D Prokhorovka event. Tank battle near Prokhorovka - clearly in numbers

The battle continued. The Oryol-Kursk section of the Central Front successfully resisted the Wehrmacht soldiers. In the Belgorod sector, on the contrary, the initiative was in the hands of the Germans: their offensive continued in a south-eastern direction, which posed a threat to two fronts at once. The site of the main battle was to be a small field near the village of Prokhorovka.

The choice of area for combat operations was carried out based on geographical features - the terrain made it possible to stop the German breakthrough and deliver a powerful counterattack by the forces of the Steppe Front. On July 9, by order of the command, the 5th Combined Arms and 5th Tank Guards Armies moved to the Prokhorovka area. The Germans advanced here, changing their attack direction.

Tank battle near Prokhorovka. Central battle

Both armies concentrated large tank forces in the village area. It became clear that an oncoming battle simply could not be avoided. On the evening of July 11, the German divisions began an attempt to attack the flanks, and our troops had to use significant forces and even bring in reserves to stop the breakthrough. On the morning of July 12, at 8:15, she launched a counteroffensive. This time was not chosen by chance - the Germans' aimed shooting was made difficult as a result of being blinded by the rising sun. Within an hour, the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka acquired a colossal scale. At the center of the fierce battle were approximately 1,000-1,200 German and Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery units.

For many kilometers the grinding of colliding combat vehicles and the roar of engines could be heard. The planes flew in a whole “swarm”, resembling clouds. The field was burning, more and more explosions shook the ground. The sun was obscured by clouds of smoke, ash, and sand. The smell of hot metal, burning, and gunpowder hung in the air. Choking smoke spread across the field, stinging the soldiers’ eyes and preventing them from breathing. The tanks could only be distinguished by their silhouettes.

Battle of Prokhorovka. Tank battles

On this day, battles were fought not only in the main direction. South of the village, a German tank group attempted to penetrate our forces’ left flank. The enemy's advance was stopped. At the same time, the enemy sent about a hundred tanks to capture the heights near Prokhorovka. They were opposed by soldiers of the 95th Guards Division. The battle lasted three hours and the German attack ultimately failed.

How the Battle of Prokhorovka ended

At approximately 13:00, the Germans once again tried to turn the tide of the battle in the central direction and launched an attack on the right flank with two divisions. However, this attack was also neutralized. Our tanks began to push the enemy back and by evening they were able to push him back 10-15 km. The Battle of Prokhorovka was won and the enemy advance was stopped. Hitler's troops suffered heavy losses, their attacking potential on the Belgorod sector of the front was exhausted. After this battle, right up to the Victory, our army did not let go of the strategic initiative.

Bottom line ? Parties USSR Third Reich Commanders Pavel Rotmistrov
lieutenant general Paul Hausser
SS Gruppenführer Strengths of the parties ? ? Losses ? ?
The Great Patriotic War
Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

Battle of Prokhorovka- a battle between units of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It is considered one of the largest battles involving armored forces in military history. Happened on July 12, 1943 on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station on the territory of the Oktyabrsky state farm (Belgorod region of the RSFSR).

Direct command of the troops during the battle was carried out by Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Pavel Rotmistrov and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

The situation on the eve of the battle

Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo-Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards Armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, the front commander signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack, delivered by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.

Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command on the evening of July 9 decided, without stopping the offensive on Oboyan, to shift the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka and reach Kursk through the bend of the Psel River.

By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. From this area it was planned to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

It should be noted that by this time the German offensive on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge had already begun to dry up - from July 10, the advancing units began to go on the defensive.

Major General Mikhail Ovsyannikov recalls:

Strengths of the parties

Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly lower figure is indicated - 1200.

Many modern researchers believe that the forces brought into the battle were probably significantly smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such an area.

Germany

From the western direction, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2 SS Tank Corps) was advancing on Prokhorovka, while the Adolf Hitler division operated in the zone between the Psel River and the railway, and from the southern direction - the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 Tank Corps). The presence of tanks and assault guns in the 2nd SS Tank Tank divisions as of the evening of July 11 and 3rd Tank Tank as of the morning of July 12th is shown in the table.

The strength of units and formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps 4 TA and the 3rd Panzer Corps AG "Kempf" on July 11, 1943
Pz.II Pz.III
50/L42
Pz.III
50/L60
Pz.III
75 mm
Pz.IV
L24
Pz.IV
L43 and L48
Pz.VI "Tiger" T-34 Total tanks and StuG
2nd SS Panzer Corps
Td Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler" (at 19.25 11.07) 4 - 5 - - 47 4 - 10 7 77
TD SS "Das Reich" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 34 - - 18 1 8 27 7 95
TD SS "Totenkopf" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 54 - 4 26 10 - 21 7 122
2nd SS Panzer Corps, total 4 - 93 - 4 91 15 8 58 21 294
3rd Tank Corps
6th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 11) 2 2 11 ? - 6 - - - 2 23 (?)
7th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 24 2 1 9 - - - 3 39
19th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 7 4 - 3 - - - 1 15
503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of July 11) - - - - - - 23 - - - 23
228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of July 12) - - - - - - - - 19 - 19
3rd Tank Corps, total 2 2 42 6 1 18 23 - 19 6 119

USSR

The Soviet group included the following forces:

