainted with some of these leviathans. What were their strengths and weaknesses? Were the Japanese cruisers able to live up to the expectations of their creators? How did brave ships die?

Furutaka-class heavy cruisers

Number of units in the series – 2
Years of construction: 1922 – 1926.
Total displacement – ​​11,300 tons
Crew – 630 people.
Armor belt thickness – 76 mm
Main caliber – 6 x 203 mm

The first Japanese cruisers of the interwar period were designed even before the Washington restrictions came into force. In general, they turned out to be very close to the standards of the “Washington cruiser”, because were originally planned as scout cruisers in a hull with the minimum possible displacement.

An interesting arrangement of main caliber guns in six single-gun turrets (later replaced by three double-gun turrets). A typical Japanese wavy hull silhouette with an “upturned” bow and the lowest possible side in the stern area. The low height of the chimneys, which was later recognized as an extremely unsuccessful solution. Armor belt integrated into the body structure. Poor conditions for accommodating personnel - Furutaka, in this sense, was the worst of the Japanese cruisers.

Due to the low height of the side, it was forbidden to use portholes during sea crossings, which, coupled with insufficient ventilation, made service in the tropics an extremely grueling undertaking.

History of death:

"Furutaka" - On October 11, 1942, during the battle at Cape Esperance, the cruiser received severe damage from 152 and 203 mm shells from American cruisers. The subsequent detonation of the torpedo ammunition, aggravated by the loss of speed, sealed the fate of the cruiser: 2 hours later the blazing Furutaka sank.

"Kako" - the day after the pogrom off Savo Island, the cruiser was torpedoed by the submarine S-44. Having received three torpedoes, the Kako capsized and sank. The US Navy received its “consolation prize.”

Aoba-class heavy cruisers

Number of units in the series – 2
Years of construction: 1924 – 1927.
Total displacement – ​​11,700 tons
Crew – 650 people.
Armor belt thickness – 76 mm
Main caliber – 6 x 203 mm

They are a modification of earlier Furutaka-class cruisers. Unlike its predecessors, the Aoba initially received two-gun turrets. The superstructure and fire control systems have undergone changes. As a result of all the changes, Aoba turned out to be 900 tons heavier than the original project: the main disadvantage of the cruisers was critically low stability.

"Aoba" lying on the bottom of Kure Harbor, 1945

History of death:

"Aoba" - the cruiser covered with wounds was able to survive until the summer of 1945. Finally finished off by US Navy aircraft during regular bombing of the Kure naval base in July 1945.

Kunugasa - sunk by torpedo bombers from the aircraft carrier Enterprise during the Battle of Guandalcanal, 11/14/1942.

Myoko-class heavy cruisers (sometimes Myoko-class)

Number of units in the series – 4
Years of construction: 1924 – 1929.
Total displacement – ​​16,000 tons
Crew – 900 people.
Armor belt thickness – 102 mm
Main caliber – 10 x 203 mm

The first “Washington cruisers” of the Land of the Rising Sun, with all their advantages, disadvantages and original design solutions.

Five main caliber turrets, three of which are located in the bow of the ship in a “pyramid” pattern - ten 203 mm caliber guns. The armor scheme is generally similar to that adopted on the Furutaka cruiser, with individual elements being strengthened: the thickness of the belt was increased to 102 mm, the thickness of the armor deck above the engine rooms reached 70...89 mm, the total weight of the armor increased to 2052 tons. The thickness of the anti-torpedo protection was 2.5 meters.

A sharp increase in displacement (standard - 11 thousand tons, total could exceed 15 thousand tons) required a significant increase in the power of the power plant. The boilers of the Mioko cruisers were initially designed for oil heating; the power on the propeller shafts was 130,000 hp.

History of death:

"Mioko" - during a fierce battle off the island of Samar, it was damaged by a torpedo from a deck torpedo bomber. Despite the damage, he was able to hobble to Singapore. During emergency repairs, it was hit by a B-29. A month later, on December 13, 1944, it was again torpedoed by the submarine USS Bergall - this time it was not possible to restore the combat effectiveness of the Myoko. The cruiser was sunk in shallow waters in Singapore Harbor and was subsequently used as a fixed artillery battery. All that remained of the Myoko was captured by the British in August 1945.

“Nati” - in November 1944, in Manila Bay, was subjected to massive attacks by US Navy carrier-based aircraft, was hit by 10 torpedoes and 21 aerial bombs, broke into three parts and sank.

"Ashigara" - sunk by the British submarine HMS Trenchant in the Bangka Strait (Javan Sea), June 16, 1945.

Takao-class heavy cruisers

Number of units in the series – 4
Years of construction: 1927 – 1932.
Total displacement – ​​15200 - 15900 tons
Crew – 900-920 people.
Armor belt thickness – 102 mm
Main caliber – 10 x 203 mm

They are a natural evolution of the Myoko-class cruisers. They are recognized as the most successful and balanced project among all Japanese heavy cruisers.

Externally they were distinguished by a massive, armored superstructure, which gave the cruisers a resemblance to battleships. The elevation angle of the main caliber guns increased to 70°, which made it possible to fire the main caliber at air targets. Fixed torpedo tubes were replaced with rotating ones - a salvo of 8 “long lances” on each side was capable of finishing off any enemy. The armoring of ammunition magazines has been strengthened. The composition of aviation weapons was expanded to two catapults and three seaplanes. High-strength steel “Dukol” and electric welding are widely used in the design of the hull.

History of death:

"Takao" - came under attack from the American submarine "Darter" on the approach to Leyte Gulf. With difficulty it reached Singapore, where it was turned into a powerful floating battery. On July 31, 1945, the cruiser was finally destroyed by the British dwarf submarine XE-3.

"Tokai" - mortally wounded in a battle near the island of Samar, as a result of a shell hitting a torpedo tube. A few minutes later, the flaming box of the cruiser was bombed by carrier-based aircraft. Due to the complete loss of speed and combat effectiveness, the crew was removed and the cruiser was finished off by the escort destroyer.

Mogami-class heavy cruisers

Number of units in the series – 4
Years of construction: 1931 – 1937.
Total displacement - about 15,000 tons
Crew – 900 people.
Thickness of the armor belt – 100…140 mm
Main caliber – 10 x 203 mm

Having familiarized himself with the information obtained by intelligence about the new Japanese cruiser Mogami, the Chief Designer of Her Majesty's Fleet only whistled: “Are they building a ship out of cardboard?”