  • 5th Guards Tank Army consisting of
    • 18th Tank Corps (18 TK)
    • 29th Tank Corps (29 TK)
    • 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards MK)
  • The 5th Guards Tank Army was also reinforced with formations
    • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards TTK)
The state of the equipment and support of the 5th Guards Tank Army at 17:00 on July 11, 1943
Combat vehicles 29 tk 18 tk 2 tk 2nd Guards tk 5th Guards mk army units Total
T-34 120 68 35 84 120 36 436
T-70 81 58 46 52 56 8 301
Mk IV - 18 4 3 - - 25
SU-122 12 - - - 10 - 22
SU-76 8 - - - 7 - 15
Total tanks and self-propelled guns 221 134 85 139 193 44 826
On the way to the station Prokhorovka 13 33 - - 51 4 101
Under repair 2 6 9 - 1 6 24
Total armored units 236 183 94 139 245 54 951

G. A. Oleynikov, as of July 10, has 850 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Mk IV Churchill and 57 SU-152.

The assessment of the forces of the parties very much depends on the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps were advancing - a total of 348 tanks.

Plans of the parties

1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having brought large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the north. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).

In the area of ​​Pokrovka, Yakovlevo, Bol. Beacons marked up to 100 enemy tanks.

2. 5th Guards. tank army with 2 tanks, 2 guards. Ttk, 10th Iptbr, 27th cannon artillery brigade (pabr), 522nd and 1148th high-power howitzer artillery regiment (gap), 26th zen. Div., 16 and 18 GMP (Guards Mortar Regiment), 1329 Sap (self-propelled artillery regiment) from 10.00 on 07/12/43 strikes in the zone: on the right - Beregovoye, Andreevka (excl.), Krasnaya Polyana, Krasnaya Dubrava; on the left - Pravorot, Belenikhino, elev. 232.0, mound with elevation. +1.1 (3 km southeast of Yakovlevo) and in cooperation with the 5th Guards. A and 1st Guards. TA destroys the enemy group that has broken through in the area: Pokrovka, Greznoye, Kochetovka, preventing its withdrawal to the south.

By the end of the day it reaches the line: Krasnaya Dubrava, elevation. 254.5, Yakovlevo, meaning to further advance in the southwest. direction.

Starting position at the turn: Polestnoye, Sentry, Small. Yablonovo - occupy by 24.00 07/11/43

Readiness to attack - 3.00 07/12/43

The start of an attack is an additional order.

3. 18 Tank Corps with 80 GMP, one 76-mm iptap, one 57-mm iptap, 10 iptabr - break enemy resistance at the line: Andreevka, grove, which is north-west. state farm "Komsomolets", and destroy the enemy in the area: Krasnaya Dubrava, Bol. Moyachki, Krasnaya Polyana, turning the front to the north, ensure the offensive actions of the army to the south.

4. 29 Tank Corps with 76 GMP, 1529 Sap - break enemy resistance at the line: Grove (which is 1 km north of the Komsomolets state farm). Destroy his group in the area of ​​Luchka, Bolshie Mayachki, Pokrovka.

By the end of July 12, 1943, reach the area of ​​Pokrovka and the groves of the west. and south Pokrovki, in the future be ready for actions to the south.

Before the attack begins, the corps is supported by 378 gaps.

5. 2nd Guards Ttk with 16 gmp, one 76-mm iptap, 10 ipeabr break the enemy’s resistance at the line: Yasnaya Polyana, Belenikhino, destroy his group in the Yakovlevo area and the forests to the east and be ready for an offensive to the south. direction.

8. Artillery

B) Tasks

a) a ten-minute fire raid along the front line in the area: Vasilyevka, Komsomolets state farm, Ivanovsky Vyselok, Belikhino;
b) five-minute methodical fire in the enemy’s depths;
c) a five-minute fire raid along the enemy’s front edge and depth (fire is opened on objects, in accordance with the requests and requirements of the corps commanders).

RS Group:

a) a fire salvo at the front edge of the enemy’s defense at the moment the enemy’s artillery bombardment begins;
b) the second salvo - at the front line targets, the end of the artillery bombardment.

The attack time was postponed several times and was finally set at 8.30:

To the commander of the 29th Tank Tank, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko

1. The task of the corps is the same...
2. Start of the attack - 8.30 July 12, 1943. Artillery preparation begins at 8.00.
3. I authorize the use of the radio from 7.00 on July 12, 1943. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov

2 SS tanks defeat the enemy in the south. Prokhorovka and thereby creates the preconditions for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:

Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take possession of the river valley. Psel attacked from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.

The “AG” division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, occupied Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the branch of the “Stalinskoe” state farm, etc. on the right flag. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of a threat from the river valley. Psel, together with MG units, captured Prokhorovka and height 252.4.

Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, occupy Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After capturing the right-flank units of the AG division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, move the main efforts in the direction of the heights of the southwest. Right-handed. Hold the new line of Ivanovka, the heights of the southwest. Right, height 2 km east. Sentry (lawsuit).

Progress of the battle

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17:00, he and Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.

At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers gained a significant advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west.

Very soon the battle formations were mixed. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.