Fifteen 155 mm guns in five main battery turrets, universal artillery of 127 mm caliber, long lances, 2 catapults, 3 seaplanes, armor belt thickness - up to 140 mm, massive armored superstructure, power plant with a capacity of 152 thousand hp. ... and all this fit in a hull with a standard displacement of 8500 tons? The Japanese are lying!

"Mogami" with its bow torn off - the result of a collision with the cruiser "Mikuma"

In reality, everything turned out to be much worse - in addition to the forgery of displacement (standard displacement, according to secret calculations, reached 9,500 tons, later it increased to 12,000 tons), the Japanese performed a clever trick with main-caliber artillery - with the start of hostilities, “fake” 155 mm the barrels were dismantled and ten menacing 203 mm guns took their place. "Mogami" turned into a real heavy cruiser.

At the same time, the Mogami-class cruisers were monstrously overloaded, had poor seaworthiness and critically low stability, which, in turn, affected their stability and the accuracy of artillery fire. Due to these shortcomings, the lead cruiser of the project was Mogami in the period from 1942 to 1943. underwent modernization and was turned into an aircraft-carrying cruiser - instead of a stern artillery group, the ship received a hangar for 11 seaplanes.

Aircraft carrier "Mogami"

History of death:

"Mogami" - damaged by artillery fire in the Surigao Strait on the night of October 25, 1944, the next day it was attacked by carrier-based aircraft, collided with the cruiser "Nati" and sank.

Mikuma was the first Japanese cruiser lost in World War II. Was attacked by carrier-based aircraft in the battle of Midway Atoll, June 7, 1942. The detonation of the torpedo ammunition left no chance of salvation: the skeleton of the cruiser, abandoned by the crew, drifted for 24 hours until it disappeared under water.

"Mikuma" after the detonation of its own torpedoes. On the roof of the fourth tower you can see the wreckage of a downed American plane (similar to Gastello’s feat)

Suzuya - sunk by carrier-based aircraft in Leyte Gulf, October 25, 1944. It is noteworthy that the cruiser was named after the Susuya River on the island. Sakhalin.

"Kumano" - lost its bow end in a skirmish with American destroyers in Leyte Gulf, and was damaged by carrier-based aircraft the next day. A week later, while moving to Japan for repairs, he was torpedoed by the submarine Ray, but still managed to reach Luzon. On November 26, 1944, it was finally finished off by carrier-based aircraft in the harbor of Santa Cruz: the cruiser was hit by 5 torpedoes, completely destroying the hull of the Kumano. Oh, and it was a tenacious beast!

Tone-class heavy cruisers

Number of units in the series – 2
Years of construction: 1934 – 1939.
Total displacement – ​​15,200 tons
Crew – 870 people.
Armor belt thickness – 76 mm
Main caliber – 8 x 203 mm
A special feature of the Tone was its advanced aviation armament - up to 8 seaplanes (in reality no more than 4).

"Tone" on the way to Midway

Legend cruiser. A fantastic combat vehicle with four main caliber turrets concentrated in the bow of the hull.

The whimsical appearance of the Tone was dictated by a serious calculation - this arrangement of the main battery towers made it possible to reduce the length of the armored citadel, saving several hundred tons of displacement. By unloading the aft end and shifting the weights to the midsection, the strength of the hull was increased and seaworthiness was improved, the spread of main battery salvos was reduced, and the behavior of the ship as an artillery platform was improved. The freed aft part of the cruiser became a base for the deployment of aviation - now seaplanes were not exposed to the risk of exposure to powder gases, in addition, this made it possible to increase the air group and simplify the operation of aircraft.

However, for all the apparent genius of this solution, the placement of all the main battery turrets in the bow had an important drawback: a dead zone appeared on the stern corners - the problem was partially solved by turning a couple of main battery turrets with their barrels backwards. In addition, one single hit threatened to disable the entire main battery of the cruiser.

In general, despite a number of significant and insignificant shortcomings, the ships turned out to be worthy and frayed a lot of nerves of their opponents.

History of death:

"Tone" - the damaged cruiser was able to escape from Leyte Gulf and reach its native shores. Was restored, but never saw combat at sea again. On July 24, 1945, she was sunk by American aircraft during a raid on the Kure naval base. On July 28, the wreck of the cruiser was bombed again by US Navy aircraft.

"Tikuma" (also known as "Chikuma") - sunk by carrier-based aircraft in Leyte Gulf, October 25, 1944.

Heavy cruiser "Tikuma"

Thank you to all the readers for making it through this entire list of quirky Japanese titles!

Based on materials:
http://www.warfleet.ru/
http://www.wikipedia.org/
http://www.wunderwaffe.narod.ru/
http://hisofweapons.ucoz.ru/

Jump to: navigation, search

"Nati"
那智
Heavy cruiser "Nati" shortly before entering service
Service:	Japan Japan
Vessel class and type	Myoko-class heavy cruiser
Organization	Imperial Japanese Navy
Manufacturer	Kure Naval Arsenal
Ordered for construction	1923
Construction has started	November 26, 1924
Launched	November 15, 1927
Commissioned	November 26, 1928
Status	Sunk by American aircraft on November 5, 1944
Main characteristics
Displacement	standard/full Initially: 10,980/14,194 t After modernization: 12,342/15,933 t
Length	201.74 m (waterline); 203.76 m (largest, after modernization)
Width	19.0 m (largest initially); 20.73 m (after modernization)
Draft	6.23 m (initial); 6.35 m (after modernization)
Booking	Initially: Armor belt - 102 mm; deck - 32-35 mm; anti-tank missiles - 58 mm; towers - 25 mm;
Engines	4 TZA "Kampon", 12 “Kampon Ro Go” boilers
Power	130,000 l. With. (95.6 MW)
Mover	4 propellers
Travel speed	35.5 knots initially, 33.3 after modernization
Cruising range	7,000 nautical miles at 14 knots (effective, original)
Crew	764 people initially; up to 970 on Myoko and Ashigara after the second modernization
Armament (Original)
Artillery	5 × 2 - 200 mm/50 type 3 No. 1
Flak	6 × 1 120 mm/45 type 10, 2 × 7.7 mm Lewis machine guns;
Mine and torpedo weapons	12 (4 × 3) - 610 mm TA type 12 (24 torpedoes type 8);
Aviation group	1 catapult, up to 2 seaplanes
Weapons (After modernization)
Artillery	5 × 2 - 203 mm/50 type 3 No. 2
Flak	4 × 2 127 mm/40 type 89, 4 × 2 - 25 mm/60 type 96 (up to 48 by the end of the war), 2 × 2 13.2 mm machine guns type 93
Mine and torpedo weapons	16 (4 × 4) - 610 mm Type 92 TA (24 Type 93 torpedoes)
Aviation group	2 catapults, up to 4 seaplanes
Images on Wikimedia Commons

"Nati"(Japanese 那智?, after the name of a mountain in Wakayama Prefecture) is a Japanese heavy cruiser, the second laid down and the first representative of the Myoko class to enter service.

Built in Kure in 1924-1928. It was actively used in the interwar period; in 1934-1935 and 1939-1940 it underwent two major modernizations.

During the fighting in the Pacific Theater of World War II in the first half of 1942, as part of the 5th Cruiser Division, he participated in the capture of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. In the battle in the Java Sea on February 27, 1942, she was the flagship of Admiral Takagi, and sank the Dutch cruiser Java with torpedoes. He also took part in the Second Battle of the Java Sea on March 1. Since the spring of 1942 - the flagship of the Fifth Fleet, in this capacity he participated in the Aleutian operation, escorting convoys to Attu and Kiska, the battles of the Commander Islands and in Leyte Gulf. On November 5, 1944, Nati was sunk in Manila Bay by carrier-based aircraft from the American aircraft carriers Lexington and Ticonderoga.

• 1 Construction
• 2 Service history
  • 2.1 Pre-war
  • 2.2 During World War II
  • 2.3 Fate of the ship's remains
• 3 Commanders
• 4 Notes
• 5 Literature

Construction

The order for the construction of the first pair of 10,000-ton cruisers, costing 21.9 million yen, was issued in the spring of 1923. On December 11, 1923, cruiser No. 6 (the second of the pair) was given the name "Nachi", after the mountain in the southeast of Wakayama Prefecture. This name was used for the first time at YIF, although previously it was among those reserved for naming the 8,000-ton ships of the “8-8” program.

"Nati" during sea trials. Listen to the introduction to the article · (inf.)
This audio file was created from the May 31, 2014 version of the article introduction and does not reflect edits after that date. See. also other audio articles

On November 26, 1924, its hull was laid down on slipway No. 3 of the Naval Arsenal in Kure. "Nachi" was built faster than the lead "Myoko". Its launching was already scheduled for October 15, 1926, but due to the collapse of two overloaded portal cranes on December 24, 1925, the bow of the cruiser's hull was seriously damaged, which delayed its launch from the slipway for eight months.

The Nachi was launched on June 15, 1927, in the presence of Prince Morimasa Nashimoto and 35,000 spectators. A political decision was made to put it into operation as quickly as possible in order to meet the naval review scheduled for December 4, 1928, timed to coincide with the coronation of Emperor Hirohito. During sea trials on October 22, 1928, off the island of Ugurujima, with a displacement of 12,200 tons and a vehicle power of 131,481 hp. it developed 35,531 knots, slightly exceeding the contracted 35.5. On November 20 of the same year, “Nati” was accepted by the fleet, but lacking, however, some of the fire control devices, catapult and shields of 120 mm guns.

Service history

Pre-war

After entering service, Nachi took part in the naval parade in honor of the coronation of Emperor Hirohito on December 4, 1928. Then she was returned to the shipyard for completion, where she remained until April 1929.

On May 28-29, 1929, Hirohito aboard the Nachi made an inspection tour of factories in the cities of the Kansai region. In November, all four Myoko-class ships were assigned to the 4th Cruiser Division of the Second Fleet.

From May 17 to June 19, 1930, Nati, together with the rest of the units in the formation, sailed to the southern seas to test the operation of systems in a tropical climate. On November 26, they all took part in a naval review in Yokosuka. At the end of the year, the first chimney on the cruiser was extended by 2 m to reduce gas pollution on the bridge, and rainproof caps were installed on both chimneys.

From March 29 to the end of April 1931, the 4th Division, together with Furutaka and Aoba, operated in the Qingdao area, and participated in exercises in August and September. In November, work began on the cruiser to replace the main battery guns with new Type 3 No. 2 guns, remodel the magazines and lifts for heavier ammunition, and improve ventilation. On August 4, 1932, during the annual maneuvers of the fleet, “Nati”, together with “Myoko”, participated in firing new type 91 armor-piercing shells at the target ship “Haikan No. 4” (former minelayer “Aso”, until 1905 - Russian armored cruiser “ Bayan"), which was then sunk by submarine torpedoes.

On August 16–21, 1933, Nati, together with ships of the same type (now part of the 5th cruiser division), made another voyage to the southern seas, and on the 21st participated in Yokohama. On December 11, on the eve of the start of the first major modernization, it, together with Myoko, was transferred to the Kure district security division, and on February 1, 1934, to a similar formation covering the Sasebo region.

The first stage of work on the Nati was carried out from February to June 1935, during which the old anti-aircraft guns, fixed torpedo tubes and a catapult with an aircraft hangar were dismantled (instead, new ones were installed: respectively 4 × 2 127 mm/40 type 89, 2 × 4 TA type 92 model 1, 2 × type No. 2 model 3), the first tier of the superstructure was extended to the 4th main battery turret (forming a new anti-aircraft deck), the old anti-torpedo bulges were replaced with larger ones, instead of unreliable cruising electric motors they were installed induction turbines, additional rooms for the increased crew were placed on the middle deck. After leaving repairs and until July 10, the cruiser served as an artillery training ship. Then, from mid-July until October 2, he participated in the annual maneuvers, passing through the center of the typhoon on September 26 along with other units of the Fourth Fleet. In October, Nati, along with other ships of the same type, went through the second stage of modernization work, receiving new searchlights and two quad 13.2 mm machine guns, while SUAZO type 91 and Lewis machine guns were also moved. The third stage was carried out there in January-March 1936, following the results of investigations into incidents with the Fourth Fleet and the explosion in the turret of the cruiser Ashigara: the weak points of the hull were strengthened with 25 mm plates, and the system for purging the barrels of main battery guns after firing was improved. In April, the 5th Division conducted firing exercises in the Yellow Sea. Finally, from May 25 to June 29, Nachi, together with Myoko and Haguro, underwent the fourth stage of work in Sasebo, during which a more powerful cargo boom drive was installed on the mainmast, and its supports were strengthened. In August-September, the cruiser took part in the annual fleet maneuvers, making a trip to the Taiwan area.