One of the participants in this battle, Hero of the Soviet Union, Yevgeny Shkurdalov later recalled:

The battle formations were mixed up. From a direct hit from shells, the tanks exploded at full speed. The towers were torn off, the caterpillars flew to the sides. No individual shots were heard. There was a continuous roar. There were moments when in the smoke we distinguished our own and German tanks only by silhouettes. Tankers jumped out of burning vehicles and rolled on the ground, trying to put out the flames.

To the south of the main battle, the German tank group “Kempf” was advancing, which tried to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.

At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the “Totenkopf” division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.

By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

There are other versions of this battle.

Version based on the memoirs of German generals

Based on the memoirs of German generals (Guderian, Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 (some probably lagged behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles) Soviet tanks took part in the battle, of which about 270 were knocked out (meaning only morning fight on July 12th). Aviation did not take part in the battle; even reconnaissance aircraft did not fly from the German side. The collision of the tank masses was unexpected for both sides, since both tank groups were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy.

According to Rotmistrov’s recollections, his army had to break through the front and move to Kharkov (this is indirectly confirmed by the qualitative composition of the army, half consisting of light vehicles and almost no heavy ones) bypassing the German tank concentration, located, according to intelligence data, 70 km from Prokhorovka and “successfully attacked” at that moment by attack aircraft.

The groups moved towards each other not “head-on” but at a noticeable angle. The Germans were the first to notice the Soviet tanks and managed to reorganize and prepare for battle. The light and most of the medium vehicles attacked from the flank and forced Rotmistrov's tankers to pay full attention to themselves, who began to change the direction of the attack on the move. This caused inevitable confusion and allowed the Tiger company, supported by self-propelled guns and part of the medium tanks, to unexpectedly attack from the other side. Soviet tanks were caught in the crossfire, and only a few saw where the second attack was coming from.

The tank dump took place only in the direction of the first German attack; the “tigers” fired without interference, as if in a shooting range (some crews claimed up to 30 victories). It was not a fight but a beating.

Nevertheless, Soviet tank crews managed to disable a quarter of the German tanks. The corps was forced to stop for two days. By that time, counterattacks by Soviet troops had begun on the flanks of the German strike forces, and the further offensive of the corps was becoming futile. As at Borodino in 1812, tactical defeat ultimately became victory.

Other versions

Results

According to the research of A.V. Isaev:

The counterattack of Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area was an expected move for the Germans. Back in the spring of 1943, more than a month before the offensive, the option of repelling a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area was being worked out, and units of the II SS Panzer Corps knew very well what to do. Instead of moving to Oboyan, the SS divisions “Leibstandarte” and “Totenkopf” exposed themselves to the counterattack of P. A. Rotmistrov’s army. As a result, the planned flank counterattack degenerated into a head-on collision with large German tank forces. The 18th and 29th tank corps lost up to 70% of their tanks and were actually taken out of the game...

Despite this, the operation took place in a very tense situation, and only offensive, I emphasize, offensive actions of other fronts made it possible to avoid a catastrophic development of events.

However, the German offensive ended in failure, and the Germans did not undertake any more such large-scale attacks near Kursk.

According to German data, the battlefield remained behind them and they were able to evacuate most of the damaged tanks, some of which were subsequently restored and brought back into battle.

In addition to their own vehicles, the Germans also “stole” several Soviet ones. After Prokhorovka, the corps already had 12 thirty-fours. The losses of Soviet tank crews amounted to at least 270 vehicles (of which only two tanks were heavy) in the morning battle and a couple of dozen more during the day - according to the recollections of the Germans, small groups of Soviet tanks and even individual vehicles appeared on the battlefield until the evening. It was probably the stragglers on the march who were catching up.

However, having disabled a quarter of the enemy’s tanks (and given the qualitative balance of forces of the parties and the surprise of the attack, this was extremely difficult), the Soviet tankers forced him to stop and, ultimately, abandon the offensive.

According to the military archive of Germany, the 2nd SS Tank Tank lost 4,178 people from July 10 to July 16 (approximately 16% of its combat strength), including 755 killed, 3,351 wounded and 68 missing. In the battle on July 12, it lost: killed - 149 people, wounded - 660, missing - 33, total - 842 soldiers and officers. 3 Tank Corps lost 8,489 people from July 5 to July 20, of which approximately 2,790 people were lost on the approaches to Prokhorovka from July 12 to July 16. Based on the data provided, both corps (six tank and two infantry divisions) lost about 7 thousand soldiers and officers from July 10 to 16 in the battles near Prokhorovka. The ratio of human losses is about 6:1 in favor of the enemy. Depressing numbers. Especially considering that our troops defended themselves with superiority in forces and means over the advancing enemy. Unfortunately, the facts indicate that by July 1943, our troops had not yet fully mastered the science of winning with little bloodshed (Lopukhovsky).