From March 27 to April 6, 1937, Nachi, together with Myoko and Haguro, made a short trip to the Qingdao area and back. After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, all four cruisers of the Myoko, Maya class and the 2nd destroyer squadron participated in the transfer of the 3rd Infantry Division of the YIA to Shanghai on August 20–23. On August 20–21, “Nati” itself transported the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 6th Infantry Regiment that was part of it from Atsuta to the Maan Islands. In September and November, together with the Haguro, he made several more trips to the coast of Northern China and after that, on December 1, he was withdrawn to the reserve.

The cruiser underwent its second major modernization between January 1939 and March 1940 in Sasebo. It consisted of installing a second pair of torpedo tubes, four twin anti-aircraft guns type 96 and two twin machine guns type 93 (the quadruple ones were removed), the catapults were replaced with new type No. 2 model 5, the boules were replaced with improved ones, the fire control devices were installed the same as previously on "Ashigaru". A central communications post, an encryption room and a centralized control post for flooding and draining compartments were also equipped.

From February 17 to March 12, 1941, Nachi, together with Haguro, made a voyage from Sasebo to the coast of Southern China and back. After docking on March 13–20, he moved to the Palau Islands on March 29–April 8, and returned back on March 12–26. In May, a demagnetizing winding of the hull and a torpedo fire control post on the foremast were installed on the cruiser - just like on the last Myoko, which underwent the second modernization.

The Nachi spent the summer of 1941 engaged in combat training off its shores, and at the beginning of September it was docked in Sasebo. On November 23, the cruiser left Kure with full reserves of ammunition, fuel and supplies, and visiting Sasebo and Mako along the way, arrived on the Palau Islands on December 6.

During the Second World War

After the outbreak of war, Nachi, along with Myoko and Haguro, took part in Operation M (the capture of the southern Philippines). On December 11, he covered the landing at Legazpi, on December 19-20 at Davao, on December 24 on Jolo Island. On January 4, 1942, due to damage during the bombing of the flagship of the 5th division "Myoko" (on the "Nati" stationed 500 m from it, fragments of the same bomb from a B-17 destroyed a searchlight and wounded the commander of an artillery warhead), its commander, Admiral Takagi moved his flag to Nachi.

On January 9, the cruiser, together with Haguro, left Davao to participate in Operation H (capture of Sulawesi), during which it initially escorted transports, and then covered the landings of troops - on the 11th at Manado and Kema, on the 24th at Kendari. On the 26th, it was attacked by the American submarine Sailfish, which fired four Mk 14 torpedoes at it. Although its commander, Captain 3rd Rank Vogue, claimed that he heard explosions and the sound of the propellers stopping, the Nachi and Haguro suffered no damage. got.

On January 30, the cruiser covered the landing on Ambon, and on February 9, in Makassar. Stationed at Staring Bay from 10 to 17 February, she supported the capture of Dili and Kupang on Timor on the 20th.

On February 27, Nachi (Admiral Takagi's flagship) and Haguro, together with the 2nd and 4th EEM (light cruisers Naka and Jintsu, 14 destroyers) took part in the battle in the Java Sea with the ABDA fleet (2 heavy and 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers). At the first stage of the battle, which initially consisted of an artillery duel at very long distances (Nati opened fire at 16:16 from a range of 25.6 km) and lasted about an hour, the cruiser fired 845 shots with the main caliber and achieved, together with Haguro, five hits: two at De Ruyter, two at Exeter and one at Houston. Only one of them had serious consequences - at 17:08, a 203-mm shell from the Haguro exploded in the boiler room of the Exeter, reducing its speed to 11 knots and forcing it to withdraw from the battle due to the loss of power to the gun turrets. During the subsequent attack by Allied destroyers, both ships fired another 302 203-mm shells (probably without hitting) and turned north, breaking fire contact. Finally, during the night phase of the battle at 23:46, one of the eight Type 93 torpedoes launched by the Nati fourteen minutes earlier hit the Java in the area of ​​the stern magazines, causing them to detonate and tear off a tip about 30 meters long, after which the cruiser stayed afloat 15 minutes.

On March 1, 1942, Nati took part in finishing off the remnants of the ABDA fleet (Exeter with two destroyers), known as the Second Battle of the Java Sea. Due to the high consumption of ammunition in the previous battle, its contribution, like the Haguro, was quite limited - 170 fired 203-mm shells and 4 torpedoes, the main role was played by the Myoko and Ashigara with destroyers.

The composition of the armament of the cruiser "Nati" in different years
	December 1928	April 1929	December 1932	June 1935	October 1935	March 1940	May 1943	January 1944	October 1944
Main caliber	5 × 2 - 200 mm/50 type 3 No. 1		5 × 2 - 203.2 mm/50 type 3 No. 2
Universal artillery	6 × 1 - 120 mm/45 type 3			4 × 2 - 127 mm/40 type 89
Small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery	2 × 1 7.7 mm Lewis				2 × 4 13.2 mm type 93, 2 × 1 7.7 mm Lewis	4 × 2 - 25 mm/60 type 96, 2 × 2 13.2 mm type 93	8 × 2 - 25 mm/60 type 96, 2 × 2 13.2 mm type 93	8 × 2, 8 × 1 - 25 mm/60 type 96	10 × 2, 28 × 1 - 25 mm/60 type 96
Torpedo weapons	4 × 3 - 610 mm TA type 12					4 × 4 - 610 mm TA type 92 model 1			2 × 4 - 610 mm TA type 92 model 1
Catapults	-	1 × type No. 1 model 1		2 × type No. 2 model 3		2 × type No. 2 model 5

On March 2-17, "Nati" moved to Sasebo (with visits to Kendari and Makassar), where she was expelled from the 5th Division, and until April 7 she underwent repairs and dry-docking there. At the same time, it was converted into a flagship for operation in northern waters, and after the 7-25 April campaign to the shores of Hokkaido, on the 29th, the commander of the Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Hosogaya, raised his flag on it. On May 3, the cruiser moved to Akkesi and left there on the 6th, heading to the Kuril Islands. However, on 10-12 he, together with the Tama, towed the tanker Syria with a damaged rudder along the return route. On May 12-15, Nati moved to Ominato, where she began repairs.