According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV tanks and 2 Pz. III, in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

Summary data on losses of the 5th Guards. TA for July 12
Compound Personnel, total Irrevocable losses Source of losses Tanks and self-propelled guns in service Participated in battle Losses (burnt out / hit) Source of tank and self-propelled gun losses In service at 13.00 07/13/43
18 tk 471 271 TsAMO RF, f. 18 tk, op. 2, d. 5, l. 125 183 149 84 (35/49) TsAMO RF f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, d. 75, l. 32 33
29 tk 1991 1033 TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, no. 80, l. 7 215 199 153 (103/50) TsAMO RF f. 332, op. 4948, no. 46 51
2 tk 124 36 59 52 22 (11/11) TsAMO RF f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, d. 67, l. 12 l. 70 l. 203 44
2nd Guards tk 550 145 140 138 54 (29/25) TsAMO RF f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, d. 75, l. 20,28,34 80
5th Guards MK (at 18.00) 405 ? 158 66 15 (5/10) TsAMO RF f. 5th Guards TA, op. 4948, no. 70, l. 137 arr. 158
Availability of combat-ready tanks and assault guns in the 2nd SS Tank Tank on the evening of July 13, 1943.
Number, connection name Pz.II Pz.III 50/L42 Pz.III 50/L60 Pz.III 75 mm Pz.IV L24 Pz.IV L43 and L48 Pz.VI "Tiger" T-34 StuG Bef.Pz. III Total tanks and StuG
Td Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler" 4 - 5 - - 31 3 - 20 7 70
TD SS "Das Reich" - - 43 - - 20 1 11 24 8 107
TD SS "Totenkopf" - - 32 - 3 14 0 - 20 5 74
Total 2 tk SS 4 - 80 - 3 65 4 11 64 20 251

On July 12, 1943, Soviet troops repelled an attack by Nazi troops. In a wide field, near the village of Prokhorovka, two huge tank armies met, the total number of tanks exceeding 1,200 units. The battle lasted from morning to evening, and the Soviet troops won a difficult but confident victory.

This is how this battle is usually described in Soviet textbooks, and from there the description migrated to many Russian textbooks. What is most interesting is that there is not a word of untruth in the description itself. And what’s even more interesting is that if we take the meaning and not the individual words, we won’t find even a word of truth. Yes, the Soviet troops won, yes, the battle took place in the field, yes, the number of tanks exceeded 1,200 units, yes, all this is true, but... The Kursk Bulge was a section of the front curved towards the fascist troops, essentially a springboard for the Soviet army. Now let's figure out what a bridgehead is from the point of view of military science. The enemy can attack from 3 sides; defending a bridgehead is always very difficult, often completely impossible. That is, statically, strategically, the side with the bridgehead is at a disadvantage. But dynamically, tactically, it has a great advantage. It lies in the fact that you can attack from the bridgehead several points of the enemy’s defense, some even from the rear. In addition, the enemy must rearrange his formations in order to seize a bridgehead, since he cannot be ignored.


So, we have come to the correct and logical conclusion: the side with the bridgehead must either attack or mine the bridgehead and leave. Soviet troops did neither one nor the other. They decided to defend the Kursk Bulge, and, having exhausted the advancing German troops, defeat the enemy armies with a powerful counterattack, liberating a large territory from occupation. The Wehrmacht attack plan, in general terms, was known to the Soviet troops: the partisans intercepted it and handed it over to the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet defense consisted of three lines of trenches, bunkers and bunkers (long-term camouflaged firing points). The Germans were supposed to attack from the south and north. However, on July 4, the day before the offensive, an order came from Berlin: immediately send two panzer divisions (tank divisions) to Italy, where Mussolini’s troops suffered defeat after defeat from local units of the Italian Resistance. A light tank division was recalled from the northern direction of the attack, reinforced by a repair brigade (the way to Italy is long, and after 3-4 days a repair brigade was supposed to approach the attacking troops from another front) and a tank division (mainly PZ-IV) from the southern direction attacks. On the night of the 5th, Soviet troops conducted artillery shelling of German positions. They shot mainly at the bushes, the losses of the fascist troops were minimal, but the German officers realized that the Soviet troops knew about the upcoming offensive. Taking this into account, as well as the sending of two panzer divisions to Italy, many were inclined to postpone the offensive. However, early in the morning an order was received: to begin the offensive according to a pre-approved (known to the Soviet troops) plan.

The Germans assembled a little more than a thousand tanks on the Kursk Bulge (PZ-III, PZ-IV, PZ-V “Panther” and PZ-VI “Tiger”). PZ-I and PZ-II, which the Germans themselves called “cardboard boxes,” can be ignored. There were cases when a bullet from a machine gun, fired at point-blank range, pierced the frontal armor of this tank, killed the tank driver, pierced the armor of the tank from behind and killed a German infantryman running behind the tank. After sending two divisions to Italy, the Germans were left with approximately 1,000 tanks. All “Panthers”, numbering 250 units, were assembled in the northern direction into a separate tank corps. "Tigers", numbering 150, stood in the southern direction. About 600 PZ-III and PZ-IV and 50 “Elephants”, or, as they were otherwise called, “Ferdinads” were concentrated in approximately equal numbers on both directions of the offensive. It was assumed that the medium tanks of the northern corps would attack first. Three hours later, the southern corps is attacked, also with the forces of medium tanks PZ-III and PZ-IV. At this time, the “Panthers” march around the positions of the Soviet troops and hit them in the flank. And when the Soviet command decides that the main offensive is coming from the north, and the southern direction is just a diversionary maneuver, the SS panzer divisions will appear on the scene. In total, Germany had 4 panzer-SS divisions, three of them were stationed in the southern direction of the Kursk Bulge.

As a result of two armored divisions leaving for Italy, the offensive was later than planned and the northern and southern corps struck simultaneously. Many of the Panthers assembled near Kursk had recently come off the production line and had certain flaws. Since the repair crew had left, and the majority of the tankers had not driven such vehicles before, about 40 “Panthers” were unable to take part in the battle for technical reasons. Light tanks were supposed to go in front of the Panther corps, they were supposed to reconnoiter the road for the main strike force in the northern direction. The light tank division was also sent to Italy; there was not enough strength for the initial strike, let alone for reconnaissance. As a result, the Panthers stumbled upon a minefield, from 50 to 70 vehicles were disabled. After about 150 of the 250 vehicles remained, the command decided to abandon the plan of outflanking and attacking the flank with the Panthers; they were forced to attack the Soviet positions head-on. As a result, in the northern direction the Germans did not even take the first line of defense out of three. What happened in the south?

Since the division, consisting of PZ-IV, was sent to Italy, the Panzer-SS divisions had to not wait for the decisive moment, but attack openly from the very first day of the operation. In the southern direction, the attack of German troops was extremely successful; two lines of Soviet defense were broken, albeit with fierce fighting, albeit with heavy losses, but they were broken. The third line was still defending. If it had fallen, the division's panzers would have literally crushed the northern lines of defense, attacking them from the rear. The troops of the neighboring Soviet fronts, in particular Steppe, were noticeably weaker than the armies defending the Kursk Bulge; in addition, if successful here, the Germans were ready to attack along the entire front; it can be argued that victory in the Battle of Kursk would have confronted the Soviet troops with a difficult task . The Germans could advance on Moscow, attack Stalingrad, or simply move straight to Voronezh and Saratov, in order to cut the Volga there and create a defensive position in the rear of the Soviet troops.

On July 10, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Soviet troops. The units defending the third line of northern defense were removed and hastily thrown to the south. The Germans in the south initially attacked in the area of ​​​​the town of Oboyan, then transferred the main attack to the Soviet defense section passing through the Psel River. It was here on July 12 that two Soviet armies, the 5th Tank and the 5th Combined Arms Guards, attacked three German Panzer-SS divisions. The Soviet tank army, according to its staff, consisted of 4 divisions. Each division has 200 tanks. The combined arms army also had a tank division. In total, taking into account the forces defending the area near Prokhorovka, the USSR concentrated about 1,200 tanks on this section of the front. That is why all textbooks say that MORE than 1200 units of equipment took part in the battle - 1200 from the Soviet Union plus tanks from the Wehrmacht. Let's figure out how many tanks the Germans had.

The German panzer division consists of 10 companies, which are united into 3 battalions (three companies each) and a separate company. The first battalion consisted of light PZ-I and PZ-II and performed mainly reconnaissance functions. The second and third battalions formed the main striking force (PZ-III and PZ-IV). The 10th separate company was equipped with “panthers” and “tigers”. Each company had 10 units of equipment, for a total of 120 tanks per division. Panzer-SS divisions consisted of 150 tanks. According to reports from German officers, by July 12, on the eighth day of the offensive, between 30% and 50% of the personnel and equipment remained in the troops. In total, by the time the battle of Prokhorovka began, the Panzer-SS corps consisted of about 180 tanks. This is approximately 6.5 times less than the number of Soviet tanks.

If the Great Tank Battle had taken place in an open field, then the fully equipped Panzer-SS divisions would not have stood up to the number of Soviet tanks, but the fact is that the place of the battle, which took place between the village of Prokhorovka and the Udarnik collective farm, was limited, on the one hand, by a bend of the Psel River, and with another railway embankment. The width of the field was from 6 to 8 kilometers. According to military science, the distance between advancing tanks should be about 100 meters. When reduced by half, the effectiveness of the offensive increases by one and a half times, and losses by three. The battlefield was not only narrow, but also indented by ravines and streams. Therefore, we can safely say that no more than 150 units of equipment took part in the battle at the same time. Despite the enormous numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, the battle was fought almost one-on-one. The difference was that the reserves of the Wehrmacht, unlike the reserves of the Headquarters, were very limited.

On the German side, only three panzer-SS divisions took part in the battle (there were 4 such divisions in total): “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, “Das Reich” and “Totencopf” (“Death’s Head”). The battle lasted from morning to evening, Soviet troops lost about 900 tanks, the Panzer-SS Corps about 150, 6 times less. In the evening, the 30 remaining German tanks, seeing the hopelessness of further battle, retreated. 300 Soviet tanks did not dare to pursue them.

Thus ended the Great Tank Battle.

The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve “Prokhorovskoe Field” was opened on the site of the legendary tank battle of the Great Patriotic War, which became the greatest battle of armor and shells in the entire history of mankind. About a thousand tanks and self-propelled guns converged here on a relatively small area of ​​flat Central Russian land. And today, traces of those battles are found here every day: the ground is filled with burnt metal.

TANKS ROOMED ACROSS THE FIELD...

The Battle of Prokhorovka is considered one of the largest battles in military history using armored forces.

Prokhorovka would have remained an ordinary village in the Russian outback if an event had not occurred here that some historians consider decisive in the entire Second World War.

On July 12, 1943, during the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in World War II - and in all of world history - took place. Up to 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

In the history of the country, Prokhorovskoye Field is called the Third Military Field of Russia, along with Kulikov and Borodino.