On June 2, the cruiser arrived at Paramushir, and after refueling from the Nissan-Maru tanker, she went to sea on June 3 to participate in Operation AL. Until returning to Ominato on the 23rd, he covered the landing of troops on Attu, patrolling the ocean south of the island. From June 28 to July 14, Nati made a second trip to this area, then from 24 to 30 she docked in Yokosuka. On July 14, she was transferred to the 21st Cruiser Division (Tama and Kiso), while remaining the flagship of the Fifth Fleet. On August 2, “Nachi” left Yokosuka and until the twentieth of March 1943 plyed the Paramushir-Ominato route. On September 30, 1942, due to an erroneous report of the appearance of American ships, she set out to intercept them; in February she underwent repairs in Sasebo (with the installation of windproof visors).

On March 26, 1943, Nati, as part of the Northern Forces, took part in the battle of the Commander Islands. During it, he fired 707 203-mm shells and 16 Type 93 torpedoes, damaging the cruiser Salt Lake City and the destroyer Bailey, while receiving five hits from return fire. All of them were inflicted by fire from 127 mm guns. The first shell exploded at the rear of the compass bridge, breaking part of the electrical circuits of the fire control system, the second damaged one of the foremast supports, the third damaged the catapult and one of the seaplanes. The fourth shell hit the main battery turret No. 1, jamming it, the fifth hit the signal platform on the starboard side. The cruiser's crew lost 14 people killed and 27 wounded during the battle.

On April 3, Nachi arrived in Yokosuka and began repairs there, which lasted until May 11. In addition to repairing the damage, it was equipped with a No. 21 air target detection radar and an additional 4 twin Type 96 anti-aircraft guns, doubling the number of their barrels to 16.

In May-June, the cruiser again cruised from Ominato to Paramushir and back. On July 10-15, he and “Maya” went out to evacuate the garrison of Kiska Island, but they were forced to return due to weather conditions. On August 5, the Northern Forces were disbanded, and the Fifth Fleet, together with Nati, became organizationally part of the fleet of the North-Eastern zone.

At the end of August, universal radar No. 21 of the 3rd modification was installed on a trial basis on the cruiser in Ominato. On September 6, when leaving the port, Nati was attacked by the American submarine Halibat, which fired 4 torpedoes at it, of which only one hit and, without exploding, caused minor damage. In September-November the cruiser operated in northern waters. From December 9 to January 15, 1944, it underwent a second military modernization in Sasebo, during which 8 single type 96 machine guns were installed (the number of barrels after that was 24) and a surface target detection radar No. 22, an experimental radar No. 21 of the 3rd modification was replaced by the usual 2nd modification. In February-March, “Nachi” made trips to Tokuyama and Mutsu Bay, and from April 2 to August 2, together with “Ashigara”, it was part of the Ominato security district, with a break for repairs in Yokosuka on the twentieth of June. Until October, the cruiser did not leave the Inland Sea; in the second half of September, the third military modernization took place in Kure, with the addition of 2 more twin and 20 single anti-aircraft guns (total number of guns - 48), the installation of the OVTs radar No. 13 and the dismantling of the second pair of torpedo guns. devices. Also, the ONTs radar No. 22 of the 4th modification was modernized with the installation of a superheterodyne receiver and then made it possible to control artillery fire; the Type 92 target tracking sights, which had become unnecessary, were removed.

On October 14-16, the 21st Division (Nachi and Ashigara, Commander-Vice Admiral Shima) moved to Amamioshima Island. On the 23rd, in preparation for Operation Sho Go, she arrived at Coron Bay in the Philippines and joined the Second Raid Force, Nati becoming its flagship. On the morning of October 25, in the Surigao Strait, both cruisers, during a short battle with Oldendorf’s ships, fired 8 torpedoes without achieving hits, and then returned to Manila. At the same time, the Nati rammed the damaged Mogami, receiving a 15-meter hole on the port side of the bow and a maximum speed limit of 20 knots, and the 127-mm installation No. 2 was also destroyed.

On October 27-28, together with the Ashigara, he moved from Coron Bay to Manila and was docked at Shipyard No. 103 in Cavite. On the 29th, the cruiser was attacked by carrier-based aircraft of American Task Force 38.2, receiving an aerial bomb hit in the catapult area, 53 crew members were killed and wounded. On November 2, the repairs were completed and the cruiser began preparing to participate in Operation TA (conducting military convoys to Ormoc on the island of Leyte).

On the morning of November 5, 1944, the Nati in Manila Bay was attacked by carrier-based aircraft from the American aircraft carriers Lexington and Ticonderoga of Rear Admiral Sherman's Task Force 38.3. During the first two raids, the cruiser did not receive any damage and went to the open sea, but at about 12:50 it was subjected to a third raid consisting of approximately 60 aircraft, receiving two or three torpedo hits and five bomb hits, and as a result of the flooding of the starboard boiler rooms, it lost speed . By 14:00 the list was leveled by counter-flooding, preparations were underway for launching vehicles or towing with the help of the destroyer Akebono. 14:45 "Nati" was subjected to the fourth raid, receiving 5 torpedoes, 15 bombs and 16 missiles in a short period of time and was torn into three parts, the central one sank at 14:50 at a point with coordinates 14°31′ N. w. 120°44′ E. d. / 14.517° n. w. 120.733° E. d. / 14.517; 120.733(G)(O). 807 crew members were killed, including the cruiser commander, Captain 1st Rank Kanooka, and 74 members of the Fifth Fleet headquarters (Admiral Shima was ashore at the time of the battle), about 220 were rescued by the destroyers Kasumi and Ushio, despite active opposition from American aircraft .