The Battle of Prokhorov unfolded in the southern section of the Kursk Bulge, where the German command decided to direct the main attack. The Germans launched their best forces on the offensive: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which included the elite divisions “Totenkopf”, “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” and “Reich”. An armored wedge consisting of up to 300 tanks and assault guns broke through two lines of fortifications of the Soviet troops and reached the third, which was created 10 km southwest of the Prokhorovka station (in parallel, the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was developed by other German units: to the west and east of the Prokhorovka direction , which created a threat of encirclement - it was necessary to hurry).

On July 11, the enemy managed to break the defenses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 183rd Rifle Division of the Red Army and approached the outskirts

Prokhorovka. At the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops stopped the Germans. A situation arose when the outcome of a grandiose battle was decided not by hours, but by minutes. The Soviet command decided to carry out a powerful counterattack and destroy the enemy troops wedged into the defense. It was decided to strike on the morning of July 12 by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov (1901-1982). The army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps. In total - more than 700 tanks and self-propelled artillery self-propelled guns.

At 08:30 on July 12, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, a counterattack was launched, after which the tank formations moved towards each other. The battle took place on a small - for such an incredible number of tanks and self-propelled guns - area, 3 to 8 km wide, between the railway and the bend of the Psel River.

The armor of Soviet tanks was not as powerful as that of German ones, but they wedged themselves into the battle formations of German troops, gaining an advantage due to speed and maneuverability, and shot the enemy at close range into the side armor. The short-range battle deprived the Germans of the opportunity to take advantage of powerful guns. As a result, the battle formations were mixed, and tank duels began.

Towards evening, the “Totenkopf” division, having received the support of aviation and artillery, managed to break through the defenses of the Soviet rifle units. The Germans did this at the cost of huge losses, which weakened their combat capabilities. The offensive ran out of steam.

On July 16, the German army stopped the attack and began to retreat towards Belgorod, while Soviet troops pursued the retreaters.

The result of the tank battle near Prokhorovka was the failure of the German plan on the Kursk Bulge “Citadel” and significant losses of the tank forces of the German army. The tank battle near Prokhorovka was the prologue to the defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943), which became a turning point in the entire Second World War.

The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoe Field" is located in the north of the Belgorod region, not far from the sources of the Psel River, and is an area with memorial buildings and monuments, the main one being the Victory Monument "Belfry".

QUIET FIELD

There is silence over the Prokhorovsky field, as befits a place where thousands of soldiers fell. And it’s hard to believe that relatively recently tank armies fought here in mortal combat.

On April 26, 1995, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the President of the Russian Federation signed a Decree “On the creation of the State Military Historical Museum-Reserve “Prokhorovskoe Field”” “in order to perpetuate the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland in the Battle of Kursk arc and in connection with the completion of the creation of the Prokhorovsky Field museum and memorial complex.”

In 2010, a museum complex with a cultural and historical center “The Third Military Field of Russia “Prokhorovskoe Field”” was opened.

In the center of the square in front of the museum there is a sculptural and artistic composition “Tank Battle of Prokhorovka. Ram". The composition is very emotional, as the veterans said, fully conveying the intensity of the battle.

There is a Memory Candle on the square in front of the museum. At the entrance to the museum there are six steles - a kind of stone book about the Battle of Kursk.

In the museum itself, in the center of the hall dedicated directly to the battle of Prokhorova, an authentic T-34 tank froze.

Behind the museum building, fragments of Soviet and German defensive fortifications have been recreated: dugouts, trenches, trenches, communication passages, observation posts, artillery platforms and tank shelters. The museum forms a single architectural ensemble with the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, built with public donations. The temple was opened in 1995 in memory of those killed at Prokhorovka and on the 50th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The names of 7,382 soldiers who died on this land are inscribed on the walls of the temple.

On the Day of the Battle of Prokhorovka, celebrated annually, services are held in the Church of Peter and Paul in memory of the fallen soldiers.

The center of the museum complex is the Victory Monument “Belfry”. It is a stylized old Russian belfry, which was placed two kilometers from the outskirts of Prokhorovka, at an altitude of 252.2, where the epicenter of the Prokhorovka tank battle was located. It was also opened for the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War in 1995.

The walls of the Belfry are four white marble pylons separated from each other, symbolizing the four years of war. At the top of the “Belfry” on a copper plate are fixed words from the Bible in Church Slavonic: “There is no one who sows greater love, but whoever lays down his life for his friends” (There is no greater love than to lay down your life for your friends). The alarm bell of the Belfry sounds every 20 minutes - three times an hour: the first time - about the heroes of the Kulikovo Field, the second - about the soldiers of Borodin, the third - in memory of the Battle of Prokhorov.

Next to the Belfry, episodes of the beginning of the attack of the tank company of the 5th Guards Tank Army are recreated. Every year on July 12, the day of the tank battle near Prokhorovka, a rally of many thousands takes place at the Belfry. The urban village of Prokhorovka, located next to the museum, has been known since the 17th century, although under different names. Currently, it is the administrative center of the Prokhorovsky district of the Belgorod region of Russia. This is a fairly large settlement with a population of about 10 thousand people. and several industrial enterprises.