The fate of the ship's remains

In March–April 1945, divers from the American ship Chanticleer visited the site of the cruiser's sinking. They found the central and aft parts of the ship lying at a depth of 30 meters with a list of 45° to the starboard side; the previously severed bow end could not be found. During 296 dives, several radar antennas, maps of Japanese fortifications on Luzon, code books and banknotes worth two million yen were brought to the surface. After completion of the work, the cruiser's masts were blown up so as not to interfere with traffic on the shipping fairway.

In the post-war period, rumors spread about the alleged gold on board the Nati. Around the 1970s, the remains of the cruiser were completely removed from the bottom as they posed a navigational hazard; in 2000, Australian diver Kevin Denley, who carried out a detailed search for them, could no longer find anything. He also discovered that their usually indicated position (west or southwest of the island of Corregidor) was in the diametrically opposite direction from the real one, known from documents from the Chanticleer - almost in the center of Manila Bay, on the main shipping channel.

Commanders

• 10.9.1928 - 30.11.1929 captain 1st rank (taisa) Yoshiyuki Niiyama (Japanese: 新山良幸);
• 11/30/1929 - 12/1/1930 captain 1st rank (taisa) Jiro Onishi (Japanese: 大西次郎);
• 12/1/1930 - 12/1/1931 captain 1st rank (taisa) Noboru Hirata (Japanese: 平田昇);
• 12/1/1931 - 12/1/1932 captain 1st rank (taisa) Hiroyoshi Tabata (Japanese: 田畑啓義);
• 12/1/1932 - 11/15/1933 captain 1st rank (taisa) Yoshinosuke Owada (Japanese: 大和田芳之介);
• 11/15/1933 - 11/15/1934 captain 1st rank (taisa) Fuchin Iwaihara (Japanese: 祝原不知名);
• 11/15/1934 - 12/2/1935 captain 1st rank (taisa) Teruhisa Komatsu (Japanese: 小松輝久);
• 12/2/1935 - 11/16/1936 captain 1st rank (taisa) Michitaro Totsuka (Japanese: 戸塚道太郎);
• 11/15/1936 - 12/1/1937 captain 1st rank (taisa) Ryozo Fukuda (Japanese: 福田良三);
• 12/1/1937 - 10/10/1939 captain 1st rank (taisa) Kanki Iwagoe (Japanese: 岩越寒季);
• (acting) 10.10.1939 - 15.11.1939 captain 1st rank (taisa) Tsutomu Sato (Japanese: 佐藤勉);
• 11/15/1939 - 11/15/1940 captain 1st rank (taisa) Sukeyoshi Yatsushiro (Japanese: 八代祐吉);
• 11/15/1940 - 8/20/1941 captain 1st rank (taisa) Tamotsu Takama (Japanese: 高間完);
• 20.8.1941 - 16.11.1942 captain 1st rank (taisa) Takahiko Kiyota (Japanese: 清田孝彦);
• 11/16/1942 - 9/10/1943 captain 1st rank (taisa) Akira Sone (Japanese: 曽爾章);
• 10.9.1943 - 20.8.1944 captain 1st rank (taisa) Shiro Shibuya (Japanese: 渋谷紫郎);
• 20.8.1944 - 5.11.1944 captain 1st rank (taisa) Empei Kanooka (Japanese: 鹿岡円平).

Notes

Comments

1. Upon entry into service, they were classified as 1st class cruisers (itto junyokan, according to displacement), since 1931 as class A (ko-kyu junyokan, with an 8-inch main caliber, that is, heavy).
2. Rear Admiral (shosho) from November 1, 1942.
3. Posthumously promoted to the rank of rear admiral (shosho).

Used literature and sources

1. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 809.
2. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 812.
3. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 84.
4. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 87.
5. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 808.
6. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 85.
7. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 107.
8. 1 2 3 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 86.
9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Hackett and Kingsepp, 1997.
10. 1 2 3 4 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 109.
11. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 113.
12. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 220-224.
13. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 224.
14. 1 2 3 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 224-225.
15. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 225.
16. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 226.
17. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 227.
18. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 274.
19. 1 2 3 4 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 275.
20. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 266-269.
21. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 276.
22. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 296.
23. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 297.
24. Cox, 2014, p. 285.
25. Cox, 2014, p. 290.
26. Cox, 2014, p. 298.
27. 1 2 3 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 298.
28. Cox, 2014, p. 296.
29. Cox, 2014, p. 302-304.
30. Cox, 2014, p. 317.
31. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 315.
32. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 327.
33. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 342-344.
34. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 299.
35. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 300.
36. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 302.
37. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 314.
38. 1 2 3 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 316.
39. 1 2 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 326.
40. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 341.
41. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 338.
42. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 344.
43. Tully, 2009, p. 222-223.
44. Tully, 2009, p. 224-225.
45. 1 2 3 Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 351.
46. Lacroix and Wells, 1997, p. 356.
47. 1 2 3 Tully, 2003.
48. Niiyama, Yoshiyuki. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
49. Onishi, Jiro. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
50. Tabata, Hiroyoshi. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
51. Owada, Yoshinosuke. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
52. Iwaihara, Fuchina. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
53. Komatsu, Teruhisa. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
54. Totsuka, Michitaro. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
55. Fukuda, Ryozo. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
56. Iwagoe, Kanki. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
57. Sato, Tsutomu. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
58. Yatsushiro, Sukeyoshi. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
59. Takama, Tamotsu. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
60. Kiyota, Takahiko. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
61. Sone, Akira. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
62. Shibuya, Shiro. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.
63. Kanooka, Enpei. Imperial Japanese Navy. Retrieved April 7, 2014.

Literature

• Bob Hackett; Sander Kingsepp. CombinedFleet.com IJNMS NACHI:Tabular Record of Movement. JUNYOKAN!.Combinedfleet.com (1997).
• Eric Lacroix, Linton Wells II. Japanese cruisers of the Pacific war. - Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. - 882 p. - ISBN 1-86176-058-2.
• Tully, Anthony P. CombinedFleet.com The NACHI ~ MOGAMI Collision: A Study in the Fragility of History. Combinedfleet.com (1997).
• Tully, Anthony P. CombinedFleet.com Located/Surveyed Shipwrecks of the Imperial Japanese Navy.Combinedfleet.com (2003).
• Anthony Tully. Battle of Surigao Strait. - Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. - 329 p. - ISBN 978-0-253-35242-2.
• Jeffrey Cox. Rising Sun, Falling Skies: The Disastrous Java Sea Campaign of World War II. - Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2014. - 480 p. - ISBN 978-1-78096-726-4.

Cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy Heavy cruisers Furutaka-class cruisers "Furutaka" · "Kako" Aoba-class cruisers "Aoba" · "Kinugasa" Myoko-class cruisers "Myoko" · "Ashigara" · "Nati""Haguro" Takao-class cruisers "Takao" · "Maya" · "Cyokai" · "Atago" Mogami-class cruisers* "Mogami" · "Mikuma" · "Suzuya" · "Kumano" Tone-class cruisers "Tone" · "Tikuma" Light cruisers Tikuma-class cruisers "Chikuma" · "Yahagi" · "Hirado" Tenryu-class cruisers "Tenryu" · "Tatsuta" Kuma-class cruisers "Kuma" · "Tama" · "Kitakami" · "Oi" · "Kiso" Nagara-class cruisers "Nagara" · "Isuzu" · "Natori" · "Yura" · "Kinu" · "Abukuma" Sendai-class cruisers "Sendai" · "Jintsu" · "Naka" · "Kako" (disassembled on the slipway) Yubari-class cruisers "Yubari" Yoshima-class cruisers "Yoshima" "Yashoshima" Katori-class cruisers “Katori” · “Kashima” · “Kasii” Agano-class cruisers "Agano" · "Noshiro" · "Yahagi" · "Sakawa" Oyodo-class cruisers "Oyodo" · "Niyodo" (not pawned) * Laid out as light ones, with the possibility of conversion into heavy ones.

Which was then a Dutch colony. English and American ships came to the aid of the Dutch fleet. Dutch Vice Admiral Gelfric took overall command. Carrier-based aircraft were the mainstay of the Japanese offensive, and the Allies suffered heavy losses. The British began to persuade the commander to withdraw the naval forces in order to preserve them for future use elsewhere, but the Dutch decided to fight to the end.
Japanese heavy cruiser Nachi
(1934 11,000 tons, 34 knots, ten mm guns

493
Cruisers
With fuel supplies nearly exhausted, Gelfric finally agreed to withdraw some of his forces. The Allies had at their disposal the damaged American cruiser Houston and the English heavy cruiser
"Exeter" (participant in the sinking of the ship Admiral Graf Spee), the Australian cruiser Perth and three destroyers. The Dutch had the cruisers De Ruyter and Java and two destroyers. The combined squadron was commanded by the Dutch Rear Admiral Doorman.
On the afternoon of February 26, a report was received of a large Japanese convoy sailing off the coast of Borneo. Admiral Doorman's small, ragtag force was ordered to sea for a night attack. The order ended with the words “You must continue attacks until the enemy is destroyed.”
The Japanese convoy, discovered by American patrol planes, consisted of transport. In addition to direct protection from two detachments of destroyers (2 light cruisers and 14 destroyers), long-range cover was provided by the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro, which followed behind the convoy. The Japanese unit was commanded by Rear Admiral Tanaka.
Allied cruisers moved at speed
24 knots in wake formation - De Ruyter in the head, followed by Exeter, Houston, Perth and Java. Nine destroyers provided security. This formation was good for protection against submarines, but was not suitable for artillery combat, since in this case the destroyers had to be ahead of the heavier ships in order to take a favorable position for a torpedo attack. At about 16:00 the enemy was discovered. However, the allies did not meet what they expected. Admiral Tanaka received word of the enemy sighting at 12:30 p.m. from a seaplane pilot. Therefore, he ordered the transports, escorted by patrolmen, to begin retreating north. The heavy cruisers sharply increased their speed and caught up with the security forces. They appeared in the battle area almost simultaneously with the establishment of visual contact with the enemy. Thus, instead of transports and light ships, the Allies encountered a powerful squadron of four cruisers and fourteen destroyers.
Visibility was good, the strong east wind raised significant waves. At 1616 hours, the Japanese cruisers opened fire at maximum range, and the Allied ships changed course to port to bring all guns into action. Both formations followed western courses, with the Japanese slightly ahead, and the battle distance gradually decreased. At first, Japanese shells fell around the Allied cruisers, without causing them much damage, however, just like the Allies did to the Japanese. Java then took a hit, which did not do much damage to her. Both sides continued to fire from long range until 17:00, when Japanese destroyers launched a torpedo attack. While maneuvering to avoid torpedoes, Exeter was hit in the engine room by a mm shell. The shell easily penetrated the English destroyer Jupiter
(1932 1900 tons, 36 knots, four mm guns and four torpedo tubes

THE AGE OF MACHINES
the thin armor of the Washington cruiser and broke the main steam pipeline. The ship rolled out of formation to the left, its speed dropped to 15 knots. The Dutch destroyer was hit by a torpedo and sank instantly. The Allied line collapsed.
Doorman ordered a smoke screen to be placed between the damaged Exeter and the enemy. The English destroyer Elektrav Smoke collided point-blank with Japanese destroyers, received many hits and sank a few minutes later. Doorman reassembled his cruisers and turned north to renew the battle. The Exeter, accompanied by an also damaged Dutch destroyer, was sent to base. At 18:30 the Allied cruisers headed northeast, followed by the remaining destroyers. After a short skirmish in the dark with enemy cruisers, the formation turned south again. About an hour later, four American destroyers, low on fuel, returned to the Indonesian port of Surabaya, where they found Exeter and a Dutch destroyer. Thus, only two British destroyers remained at sea with four cruisers. At 21:30 the destroyer Jupiter hit a mine and sank, the second destroyer was ordered to pick up people. So the cruisers were left without an escort.
At 23:00 the Japanese cruisers Nachi and Haguro appeared again. In the ensuing battle, De Ruyter was hit