FUN FACTS

■ In the old days, the village was called the Ilyinskaya settlement after its founder, the Polish nobleman Kirill Ilyinsky (Korchak). In the 1860s. was renamed in honor of the reigning Emperor Alexander II into the village of Aleksandrovskoye. In the 1880s near the village a line of the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov Railway was laid and the Prokhorovka station was built, named after the track engineer V.I. Prokhorov, who supervised the construction. Later, the village itself began to be called by the name of the station.

■ From the side of the German troops, medium tanks T-IV modifications G and H (hull armor thickness - 80 mm, turret - 50 mm), as well as heavy tanks T-VIE "Tiger" (hull armor thickness - 100 mm, turret - 110 mm). Both tanks were armed with long-barreled cannons of 75 and 88 mm caliber, which penetrated the armor of Soviet tanks almost anywhere at a distance of over 500 m. The only exception was the IS-2 heavy tank.

■ The Soviet T-34 tanks that took part in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in speed and maneuverability. And because of this, the Germans regularly used captured T-34s. In the battle of Prokhorovka, 8 such vehicles took part in the SS Panzer Division “Das Reich”.

■ In the battles near Prokhorovka on July 11, senior sergeant of the 2nd Tank Corps M.F. Borisov distinguished himself, knocking out seven enemy tanks with his gun and being awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for this feat.

■ Externally, the building of the museum “The Third Military Field of Russia” resembles a semicircle (symbolizing the Kursk Bulge), the main facade of the building is made in the form of tank tracks, and the ends are in the form of tank armor.

■ The celebration of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, in whose honor the church in Prokhorovka was named, falls on July 12 - the day of the famous battle.

■ Belfry - in Old Russian architecture - a building for hanging bells, usually located near the church. Can also denote a particularly memorable place.

■ At the foot of the Belfry there is a monument to the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov (1939-2006), its main author. According to the creators of the monument, the sculptor examines the result of his work.

ATTRACTIONS

■ Museum complex “The Third Military Field of Russia” (2010).
■ Victory Monument “Belfry” (1995).
■ Temple of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul (1995).
■ Monument “Candle of Memory”.
■ Sculptural composition “Great commanders of the three military fields of Russia - Dmitry Donskoy, Mikhail Kutuzov, Georgy Zhukov” (2008).
■ Exhibition of armored vehicles from the Great Patriotic War.
■ Bell of the Unity of Slavic Peoples (2000).
■ Monument to sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov, the main author of the Belfry.

NUMBERS

Forces of participants in the battle of Prokhorovka: USSR (5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov) - 699 (according to other data 714) tanks and 21 self-propelled guns, Germany (2nd Tank Corps of SS Oberstgruppen-Führer Paul Hausser) - 232 tanks and 70 self-propelled guns .
Losses of the parties: USSR - about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, Germany - about 100 tanks and assault guns.
Strengths of the parties in the Battle of Kursk: USSR - about 2 million people, about 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3,500 aircraft, up to 30 thousand guns and mortars, Germany - about 850 thousand people, more than 2,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 2,000 aircraft and up to 8,000 guns.
Museum complex “Third Military Field of Russia”: total area - 5000 m2.
Total number of museum exhibits: about 20,000.
Victory Monument "Belfry": height - 59 m, weight of the alarm bell - 3.5 tons, height of the dome figure of the Virgin Mary at the top of the Belfry - 7 m.
Distance: 56 km from Belgorod.

Atlas. The whole world is in your hands #282

Last May, I very actively traveled to places associated with tragic events. I managed to talk about some of them on the blog, but not yet about others. Why? Well, firstly, this topic is very difficult for me to write, both morally and technically, and secondly, many citizens of the Russian Federation remember the Second World War only when Victory Day and related weekends approach. And during the year they try not to bother themselves with patriotism and terrible details of military operations. Accordingly, there is no interest and then simply no one reads the posts, and the statistics do not show even half of the average views for my blog. It is for these two reasons that quite a lot of photographic material lay on the hard drive for almost a year. But spring is in full swing, many will go on various trips during the May holidays and, perhaps, even stop somewhere along the way to honor the memory of soldiers and officers who fell in battle. For example, in Prokhorovka, where on July 12, 1943, during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk, one of the largest battles in military history using armored forces took place.

In this post I will give an overview of what you can see in Prokhorovka, where to stay the night, eat, and so on. And, of course, as briefly as possible (after all, May 9 is still far away) I’ll tell you about the meat grinder that happened here in the summer of 1943.


So, north, urban-type settlement Prokhorovka. In fairness, it is worth noting that the famous tank battle took place at the Prokhorovka railway station, named after the track engineer V.I. Prokhorov, and located a little to the side. Until 1968, this settlement was called the village of Aleksandrovskoye. In the post-war years, it grew and included the very Prokhorovka station, which became the western part of the village.

02 . There are no hotels in Prokhorovka other than the one you see in the photo below, so I recommend booking rooms in advance through the website of the Prokhorovskoye Pole hotel complex. The hotel is not bad, especially for a provincial one. The only bad thing is the organization of meals for guests. Breakfast is extremely slow, and we didn’t get to have dinner at all, because the hotel restaurant closes very early. We wanted to take a walk at sunset. However, catering is bad everywhere in Prokhorovka. More than 9 thousand people live in the village, there is a sports complex, a cinema, an elevator, factories, but there is nowhere to eat. We raided three cafes that the hotel administrator recommended to us, and as a result, one was hosting a wedding, another served only beer and snacks, and the third was completely closed. Therefore, we had to improvise in the room ourselves. We had a three-year-old daughter with us, who didn’t really want to feed sandwiches at night.