The cruiser to the stern, which forced him to turn to the side. A few minutes later, Java and De Ruyter were hit by a torpedo. Both ships caught fire. Crews were seen abandoning ships amid explosions of ammunition. Soon the cruisers sank. Only Houston and Perth survived, and they hurried back to base. However, soon the remnants of the Allied force were finished off by Japanese cruisers and aircraft. Only four American destroyers, which broke through to Australia, were able to escape. The Japanese had one heavy cruiser slightly damaged.
In this battle, powerful Japanese cruisers, created specifically to destroy enemy ships, showed their best qualities. However, the allies did not provide them with such an opportunity anymore. They preferred to field battleships against Japanese heavy cruisers or destroy them with aircraft.
POST-WAR CRUISERS
In the 10 years following the end of World War II, the construction of warships decreased significantly. The only exception was the Soviet Sverdlov-class cruisers, laid down in 1948–1953 mainly for reasons of prestige.
Cruisers of this type were a development of the ships of the Chapaev series. In total, it was planned to build 25 units, but 21 were laid down, of which seven were laid down in October 1959. Soviet cruiser
"Chapaev"

THE AGE OF MACHINES
years were removed from construction and dismantled for metal. This is the largest series of large surface ships in the entire summer history of the Russian fleet. The lead cruiser was laid down on January 21, 1948, and the last in April. These were large fast ships (15,450 tons, 34 knots, length, width - 22 m, twelve mm and mm guns, thirty-two mm anti-aircraft guns, armor mm belt, mm deck and mm turret armor. Thus, by all indicators, this was a typical World War II cruiser.
In other states during this period, only cruisers laid down at the start of the war entered service. Examples include the American "Worcester"
(12,500 tons, 32 knots, twelve mm guns, twenty mm cannons, French De Grasse" (10,000 tons, 33.5 knots, sixteen mm guns, Soviet "Chapaev" and Dutch De Ruyter."
In the mid-s, a new type of weapon - a rocket - reached a fairly high degree of perfection, acquired a solid foundation and began to be used both on land and at sea. The rocket had a more powerful destructive force than even the largest caliber projectile, and the accuracy of hitting the target was far superior to artillery. The leading naval powers wanted to equip their ships with this new weapon, but they were not yet ready to build special carriers for it.
In the early 1990s, American naval doctrine placed emphasis on the construction of aircraft carriers. Shipyards are beginning to lay down ships of unprecedented size. However, these giants, filled with aviation flammable ammunition, turned out to be so vulnerable to any weapon that it was impossible to release them into the sea as a hopeless escort. Therefore, the fleet’s focus on attack aircraft carriers changed the requirements for all other ships. To protect aircraft carrier strike formations, ships were required that were equipped with more powerful anti-aircraft anti-submarine weapons than previous destroyers. The choice was made on large URO frigates (guided missile weapons. But since the development of these frigates was delayed and they could not be commissioned until the beginning of the year, the idea arose to adapt military-built cruisers for this purpose, modernizing them and equipping them with UROs. Just in time for this USA was accepted onto the American cruiser Boston after modernization in 1955

Cruiser armament is a good anti-aircraft guided missile Terrier (length, weight -
1360 kg, range - 32 km).
The United States was the first to rebuild its cruisers, which in 1955-1956 mounted two twin launchers (Terrier missile ammunition) in place of the aft turrets of heavy cruisers such as Baltimore, Boston and Canberra, leaving the bow armament in the same form. A similar modernization, affecting only the stern part of the ship, was carried out in 1957–1960 on six Cleveland-class light cruisers. Three of them received a twin installation of Terrier missile ammunition; the other three received a twin missile launcher of the Talos type (length, weight - 3160 kg, range - 130 km, missile ammunition).
Finally, the decision was made to install missile launchers at both ends of the ship. The first Baltimore-class cruisers to undergo such reconstruction in 1958–1962 were Albany, Chicago and Columbus. The ethical ships borrowed only the hull from the prototype; everything else was redone. Even chimneys have been replaced by tall chimneys in the form of masts, convenient for attaching locator antennas. The ships' armament consisted of two twin Talos installations (ammunition -
92 missiles, two twin Tartar lengths, weight - 545 kg, range - 16 km, ammunition - 80 missiles, two mm guns, two helicopters, as well as an Asrok anti-submarine guided missile torpedo system (length, weight - 454 kg).
The history of gun cruisers in the US Navy ends with these ships. In subsequent years, the Americans built completely new guided missile cruisers, specifically designed to protect aircraft carrier formations.
Following the example of the United States, Italy and Holland converted their cruisers in 1962–1964. The Italians on the Garibaldi replaced the stern mm guns with a twin Terrier missile launcher (72 missiles), and the main caliber bow guns were replaced with turrets with mm universal cannons. The Garibaldi became the only surface ship in the world capable of carrying ballistic missiles, four silos were mounted on it for Polaris missiles Dutch cruisers De
Reuther and De Zeven Provincien retained the bow mm guns, and instead of the aft turrets, a twin Terrier launcher (40 missiles) was installed. In 1974, both ships were sold to Peru.
The fate of the English cruisers was different. Having lost its dominant position as the Lady of the Seas after the Second World War, Great Britain was forced to follow the lead of its stronger partner - the United States. And everything after-
Dutch cruiser De Zeven Provincien" after modernization
1962

THE AGE OF MACHINES
The ongoing development of the English fleet represents weak attempts to copy American strategy. There are only four aircraft carriers left in the Royal Navy. Cruisers were needed to protect them
URO, therefore, it was decided to complete the construction of three Tiger-class cruisers (9500 tons, 31.5 knots, four mm and six mm guns, mm side belt and mm deck. The construction of these ships, laid down in 1942, was suspended and resumed only in The lead ship entered service in 1959, the other two in 1960.
However, they did not create missiles for them, and the cruisers became purely artillery ships. Only in 1965–1969 did the strengthening of their anti-submarine weapons begin. They decided to turn two ships into helicopter carrier cruisers. The aft two-gun turret was removed, and a hangar for four C-type anti-submarine helicopters (ASW) was installed in its place.
King." A runway and landing pad was installed right at the stern.
Of the European NATO countries, only France and Italy built new ships, which are officially called cruisers.
In 1958, the French built an air defense cruiser of the new Colbert project (8720 tons,
32 knots, sixteen mm and twelve mm universal guns. From April 1970 to October 1972, the purely gunship was converted into a missile cruiser. Its armament now consists of two mm guns,