03 . Near the hotel parking lot there is a sculptural group “Tankman and Infantryman”. It is clear that the role of infantry in a tank duel was the most unenviable and essentially suicidal.

04 . Almost opposite the hotel complex there is a huge building of the Museum of Military Glory “The Third Military Field of Russia”.

05 . The building was opened on May 2, 2010. Outwardly, it resembles an arc, lined with gray granite, and the main façade, as conceived by the architect, imitates tank tracks.

06 . A sculptural composition that struck me to the core. Two Soviet and three life-size German tanks collided in a powerful ram. They write on the Internet that you can climb into one of the tanks and see a defeated fascist there, but they open this door, as I understand it, only for large organized groups.

06 . Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the Battle of Prokhorovka. 800 Soviet and 700 German. Some modern historians claim that there were fewer tanks, but looking at this monument, I can’t even imagine what kind of hell was going on here then.

07 . To the right of the museum building is the rather unusual Church of Peter and Paul.

08 . Remake. Built for the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory.

09 . In the courtyard there is also a small St. Nicholas Church, etc. "Bell of Unity" This is a monument erected as a symbol of the unity of three Slavic peoples: Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Opened on the anniversary of the 55th Victory Day. Patriarch Alexy II, Putin, Kuchma and Lukashenko were present at the opening.

10 . By evening light we drove from the village, actually, to the battlefield. Now bread grows on it every day, but how much blood it once absorbed...

11. The height of 252.2 is marked by a belfry.

12. The height of the belfry itself is 59 meters. Inside, under the dome, there is an alarm bell weighing 3.5 tons, and on 4 wall pylons there are 24 high reliefs with 130 images. I am specially publishing photos in large size so that you can appreciate this work of art and the main monument of the entire Prokhorovskoe Field memorial complex.

13 . A little further away they erected a monument to one of its creators - sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov. He died in 2006

14 . Nearby is another sculptural group - "Great commanders of the three military fields of Russia - Dmitry Donskoy, Mikhail Kutuzov, Georgy Zhukov."

15 . And, of course, tanks.

16 . More precisely, tanks, Katyushas, ​​guns and other military equipment from the times of the Great Patriotic War.

17 . T-34-85 and my favorite Vikushonok.

18 . The next morning we continued our exploration of Prokhorovka. We had breakfast, checked out of the hotel and went to the museum.

19 . But first they walked around him in a circle. Behind the building there was a rather interesting exhibition showing a fragment of the defense line: trenches and enemy equipment in positions.

20 . Almost all of the German equipment was melted down in the post-war years, so the German tank is represented only by a turret on a stand.

21 . Shortly before our arrival, next to the museum, another monument was opened for the 70th anniversary of the Victory, called “Tank Landing”. Work was in full swing around it to improve the territory (we were in Prokhorovka on May 1) and by the ninth there was still a lot to be done.

22 . Work also took place at another exhibition site of military equipment, where 12 of the most significant vehicles in the history of armored vehicles were presented, through which one can trace the main stages of the development of armored vehicles and tank weapons. In addition, on May 9, the opening of a tankodrome with an obstacle course, stands for spectators with 1,300 seats, and other things was supposed to take place. It’s a pity that we weren’t able to see the tank show, but it will give us a reason to come back someday.

23 . In general, then we go to inspect the museum exhibition. It is huge and perhaps I will talk about it in a separate post, but now just a couple of fragments. An excellent interactive map of attractions in the Belgorod region. It can be seen that now the belfry and the Cathedral of Peter and Paul are highlighted on it, but if you turn on another area on the multimedia screen next to the map, then other objects will be highlighted, and you can read general information on the monitor. Very cool, in my opinion.

24 . I note that everything in the museum is very modern and interactive. There is no typical museum “mothball” feel, if you know what I mean.

25 . Although not without some complications, as it turned out. In front of me, one of the spectators puzzled the guide with a question about some discrepancy between a detail of the soldier’s uniform (I don’t remember what exactly) and the 1943 uniform. The woman was embarrassed and said that the stands were made and decorated by some Moscow office and in a very fast manner, so there may be slight discrepancies.

26. And finally, let’s return to the topic of public catering in Prokhorovka. Not far from the belfry there is a rather interesting themed cafe "Blindage". In general, I give the establishment a "test" (a wooden jukebox with songs from the war years and artillery shell casings as vases for wild flowers - that's five!), but in the evening of the first day it was already closed, and at lunchtime on the second day almost the entire ration was eaten.

27 . In particular, there was not enough foie gras potatoes. The last portion was grabbed for our daughter (the cook scraped the bottom of the barrel for the little girl), and Lena and I took the less popular millet for ourselves. I note that landscaping work was also going on around the “Dugout” and it is quite possible that another cafe appeared nearby. At least on Wikimapia there is a mark of the Prival cafe, so I hope that people who, on my advice, go to Prokhorovka will not remain hungry.

28 . After lunch we went to see the observation post of the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov. It was from here that the command of the Prokhorovsky battle was exercised. Alas, there was a lock on the door and we had to limit ourselves to only an external inspection. After that, our program had a wonderful